6.3 The Identifiable Victim Effect

Irrational Behaviors
3 followers
2 Video Views·May 18, 2023
Another distinction between emotion and cognition
comes from something we call the trolley problem.
And there's a huge cottage industry
of papers about this problem with all kinds of versions.
But here's the basic question.
Imagine that you're standing next to a train track.
And you see the train is coming.
And you see that if the train is going to come and continue
straight, it's going to kill four people.
There are four people who are laying on the track,
working, and doing something.
And they don't know the train is coming.
And if the train will come, it would kill all four of them.
Now, you're standing quite far away.
But you're standing next to a lever.
And if you pull the lever, the train
will take a different track.
And instead of killing these four people,
it would only kill one.
Because on this other track, there's only one person working.
Now, ask yourself.
If you do nothing, the train will kill four people.
If you pull the lever, the train will turn.
It would kill one person.
Would you do it?
And most people say yes.
Most people say, I compare the life of four people
to the life of one.
And I think this is a good trade-off.
And I'm going to redirect the train.
Imagine, though, a second case.
You're standing on the bridge.
And there's a train coming.
And if the train comes, it's going
to kill the four people who are working on the train,
because they don't know it's coming.
And next to you is a guy.
And this guy is wearing a backpack.
And he's looking over the bridge on the track.
And if you push him, he would fall down.
And because it's both his weight and the backpack weight,
the train would hit him, kill him.
But then the train will stop.
Now, in this story, you cannot jump yourself.
You don't have a backpack.
And you don't have the time.
The only thing you could do is you could push him.
Would you push him?
People feel very differently about this question.
People don't usually say four versus one.
They basically say, will I have the gut to push somebody?
And what if he was turning in the other direction?
You pushed him from the back, versus he
was looking you in the eyes.
And you pushed him, and you would see his eyes
as he was going down onto the track.
Again, people feel differently about it.
If you think about this trolley problem,
it's really about the fact that we
have these very different modes of thinking.
We have a mode of thinking that is consequential,
four versus one.
It's just the cognition.
Four is more than one.
Killing one is better than four.
And then we have this other mode of thinking
that is about emotion.
And when it's one person that we see them
and we care about them, all of a sudden,
we feel very differently about it.
Now, let's take this from the trolley problem.
And let's try to implement this idea in something different.
So for example, if you look at the following plot,
this plot shows how much funding in millions of dollars
is directed toward different problems in the world.
Hurricane Katrina, the terrorist activity in 9-11,
the Asian tsunami, tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS.
And on the horizontal axis, you see
how many people are affected by each of those in millions.
And of course, this is not all the problems in the world.
But with this set of problems,
you see a negative correlation.
You see that for things that attack few people,
like Katrina and 9-11,
we have lots and lots of money going toward them.
And for things that affecting lots and lots of people,
like malaria and AIDS,
we have very little money going toward.
And now I want you to think for a second
about all the things that could contribute to that.
Why is this correlation negative?
Why is it not the case that as more people are affected,
we have more funding going to it?
And what in particular is causing some of those things
to be overfunded and underfunded relative to other people?
So why don't you just think about all the possible causes,
and of course, there's more than one
that could contribute to this situation.
So I'm sure you came up with lots of reasons
of why this is happening.
You could say that some of them are more closer to the US,
which gets people to contribute more money.
Some of them are further away from the US,
which gets them to contribute less.
There could be racial issues.
There could be all kinds of things.
But what I would like to argue is that one of those things
is about the fact that some of them
look like individual causes.
Some of them are about people that you might know.
In particular, when you have disasters,
like something like Katrina or 9-11,
you can think of yourself as you might have been there.
It could have been you.
When we talk about things like malaria and AIDS,
it's things that other people might have.
It doesn't feel like you could have been there.
And on top of that, whenever we deal with something
that is preventative in nature,
it's about preventing the disease from somebody else,
from having it in a later time,
and this is very difficult for us to think about.
So all this brings us into this notion
of the identifiable victim.
And the idea is that when we see one person suffering,
our heart goes to them, we care about them,
and because of that, we're willing to give them money
and we're willing to help them.
But when the problem is large, happening to lots of people,
some of them are unborn yet,
we don't have a face on the problem
and because of that, we don't care to the same degree.
So let me give you a little bit about research
on this identifiable victim effect.
And this is something that Joseph Stalin
and Mother Teresa agreed on,
and I think this is probably the only thing
that the two of them ever agreed on.
Joseph Stalin said,
one man's death is a tragedy,
a million deaths is a mistake.
And Mother Teresa said,
if I look at the masses, I will never act.
If I look at the one, I will.
And they basically both captured this notion
of we care about one person,
we don't care about groups of people,
even if there are many.
So here's the research.
Imagine I described you the problem of starvation in Africa
and I said this number, these millions of kids in Malawi
and these millions of kids in another country
and this number of million kids in Botswana.
And so I described the range of the problem
and that I described to one group of people.
And to another group of people, I do something different.
I say, there's this one girl
and this one girl is going to be hungry
and this is her name
and this is where the village she's coming from
and this is her picture.
Would you like to give money?
Would you like to give money to starvation in Africa?
Would you like to give money to the girl?
And what happened is that the people are willing
to give twice as much money to the identifiable life,
to the little girl called Rokia that they saw their picture
than to give to the statistical life,
to the big problem out there.
In this experiment, by the way,
people got $5 for participating in something else,
presumably unrelated, and then they were asked to say
how much of that money you're willing to give.
So the moment we see a face, we start caring about it
and then we give more money.
And here's a way for you to think about it for yourself.
Imagine you're in Boston for a job interview.
It's your dream job interview.
You really wanted to go to this job
and you're walking over the bridge,
over the Charles River in the way to that building
and you have 15 more minutes
before you have to go to your interview.
And all of a sudden, you hear a girl crying.
You hear a voice of a baby crying
and you look over the edge and you see a baby about to drown,
a very young toddler about to drown.
And you have no time.
If you jump in, you'll be able to save them,
but if you take your clothes off,
you're not going to make it.
And you have new jacket and new shirt and new pants
and new socks and new shoes,
all ready for the job interview.
You know that if you'll jump,
you will never be able to make it to the job interview.
Would you jump?
And most people say, what kind of question are you asking?
How can you not jump?
Now you could say to yourself,
let me leave the baby here to drown
and I'll go to the job and I'll get this job hopefully.
And if I get it, I'll give 20% of my yearly income
to charity and of course 20 years,
20% of my yearly income is going to be much more beneficial
to poor people at the world over than saving one child.
I could save many people every year
with this amount of money.
But most people think of this as a creepy,
inhumane way to think about life.
And they say, you can't leave somebody here.
And of course, if you heard that one of your friends did
that you would judge them incredibly harshly.
Now, what happens here is that we have this one face,
it's one experience.
Now, what would happen if that girl was not just here,
she was somewhere else, she was far away
and you couldn't hear her cry.
And what would happen if there were many of her?
What would happen if she was not born?
All of that would make her much less identifiable
and would get you to be much less compelled
to jump and put some money.
The reality that all of us can put a little bit of money
aside and save lots of kids out there,
but we saw because we don't see them crying
and because they're not identifiable,
we don't care so much about.
So the first part of the experiment,
I think fits very well with the intuition
and the story about caring about one person,
not so caring the moment the problem become large.
Now, here's the next part of the study.
In the next part of the study,
they said, what if we gave people two sets of information?
We said, here's Rokia, the little girl starving,
hungry and so on in her picture.
But by the way, if you give her money,
it's not just going to be for her,
there's millions and millions of other people
who are also going to benefit from it
because the problem of starvation in Africa
is incredibly large.
What happens now?
People give lots of money to Rokia,
not so much the statistical problem.
What happens when you get both descriptions?
The amount goes down.
So what happens is that every time
you add statistical information
about the magnitude of problem,
you don't get people to be compelled to give more,
what you do is you shut off their emotion.
You see Rokia, it's just like the girl on the side,
you care about it.
You hear about the large problem
with lots of people dying or starving,
you don't care so much.
You take the emotional input
and you add a cognitive input
and caring goes down.
In fact, this was done even to a higher extreme
in another experiment,
in which before they asked people
to say how much money they would give,
they primed them.
They basically got people to think in computational way.
They gave them some little math problems
and asked them to think about computation.
And other people,
they asked to think about an emotional way.
What happens?
The moment you start thinking about the computational way,
caring goes down.
Now, if you think about it,
this actually makes sense.
The reality is that from an economic perspective,
we shouldn't give our money away,
especially not to strangers who can never help us.
So if you have some friend
that you can lend money in trouble
and they can help you later,
maybe you can make a story about
why this is okay economically.
But helping people in another part of the world
that we would never get to benefit from this,
this is not a rational thing to do.
It's something that comes from us because of our emotion.
And what happens the moment we start thinking about things
in more cognitive, rational way,
our emotion gets suppressed.
We care less.
This, by the way, is another example of a case
where being irrational is actually quite good.
Ask yourself, how much would you like to live
in a society of people who only cared about their benefit,
people who had no emotions,
had no care for other people,
were not willing to help anybody
unless it helped them back directly.
It's a case where being emotional
and caring about other people is actually quite useful.
The last experiment I want to tell you about this
is an experiment that actually did not take
a huge group versus one person.
It took a small group versus another person.
They took a picture of eight kids
and they said, all of these eight kids are suffering.
All of those kids need help.
Would you help one of them?
And in one condition, they said,
after you decide how much money to give,
we will randomly sample one of those eight kids
and your money will go to one of them,
but you just don't know which one.
In the other case, we said, we have selected that kid.
Here is the kid.
It's that kid would you like to give the money?
What happened?
In the second case, people gave much more money.
Now, this is not a large group versus one.
It's a small group, and in fact,
it's picking one kid before you gave them
versus after you gave them.
And the moment we have a particular faith,
if you say to yourself, it's one of those eight kids,
you can't care to the same level.
If you say it's this kid or it's this kid or it's this kid,
all of a sudden, there's a faith.
Your heart goes out to them.
You care more about them,
and all of a sudden, you give to a much higher degree.
Now, if you think about this,
this idea of the identifiable victim effect
and our caring of one versus our lack of caring
about the masses is something incredibly important.
This is the reason why countries don't do much for genocide.
This is the reason why there are all kind of atrocities
going around in the world, and we don't care so much.
There are too many people.
The way they're described is just too big, too massive.
Our heart doesn't go out to them.
And this is also why some of the biggest successes
in getting us to care about atrocities
have been to bring one example of this.
In Haiti, we got people with webcams
to transmit to us from the ground
very, very specific small things,
things that did not reflect the whole tragedy of the country
but reflected some very specific things.
In some of the problems with Rwanda,
there was description of small things that were happening,
tragic but not describing the whole problem,
and yet got people to act to a higher degree.
And even with the mad cow disease in England,
they were butchering hundreds and thousands of cows.
But it wasn't until they had one cute young calf
on the cover of one of the British newspapers,
and they said, this calf is going to die,
that people start getting angry and worried about it.
And their hearts went to this one young calf,
and they start calling and protesting,
and they stop these atrocities.
So we need to understand the identifiable victim effect.
We need to understand that our hearts go
to simple, small, contained things,
like one child that has a face.
And as more and more information comes in,
we care less and less.
And because of that, if we want people to act,
we need to think about how to get people
to act to a higher degree, how to represent problems
in ways that are compatible with our emotions.
And when we have large tragedies in the world,
we need to figure out how do we want
to portray this information?
How do we want to convey to people?
How do we want to take maybe the big problem,
break it into small pieces, and show just some of those
that might not be an ideal reflection of the whole problem,
but would nevertheless get people to act?
And the reason I find this whole research so important
is because we do want people to act.
There are many cases in which we think
people are just not acting enough.
And usually, we try to appeal to their cognition.
We say, look how big the problem is.
Look how important it is.
This is not the right approach.
People act both in terms of time
and in terms of opening our wallets based on emotion.
And now we need to ask yourself,
how do we get people to care?
And what are the things that are not persuasive
to people in a rational way, but what are the people
that get, what are the things that get people to care?
And if we could only do a better job at that,
we could get people to act even better.
