Pilot's Arrogant Mistakes Get 152 People Killed!
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A commercial airliner was moments away from landing when the pilot flying the plane made
several arrogant mistakes and ended up getting 152 people killed.
But the truth is that you probably didn't hear much about this because the investigation
that followed would turn out to be one of the worst in modern aviation history.
And that's why I'm going to share with you what went wrong during this flight and the
arrogant mistakes that got everyone killed.
I'm Hoover and welcome to your pilot debrief.
This is the captain that was flying the plane.
He was 61 years old and had over 25,000 hours of total flight time, including over a thousand
hours in the Airbus A321 that he was flying on the day of the crash.
He had previously flown for Pakistan International Airlines, but he left after he reached their
mandatory retirement age of 60.
And that's when he joined AirBlue since their retirement age was 65.
During the investigation, they discovered that about two months prior to the crash,
he was admitted to the hospital with diabetes and heart problems.
Despite the health issues and the fact that local regulations barred pilots from flying
if they had diabetes, he somehow passed his annual medical exam two weeks before the crash
and was cleared to fly.
Sitting in the right seat was the first officer who was only 34 years old and had about 1,800
hours of total flight time, but only 286 hours flying the A321.
He was the pilot monitoring for the flight, and that meant it was his job to verify what
the captain was doing and back him up throughout the flight.
However, because there was a significant age and experience difference between the two
pilots, he probably assumed that the captain knew what he was doing and he was a little
reluctant to question him.
That's why it was so important in this situation for the captain to speak up and set the tone
for the flight.
Something as simple as, hey, I know I might have a lot of hours, but I don't know everything
and I've never had a perfect flight.
So if you think that I'm doing something wrong or if I missed something, just let me know.
That would have immediately put the first officer at ease.
Unfortunately, the exact opposite happened.
Now we don't know what was said because the investigation never released the full cockpit
voice recorder transcript.
Instead, they provided a summary that said during the initial climb to their cruising
altitude, the captain tested the knowledge of the first officer and used harsh words
and a snobbish tone.
The question and answer session continued for about an hour after takeoff and included
humiliating lectures by the captain.
Keep in mind that this wasn't a training flight, so the questions probably caught the first
officer off guard, but also the captain wasn't an instructor and this appeared to be more
of an attempt by the captain to overcompensate and show how smart and experienced he was.
This was a huge arrogant mistake because it created a very toxic environment in the cockpit.
The investigation didn't interview any other pilots that had flown with this captain, but
my guess is that this was very typical of his behavior on most flights.
Unfortunately, as a result, after the hour-long lecture, the first officer lost confidence
and generally remained quiet for the rest of the flight, while also becoming submissive
and failing to challenge the captain for any of his mistakes or violations of established
procedures.
As they continued the flight, the mood became more tense, but things were about to get a
whole lot worse because of the approach they needed to fly.
When the flight was about an hour away from landing, the pilots discovered that heavy
rain and low clouds had reduced the visibility around the airport to just a few miles, but
the bigger issue was that the airport only had one runway and strong surface winds were
forcing pilots to land to the southeast using Runway 12.
The reason this is a problem is because there are a lot of mountains to the north of the
airfield, so Runway 12 didn't have an instrument approach procedure.
Instead, the pilots needed to fly the instrument approach to Runway 30, and then once they
got below the weather and had the runway environment in sight, they would visually maneuver north
of the field for a left downwind to turn around and land on Runway 12.
This is called a circling approach, which is not something that pilots do on a regular
basis, which is why the crew needed to take the time to review the approach and understand
how the procedure works.
If you look at the ILS approach to Runway 30, you'll see that the circling minimums
are 2,510 feet, and that means the pilots can't go any lower than that when they are
maneuvering around to land on Runway 12.
However, this approach doesn't tell you specifically how to circle to land.
That's why the pilots needed to review their flight crew operations manual, which included
this diagram that provided a detailed description of the recommended crew actions.
They would begin by flying the ILS approach to Runway 30, but level off no lower than
2,500 feet since that was the minimum descent altitude.
As soon as they had the runway environment in sight, they would turn 45 degrees to the
right and hold that heading for 30 seconds.
Then they would turn left to parallel the runway, and once they got a beam the threshold
for Runway 12, they would fly straight ahead for another 20 seconds before making a 90
Now I know that sounds really complicated, but the truth is that it's not when you actually
take the time to review the approach procedure.
One of the big issues with this approach is that there's a lot going on with the turns
and the timing.
Additionally, the captain needed to be focused on looking outside to keep the runway in sight
while relying on the first officer to help him out, which wasn't really the best scenario
considering the captain's arrogant attitude.
The other critical piece of information that's not depicted on this approach is that the
circling minimums are based on a requirement for the pilots to remain within the visual
maneuvering area, which was 8 kilometers or about 4.3 nautical miles from the runway.
Just for reference, this image was included with the investigation final report and it
shows what that looks like, but my guess is that the pilots had no idea what the limits
of the visual maneuvering area were.
That being said, the visibility at the airfield was about 3 miles, and if they followed the
recommended procedure, they would remain within about a mile and a half from the runway, giving
them plenty of room to maneuver while still keeping the runway in sight.
Regardless of how the procedure is flown, the most important thing about any circling
approach is that it's a visual maneuver, and that means if you lose sight of the runway
environment, you need to execute an immediate go-around to stay safe.
And now that you understand some of the challenges associated with the approach, we need to talk
about the captain's plan and the approach briefing.
The investigation didn't provide any details on how many times the captain had flown this
approach before, but my guess is that with over 25,000 hours, he was probably at least
a little familiar with it.
All we know for certain is that instead of reviewing the recommended circling approach
procedure, he decided he was smart enough to come up with his own plan.
The ILS approach to runway 30 specified that aircraft needed to avoid overflying the city
and also avoid the prohibited area to the south of the field.
This meant that all circling approaches to runway 12 would involve turning right to go
north of the field for a left downwind.
However, the captain briefed the first officer that he was going to turn left to fly south
of the field for a right downwind.
However, there was a much bigger problem that they needed to worry about, and this is where
it's important to understand that the aircraft has two modes of guidance for navigation.
There's managed guidance or selected guidance, and in very simple terms, managed guidance
is when the aircraft is going to follow whatever route is in the flight plan, and it's what
the pilots would be using when they were flying the ILS for the first part of the approach.
But because circling approaches are visual maneuvers, there aren't any waypoints or route
to follow, and that meant the captain needed to use selected guidance.
That involves manually selecting what heading he wanted to fly by rotating the heading knob
left or right, and then he needed to pull the knob to switch to selected guidance.
Unfortunately, he didn't do that.
For some reason, he wanted to fly this as a managed approach, and he directed the first
officer to manually insert some waypoints into the flight plan to essentially build
a route south of the field to put them on a 5 mile final for runway 12.
This was a terrible idea, because not only was it against company procedure, all of the
points were outside of the 4.3 mile visual maneuvering area, so there was no guarantee
their 2500 foot altitude was going to keep them safe.
And despite how dangerous this was, the first officer never questioned the plan, and he
just did as he was told.
As they began the descent for the final approach, the captain asked the controller if they could
circle south of the field, but the controller denied the request.
A few minutes later, the captain told the first officer to make the same request, possibly
hoping to get a different response, however, they were told once again that it wasn't possible.
At this point, they were starting to fall behind the aircraft.
Even though they would have to circle to the north, the captain still wanted to use the
managed navigation mode, so he told the first officer to adjust the waypoints and move them
north of the field at a distance of 5 miles.
Eventually, they were cleared for the ILS to runway 30, circled to land runway 12.
The captain tried asking the controller one more time if they could go south of the field,
and he was told only the left downwind to the north was available.
I'm not sure why he was so fixated on circling to the south, but obviously it was something
on his mind, and the investigation didn't say whether this was something he had done
in the past.
Regardless, as they continued the descent, the captain tried to select 2000 feet for
their altitude, but surprisingly, the first officer spoke up and reminded him that the
minimum descent altitude was 2500 feet.
A few moments later, the tower told the pilots that a Pakistan International flight had just
landed on runway 12.
This was one of AirBlue's major competitors, and also the airline that the captain had
previously flown for, so this likely created more pressure on him to land the aircraft.
The only problem is the tower didn't tell them that it took three tries before that
plane could land, and they didn't mention anything about another airliner that diverted
because they were unable to land due to the weather.
Due to the poor visibility, the captain didn't see the runway until he was almost at the
missed approach point.
Then he pulled the heading knob to get into the selected mode and initiated a right turn
to a heading of 352 degrees.
As soon as he started that turn, he also changed the aircraft altitude to begin a descent to
2300 feet, which put them 200 feet lower than the minimum descent altitude, but this
time the first officer didn't say anything.
Around that same time, the controller saw how bad the weather was and suggested that
the pilots fly a bad weather circuit.
It's not clear if the controller meant for them to fly a holding pattern or was just
recommended they fly closer to the runway to keep it in sight.
Either way, the captain ignored the suggestion and told the first officer, let him say what
he wants to say.
The first officer responded, okay sir, but are you visual?
And the captain angrily replied, visual, okay?
Keep in mind that the first turn to the right was only supposed to last for about 30 seconds
before they turned to parallel the runway on the downwind leg.
Unfortunately, according to the flight data, the captain continued on the 352 heading for
almost 2 full minutes before he rotated the heading knob to the left to initiate a turn
to a heading of 300 degrees.
Because he took so long to make the turn, by the time he rolled out on the 300 heading
for the downwind, they were already abeam the threshold for runway 12.
All they needed to do at that point was wait 20 seconds and then start a left turn back
towards the runway.
However, the captain wasn't paying attention to where the runway was and instead he pushed
the heading knob to get back into a managed navigation mode and the aircraft began steering
towards one of the waypoints in front of them.
They were well off course by now and the controller told them to turn left because they were getting
close to a restricted area, but the captain ignored him.
A few seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder captured the audio warning that there was
terrain ahead, which sounded like this.
Terrain ahead.
When the first officer heard that, he told the captain, sir, higher ground has reached.
Sir, there is terrain ahead.
Sir, turn left.
And this is where it's important to understand that the aircraft was equipped with an enhanced
ground proximity warning system designed to detect and warn the pilots if they're about
to fly into the terrain.
The system is very reliable and it identifies potential conflicts in front of the aircraft
and provides a voice and visual warning 60 seconds prior to the conflict.
If the pilot doesn't do anything about it, as you get closer to the terrain, the warning
will eventually change and tell you to pull up.
By the time the warning started going off, the captain was so far behind the aircraft
and was so confused, he had no idea he only had about 70 seconds left to live.
The tower controller could no longer see the aircraft because they were over five miles
away from the runway and he asked the pilots if they were still visual with the airfield.
There was no response and in the cockpit, the first officer asked the captain, what
should I tell him, sir?
A few seconds later, the controller asked them again if they were visual and this time
both the captain and the first officer responded at the same time saying, air blue 202, visual
with the ground.
To be perfectly clear, there's a big difference between visual with the ground and visual
with the airfield and the captain no longer had the airfield in sight, so they should
have immediately performed a go around.
Instead, he kept flying straight ahead and the first officer tried to warn him again
saying sir, terrain ahead is coming and the captain responded, we are turning left.
The only problem was that the aircraft wasn't turning left.
That's because the captain rotated the heading knob to the left, but he never pulled it to
switch from managed to selected guidance and the first officer never verified the change
or what the captain was doing.
This was a huge breakdown in crew communication and the first officer wasn't doing his job
as the pilot monitoring.
As the aircraft continued to head, the captain couldn't figure out why they weren't turning,
so he kept rotating the heading knob to the left.
By the time he realized that he was still in the managed navigation mode and pulled
the heading knob, he had spun the heading all the way around to 086 degrees.
This meant the aircraft began to turn to the right since that was the shortest direction
to the heading he had selected.
Now they were pointed directly at the hillside, even though the captain probably couldn't
see it because of the poor visibility, and that's when they heard this.
Terrain ahead, pull up.
That's probably one of the scariest things that a pilot can hear if you're flying low
to the ground and you're in the weather, and as soon as you hear that, you need to immediately
execute a terrain escape maneuver.
This is a memory item because you don't have time to get out the checklist and figure out
what to do.
The captain needed to disconnect the autopilot and pull back on the controls to get full
backstick pressure while advancing the thrust levers to the takeoff and go around power
setting and also keeping the wings level and ensuring that the spoilers are retracted.
Unfortunately, the captain remained unresponsive and the first officer didn't take over the
controls to perform the maneuver.
Instead, he deferred to the captain telling him, sir, turn left.
Pull up, sir.
Sir, pull up.
The captain moved the thrust levers, but he never selected the takeoff and go around power
setting and also for some reason, he changed the selected altitude to 3,700 feet before
he decided to disconnect the autopilot.
He tried applying full left stick along with some left rudder and began a 52 degree bank
turn to the left.
However, he lowered the nose slightly and the aircraft began a rapid rate of descent.
The first officer continued to yell at him saying, sir, we are going down, sir, we are
going down.
They were 7.3 nautical miles from the runway when they crashed into the hillside, killing
all 152 people on board the aircraft.
During the final 70 seconds before the crash, the captain ignored at least 21 terrain warnings
from the aircraft and almost a dozen requests from the first officer to turn left or pull
up.
He lost all awareness of what was going on and forgot the basics of flying the aircraft
first.
There's no reason he should have been trying to do a visual maneuver in a managed navigation
mode and when his plans started falling apart, he should have disconnected the autopilot
and flown the maneuver visually.
However, more importantly, the moment he lost sight of the runway, he needed to execute
a go around.
The first officer had multiple opportunities to interrupt the sequence of events and save
the aircraft.
And it's just shocking to me how powerful the captain's authority was over the first
officer during the flight.
Airblue flight 202 would become Pakistan's deadliest plane crash ever.
And unfortunately, the 38 page final report from the investigation left everyone with
more questions than answers.
I hope you were able to learn something from this debrief.
And if you want to find out what happened when an airline captain and a first officer
made several insane mistakes that got 97 people killed, then be sure to watch this video on
your screen.
And thanks for your support.

