H.G. Wells- The Outline of History- Napoleon III, German Unification, and Abraham Lincoln

Napoleon III
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Hello everyone, Thercites the Historian here.
Welcome to the first H.G. Wells The Outline of History reading for 2021.
In the recent past, we have looked at Wells' thoughts on the French Revolution,
the age of Napoleon, and then the major social and political changes of the 19th century,
most notably the Industrial Revolution and all of the political movements which stemmed from it.
Today, we get back into the history of events of the 19th century
by looking at what happened in the middle of the century in Europe and in America.
His two sections that we'll cover today, sections 9 and 10,
are centered around the figures of Napoleon III and Abraham Lincoln.
Why, you might ask, is one section centered around Napoleon III?
Well, Wells' essential claim is that by destabilizing the order of Europe,
Napoleon III effectively allowed for German and Italian unification.
And so, by allowing for German unification and making them the preeminent power due to his failure,
Napoleon III bears a great deal of responsibility for World War I.
This argument is not quite explicit, but if you read his section, it's very clearly there by implication.
And this makes me wonder about his general anti-Napoleon bias.
In the past, I noted that he's very hostile to Napoleon I.
And now that I read this section, and now that I'm more aware of how he views World War I as this apocalyptic event,
which was sort of the end of history for him in a sense,
I think that maybe the reason he hates Napoleon I so much is not because he was British
and he inherited that prejudice from the history as it's taught by his country,
but rather that he really, really despises Napoleon III.
And so, gives Napoleon I credit for things that he attributes to his nephew.
At least that's sort of my working theory at this juncture.
When it comes to his treatment of the Italian unification and the Crimean War,
both of which were major events in the 19th century,
Wells makes sure to get some jabs in at Napoleon III.
He was involved in both of these things, albeit indirectly.
And I get the sense that even though Wells is not opposed to Italian unification,
he does see it as somewhat stained by the involvement of Napoleon III,
who to him is an absolutely horrible and derisible figure.
He effectively also tries to take away credit from Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns when it comes to German unity.
He says the German nation was a reality since 1848,
and that effectively Bismarck and the Prussian state stepped in to delay that process of unification
so that they could make sure that the process was entirely Prussian and left Prussia in charge.
There may be something to that, but I think that he is just a little too eager to try to discredit people he doesn't like.
People who he blames, once again, and this time quite rightly, for World War I.
When he looks at Napoleon III's Mexican adventure,
where he tried to install Maximilian as the Emperor of Mexico,
he says that this was a bad idea for a couple of reasons.
One, Napoleon III was opportunistically violating the Monroe Doctrine.
Wells seems to think that no monarch in his right mind would try to challenge America in the new world in the 19th century,
despite the fact that America was not yet much of a power,
especially if you're deploying hundreds or even over a thousand miles to the south.
It really makes little enough sense.
And he also says that Napoleon III, by tying up so many troops in the new world,
gave Bismarck the opening to crush Austria and ultimately crush France a few years later.
So he thinks that this was the key mistake in allowing Prussia to become too powerful and too imperialistic.
He also, as I said just a minute ago, really believes the Monroe Doctrine was respected and feared in Europe
and that it wasn't more practical considerations which kept the Europeans out of America after the Monroe Doctrine.
In reality, there were just easier opportunities elsewhere,
because again, America did not have the naval or military strength to meaningfully enforce the Monroe Doctrine.
It was a lucky thing for America that it was never challenged,
but Wells seems to think that Europe legitimately respected and feared American power in the 19th century.
When we turn to Section 10 and look at Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War,
we see that Lincoln is the key figure, which makes absolute sense,
and that his role was ultimately to keep America whole and pave a path forward for a unified and powerful America
which was poised in Wells' own time to rule the world.
There are some inaccuracies about the strength of, say, the abolitionists in the antebellum world,
and there are a few judgments that I'm sure my friend Sean Chick would disagree with,
even a few that I kind of looked at and wasn't too sure about.
But overall, it's not bad.
We have to remember, though, that Wells is more interested in Europe than in America,
and that what he's trying to do is contextualize the American Civil War,
not in terms of American history, but in terms of setting America up as a world power.
By keeping the country unified, Lincoln ensured that America would be able to play a huge role in World War I and beyond.
So, for Wells, that is more important.
He's also interested in democracy and industrialization, and the U.S. was a major power in those regards as well.
So, once again, we can see that Wells has reasons for praising America the way that he does.
If anything, his account of America is excessively bullish, and he seems blind to any flaws that America in his own day may have had.
It's kind of interesting just how enthusiastic he was about America's future when he wrote this book in 1920,
and I can't help but wonder how he'd feel today.
But a hundred years ago, in the wake of World War I, this made perfect sense.
America was clearly on the rise, and...
The Great Exhibition of 1851 released a considerable amount of international talk and sentiment.
It had already found expression in the work of such young poets as Tennyson, who had glanced down the vista of the future.
Till the war drums throbbed no more, and till the battle flags were furled,
In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.
The vision was premature.
Beneath the apparent peace of that brief interval of liberalism and superficial enlightenment,
the seeds of a new crop of international conflicts were germinating.
France was nominally a liberal republic, but her president was a Bonaparte, the nephew of the first Napoleon.
He was a person of great cunning and enterprise,
and he was destined to bring upon France and Europe even greater disasters than those his uncle had achieved half a century before.
The French Republic, which had replaced the Orléans monarchy in 1848, had had a brief and troubled career.
From the outset, it was embarrassed by crude socialistic proposals,
which produced much economic disorganization and even more business anxiety.
The new Napoleon Bonaparte, posing as a liberal, quote, safe man,
who would restore confidence and stabilize affairs,
was able to secure his election as president in the October of that year.
He took an oath as president to be faithful to the democratic republic,
and to regard as enemies all who attempted to change the form of government.
And for a year's time, December 1852, he was emperor of the French.
At first, he was regarded with considerable suspicion by Queen Victoria,
or rather by Baron Stockmar, the friend and servant of King Leopold of Belgium,
and the keeper of the international conscience of the British queen and her consort.
All this group of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha people had a reasonable and generous enthusiasm for the unity and well-being of Germany,
upon liberal lines, and they were disposed to be alarmed at this Bonapartist revival.
Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister, was, on the other hand, friendly with the usurper from the outset.
He offended the queen by sending amiable dispatches to the French president without submitting them for her examination,
and so giving her sufficient time to consult Stockmar upon them, and he was obliged to resign.
But subsequently, the British court veered round to a more cordial attitude to the new adventurer.
The opening years of his reign promised a liberal monarchy rather than a Napoleonic career,
a government of cheap bread, great public works, and holidays,
and he expressed himself warmly in favor of the idea of nationalism,
which was naturally a very acceptable idea to any liberal German intelligence.
There had been a brief all-German parliament at Frankfurt in 1848,
which was overthrown in 1849 by the Prussian monarchy.
Before 1848, all the great European courts of the Vienna settlement
had been kept in a kind of alliance by the fear of a second and more universal democratic revolution.
After the revolutionary failures of 1848 and the restoration of monarchy in France,
this fear was lifted, and they were free to resume the scheming and counter-scheming of the days before 1789,
with the vastly more powerful armies and fleets the first Napoleonic phase had given them.
The game of great powers was resumed with zest after an interval of 60 years,
and it continued until it produced the catastrophe of 1914.
For a time, the new Napoleon went warily.
It was the Tsar of Russia, Nicholas I, who made the first move towards war.
He resumed the traditional thrust of Peter the Great towards Constantinople.
Nicholas invented the phrase of the sick man of Europe for the sultan,
and, finding an excuse in the misgovernment of the Christian population of the Turkish Empire,
he occupied the Danubian principalities in 1853.
It was a real international retrocession.
European diplomatists found themselves with a question of quite the 18th century pattern.
The designs of Russia were understood to clash with the designs of France and Syria,
and to threaten the Mediterranean route to India of Great Britain,
and the outcome was an alliance of France and England to bolster up Turkey,
and a war, the Crimean War, which ended in the repulse of Russia.
One might have thought that the restraint of Russia was rather the business of Austria and Germany,
but the passion of the foreign offices of France and England for burning their fingers in Russian affairs
has always been very difficult to control,
and the new Napoleon saw in this war an opportunity of cementing his insecure friendship with Britain and the British court,
which had so far held aloof from him.
The next phase of interest in this revival of the great power drama
was the exploitation by the Emperor Napoleon III and the king of the small kingdom of Sardinia in North Italy
of the inconveniences and miseries of the divided state of Italy,
and particularly of the Austrian rule in the north.
The king of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel,
made an old time bargain for Napoleon's help in return for the provinces of Nice and Savoy.
France was to have these, and Sardinia was to be compensated in Italy.
The war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other broke out in 1859,
and was over in a few weeks.
The Austrians were badly beaten at Magenta and Solferino.
Then, being threatened by Prussia on the Rhine,
Napoleon made peace, leaving Sardinia, the richer, for Lombardy.
The next move in the game of Victor Emmanuel and of his chief minister, Cavour,
was an insurrectionary movement in Sicily, led by the great Italian patriot, Garibaldi.
Sicily and Naples were liberated, and all Italy, except only Rome,
which remained loyal to the Pope, and Venetia, which was held by the Austrians,
fell to the king of Sardinia.
A general Italian parliament met at Turin in 1861,
and Victor Emmanuel became the first king of Italy.
But now the interest in this game of European diplomacy shifted to Germany.
Already the common sense of the natural political map had asserted itself.
In 1848, all Germany, including, of course, German Austria,
was for a time united with the Frankfurt parliament.
But that sort of union was particularly offensive to all the German courts and foreign offices.
They did not want a Germany united by the will of its people,
they wanted Germany united by regal and diplomatic action, as Italy was being united.
In 1848, the German parliament had insisted that the largely German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein,
which had been in the German Bund, must belong to Germany.
It had ordered the Prussian army to occupy them,
and the king of Prussia had refused to take his orders from the German parliament,
and so had precipitated the downfall of that body.
Now the king of Denmark, Christian IX, for no conceivable motive except the natural folly of kings,
embarked upon a campaign of annoyance against the Germans and these two duchies.
Prussian affairs were then very much in the hands of a minister of the 17th century type,
von Bismarck, count in 1865, prince in 1871,
and he saw brilliant opportunities in this trouble.
He became the champion of the German nationality in these duchies.
It must be remembered that the king of Prussia had refused to undertake this role for democratic Germany in 1848,
and he persuaded Austria to side with Prussia in a military intervention.
Denmark had no chance against these great powers.
She was easily beaten and obliged to relinquish the duchies.
Then Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria for the possession of these two small states.
So he brought about a needless and fratricidal war of Germans for the greater glory of Prussia
and the ascendancy of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany.
He consolidated Germany under the Prussian Hohenzollerns.
German writers of a romantic turn of mind represent Bismarck as a great statesman planning the unity of Germany.
But indeed, he was doing nothing of the kind.
The unity of Germany was a reality in 1848.
It was and is the nature of things.
The Prussian monarchy was simply delaying the inevitable in order to seem to achieve it in Prussian fashion.
That is why, when at last Germany was unified, instead of bearing the likeness of a modern civilized people,
it presented itself to the world with the face of this archaic Bismarck,
with a fierce mustache, huge jackboots, a spiked helmet, and a sword.
In this war between Prussia and Austria, Prussia had for an ally Italy,
while most of the smaller German states, who dreaded the schemes of Prussia, fought on the side of Austria.
The reader will naturally want to know why Napoleon III did not grasp this admirable occasion for statecraft
and come into the war to his own advantage.
All the rules of the great power game required that he should.
He was allowing a dangerous rival to France to arise in Europe in the shape of Prussia.
He should have done something to prevent this.
But Napoleon, unhappily for himself, had gotten his fingers into a trap on the other side of the Atlantic
and was in no position just then to intervene.
He had been sorely tempted by America.
The discord between the interest of the southern and northern states in the North American Union,
due to the economic differences based on slavery, had at last led to an open civil war.
In our next section, we will deal with this civil war more fully.
Here we will only say that it lasted four years, and ended at last in a reunited United States.
All the elements of reaction in Europe rejoiced during the four years of Republican dissension.
The British aristocracy openly sided with the Confederate states,
and the British government permitted several privateers, and particularly the Alabama,
to be launched in England to attack the federal shipping.
Napoleon III was even more rash in his assumption that, after all, the new world had fallen before the old.
Hitherto, the United States had forbidden European interference upon the continent of America.
This was, so to speak, a fixed rule of American policy.
The sure shield of this Monroe Doctrine, it seemed to Napoleon, was now thrust aside for good.
The great powers might meddle again in America, and the blessings of adventurous monarchy be restored there.
A pretext for interference was found in certain liberties taken with the property of foreigners by the Mexican president.
A joint expedition of French, British, and Spanish occupied Veracruz,
but Napoleon's projects were too bold for his allies,
and they withdrew when it became clear that he contemplated nothing less than the establishment of a Mexican empire.
This he did, after much stiff fighting, making the Archduke Maximilian of Austria emperor of Mexico in 1864.
The French forces, however, remained in effectual possession of the country,
and a crowd of French speculators poured into Mexico to exploit its mines and resources.
But in April 1865, the Civil War in the United States was brought to an end,
and the little group of eager Europeans in possession of Mexico found themselves faced by the victorious United States government
in a thoroughly grim mood, with a large, dangerous-looking army in hand.
The French imperialists were bluntly given the alternative of war with the United States, or clearing out of America.
In effect, this was an instruction to go.
This was the entanglement which prevented Napoleon III from interference between Prussia and Austria in 1866,
and this was the reason why Bismarck precipitated his struggle with Austria.
While Prussia was fighting Austria, Napoleon III was trying to escape with dignity from the briars of Mexico.
He invented a shabby quarrel upon financial grounds with Maximilian, and withdrew the French troops.
Then, by all the rules of kingship, Maximilian should have abdicated.
But instead, he made a fight for his empire.
He was defeated by his recalcitrant subjects, caught, and shot as a public nuisance in 1867.
So the peace of President Monroe was restored to the new world.
But while Napoleon was busy with his American misadventure, Prussia and Italy were snatching victory over the Austrians, 1866.
Italy, it is true, was badly beaten at Custaza, and in the naval battle of Lisa.
But the Austrian navy was so crushed by the Prussian at the battle of Sadowa, that Austria made an abject surrender.
Italy gained the province of Venetia.
So making one more step towards unity.
Only Rome and Trieste and a few towns of the north and northwestern frontiers remained outside the kingdom.
And Prussia became the head of a north German confederation.
From which Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Austria were excluded.
This victory of Prussia, this supercession of Austria as even the nominal head of things German,
this restoration of the predominance of the kingdom of Frederick the Great, brought Prussia and France face to face.
A great rivalry had become clear.
A rivalry that was to produce at last the greatest and most desolating war in all history.
It was only a question of time before France and Prussia clashed.
Each armed, but Prussia had better schoolmasters and a higher standard of obedience and efficiency than France.
The war almost came in 1867, when so soon as he was free from Mexico, Napoleon sought to pick a quarrel with Prussia over Luxembourg.
It came in 1870, quite on 18th century grounds, with a dispute about the candidates for the vacant throne of Spain.
Napoleon had some theory in his mind that Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and the other states outside the north German confederation would side with him against Prussia.
He probably thought that this would happen because he wanted it to happen.
But since 1848, the Germans, so far as foreign meddling was concerned, had been in spirit a united people.
Bismarck had merely imposed the Hohenzollern monarchy with pomp, ceremony, and bloodshed upon accomplished facts.
All Germany sided with Prussia against France.
Early in August 1870, the united German forces invaded France.
In numbers, discipline, equipment, and leading, they proved better than the French.
The debacle of France was swift and complete.
After the battles of Würth and Gravelot, one French army under Bazaine was forced into Metz and surrounded there,
and on September 1st, a second, with which was Napoleon, was defeated and obliged to capitulate at Sedan.
Napoleon became a prisoner. Paris found herself bare to the invader.
For a second time, the promises of Napoleonism had failed France disastrously.
On September 4th, France declared herself a republic again, and thus regenerated, prepared to fight for existence against triumphant Prussianism.
For, though it was a united Germany that had overcome French imperialism, it had Prussia in the saddle.
The army in Metz capitulated in October.
Paris, after a siege and bombardment, surrendered in January 1871, and France sued for peace.
With pomp and circumstance, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, amidst a great array of military uniforms,
the king of Prussia was declared German emperor, and Bismarck and the sword of the Hohenzollerns claimed the credit for that German unity which a common language and literature had long since assured.
The Peace of Frankfurt which followed was a Hohenzollern peace.
Bismarck had availed himself of the national feeling of Germany to secure the aid of the South German states,
but he had no grasp of the essential forces that had given victory to him and to his royal master.
The power that had driven Prussia to victory was the power of the natural political map of Europe, insisting upon the unity of the German-speaking peoples.
In the East, Germany was already sinning against that natural map by her administration of Posen and other Polish districts.
Now greedy for territory, and particularly for iron mines, she annexed a considerable area of French-speaking Lorraine,
including Metz and Alsace, which in spite of its German speech, was largely French in sympathy.
Inevitably, there was a clash between German rulers and French subjects in these annexed provinces.
Inevitably, the wrongs and bitterness of the subjugated France of Lorraine echoed in Paris and kept alive the passionate resentment of the French.
How at last that flared up in a great revanche, we shall tell later.
Napoleon III hid his diminished head in England and died there a year or so after his collapse.
So ended the second Bonapartist regime in France.
It is a relief to turn from the disastrous exploits of this Bonapartist adventure in France
and the temporary triumph of the Hohenzollern family over the popular movement in Germany,
to an altogether greater and more significant figure, the figure of Abraham Lincoln,
about which the incidents of the Great War of Secession in America may very conveniently be grouped.
The opening half of the 19th century, which had been an age of reaction and recovery in Europe,
was in America a period of extravagant growth.
The new means of communication, the steamboat and the railway, and presently the electric telegraph,
came just in time to carry forward the movement of the population across the continent.
But for these mechanical aides, the United States even today might not reach westward beyond the Rocky Mountains,
and entirely different people might be in possession of the western coast.
It is still very imperfectly grasped by politicians how dependent are the areas enclosed by governmental and administrative boundaries
upon the means of communication available and the character of the country in relation to transport.
Given roads and writing, open valleys tend to become consolidated under one government.
Mountainous barriers separated not only peoples but rulers.
The Roman Empire was an empire of high road and wheel, and its divisions and separations and fall
were due to the impossibility of maintaining swift communications between part and part.
The western Europe that emerged from the Napoleonic storm was divided into national states
that were perhaps as large as they could become without loss of solidarity,
with high road horse traction as their swiftest linking method.
Had the people of the United States spread over the American continent with only horse traction,
rough road, and letter writing to keep them together,
it seems inevitable that differences in local economic conditions would have developed different social classes
that wide separation would have fostered differences of dialect and effaced sympathy,
that the inconvenience of attending congress in Washington would have increased with every advance of the frontier westward,
until at last the states would have fallen apart into a loose league of practically independent and divergent nations.
Wars for mineral wealth, for access to the sea, and so forth would have followed,
and America would have become another Europe.
But the river steamboat, the railway, and the telegraph arrived in time to prevent this separation,
and the United States became the first of a new type of modern transport state,
altogether larger, more powerful, and more conscious of its unity than any state the world had ever seen before.
For the tendency now in America is not to diverge but assimilate,
and citizens from various parts of the states grow not more but less unlike each other in speech and thought and habit.
The United States is really not comparable to a European power such as France or Italy,
it is a new and bigger type of political organization.
Empires there have been before in the world comparable in area and population to the United States,
but they were merely accumulations of diverse tribute paying peoples united only by a government.
The unity of the United States is inherent, it is a community of outlook of over 100 million men.
The railways which intensified the conflicts and congestions of Europe,
the inventions that diminished the striking distance of the European armies,
and gave them even greater destructive power,
so that now there seems no choice for Western Europe between voluntary unification or forcible unification,
under some one predominant power, or chaos and destruction,
confirmed the free unity of Republican America.
To Europe, steam brought congestion, to America, opportunity.
But on the other hand, to this present greatness and security, the American people passed through one phase of dire conflict.
The river steamboats, the railways, the telegraph, and their associate facilities,
did not come soon enough to avert the deepening conflict of interest and ideas
between the southern slaveholding areas and the free industrial north.
The railways and steamboats, at first, did but bring into sharper conflict an already established difference.
There was a profound difference in spirit between the two sections of the United States,
and the increasing unification due to the new means of transport,
made the question whether the southern spirit or the northern should prevail an ever more urgent one.
There was little possibility of compromise. The northern spirit was free and individualistic.
The southern made for great estates and a conscience gentility, ruling over a dusky subject multitude.
The sympathies of British liberalism and radicalism were for the north.
The sympathies of the British landlords and the British ruling class were for the south.
Every territory that was organized into a state, every new incorporation into the fast growing American system,
became a field of conflict between the two ideas, whether it should become a state of free citizens,
or whether the estate system should prevail.
The issue crept slowly to predominance in American affairs after the establishment of Missouri 1821,
and Arkansas 1836 as slaveholding states.
From 1833, an American anti-slavery society was not merely resisting the extension of the institution,
but agitating the whole country for its complete abolition.
The issue flamed up in the conflict over the admission of Texas to the Union.
Texas had originally been part of the Republic of Mexico,
but it was largely colonized by Americans from the slaveholding states,
and it seceded from Mexico and established its independence in 1836.
A vigorous agitation for the annexation of Texas followed,
and Texas was annexed in 1844 and admitted as a state in 1845.
Under the Mexican law, slavery had been forbidden in Texas,
but now the South claimed Texas for slavery, and got it.
Moreover, a war with Mexico arising out of Texas annexation,
had added New Mexico and other parts of the United States,
and in these regions also slavery was permitted,
and a Fugitive Slave Bill increased the efficiency of the methods of catching and returning slaves who had fled the free states.
But meanwhile, the development of ocean navigation was bringing a growing swarm of immigrants from Europe
to swell the spreading population of the northern states,
and raising of Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Oregon,
all northern farmlands to state level,
gave the anti-slavery North the possibility of predominance both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.
The caught and growing South, irritated by the increasing threat of the abolitionist movement,
and fearing this predominance in Congress, began to talk of secession from the Union.
Southerners began to dream of annexations to the South of them in Mexico and the West Indies,
and of a great slave state, detached from the North and reaching from the Mason and Dixon line to Panama.
Kansas became the region for the final decision.
The slavery issue plunged into the territory of Kansas into what was practically a civil war
between settlers from the free and immigrants from the slave states,
a war that continued until 1857 and ended in the victory of the anti-slavery settlers.
But until 1861, Kansas was not raised a statehood.
The extension of slavery was the chief issue before the country in the presidential election of 1860,
and the return of Abraham Lincoln as an anti-extension president decided the South to split the Union.
South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession and prepared for war.
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas joined her early in 1861,
and a convention met in Montgomery, Alabama, elected Jefferson Davis president of the Confederated States of America,
and adopted a constitution similar to that of the United States, but specifically upholding
the institution of Negro slavery."
Such was the political situation with which Abraham Lincoln was called to deal as president of the Union.
He was, it chanced, a man entirely typical of the new people that had grown up after the War of Independence.
His people were quite common folk, his father could not read or write until after his marriage,
and his mother, it is said, was an illegitimate child.
She was a woman of exceptional intellect and character.
His early years had been spent as a drifting particle in the general westward flow of the population.
He was born in Kentucky, 1809, was taken to Indiana as a boy, and later on to Illinois.
Life was rough in the backwoods of Indiana in those days, the house was a mere log cabin in the wilderness,
and his schooling was poor and casual.
But his mother taught him to read early, and he became a voracious reader.
At 17, he was a big athletic youth, a great wrestler and runner.
At 19, he went downriver to New Orleans as a hired hand on a flatboat.
He worked for a time as a clerk in a store, served as a volunteer in the Indian War,
went into business as a storekeeper with a drunken partner,
and contracted debts that he did not fully pay off for 15 years.
Finally, when he was about 24, he got a job as a deputy to the county surveyor of Sangamon County,
which he said kept body and soul together.
All this time, he was reading hard.
His earlier books, those early books that made his mind, seemed to have been few but good.
He read all he could get.
He knew his Shakespeare and Burns well, the life of Washington, the history of the United States, and so forth.
He had the instinct for expression, and from his boyhood, he wrote as well as studied,
producing verse, essays, and the like.
Much of this was coarse, homely stuff.
Politics soon attracted him.
In 1834, when he was still only 5 and 20, he was elected member of the House of Representatives for the state of Illinois.
He read for the bar, and was admitted in 1836.
For a time, he worked at law rather than politics.
But the great question before the people of the United States insisted upon the attention of every able man.
This big, capable, self-educated man, typically a man of the Middle West,
could not fail to be profoundly stirred by the steady development of the issues of slavery and secession.
In Illinois particularly, the question flamed because the great leader in Congress of the party for the extension of slavery
was Senator Douglas of Illinois.
There was a personal rivalry between the two.
They had both courted the lady who became Mrs. Lincoln.
Douglas was a man of great ability and prestige, and for some years, Lincoln fought against him by speech and pamphlet.
First in Illinois, and then throughout the eastern states,
rising steadily to the position of his most formidable and finally victorious antagonist.
Their culminating struggle was the presidential campaign of 1860,
and on the 4th of March 1861, Lincoln was inaugurated president,
with the southern states already in active secession and committing acts of war.
The first proceeding of the secessionists was the seizure of all federal forts and stores within their boundaries.
These federal posts were built on territory belonging to the states in which they stood,
and these states claimed the right to, quote, resume, end quote, their property.
The garrison of Fort Sumter at Charlestown resisted,
and the war began with the bombardment of this fort on the 12th of April 1861.
America at the time had only a very small regular army.
It remained loyal to the president, and these opening operations of the confederacy were conducted by state levies.
President Lincoln at once called for 75,000 men,
and Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia immediately went over to the confederacy,
which had now hoisted its own flag, the stars and bars, against the stars and stripes.
So began the Civil War in America.
It was fought by improvised armies that grew steadily from a few score thousands to hundreds of thousands,
until at last the federal forces exceeded a million men.
It was fought over a vast area between New Mexico and the Eastern Sea.
Washington and Richmond were the chief objectives.
It is beyond our scope here to tell of the mounting energy of that epic struggle that rolled to and fro
across the hills and woods of Tennessee and Virginia, and down the Mississippi.
There was a terrible waste and killing of men.
Thrust was followed by counterthrust.
Hope gave way to despondency, and returned and was again disappointed.
Sometimes Washington seemed within the confederate grasp.
Again, the federal armies were driving towards Richmond.
The confederates, outnumbered and far poorer in resources, fought under a general of supreme ability, General Lee.
The generalship of the Union was far inferior.
For long, Lincoln clung to General McClellan, the young Napoleon, a pedantic, dilatory, and disappointing commander.
Generals were dismissed, new generals appointed, until at last, under Sherman and Grant, came victory over the ragged and depleted South.
In October 1864, a federal army under Sherman broke through the confederate left,
and marched down from Tennessee through Georgia to the coast, right across the confederate country,
and then turned up through the Carolinas, coming in upon the rear of the confederate armies.
Meanwhile, Grant held Lee before Richmond, until Sherman closed on him.
On April 2nd, 1865, the confederate troops evacuated Richmond.
On April 9th, Lee and his army surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse,
and within a month, all the remaining secessionist armies had laid down their arms, and the confederacy was at an end.
But this four year struggle had meant an enormous physical and moral strain for the people of the United States.
In many states, in Maryland and Kentucky, for example, opinion upon the war was acutely divided.
The principle of state autonomy was very dear to many minds,
and the North seemed in effect to be forcing abolition upon the South.
Many men were against slavery, but also against interference with the free power of each individual state over its own people.
In the border states, brothers and cousins, even fathers and sons, would take opposite sides and find themselves in antagonistic armies.
The North felt its cause a righteous one, but for great numbers of people, it was not a full-bodied and unchallenged righteousness.
But for Lincoln, there was no doubt. He was a clear-minded man in the midst of such confusion.
He stood for the Union. He stood for the great peace of America.
He was opposed to slavery, but slavery held to be a secondary issue.
His primary purpose was that the United States should not be torn into two contrasted and jarring fragments.
So through the long four years of struggle, he stood out an inflexible conviction, a steadfast will.
When in the opening stages of the war, Congress and the federal generals embarked upon a precipitate emancipation,
Lincoln opposed and mitigated their enthusiasm.
He was for emancipation by stages and with compensation.
It was only in January 1865 that the situation had ripened to a point when Congress could propose to abolish slavery forever by a constitutional amendment,
and the war was already over before this amendment was ratified by the states.
As the war dragged on through 1862 and 1863, the first passions and enthusiasms waned,
and America learned all the phases of war weariness and war disgust.
Conscription replaced volunteering and changed the spirit of the fighting both in the South and in the North.
The war became a prolonged, dismal, fratricidal struggle.
July 1863 saw New York rioting against the drafts,
and the Democratic Party in the North sought to win the presidential election on the plea that the war was a failure and should be discontinued.
This would, of course, have meant a practical victory for the South.
There were organized conspiracies to defeat the draft.
The gaunt, tall man at the White House found himself with defeatist traitors, dismissed generals,
tortuous party politicians, and a doubting and fatigued people behind him,
and uninspired generals and the press troops before him,
and his chief consolation must have been that Jefferson Davis at Richmond could be in little better case.
The English government had misbehaved and permitted the Confederate agents in England
to launch and man three swift privateer ships, the Alabama is the best remembered of them,
which were chasing United States shipping from the seas.
The French army in Mexico was trampling the Monroe Doctrine in the dirt.
Came subtle proposals from Richmond to drop the war,
leave the issues of the war for subsequent discussion,
and in turn federal and confederate an alliance upon the French in Mexico.
But Lincoln would not listen to such proposals unless the supremacy of the Union was maintained.
The Americans might do such things as one people, but not as two.
He held the United States together through long, weary months of reverses and ineffective effort,
through black phases of division and failing courage.
And there is no record that he ever faltered in his purpose.
There were times when there was nothing to be done, when he sat in the White House silent and motionless,
a grim monument of resolve.
Times when he relaxed his mind by jesting and broad anecdotes.
He was full of sardonic humor, but very tender with the pain of others.
When some enemies of Grant came to tell him that the general drank,
he asked for the brand of his whiskey, for the others.
He was himself a man very abstemious in his habits,
capable of either an immense industry or an immense patience.
At last in the early months of 1865, it was plain that victory was coming,
and he set himself with all his force to make surrender easy
in the treatment of the vanquished the beginning of a reconciliation.
Still his watchword was Union.
He was soon in conflict with the extremists on his own side who wished for a vindictive peace.
He saw the Union triumphant.
He entered Richmond the day after its surrender and heard of Lee's capitulation.
He returned to Washington, and on April 11th made his last public address.
His theme was reconciliation and reconstruction of loyal government in the defeated states.
On the evening of April 15th, he went to Ford's Theater in Washington,
and as he sat looking at the stage, he was shot in the back of the head
and cruelly murdered by an actor named Booth,
who had some sort of grievance against him and who crept into the box unobserved.
If the work of healing was impaired and if the United States had more trouble and bitterness
in the years following the war than there was need for, it was because Lincoln was dead.
But his work was done, and the Union was saved, and saved for good.
At the beginning of the war, there was no railway to the Pacific coast.
Now the railway spread like a swiftly growing plant until they had clutched and held and woven
all the vast territories of the United States into one now indissoluble mental and material unity.
From that time, the consolidation of the United States has gone on steadfastly.
Within half a century, its population had passed the 100 million mark,
and there is no sign that growth and development have yet reached any limitation.
This titanic democracy, without king or elaborate foreign policy,
is, we repeat, a new thing in the world's experience.
It is not a quote great power in the sense in which that phrase is used in Europe.
It is something more modern in its nature, and greater, and with a greater destiny.
