Fleet Marine Force

The MEU, enabled by amphibious ships, remains the crown jewel of our naval expeditionary forces. No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of supporting a more diverse set of missions than the amphibious warship. The Marine Corps began, and continues to be, an expeditionary force, thoroughly tied to the Navy, on land and at sea. Throughout its history, Marines have prevailed as America's 9-1-1 force, responding to global crisis, assisting the joint force and the whole of government, and deploying to conflicts in every climate and place. Naval forces from amphibious warfare ships have deployed globally in support of peacekeeping missions, evacuated U.S. embassies, and provided humanitarian assistance to those in need. They were there when troops were needed to engage Saddam Hussein's forces from the sea in the Gulf War, later sent to the hills of Afghanistan after 9-11, and yet again went ashore to engage ISIS. Most recently, they were the first on the ground to support evacuation efforts in Kabul. Time and again, naval forces on ships are often the first on the scene, the first to provide aid and comfort, the first to contain a brewing crisis, and when asked to do so, the first to fight. As our nation expects, the Marine Corps, when partnered with the Navy, is uniquely capable of expeditionary and amphibious operations. Through our forward posture and consistent presence, we provide the joint force and our allies the ability to stand in and persist inside an adversary's weapons engagement zone, seize and defend key maritime terrain, including sea lines of communication, and immediately respond to global crisis. We must retain no less than 31 amphibious warfare ships to meet requirements stated in national defense strategies spanning multiple administrations. Until 2010, the amphibious-ready groups and Marine Expeditionary Units maintained the ability to provide the Joint Force Commander with three ARGMUs globally 365 days a year. Analytical studies from 2008 to 2022 showed that with current maintenance readiness, 31 amphibs are required to keep two ARGMUs forward throughout the year, each made up of three amphibious warships. Today, if directed, contingency plans indicate that we will be required to deploy five ARGMUs in a condensed timeframe in times of conflict. In addition, ships must be available for training to ensure the proficiency we need to meet our mission essential tasks. As the size of our amphibious fleet has diminished over the years, UCOM no longer receives a MEW 365 days a year for a 24-7 active crisis response. If the inventory supported it, would you benefit from having a MEW that was enabled by both tactical aviation and Group 5 UAS that's capable of reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance and would be on station 365 days a year? I would, Congressman, but as you well know, as a commander, you never get everything that you want, but certainly those capabilities are precious for effective deterrence. The 30-year shipbuilding plan, when combined with decommissioning plans, sees a drastic decline in amphibious warfare ships from 31 in 2022 to 28 in fiscal year 2025, and then to 24 in fiscal year 2037. Concurrently, historic naval fleet readiness levels are 46%, compared to the plan 80%, and extended maintenance cycles are averaging 12-plus months vice 8, further reducing availability of global maritime mobility. Maritime mobility within an adversary's reach is crucial to our success. Operating inside this zone will enable Marines to hold key terrain while our larger amphibious ships secure critical sea lines of communication. We must be able to move troops and supplies within the West. This opens the door for additional follow-on forces from the Marine Corps and the larger Joint Force to mobilize and respond. Distributed maritime operations, such as Expeditionary Advanced Space Operations, demands the ability to maneuver to and within the global littorals. A key planning factor remains operating without ports or runways. To achieve this, we require 35 medium landing ships, produced by the Navy's Light Amphibious Warship Program, in addition to our traditional amphibious warfare ships. These Light Amphibious Warships are smaller than our recognizable ships, but larger than our current ship-to-shore connectors, such as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, Landing Craft Utility, or the Landing Craft Air Cushion. The 35 requirement stems from a minimum of nine LSMs being required to support one Marine Regiment. Our stand-in forces require maritime mobility for three regiments. To ensure 27 ships are available for these forces at any given time, we must account for eight additional ships due to routine maintenance cycles. And it appears that in Indo-Pacom, those intra-theater connectors are going to allow us to operate in that contested space. Things like the Army Watercraft, the Navy Next Generation Connector Ship, the Marine Corps Light Amphibious Warship. All those things are incredibly important. If you were to believe Admiral Aquilino and Admiral Davidson, which I do, they have stated that the risk is now, and that intra-theater connectors are incredibly important to bridge the tyranny of distance to be able to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacom. In your estimate, is there a deficit today as we speak with intra-theater logistics connectors, as I spoke of? And how essential are these programs in allowing logistics to flow? This is a critical question. Intra-theater movement is very important, especially the distances we're talking about in the Pacific and the fact that we will be under multi-domain attack essentially when we do this. Ultimately, the LSM will allow Marines to rapidly and efficiently move throughout the battle space to sense and make sense of the adversary's actions and provide valuable intelligence to commanders. They are critical to modernizing our legacy prepositioning capability into a dynamic, integrated, afloat, and ashore network that is ideal for intra-theater small-scale distribution and sustainment and will complement the actions of the larger naval and joint force. However, LSM fielding does not start until 2029. Until then, a bridging solution is required. Some examples in use include the Expeditionary Fast Transport and Contracted Commercial Vessels, which can provide a basic level of mobility. The Expeditionary Fast Transport is an aluminum catamaran based off a commercial design. It is helping to temporarily bridge the gap between airlift and sealift through its ability to transport Marines and their equipment to austere, shallow draft, and degraded ports. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, working with Military Sealift Command, has contracted to charter a commercial stern landing vessel. This vessel will be used to test the shore-to-shore beach-able concepts associated with Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations where the Expeditionary Fast Transport cannot be used. The lessons learned using the stern landing vessel will be valuable in developing the final requirements for the LSM. Is this some of the stuff we've heard about? 2nd Marine Division potentially working in cooperation with the 6th Fleet to do ASW operations, sensing operations. Could you elaborate on that a little bit? All of that is ongoing in all domains, and the guidance is we embrace cold response. It's an exercise that's proceeding as we speak, is to get all of us to stretch our left and right buoys. And you can't succeed if you just occupy one domain and attempt to achieve effects in one domain. So the Marines are doing a fantastic job of leading from the front and showing the rest of us how to do it right, especially in the brown water environment. So you as a combatant commander see a lot of promise in these experimental efforts? Absolutely. While we peer into the past for inspiration and continue to experiment, we must also look to leveraging what our allies and partners have to offer, including commercial vessels and littoral staging platforms as a way to enhance our littoral maneuver capabilities today. Going forward, the Naval Force must advocate for a larger Department of the Navy budget. This will enable congressionally authorized multi-ship buys, provide cost savings through industrial-based stability, and improve current maintenance and readiness cycles. The amphib ships that you refer to, sir, are not nice to have. They're essential. If we're going to achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, we need those 31 ships plus the light amphibious warships. They're not nice to have. They're essential. They're essential to deter campaign forward. They're essential to be able to respond to a crisis. They're essential in a war fight. Our maritime mobility is critically important now and will be even more so in the future.