CFB Wainwright fire recalls deadly 1988 training accident at CFB Chilliwack | Hanomansing Tonight
Oct 20, 2026
Video Summary
AI GeneratedA deadly grass fire during a training exercise at CFB Wainwright, which killed four soldiers and hospitalized 39, has prompted reflections on a similar 1988 tragedy at CFB Chilliwack. Paul Mann, a veteran and former commandant, discusses the emotional impact of such accidents and the critical importance of thorough investigations to mitigate future risks.
We continue to follow the investigation
into the deadly fire that killed four soldiers
on Saturday. A fast-moving grass fire ignited during
a training exercise at CFB Wainwright.
That's about a two-hour drive southeast of Edmonton.
39 people remain in hospital,
19 of whom are in critical condition.
For some members of the armed forces and their families,
the Wainwright tragedy brings back some difficult memories.
A deadly training accident
at CFB Chilliwack in British Columbia in June of 1988.
Paul Mann was a student on training
at the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering
when 27 kilograms of explosives detonated prematurely.
Six military engineering students were killed,
several more were injured.
Powell wasn't on the range when it happened
but was scheduled to go later in the day
and worked later on at that same engineering school.
And Powell joins us from Bedford, Nova Scotia.
I covered that story in June of 1988, Paul.
So as soon as I heard about what happened in Wainwright,
it brought back memories for me about Chilliwack.
What was going through your mind
when you heard about the tragedy on the weekend?
Well, thanks, Ian.
You know, before I delve into that answer, I'd like to say first
and foremost that my heart goes out to the families
of those who are lost, to the injured and everyone affected.
And though I'm not a spokesperson for veterans across Canada,
I feel confident saying that the entire veteran community offers
its deepest condolences.
That's an incredibly different, difficult time.
Yeah, when I heard the news on Saturday, you know, honestly,
my first thought was for the families losing their sons in such a way.
And then as you think about the wider aspects,
you think for the injured and the soldiers who were there.
Having experienced the aftermath of the demolition accident in 1988,
I know that impact reaches far beyond those who were directly involved.
And I know the wider community in Wainwright as well is also feeling
the pain as well as the Canadian public across Canada.
Take us back to that day in June of 1988 in Chilliwack.
Where were you when the explosion happened
and what unfolded after that?
Yeah, so the course that I was on was a large course
and we were split into two parts.
There was a troop or a platoon, as some people would
be more familiar with the term, that was on the demolition range.
And I was in the bilingual troop
and we were doing classroom training to prepare to go the range.
We received word that an accident had happened.
We didn't really know the details,
but we knew that our training was cancelled.
And as we, you know, struggled to figure out what happened
and try to understand the scope of the accident,
you could see that the shock
and disbelief started to pervade the group.
And quickly, you sort yourself out.
You know, you don't want to be one
of the people who has to be supported.
So you learn how to adapt with the shock
and move into a role where you can support others.
But six people were killed and others were injured,
some of them really badly injured.
And I assume no matter how many warnings you get on base,
because these are people learning how to use explosives.
So no matter how many warnings you get on base,
I assume nothing prepared you for the shock of learning
that some of your colleagues had been killed.
No, I think that's the very nature of training
as we go through learning, learning what we want to do.
You expect that whenever training happens to come home,
you prepare for the dangers.
You know that the military is a dangerous business,
but training is supposed to prepare you for those dangers.
So the shock of going through someone
who's actually been injured or killed on training is unexpected.
But professionals are professionals.
You understand that you must carry on with either the mission
or taking care of those that need assistance.
so one of the great aspects of the military
is that you you do carry on uh you do deal with the
immediate aftermath of what needs to be done
and you do find that later when your requirement to
act stops that's when it sinks in a little bit more
and you start thinking about and trying to
process what you went through all right well don't go too far away
because we're going to take a break
And when we come back, I want to ask you about the investigation
that followed, because I think that there may be some lessons there
for the process that may be underway in Wainwright,
how how good that investigation was and and what came out of that.
So, pal, thank you very much for speaking with us.
And we'll continue our conversation right after this.
As we were discussing before the break,
Saturday's tragedy at CFB Wainwright is bringing back for some
memories of a deadly incident in 1988
at CFB Chilliwack in British Columbia.
Well, I definitely want to know the answer.
There's no question about that.
And I want to know if people have did their job properly.
27 kilograms of explosives detonated prematurely
at the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering.
Six military engineering students were killed
and several others were injured pal man
was supposed to take part in an exercise there
later in the day he later became the commandant
of the same engineering school and pal let's
continue the conversation we were having before
the break um what went wrong that day that led
to the deadly explosion there were a number
of factors that went wrong the investigation as you
know much like the investigation that will happen now it needs
to establish what happened why it
happened and whether anything needs to change.
There's a number of factors that need to be
considered, not only the actions
of those that were in the vicinity of the accident itself,
but there's a whole series of things that have to be looked at.
Was the nature of the explosives
of good quality? Supply chain issues?
Was it stored properly? Was doctrine and tactics followed
when the uh when the training was done
so uh to collect this information it takes time to talk to
the number of people who are involved
and as you can imagine in any incident everyone has a slightly
different perspective and everyone's truth
is slightly different based on what they've observed
and what they've felt or what they were told
so to collect all that information and to distill it
into something that's tangible that is reflective
of the most probable uh chain of events that
occurred you need to look at that and while you
also have to deal with what the immediate events
were there you have to delve deeper
and go into layers to find out what were the what were the
root causes uh what was it that could have contributed to the accident
and then you have
to analyze and see if those things need
to be adjusted changed updated modernized to prevent
the possibility of such an activity happening again
these engineering students these young
soldiers were making craters on a road as they would in a combat zone
so they were tamping down
explosives into a hole i guess in a tube using
a metal device to tamp them down and and i think
one of the the problems was that metal that they
were using to to do that i mean creating
craters in a road in in a conflict zone is inherently dangerous
but were lessons learned
from the tragedy that made it less dangerous
in the future you can never get rid of risk
completely and everyone
who's in the military knows that our job is to mitigate risk as best
as possible. I think in the instance in 1988,
there were a couple of decisions that were made
that contributed to the accident.
As you mentioned, it was a metal tamping rod that was used to tamp
down the explosives in the chamber,
the hole that would eventually be expanded. It should have been
a wood rod, but the supply chain delivered something
that was ordered and a NATO stock
number or a stock number that was used may have delivered
the wrong piece of equipment.
Or they may have used that piece of equipment successfully in the past
and so no one thought to question it.
But it was definitely one of the things in the aftermath they examined
that found that it contributed to the premature detonation.
We have just 30 seconds, but let me ask you this.
Based on your experience at CFB Chilliwack,
are you confident that the investigation into incidents like
this are done independently and properly?
The military has a great protocol to do these investigations and they
bring in people who are outside the event and ask the questions.
I have full confidence in the chain of command to ask the questions,
to collect the information and analyze that information and to
determine what the root causes were and to adjust doctrine and training
if needed in order to prevent instances like this from happening again.
Palman was a student on training at the Canadian Forces School
of Military Engineering at CFB Chilliwack in 1988
and later became commandant of that same engineering school.
Thank you very much for speaking with us.
Thank you, and have a good night.

