IMF Holds a Live Press Briefing on the Release of the World Economic Outlook

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) holds a live press briefing on Oct. 13 in Bangkok for the release of the World Economic Outlook and explores how geopolitics and artificial intelligence are reshaping the global economy.
IMF Chief Economist Silvana Tenreyro, Deputy Director in the Research Department Petya Koeva Brooks, and Chief of the IMF Research Department's World Economic Studies Division Deniz Igan will attend and speak on the latest forecasts, risks, and what they mean for the global economy.
AI Generated·May contain errors
Okay, I think we have a quorum, and we are going to start.
Let me see how I pronounced it.
Sawadee, don't chow crop.
Good morning for those who are joining us here in Bangkok.
Good afternoon or good evening for those who
are joining us around the world.
I want to start thanking the Thai Thailand
and the Thai authorities for hosting us today.
I'm Jose Luis de Arce with the communications department,
and we are gathered here today for the launch
of the latest edition of the World Economic Outlook
titled Resilience Under Restraint, Urgent Choices.
So if you haven't had access to the latest copy,
I will recommend for all of you to go to imf.org.
There you're going to find the latest World Economic Outlook,
also Silvana's blog
and other assets that might be helpful for your reporting.
And what's best, that to be talking about the World Economic Outlook
and this latest edition, that be here today with Silvana Tenreiro.
She is the new Economic Counselor, Chief Economist,
and Director of the Research Department.
Next to her are Petia Koeva-Brooks.
She is the Deputy Director of the Research Department.
And last but not least, we have Denise Egan.
She's the division chief also with the research department.
To keep the tradition going,
Silvana is going to start with some opening remarks
and then we will open the floor to your questions.
So, without further ado, Silvana, the floor is yours.
Thank you very much, José Luis.
Good morning, everyone.
The global economy has been resilient,
but that resilience is under strain
with risks tilted to the downside.
Global activity is projected to grow at 3.1% this year,
40 basis points lower than last year,
and it's forecast to rise by 3.4% in 2027.
This is the net result of two key forces that are shaping the outlook.
First, the increase in the prices of energy and other commodities
triggered by the war, which is akin to a negative global supply shock,
driving up prices and hampering activity.
Second, the tech boom, mostly driven by AI,
which acts as a positive demand shock,
driving up both prices and activity, particularly trade and investment.
While these demand and supply forces pull activity
in opposite directions, both forces put upward pressures on inflation.
Global headline inflation is projected to rise
to 4.7% this year and to fall to 4.1% in 2027.
The projections for core inflation are 3.9%
and 3.7% for 2026 and 2027, respectively.
In part as a result of these demand and supply forces, borrowing costs
in several advanced economies have risen at a time of elevated debt.
The interaction of high public debt and higher financing costs,
in turn, has heightened fiscal concerns and risks.
The outlook is highly uneven across countries,
reflecting differences in exposure to commodity prices
and AI-related activity, as well as borrowing costs.
Energy exporters not in the conflict region and countries
closely integrated in the AI cycle are expected to fare better,
while energy importers and those with limited participation
in the AI tech boom face weaker growth prospects.
Many low-income countries
and fragile states fall into the latter group.
The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside,
underscoring three main limits
to resilience.
First, with renewed tensions in the Middle East,
prices of crude oil, gas and refined
oil products such as diesel and jet fuel have risen sharply.
A more prolonged disruption of production
and transport in the Middle East could lead
to even higher prices of energy and other commodities.
Until now, many margins of adjustment
in energy markets have helped cushion the shock.
Rerouting of energy supplies,
increased energy production in other countries, inventory drawdowns,
substitution to other sources of energy,
including renewables, and higher energy efficiency
have all helped contain the impact of the shock.
Without these margins,
we estimate that this year's global growth would have been 60 basis
points lower at 2.5 percent instead of 3.1 percent.
But some of these margins, in particular
inventories and energy efficiency gains, are reaching their limits.
Extreme weather events
triggered by El Niño could cause further disruption
in commodity markets, exacerbating
supply pressures.
A second limit to resilience stems from the composition of growth.
The AI-related
boom through investment
and trade has been a key driver of global growth, but AI supply
chains are highly concentrated in a few countries,
sectors and firms, which creates potential
choke points. Moreover,
a market value correction and AI threats to cybersecurity could weigh
on growth and add financial stability risks.
The third limit to resilience is fiscal.
Higher borrowing costs and interest rate payments
could crowd out critical spending in other areas
and reduce fiscal buffers for future
shocks.
In Chapter 1 of the WEO report,
we illustrate further vulnerabilities by considering a risk
scenario in which higher commodity prices
and concerns with the fiscal outlook lead
to a reassessment of public borrowing risks.
This causes an increase in both the term premium
and inflation expectations.
In that scenario, growth in advanced
and emerging economies would be 50 to 60 basis points lower
by 2027 relative to the baseline forecast,
with inflation materially higher.
This confluence of risks calls for decisive action.
Fiscal policy must be restrained to contain demand pressures
at a time of highly inflationary
risks.
Countries with high debts
and deficits need to initiate a fiscal consolidation and make
sure that deficits and ultimately debt are on a downward trajectory.
Any support measure, if needed,
should be temporary and targeted to protect the most
vulnerable while preserving price signals.
In turn, monetary policy should remain firmly focused
on price stability in line with central
banks' mandates.
The monetary policy stance should
be sufficiently restrictive to prevent second-round effects
and ensure a timely return of inflation to target.
The appropriate stance will vary across countries.
Starting levels of inflation, labour market tightness,
and exposure to technology and commodity shocks
are all key policy guideposts.
More than ever, central bank independence is vital
in achieving inflation targets.
To support medium-term growth,
countries should continue to build fiscal buffers,
safeguard financial stability,
enhance private sector dynamism, and strengthen supply-side resilience.
Let me conclude by stressing the main message.
The economy has been resilient,
but that resilience is reaching its limits.
The task ahead is to move from coping to rebuilding,
restoring fiscal space and supply-side resilience,
and in that way, strengthen countries' ability to grow sustainably.
Thank you. Over to you.
Thank you, Silvana.
So before we open the floor to your questions,
let me remind some ground rules.
If you want to ask a question, raise your hand.
If we call on you, identify yourself
and the outlet that you represent to keep things organized.
We're going to start with two rounds of global questions,
and then we're going to be moving to regions and countries.
So also, I want to remind you that we are here
to discuss the World Economic Outlook.
So if you have questions regarding country programs
or institutional issues this is not the forum you're going
to have plenty of opportunities
this week during those regional press conferences
and the managing directors
press conferences this week
so we're going to start with global questions who has global questions
i'm going to go through two rounds
so i'm going to start with the gentleman here i'm going to go
through
um here here
okay so now
center
of the room
i'm going
to go to um
the first uh
lady here
in the first row and then
I will go to the
person on the back
where is the mic
we're going to be grouping questions so we
make this a little bit of a speed dating
thing. Hi, Jorgelina Rosario
with Bloomberg. Following up on AI
basically asking directly
if AI was not into
the 2026-2027 factor
will the world economy
be on recession and
secondly MD
Shorsheva just mentioned a slow tsunami on jobs.
This is mainly for advanced economies, but this will
also have an impact on EM, even if AI is not as developed
as in advanced economies. What type of preparedness are you advising
for both advanced and emerging economies if the AI boom
does not prove to generate the productivity that is expected?
Thank you. Okay, just one more question. I'm going to go to a gentleman
behind there and then we will move
to that side of the room. Hi, David Lauter
with Reuters News Service. Just following up on Jorge's question about
potential for a global recession
if AI completely comes unraveled and we have
a major asset price reductions.
How prepared are countries to respond to
that? Is there any particular region
or country that still has fiscal space
left or is this the reason why we need
to start to rebuild thank you okay we
have those two questions on the opposite forces
of the global economy AI and the
potential of of our recession if things go wrong thank you
so let's start with
AI and let's start with the facts
and the hard data and then I'll move to the
forecast and what's in perspective
so AI has had a big role in global
trade and growth.
Just to give you a sense of magnitudes, global trade grew
between 2023 and 2025 by 8.3% cumulatively.
Global trade in goods
related to AI grew by 29%.
Without that global trade in AI related products, the
overall trade would have been only 4.6% instead of 8.3%. So
these are big numbers so more prospectively looking into the
future what we do in the forecast in the wheel
is look at different scenarios for
AI in our baseline we assume
that in the baseline forecast we assume that this
boom dissipates over time what we
do in the scenario analysis is assume that
that boom lasts for longer that's
the scenario a and is coupled with actual
productivity gains from AI in that case you have
a further expansion in activity
that is not inflationary we have
a second scenario scenario B in which we
still have this demand boom
but that is that doesn't come with the gains in
productivity and so the gains there for growth are smaller
and that comes with
higher levels of inflation.
And the third scenario which perhaps relates to what
David had in mind is one in which there's a reassessment of the
profitability gains from AI
and that reassessment leads to a downward
adjustment in in demand
so what we you will see in this in in the simulations
is effects on the level not on growth
so there are no really growth effects in in
here you can play with the numbers
and scale up or down the shock but I mean
that's that's that's the exercise that we have done
and it's it's basically an
unwind of this boom that we are seeing.
In terms of jobs, the research department has done a lot
of work on the impact of AI on jobs, and is updating that work.
It put together an index
of preparedness, and you might want to look at that work.
I don't have the exact numbers here,
but definitely something that we can share with you
and it's publicly available.
I don't know if you would like to...
Okay.
Okay, so second round of global questions.
No one here?
I'm going to go to the gentleman on the 1, 2, 3, 4th row
and then I will go to this side of the room.
Hi, this is Sebastian from Kyodo News.
Yeah.
Thank you for taking my question.
I'd like to elaborate more about
the recent rise in long-term interest rates.
As government bond yields increase across a number of countries,
what risks and implications
do you see for global growth
and financial stability?
In this environment, how should major central banks such
as Federal Reserve or the European
Central Bank and the Bank of Japan conduct monetary policy?
Thank you.
Okay,
I'm going to go here.
Thank you very much.
Yes, yes.
You can hear me.
My name is Vasil Slav from BTV Bulgaria.
So since the beginning of the year,
we have a pressure on the oil prices because of the
Middle East.
If this continues for, for example,
six more months, what will happen?
Thank you.
Last question from these global rounds.
Go to a gentleman on the...
Yeah.
Thank you.
Faisal Islam, BBC News.
following up the question on fiscal policy i'm struck looking
at your data bank that the major
g7 countries you know half of them aren't actually reducing
their deficits um according to your your
data between 2025 and 2031 what is your call
to the the major g7 countries and just to get a
kickstart on the national questions
and the uk obviously stands apart from that with a four
percent deficit reduction um do you think you know what does
that say about the uk as regards to g7
about the UK we will go then to the European region
and we can gather those questions but
we have a question on the long-term bond yields another
on oil prices if they continue
and fiscal policy for G7. Okay
so on the first question on increasing in interest rates I think
it's important to think about the drivers behind
that increase in interest rate because that helps
us understand the effects as well
so there are essentially three main drivers one is growth
itself the investment boom driven by ai has been a big driver of demand
and that pushed
pushed up on interest rates moreover within
the demand forces we have seen higher government
spending since the pandemic which has also added to demand
and hence interest rates this is in a
way a reversal of what we had before the pandemic
when we were talking about the secular stagnation
weak demand low interest rates but now that demand is stronger
and we have higher equilibrium rates
coming from that stronger demand the second element
that has been very important is energy
prices of energy prices
and also other commodity prices part of this negative supply shock that
we're talking about, which constrains capacity globally
and pushes up inflation and calls also for
a response of central banks. So that's the second force
behind. And the third component is the premium component.
This interaction between high debt and high interest rates
given that interaction and the
risks that they pose mean that
investors are calling for a premium on bonds.
Okay, so that's the extra.
And then another component of that premium
is that in a setting with supply shocks,
bonds are not very good hedges against the cycle.
And hence, again, there is a compensation for that
that investors are asking.
So you have those three elements, three main elements.
One is growth itself.
So, when we think about, okay, will borrowing cause hamper growth?
Well, it's offsetting part of the growth, but,
you know, it's the result of that growth.
Whereas, obviously,
the part that comes from energy prices is a purely supply-side shock.
How should monetary policy react?
But again, to the first part on raising demand factors,
that's classical demand shock
and monetary policy kind of set by being more restrictive.
The energy shock is a supply shock
and inflation is driven by the supply side.
So in there, monetary policy has to be a little bit more cautious
and manage that demand side in order to make sure
that inflation returns back to target.
There are no second round effects and no de-anchoring of expectations.
But obviously, you achieve that by restricting demand and hence
exacerbating the falling activity that the shock itself is causing.
and so
going back to your question
how should monetary policy react
in principle it should be
more restrictive in order to
make sure that inflation returns
to target as we said before
we expect inflation to
pick up this year
and also next year and so it's
important that central banks
following their mandate
keep a sufficiently restrictive
stance
There was a question
Commodities, what will happen
if the oil prices are still
high? Yes, exactly that
question is, we will try to
address with the scenario in chapter
one of the WEA report
so you can see it
in box
box
1.2, table
1.21
so we look at the scenario
in which commodity
prices remain
high for an extra
roughly six months.
Actually, they
are higher by 17 and
40% in each of the two years,
2026 and 2027.
You can see in the table
the impact on advanced economies
and emerging markets.
We have downgrades
that will lead to a downgrade to growth
and an increase in inflation in both groups of countries.
We add to that scenario another layer
in which on top of the commodity price increase,
we also see an increase in the term premium
and inflation expectations,
and that leads to the higher numbers
that you can see at the end of the table.
But I invite you to look at the report
and we have a bigger discussion of the assumptions
that go into the exercise.
And then G7 recommendations, fiscal recommendations?
So the overall message
is that countries with high debts
and high risks associated to those debts
should start a fiscal consolidation
to make sure that deficits and ultimately debt
are in a downward trajectory.
As you pointed out, we have a table on fiscal policy
in the report, table 1.8, in that second panel you can see
the UK, it has the deficit, the
debt stabilising primary surplus just
as at our prediction for this year, so as you know
the UK has already started the consolidation process
and it's the country that basically
stands out in that table along with India as well okay
so we have 20 minutes and we have to go
through all the regions in the world
so we're gonna do this relatively quick we're gonna start
with Asia Pacific we are here in Thailand
so if you have questions about the region or specific
countries in Asia Pacific please raise your hand i see
the man yeah go stand up so it's easy to
identify you and then we will go here on the front hi i'm
from the Standard Thailand uh my question
is about uh it's about the report that you call
for rebuilding buffer before the next shock how
much room do countries like Thailand can absorb next shock
and what should we rebuild first thank
you perfect so now we're gonna go here
on the front row i'm gonna take the lady in red jacket
Thank you. On China, so could you walk us through
the latest growth projection on China, 4.5% for this year,
and specifically how are the major forces highlighted in your report,
the geopolitical tensions, trade fragmentation,
and AI technology cycle playing a role shaping this outlook? Thank you.
And then we have received also a question through the press centre
from Yonhap News Agency about the outlook for South Korea.
So we have Thailand and rebuilding buffers, China and South Korea.
So let me start with an overview of the region,
given that we have a few countries in the questions.
Overall, this is the region
that has grown the most.
We have upward revisions for many countries in the region,
and there are the same stories
in here, except that the AI component is very,
very strong in Asia.
So this region has been incredibly resilient,
even though they are net importers of energy
and other commodities,
the AI boom has more than offset the weaknesses coming from, or
the headwinds from the commodity markets.
So we have China and India,
they're the big engines of growth here.
Growth has been revised up sizably for China, sorry, for India.
we're expecting India to grow by 7% this year and next year.
China, China's growth for this year is projected to be 4.5%,
and next year, 4%.
And then we have a set of countries
that are very well integrated in the AI supply chain,
and those have seen significant upward revisions,
notably here Korea, Singapore, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and to some extent also Thailand.
So these countries, you know,
AI has been a big driver of this strong performance
and big drivers of the forecast revisions, upward revisions.
Let me say a couple of words on Thailand.
So Thailand last year had a deflation.
This year, we are expecting it to come out of that deflationary state.
Growth is projected to be 2.1% this year and 2.1% next year.
Coincidentally, inflation is also 2.1%, so 2.1% everywhere this year.
Next year, we expect inflation to go down to 1.7%.
It has coped well, again,
despite being a net importer of energy,
and it has been helped by this AI boom
that is really strong in this part of Asia.
Other countries within Asia
have not been as successful as being part of this,
but certainly there is a big mass
that are benefiting from the AI boom.
Okay, so because we're running out of time,
I'm going to combine two regions.
I'm going to go to Europe and the Middle East.
So if you have questions on Europe
and the Middle East, raise your hand.
I see my UK reporters there already.
So let's get some questions on the UK.
And then I think that we have a question
on the Middle East on the front row.
Let's do this because we have 15 minutes and 39 seconds.
Thank you. Hi.
Ed Conway from Sky News just on the UK.
So you said, given that there are rising debt levels
and bond yields are rising,
that decisive action is necessary.
Can you just be clear?
We have the new chancellor, John Healey,
he's giving his first budget.
Is decisive action necessary for the UK specifically?
Okay, and we're going to go here on the front row.
Do you have, I can get another question on the UK,
but we are on a very strict time here
and you will have the European department
press briefing later this week.
Please go ahead.
This is Noura Mershe from Al Sharq Bloomberg
from the Middle East.
So the regional outlook was prepared
before the latest escalation around Bab al-Mandeb
and the renewed Houthi's attack,
does that mean that the fund's outlook
for the region may now be somewhat optimistic,
particularly when it comes to the non-oil activity
in the GCC and Saudi Arabia,
given the exposure to regional trade and logistics?
And looking across the region,
which economies have the strongest fiscal buffers
to absorb a prolonged disruption?
And thinking here particularly of Egypt,
but because if tensions were to persist
and shipping through the Red Sea were further disrupted,
how concerned would the fund be about the impact
of the Suez Canal revenues and the Egyptian economy?
Okay, so we have two questions, UK,
and then we can go to the Middle East outlook.
Okay, so on the UK, I mean, as we said before,
the UK has already started a consolidation path,
fiscal consolidation.
It is on that trajectory,
and the message for the UK is just simply stay the course
and continue on that trajectory.
I will pass the question on the Middle East to my colleagues.
Thank you.
Petia, get closer to the mic so we can...
Perfect. Yes?
You can hear me now?
I think so.
So the impact in the Middle East is,
I would say, quite heterogeneous
and there's a significant difference between
the outlook for oil exporters and oil importers.
Just to be clear, we actually revised
in the last minute almost our forecast to incorporate the
higher oil prices. So that being said, of course,
there are the risks in that area still on the
downside, and that's why we
also developed some of the scenarios that Silvana spoke about earlier
that tried to quantify what the impact would
be if oil prices were even higher.
So when it comes to, again, the oil exporters,
especially in the Gulf region, we have a sharp contraction
in the forecast for their production activity, for their exports,
which is followed by, again, a strong rebound in 2027,
subject, again, to the assumptions that we have made.
We are seeing some slowdown in some countries,
also in the non-oil sectors for those oil exporters.
But again, risks there are also on the downside.
Now, for oil importers, it's a slightly different story.
We actually have a small upgrade there.
In many of these economies, there's still a robust domestic demand
and remittances and tourism are also holding up.
Now, there was also a specific question on Egypt,
and there we have an upgrade of the
forecast, both for this year and for next,
and this is driven by the rebound in the activity
in the Suez Canal and also petroleum-related activity,
but growth is expected to moderate
rate due to the lagged impact of the conflict.
And again, risks are very much on the downside
as in the rest of the region. Thanks.
Okay, we continue our traveling around the world. And now
we're going to combine two regions, Africa and Western Hemisphere.
So I'm going to go to the
lady here and then the lady on the front row.
And actually, if you want, if I call on you stand up,
so it's easier to see you in the room.
Thank you. And good morning. My name is
Duduzile Ramela from MoneyWeb.
What should the monetary policy response be
for oil importing economies,
more so that are outside of the technology value chain?
Okay, and we're going to go to the lady.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
I'm Nancy from Nigeria.
Earlier on, when you were talking,
you said that fiscal policy is already restrained.
So my question concerning Africa is,
how can African governments pursue fiscal consolidation
and put public debt on a sustainable downward trajectory?
Of course, given that there's still poverty,
imposing more hardship on vulnerable populations,
even like Nigeria.
And how can fiscal and monetary policy be better positioned
to ensure the burden of stabilization does not fall
so much on ordinary citizens like we even see in Nigeria
while preserving price, stability, and investors' confidence?
Thank you.
Okay, so we're going to answer these questions on Africa.
then we will move to the Western Hemisphere.
So on the first question on monetary policy,
how it should respond to an oil price shock
when there is no demand impulse.
I think, I mean, that's a situation,
the classical situation of trade,
all from the perspective of monetary policy.
Inflation is high,
but activity is being constrained or reduced by the shock.
And this is where the central bank
needs to manage the trade-off, make sure that inflation returns to
target within the policy horizon. We typically
think about two years, two to three years.
And so clearly it's a different situation than economies
that are experiencing a demand boom.
And so in there we're talking about central banks, again,
focus on price stability and make sure that you
keep a stance that is sufficiently restrictive
for inflation to return to target, but obviously
you're not, you know, going fully as you would go if this was a demand,
a pure demand shock.
So there's a lot of discussion of this heterogeneity
in the response of monetary policy,
depending on different circumstances.
And of course, other guideposts will be, okay,
how tight is the labor market,
what are the levels of inflation to start with,
and, again, exposure to AI or other commodities.
So, yeah, I invite you to take a look at that.
Yeah, and I think that maybe for Nigeria,
we should pass the floor to Denise.
Sure.
So let me start with the question
about fiscal policy, in particular in Africa, right?
And so the things to emphasize here is that what we are advocating
for is for policymakers to balance the near-term needs of the population,
and that involves food security, that involves energy security, given
that the prices of food and energy is increasing disproportionately,
and while also keeping in mind the medium-term stability.
And how to do that is, of course, a great question, and we do actually
also in one of our analytical chapters, our chapter two,
is looking particularly into fiscal policy responses that's most
effective when dealing with what we're calling cost-of-living crisis,
where the price of essentials are increasing faster than
the rest of the consumption basket.
What that means in practice, maybe Nigeria is a good example, right?
While the growth held up in Nigeria, given it's an energy exporter,
power rates are still very high,
and we are very mindful that the population is suffering
when it comes especially to food security,
with all sorts of risks from El Nino.
So in that environment, what we're advocating for is cash transfers
and income support, targeted temporary income support
for the most vulnerable households in Nigeria
that can be done by the cash transfers
that alleviate high poverty and ensure food security.
And that needs to be coupled with, you know,
aligned with a medium-term fiscal framework.
And there, what that involves is improving expenditure quality
and improving revenue collection.
Let me stop there.
Okay, we have 6 minutes, 25 seconds,
and we're going to the Western Hemisphere.
Here we include Latin America, U.S., so if you have questions,
raise your hand, and I'm going to go through a quick round.
Please, the lady here in the front,
and then I will go to the lady back there.
Thank you.
Karen Vanessa Quintero from El Espectador, Colombia.
My question is, what is the outlook for Latin America,
and what factors could affect the region's economic growth?
Thank you.
And then we're going to go to the lady.
Stand up so they can see you.
Hi.
Yeah, we can hear you.
I was wondering why the IMF
decided to cut the growth
forecast for Argentina, mostly
considering it's going to become
an energy exporter in this context
and also how do you assess
the fiscal development
of Argentina considering the
World Economic Outlook mentions the need
for fiscal
space. Thank you. Any questions
on the US? No? So
let's go with these two and then if we
have time we might go to another one
but uh yeah five minutes okay so on the outlook for latin
america we are forecasting growth in 2026
to be 2.3 percent a small downgrade from what we had
before and 2.5 percent in 2027 uh
also a small downgrade inflation is projected at 4.2 percent
for the region in 2026 and 4.1 percent in 2027.
Again, the outcomes in Latin America are fairly
heterogeneous depending on the commodity exposure of the countries.
AI has not been a very strong
driver in the region so far.
So we have the commodity exporters doing fairly well and the
importers are faring
not as well.
So we have this heterogeneity
in the region.
And again,
the advice from the fund
is to keep the eye on
inflation
and make sure
that we
prevent any second round
effects from this energy
and commodity shock, both for
exporters and also for importers.
And then we have a question.
In Argentina,
we have a projected slowdown in growth
from 4.5 last year to 2.1 this year
and then a pickup to 3.5 in 2027.
For this year, the number represents a downward revision of 1.4
and also we have a downward
revision for 27 as well.
Now, this downward revision that I was talking about is really due
to the weaker activity that we've already observed through
the third quarter of this year, and we've seen softer domestic
demand amid still tight domestic financial conditions
and the ongoing structural transformation of the Argentine economy.
Now, that being said,
we do expect growth to start recovering in the last quarter
of this year and to strengthen further in 2027, 2028.
And part of that recovery is due to the positive terms of trade
that we're expecting, as well as the easing of financial conditions,
as well as the pickup in investment.
which is also expected in our forecast.
Now, of course, the strength in exports
in agricultural products as well as energy
is part of the story in terms of that recovery.
And then on the fiscal picture, you know,
the fiscal adjustment has been an important part
of the stabilization effort, and I think for more detailed assessment,
I would refer you to the regional briefing
that's coming up in the latter part of this week.
Friday, yes. Thank you.
Okay, we have two minutes.
We have a new economic councillor.
We're going to start a new tradition.
So it's your first press conference, Silvana.
What are the main messages you want all these people
to leave the room with?
Okay, so let me stress the main message.
The global economy has been resilient,
but that resilience is reaching its limits.
So we need to move from just coping to rebuilding.
We need to restore fiscal space.
We need to rebuild supply-side resilience.
And that entails many steps,
depending on where the weak links or critical inputs are,
whether it's energy or other critical inputs.
And so that's the homework for everyone,
to make sure that we're resilient
and we replenish that resilience
in the face of potentially new shocks.
Okay, all good things come to an end.
And I think that we're going to make it one minute.
So on behalf of Silvana, Petya, Denise,
the communications department,
the research department,
and also we want to thank
to the Thai authorities for hosting us.
We want to thank you
for attending this press briefing.
If you want to attend
the global financial stability report release
and press briefing
is going to happen in this exact room
at 10.15am. I would
recommend you also tomorrow
fiscal issues, press briefing is
going to happen here, the managing director
director's global policy agenda
is happening tomorrow here in this room too
and later on the week all
those regional press briefings
that we've been talking about and
where you will be able to ask about
country programs and get more granularity
happening probably
Thursday and Friday. Thank you very
much have a great day and if you have any questions comments imf media
at imf.org thank you very much
