China s Scrap Metal Aircraft Carrier Fujian Exposed as Far Inferior to US Carriers

China's newest aircraft carrier, Fujian, was barely commissioned when controversy erupted around it. Chinese media have unexpectedly exposed a series of serious flaws, revealing that the ship not only lags far behind US carriers, but may even fall short of the Soviet Union's unfinished supercarrier, Ulyanovsk. Such open criticism from Chinese outlets is rare. Many netizens believe it contradicts the tightly controlled propaganda environment under Xi Jinping's leadership, raising speculation that the report slipped through censorship or was deliberately published as a subtle act of dissent. China's third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, officially entered service at the Sanya Naval Base in Hainan Province in November 2025. Yet only three months later, it was already entangled in another controversy. A Chinese military-focused social media account known as Maritime Vanguard revealed that when the ship is compared technically with the Soviet Union's final nuclear supercarrier design, it still shows numerous shortcomings. The Soviet Ulyanovsk, though never completed due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, was designed as a true supercarrier, approaching modern multirole carrier concepts. In terms of size, the Fujian appears impressive on paper. Its displacement is about 80,000 tons, slightly larger than Ulyanovsk's estimated 79,000 tons. The flight deck area is also somewhat bigger, about 18,000 square meters, compared with Ulyanovsk's roughly 16,000 square meters. But beyond these numbers, the differences become stark. Ulyanovsk was designed with nuclear propulsion, equipped with four KN-3 nuclear steam generating units and four powerful turbines producing around 280,000 horsepower, similar to the U.S. Navy's Nimitz-class carriers. This would have allowed the ship to reach speeds of around 30 knots and operate for long periods without refueling. By contrast, Fujian still relies on conventional propulsion using eight boilers and four steam turbines, requiring nearly 10,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. In endurance and power generation, it falls far behind nuclear carriers. The design of the flight deck reveals even deeper issues. Ulyanovsk's layout included a side elevator positioned to allow aircraft to move directly from the hangar to launch positions without crossing the landing path. In wartime, such a design greatly improves aircraft handling efficiency and provides redundancy if the ship is damaged. Fujian, however, lacks a similar backup elevator. Critics say this weakness stems from its structural heritage, which still reflects elements copied from older Soviet carrier designs, such as the Project 1143.5 class. Without sufficient redundancy, damage to key areas could severely disrupt aircraft operations. One of the most controversial revelations came from footage aired by Chinese state television in September 2025. Observers noticed that Fujian cannot conduct simultaneous takeoffs and landings, an ability considered standard for modern carriers since angled flight decks became widely adopted after World War II. Because one of Fujian's electromagnetic catapults intrudes into the landing area, the carrier may be forced to use only a single catapult during recovery operations. This severely limits the tempo of aircraft launches and recoveries. The problem became even clearer when an analyst studied deck images showing J-15 carrier fighters landing and taxiing across the deck. Aircraft returning to the ship must move through areas near the bow catapults, further complicating launch operations. The result is a bottleneck in deck traffic. While U.S. Nimitz class carriers can generate roughly 120 sorties per day, and the newer Ford class can reach about 160 under optimized procedures, Fujian's sortie generation rate could be significantly lower due to its constrained deck layout. Several Western naval experts have weighed in on the issue. Retired U.S. Navy officers who studied Fujian's flight deck design noted that the angle between the landing strip and the ship's center line is only about six degrees from much smaller than the roughly nine degree angle used on American carriers. A smaller angle places landing aircraft closer to catapult launch areas, reducing operational efficiency and safety margins. Because Fujian's landing zone is also unusually long, aircraft roll dangerously close to the bow catapults after touchdown, creating additional operational complications. Some analysts estimate that Fujian's real combat effectiveness could be only around 60 percent of that of a Nimitz class carrier. The reason is simple. The true power of an aircraft carrier lies in its air wing. The number of aircraft it can launch, recover and cycle within 24 hours ultimately determines its combat capability. If deck operations are restricted, even a large carrier cannot fully utilize its aircraft complement. Interestingly, some Chinese commentators themselves compare Fujian's operational capability to the U.S. Kitty Hawk class carriers of the 1960s. Both have similar displacement, around 80,000 tons, and carry roughly comparable numbers of aircraft, including about 48 fighters, along with early warning and electronic warfare planes. However, even against this decades-old American design, Fujian appears disadvantaged due to its less efficient flight deck arrangement and limited aircraft handling space. Another point of debate is Fujian's electromagnetic catapult system. Previously, only the U.S. Navy's Ford-class carriers used electromagnetic launch technology. China installed such a system on a conventionally powered ship, a bold technical leap. Chinese engineers claim they solved the power supply challenge using advanced supercapacitor energy storage to provide the intense bursts of electricity required for catapult launches. Yet critics argue that relying on a medium-voltage direct current system may create vulnerabilities. If part of the power network fails, it could potentially shut down the entire launch system. Beyond technical concerns, strategic analysts emphasize that China remains a latecomer in carrier operations. The United States has operated aircraft carriers continuously since World War II and currently maintains a fleet of 11 supercarriers with decades of combat experience. China, by contrast, began essentially from zero and has never tested its carriers in real combat. Operating a carrier is widely considered one of the most complex military skills in the world, requiring years of operational practice. Questions about quality control have also surfaced. China's military shipbuilding industry has been plagued by corruption scandals in recent years. Several senior executives of the state-owned shipbuilding conglomerate responsible for Fujian have been investigated or removed from their positions. Critics argue that systemic corruption ranging from bribery to cutting corners on materials could affect the quality and reliability of major weapons systems. Evidence of potential problems emerged in December 2025 when Fujian sailed through the Taiwan Strait heading north. Images released by Taiwan's military showed the carrier's deck completely empty without any aircraft on board. Analysts speculated that the ship might have been returning to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai for further modifications. If true, it would not be the first time a Chinese carrier required significant adjustments shortly after commissioning. China's second carrier, Shandong, reportedly returned to the shipyard just days after entering service and underwent nearly a year of modifications. For now, the Fujian remains a symbol of China's ambition to challenge U.S. naval power in the Pacific. Yet behind the grand propaganda narrative, the ship's design limitations, technological uncertainties, and operational inexperience reveal a more complicated reality. Even optimistic analysts admit that it could take many years and possibly several more carriers before China can truly close the gap with the United States in aircraft carrier warfare. China's most advanced aircraft carrier was meant to signal arrival. The moment Beijing could confidently say it had stepped into the top tier of naval powers. Instead, within weeks of entering service, that symbol of strength quietly turned around and sailed back toward the very shipyard that built it. No celebration. No triumphant footage of roaring jet launches. Just a slow, deliberate disappearance. For a vessel introduced as a generational leap, the silence that followed was deafening. This wasn't supposed to happen. The carrier Fujian was unveiled as a breakthrough. China's first flattop equipped with the electromagnetic catapults, a system only a handful of navies have ever mastered. State media framed it as proof that the People's Liberation Army Navy had closed the gap with the United States. Commentators spoke confidently about blue water dominance and technological parity. The message was clear. China had arrived. But reality doesn't bend to messaging. And when reality intrudes, no amount of ceremony can cover it. The timing made the reversal even more striking. The Fujian had barely been commissioned before it altered course. In professional navies, the weeks after commissioning are when the real work begins. Aircraft launch cycles intensify. Deck crews train relentlessly. Engineers push propulsion and power systems to their limits. A carrier earns its credibility in those grueling early months. Instead, the Fujian left Sanya with an empty flight deck, passed through the Taiwan Strait without visible aviation activity, and headed north. No aircraft operations, no training footage, no sustained drills. This was not a surge in readiness. It looked like a retreat. That absence matters. A carrier without aircraft is just steel and electronics. Its combat value comes from launching, recovering, and sustaining air power at sea. When those operations are missing, the platform's core purpose is missing with them. Observers noted the lack of deck crews rehearsing launch procedures, the absence of pilots qualifying for carrier landings, and no signs of high-tempo flight cycles. For a ship presented as fully operational, the optics were deeply inconsistent. Even the commissioning ceremony had raised subtle questions. Coverage was restrained. Technical specifics were limited. Footage of sustained aircraft launches, the defining feature of a carrier, was scarce. At one point, a catapult demonstration involved a sled rather than a live aircraft. In established naval practice, ceremonial launches are symbolic but real. Avoiding a manned aircraft suggested caution, perhaps unresolved technical risk. At the time, these details were easy to dismiss. In hindsight, they looked like warning signs. The focus quickly turned to the carrier's most ambitious feature, its electromagnetic launch system. Unlike steam catapults, electromagnetic systems demand immense electrical stability and energy management. Nuclear-powered carriers can generate and buffer that power more easily. The Fujian, however, is conventionally powered. That means every launch places enormous strain on turbines, generators, and onboard storage systems. If synchronization falters, even briefly, operations can halt.