Scientists Just Announced TERRIFYING Truth About the Oceangate Submarine!

The arrogance and the hubris that sent that ship to its doom is exactly the same thing that sent those people in that sub to their fate. Prior to the Titan disaster on June 18th, there had been no recorded casualties among those piloting or riding submersibles on deep diving expeditions, as this exceptional safety record endured for nearly a century, even with explorers conducting thousands of dives. Federal investigators have indicated that it might take them as long as 18 months to ascertain the cause behind Titan's implosion, which claimed the lives of its five occupants. However, some engineers have highlighted potential vulnerabilities in the sub's design, revealing the truth about the reasons the submarine imploded. And let me tell you, they're terrifying to say the least. Following the catastrophic implosion of the Ocean Gate Titan submarine that claimed the lives of five people, scrutiny is now being directed towards CEO Stockton Rush and his actions. Rush was one of the passengers on board the Titan during its ill-fated dive to the Titanic wreck off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. The submersible lost contact with its mothership, Polar Prince, within the first two hours of the descent to the wreck, situated at a depth of 12,500 feet below sea level. In the weeks since the tragic incident, a lot of information has emerged about Rush and his company. Tragically, the incident led to the loss of not only Rush, but also British billionaire explorer Hamish Harding, 58, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood, 48, along with his son, Suleiman Dawood, 19, and French Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargiolet, 77. One significant revelation pertains to Rush's character, as it is reported that he struggled with accepting criticism, portraying himself as an innovator, gifted with substantial self-assurance in his pursuit of ambitious ventures aimed at introducing novel and captivating contributions to the world. Several experts and engineers have shared insights with the NYT regarding potential vulnerabilities in the design of the Titan submersible that could have led to its tragic implosion. Oceangate opted to construct the majority of Titan's hull using carbon fiber, a departure from the more commonly used titanium in other submersibles, and this decision, according to experts, served to save costs and reduce overall weight, but also introduced an element of risk. Tim Fuka, a retired forensic metallurgist with extensive experience in mechanical testing and failure analysis of metals and carbon fiber, pointed out that this choice wasn't optimal given the primary forces encountered by the submersible during its prolonged descent, which predominantly involve compression. For example, titanium possesses considerable strength in both compression and tension, enabling it to endure both crushing and pulling forces. On the other hand, carbon fiber exhibits greater resistance against pulling forces as opposed to compression, and it can withstand pulling for a certain duration before giving way, but is prone to collapsing or buckling under pressure or compression. Fuka also highlighted that the changes in hull geometry, transitioning from a compact sphere to an elongated tube, might have played a role as well. A larger hull demands greater strength to endure the same level of pressure as a smaller one, and in cases where two hulls have equivalent thickness, the larger one, he noted, would be more likely to collapse or buckle under the pressure. Even before the ill-fated voyage to the depths of the Atlantic, Rush was already facing criticism. One method frequently employed by influential and affluent individuals to silence their critics is known as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, SLAPP. This legal action is initiated or even just threatened, not with the intention of upholding any rights, but to suppress the target by imposing the significant costs and burdens of legal proceedings. The objective of a SLAPP is not to secure a victory in court, it doesn't concern itself with matters of right or wrong, but instead, its purpose lies in entangling the target in prolonged legal processes, steadily increasing their financial burden, wherein the process itself becomes the punishment. This tactic is often wielded by politicians as a means to retaliate against rivals or journalists for unflattering remarks, or by businesses seeking to stifle public discourse about their practices. Regrettably, it's also been used by sexual predators to intimidate their victims into silence, and entrepreneurs have employed it to suppress scrutiny of their claimed contributions. Many individuals attempted to warn Stockton Rush that he was courting disaster, and Carl Stanley, a friend of Rush and an expert in submersibles, reported hearing a cracking sound during a dive on the Titan. He advised him, suggesting thorough testing of the carbon fiber hull. Allegedly, Rush responded by saying, keep your opinions to yourself, and I hope you, of all people, will think twice before expressing opinions on subjects in which you are not fully versed. I have to admit, the irony is real with this one. Expedition leader and former Oceangate advisor Rob McCallum also voiced his apprehensions. Rush's reaction to this was that they had heard the cries of the advisors that they were going to kill someone, and that he was insulted by them. In a subsequent communication, which now carries an eerie weight in light of the tragedy, Rush called McCallum, and he recounted feeling threatened by Rush, who warned of legal action if he spoke critically about Oceangate to others. Even an employee within Oceangate expressed concern about the dangerous trajectory of the expedition. However, they were met with a slap themselves, pun not intended. David Lockridge, once Oceangate's director of marine operations and chief submersible pilot, harbored significant reservations about the Titan's safety, and after the company dismissed his concerns, he authored a comprehensive inspection report detailing the vessel's shortcomings, and as a consequence, he was terminated from his position. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, informed Oceangate that it was investigating Lockridge's termination as a whistleblower protection matter, and subsequently, matters took an even more contentious turn. Rush and Oceangate hired the services of Thomas Gilman, a Washington attorney, who issued a threat to Lockridge. The ultimatum stated that unless he retracted his OSHA complaint and covered the company's legal fees, Oceangate would pursue legal action, tarnish his professional standing, and accuse him of immigration fraud, and this threat proved to be far from idle. After enduring significant financial and emotional distress, Lockridge ultimately settled with Oceangate, and in an attempt to persuade the company to ease their campaign against him, Lockridge withdrew his OSHA complaint and was compelled into silence regarding the safety concerns surrounding the Titan. Oceangate's recent move to delete all of its social media accounts appears to be an attempt to erase its online presence, and as of now, 32 states, along with Washington, D.C., have enacted varying degrees of anti-SLAPP laws, allowing defendants to swiftly dismiss such lawsuits and requiring those who initiated the SLAPP to cover their legal expenses. Regrettably, this protective measure was not in place when Lockridge faced the SLAPP from Oceangate, and Washington State's Supreme Court deemed its anti-SLAPP law unconstitutional in 2015, and it wasn't until 2021 that the legislature passed a revised law. Given that most federal courts do not enforce a state's anti-SLAPP law, these laws can be easily circumvented by filing in federal court. Despite proposals in every Congress since 2009, there is currently no federal anti-SLAPP law on the horizon. Russia's ambition to offer passengers a journey to witness the Titanic's remains in a vessel that had only undergone real-world tests drew criticism from a member of the Marine Technology Society, MTS, an organization established in 1963 to advocate for the safe utilization of technology in both surface and subsurface crafts. In a letter dated March 27th, 2018, Will Conan, chairman of the MTS Peer Review Group Committee on Manned Submersibles, urged Rush to consider conducting prototype testing, even if it meant incurring additional time and expense. Conan expressed concern that Oceangate's current experimental approach might lead to outcomes ranging from minor mishaps to catastrophic incidents, with far-reaching consequences for the entire industry. Similar to Edward Smith, the ill-fated captain of the Titanic, Rush also met his end along with his vessel, and as James Cameron pointed out, both tragedies might have been averted if each captain had paid heed to the warnings they were given in advance. In Smith's case, he chose to ignore telegrams from other ships cautioning about impending icebergs earlier in the day, and instead of slowing down, he commanded full steam ahead, leading to the tragic loss of over 1,500 lives. Similarly, Rush dismissed the concerns raised by his company's director of marine operations, who highlighted significant flaws in the Titan's construction. In response, Rush chose to terminate him. Furthermore, Rush disregarded the advice of industry experts and members of the deep-sea diving community, asserting that their safety regulations were overly strict and hindered progress. The Titanic disaster bears resemblance to a second historical disaster, the demise of British explorer Robert Falcon Scott. Scott lost his life a month before the Titanic's sinking while attempting to become the first person to reach the South Pole, and much like Scott, Rush's expedition was poorly equipped and inadequately managed, as he also failed to listen to more seasoned explorers. Future disaster prevention measures are on the horizon, with some already proposed. Charles Haas, the head of the Titanic Historical Society, advocates for a prohibition on tourist submersibles accessing the Titanic wreckage, and while I acknowledge and agree with his perspective, the focal point should not be solely on who explores the Titanic, but rather the manner in which they do so. Diving activities should only be permitted under conditions where the safety of the crew and passengers is paramount. Rush's fixation on his submersible's flawed design caused him to overlook a crucial principle, ensuring the safety of his crew. In his relentless pursuit of innovation, he failed to prioritize the well-being of both himself and his passengers. The way forward necessitates heightened oversight. Currently, regulating deep-sea exploration in international waters poses challenges, but nevertheless, entities such as the United Nations International Maritime Organization hold the potential to take action in order to avert future disasters of this nature. This tragedy underscores the vital lesson of prioritizing risk management and safety measures. In our fervor for innovation and progress, potential risks are sometimes overlooked or underestimated. The 21st century, marked by rapid technological advancements, emphasizes that a thorough risk assessment and robust safety measures are not optional but imperative. Furthermore, businesses must cultivate an open culture where safety concerns can be raised and addressed without fear of repercussion. Regular safety audits and well-rehearsed contingency plans are imperative. Effective and transparent communication, both internally and externally, is also pivotal, particularly in complex business structures. The Titan incident reveals the importance of leadership accountability as the leadership at Ocean Gate failed to provide the necessary guidance and oversight to avert such a disaster. Leaders in the 21st century must strike a balance between ambition and caution, risk-taking and safety. They should foster an environment of openness, learning and responsibility where issues are proactively addressed and failures are seen as opportunities for improvement. Then, the ecological fallout from the Titan disaster serves as a stark reminder of our collective responsibility towards the environment. In our pursuit of progress, we cannot afford to ignore the ecological footprints we leave behind. Modern businesses must adopt a sustainable approach that considers environmental and social responsibilities. Corporate social responsibility and environmental, social and governance criteria are now integral to a company's strategic framework. This tragedy should be a wake-up call for 21st century businesses, highlighting the importance of robust risk management, effective communication, responsible leadership and sustainability. While pushing the boundaries of innovation, it's crucial to remember that progress should not compromise safety, transparency or our environmental responsibilities. The lessons from this tragedy should serve as guiding principles for businesses navigating the complex and fast-paced waters of the 21st century. The Ocean Gate disaster will have a profound effect on the engineers working for that company as well. We could nitpick their decisions all day, but at the end of the day, this is a failure of leadership and or management. Lockheed hires interns and freshmen all the time, but they don't expect them to design and field airframes with no oversight. Will it affect their job search? Probably, but they'll be fine, as there will be many companies with the same mindset as mine. There will be many who want to avoid the potential negative PR, and there will be many who are unsure. Even if it closes a few specific doors at specific companies, there are plenty of others to choose from because humanity and the industry in general will always need engineers. As to what it means for the future of engineering, not much. This kind of thing happens all the time, maybe not in this particular industry and not this dramatically and publicly, but engineering failures, including those that kill people, are unfortunately a fact of life and unavoidable in a general sense. Not saying this specific tragedy was unavoidable, but more that there will be future failures that come from similar mindsets like arrogance or inexperience. The only consolation is that every engineering catastrophe teaches lessons that future engineers can benefit from to protect their lives. I don't expect any drastic changes to engineering cultures, as this is sadly just another tragedy in an already exceedingly long list of them. Take a moment, learn what you can, try not to make the same mistakes, and move on, same as it's always been. This tragedy is a great example of why ideas are worth nothing and engineering and commercialization are far bigger than anyone thinks. Stockton Rush has clearly demonstrated how important the final details of taking a design from MVP to commercialization are. OceanGate had a great prototype, but clearly it was not proven technology. Controversy around the design limits and post-dive inspection ultrasonic testing versus destructive testing occurred during the development. The design should be rated at 50% below the working limits and then verified using destructive testing after 50 or 60 pressure cycles. The problem is that creating a 400 plus bar test facility at scale is incredibly prohibitive. Using carbon fiber in a compressive stress environment seems a bit out of the box. When dealing with subsea tool manufacturing, it's crucial to approach new ideas with a rigorous engineering mindset. Simply having a concept isn't enough. It's essential to demonstrate that a tool can operate reliably hundreds of times without any failures. Afterward, the focus should shift to the intricate processes of manufacturing and thorough testing. It's worth noting that the prototype phase typically accounts for only about 10% of the overall costs associated with commercializing a product. This perspective emphasizes that an idea's value is relatively low without the necessary validation and investment, a particularly critical consideration when human lives are at stake. I believe this also applies to software. Building a prototype is pretty trivial these days, but making it robust from a usability and security perspective is the large underwater end of the iceberg. OceanGate has yet to unveil its future plans, but it's evident that the company will need to implement substantial changes. The incident has underscored the hazards of deep sea exploration, prompting OceanGate to take measures to mitigate these risks. The trajectory of OceanGate and the wider deep sea exploration sector remains uncertain. Prioritizing the safety of crew members is paramount, necessitating significant adjustments. Striking a balance between safety and innovation is crucial. The industry must find a way to self-regulate without stifling progress. Only time will unveil the path ahead for OceanGate and the deep sea exploration domain. Nevertheless, one fact is certain. The Titan incident has permanently altered the landscape of this industry. This story is not only a nightmare, but also a lesson about how much money really matters. Yes, you can buy yourself a trip to the bottom of the Atlantic, and if all goes well, you'll have a cool experience. But if things go wrong, it becomes completely irrelevant whether you're a billionaire or not. And these people have clearly experienced the worst nightmare a human being can have. They have learned the hard way that many things can be bought, but there are crucial exceptions. May they rest in peace, and may this kind of tragedy never happen again. Thank you for watching this video. Make sure to like and subscribe, and let us know your thoughts and opinions in the comments below.