Uganda Mayor Exposes China Project: Concrete Dug Out By Hand, “Would You Do This In China?”

China Observer
822粉絲
On September 19, Ronald Balimwezo, the mayor of Uganda’s capital Kampala, inspected drainage facilities at a road construction site on Salama Road and questioned whether some drainage work met construction standards. He ordered the contractor to remove and rebuild the sections.
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On September 19, Ronald Balinwiso, the mayor of Uganda's capital Kampala, inspected drainage
facilities at a road construction site on Salama Road and questioned whether some drainage
work met construction standards. He ordered the contractor to remove and rebuild the sections.
The video shows Mayor Balinwiso, a civil engineer by training, personally inspecting the drainage
system and finding that the concrete should be dug out by hand. He strongly criticised
a Chinese consultant from the Chinese state-owned construction group, China Railway Construction
Corporation.
Why didn't you construct the actual thing? Did you get instructions from the consultant?
Yes, we did.
Did you instruct them to do this?
No, no, no.
If it rained, what would happen? Do you know this is a bomb?
Can you bring that volume of water? Can you bring that volume of water and connect it
to this and you think it will stay? For even a minute?
You want to confuse me? You think I'm not an engineer?
No, I'm just wondering.
If we had a downpour, can this remain? If we had a downpour, look at that bore. Can
that quantity of water pass through this? Can it ever happen? You only wanted to cheat
Can you do this in China? Did you get instructions from him?
In another video, Kampala Mayor Balinwezo inspected a stone bore drainage project and
found that the stones came loose with a simple touch. He questioned the contractor,
What are you doing? Would you dare do this in China?
The mayor appeared highly emotional, repeatedly saying the project was substandard. He accused
the contractor of cutting corners and demanded that the work be rebuilt.
After the video spread on overseas Chinese social media platforms, some users commented,
Wherever the Communist Party goes, disaster begins. What the mayor doesn't know is that
they build this way in China too, or even worse.
Uganda was warned over a decade ago about the Chinese Communist Party's Bolt and Road
debt trap and its notorious shoddy construction projects. They clearly knew we were right,
but they still wanted to believe the Chinese. Others said, This is the quality of the CCP.
The CCP military is probably at the same level.
It's worth noting that Balinwezo himself has a civil engineering background. Records
from the Ugandan parliament list his profession as engineer. In 2009, he completed a master's
thesis in civil engineering at Makerere University, a comparative study of the participation of
local and foreign construction firms in donor-funded road construction projects in Uganda.
According to local media outlet Nile Post reports on September 21, after Balinwezo raised
concerns, the Chinese contractor later removed the disputed sections and carried out reconstruction
work. After returning to the site for another inspection, Balinwezo said the repairs had
addressed the previous problems.
Balinwezo told media that the design of the affected section was inadequate for effectively
draining rainwater. He warned that the poor drainage could cause flooding on the road,
accelerate road deterioration, and affect nearby residents.
According to Kampala City government records, the approximately 5 miles, 8.1 kilometer road
is part of Kampala City Roads Rehabilitation Project, funded by the African Development
Bank. The contractor responsible for the Salama Road project is China Railway 18 Bureau Group,
a subsidiary of CRCC.
Like many Chinese construction companies, CRCC has also faced a number of controversies.
In November 2024, an investigation by the African Development Bank Group found that
China Railway Construction Bridge Engineering Bureau Group, a subsidiary of CRCC, had engaged
in fraudulent practices during bidding processes for projects in Africa.
As a result, the FDB imposed a 12-month conditional non-debarment sanction on the company, effective
from November 7, 2024. During this period, the company was required to establish a compliant
integrity system before returning to normal bidding status.
In 2024, a Deputy General Manager of China Railway 15th Bureau Group, another CRCC subsidiary,
was formally charged in Hong Kong by the Independent Commission Against Corruption and other
authorities for accepting bribes of up to US$250,000 from subcontractors.
The case exposed integrity weaknesses and compliance risks in the company's overseas
and cross-border subcontracting management.
In China, CRCC has also faced regulatory scrutiny. In April 2026, the Safety Supervision Office
of China's Ministry of Transport conducted a regulatory meeting with CRCC. Such meetings
are usually linked to safety concerns, construction accidents, or poor regulatory oversight in
the company's recent projects.
Prior to this, on February 2, 2026, the Yuegang Bridge in Yancheng City, Jiangsu Province,
which was being built by China Railway 12th Bureau Group, a subsidiary of CRCC,
suddenly collapsed during the final stage of construction.
Around 20 workers were on the bridge carrying out tasks such as steel reinforcement work
and concrete pouring. The accident ultimately left five people dead.
At the moment of collapse, the bridge structure broke in a V-shape.
The impact was heard 300 meters away, a concrete mixer truck overturned,
and large amounts of construction materials fell into the river.
Chinese state-owned companies bring substandard construction practices overseas as well,
sparking anger in host countries. Uganda has paid the price more than once.
China is one of Uganda's largest sources of foreign direct investment.
Uganda officially joined the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative in September 2018.
In 2024, China and Uganda upgraded their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership.
However, over the past decade, relations between the two have been marked by disputes.
Uganda's independent newspaper Daily Monitor reported in 2021 that Uganda
borrowed US$200 billion from the Export-Import Bank of China in March 2015
to expand Entebbe International Airport.
The loan agreement had a 20-year term, including a seven-year grace period,
which was set to expire in 2022.
However, Uganda later discovered some toxic clauses in the agreement
and sought to renegotiate the terms.
Without changes, some clauses could potentially allow the airport and other government assets
to be seized and taken over by the CCP through arbitration proceedings in Beijing.
Officials from the Uganda Civil Aviation Authority identified as many as 13 clauses
in the agreement as unfair and eroding Uganda's sovereignty.
Although Uganda sought revisions to the loan agreement, the Chinese side refused to renegotiate.
The dispute eventually ended with China making partial adjustments to several clauses
that UCAA considered the most concerning regarding sovereignty issues.
In addition, in 2015, Uganda signed an engineering, procurement and construction contract
with China Harbour Engineering Company for the development of the Malaba Kampala
Standard Gorge Railway project, which would connect to the Kenyan border.
The railway project was part of the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative.
CHEC is a wholly owned subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company.
In January 2023, Uganda terminated its contracts with CHEC.
It later officially signed a railway construction agreement worth about €2.7 billion
with YARPI Merkeci, a well-known Turkish railway construction company, on October 14, 2024.
Uganda's independent media outlet Parliament Watch Uganda reported on the reasons behind the change.
According to the report, Uganda's Standard Gorge Railway project had been delayed for nearly a decade.
The Chinese bank originally expected to finance the railway project remained dissatisfied with the project.
Eventually, China National Offshore Oil Corporation had to end cooperation with Uganda three years ago.
The collapse of China-Uganda Corporation this time forced Uganda to reconsider its financing strategy
and actively seek support from multilateral lenders,
including the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.
A Ugandan NGO reviewed that the African Development Bank had committed US$650 million
to build the 203-mile, 326-kilometer Malaba-Kampala Railway.
The announcement was made during the FDB's annual meeting in Brazzaville,
the capital of the Republic of the Congo.
It was the most concrete financing commitment the project had received
since Uganda moved away from Chinese lenders and sought other partners.
In recent years, the CCP has actively expanded its diplomatic engagement in Africa.
In May 2026, it introduced a 4-0 tariff policy for 53 African countries
that maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing.
The only African country excluded was Eswatini, which maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
However, Uganda's changing approach toward the CCP reflects that some African countries
do not necessarily have full confidence in Beijing.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, the CCP has exported debt dependence,
geopolitical influence, excess industrial capacity, authoritarian governance models,
surveillance technology, environmental pollution, and corruption risks overseas.
Some Asian countries with close ties to Beijing also face significant challenges
related to the Belt and Road projects.
China and Pakistan have long described their relationship as an all-weather friendship.
Pakistan joined the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative as early as 2013.
Over the past decade, the CCP has invested tens of billions of dollars
in Pakistan's Balochistan province and Gwadar.
The project, known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
is designed to connect Xinjiang with the Arabian Sea.
The Pakistan Railway Upgrade Project is one of the most important and largest components of the CPEC.
However, the project has recently been exposed as facing unprecedented difficulties.
The Pakistan Railway Upgrade Project is a cornerstone of Pakistan's U.S. $60 billion investment plan.
The original proposal called for upgrading about 1,800 kilometers of Pakistan's main railway network.
In 2015, Pakistan rejected an earlier U.S. $3.5 billion financing plan
from the Asian Development Bank after the CCP pledged to provide the funding separately.
In 2017, China and Pakistan signed a framework agreement.
China originally planned to provide about 85% of the project's funding through concessional loans.
At the time, the total project cost was estimated around U.S. $7.7 billion to U.S. $8 billion.
Both sides described it as a project of strategic importance.
However, financing agreements have failed to materialize for years.
The original completion target of 2022 has been repeatedly delayed,
and even today, full-scale construction on major sections has not begun.
A major reason behind the prolonged delay in Chinese funding is Pakistan's own heavy debt burden and payment pressures.
Reports indicate that as of the end of June 2026,
Pakistan still owed 423 billion rupees to power plants built by Chinese companies under the CPEC framework.
Pakistan has sought relief from some late payment penalties,
but Chinese financial institutions and power companies haven't accepted the request.
Over 260 billion rupees in principal payments also remain unresolved.
While Pakistan waited for the funding, its railway equipment continued to deteriorate.
Local passengers complained that some train windows no longer open or close properly,
air conditioning frequently breaks down, toilets lack water and have poor hygiene conditions,
and aging locomotives often suffer breakdowns in remote areas.
Currently, more than 63% of locomotives are over 20 years old, with mechanical failures continuing to rise.
It's worth noting that Pakistan's urgency to upgrade the railway line is also linked to Rakhodik copper mine.
The mine is expected to begin production in 2028.
Without timely railway improvements, transporting copper concentrate to ports could become difficult.
After nine years with Chinese funding still not secured,
Pakistan once again turned to the Asian Development Bank for assistance.
This year, Pakistan has gradually moved the ML1 railway upgrade project out of China-led CPEC framework
and resumed financing negotiations with the ADB.
Reuters reported that the ADB is preparing to lead financing agreements for the roughly 500-km section between Karachi and Rohri.
This is the core section of the first phase of ML1,
with a total investment of about US$2.04 billion and an estimated construction period of three years.
Although China and Pakistan continue to describe their relationship as an all-weather friendship,
and China hasn't officially announced its withdrawal from ML1,
Beijing's recent discussions on the next phase of CPEC cooperation have focused mainly on agriculture,
industry, mining, Gwadar ports and high technology, without specifically mentioning ML1.
In addition, Pakistan's newest and most expensive Gwadar International Airport,
which cost US$240 million, was built entirely by Chinese companies.
It is also a key project under the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
The airport was completed in October 2024 and officially began commercial operations in January 2025,
but it has a low flight frequency and limited operating hours.
It has become another highly controversial Belt and Road project.
More and more countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative are realizing that
asking the CCP to build large-scale infrastructure projects can come with a high cost.
Although many Belt and Road projects receive funding from major financial institutions,
there are still huge financing gaps every year, leaving participating countries with high debt burdens.
Once debtor countries are unable to repay their loans, they may face pressure to hand over assets to the CCP.
There are many examples of this.
Sri Lanka has been a major focus of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The country borrowed billions of dollars from the CCP for infrastructure projects.
Critics argue that these loans push Sri Lanka deeper into debt,
with a large portion of government finances being used to repay loans.
Unable to repay its debts, Sri Lanka in 2017 was forced to release the strategically important
Hambantota port in the south of the country, along with 15,000 acres of surrounding land,
to China for 99 years.
The move triggered widespread criticism and protests inside Sri Lanka,
with demonstrators saying the country's sovereignty had been compromised.
In recent years, setbacks involving the Belt and Road Initiative,
as well as problems linked to some projects in participating countries,
have become increasingly prominent.
In February 2025, Panama withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative
and cancelled concessions for Chinese-operated ports.
It became the first country in Latin America to officially lead the initiative.
In Asia, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project in Indonesia,
a joint venture between China and Indonesia and mainly financed by the China Development Bank,
began operations in August 2023.
However, the project suffered major cost overruns.
The initial construction cost was US$6 billion,
including US$4.55 billion in 40-year loans from the China Development Bank
at an annual interest rate of 2%.
The project later exceeded its budget by US$1.2 billion due to various problems.
Because the railway has continued to operate at a loss,
Indonesian shareholders have suffered losses totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.
The Indonesian government negotiated debt restructuring with China,
eventually transferring the debt into state accounts
and extending the repayment period to about 80 years,
with annual repayments estimated at around US$56 million.
Indonesian officials have described the project as a financial time bomb.
Singapore's Lionghor Dadao recently reported that the Indonesian government
has launched a plan to transfer ownership and restructure debt
to the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway.
A special task force under the Ministry of Finance will take over
While the move significantly reduces Indonesia's near-term risk of debt default,
doubling the repayment period to 80 years means the debt burden will be passed on for generations.
If the railway is later extended to Surabaya in eastern Java,
cost overruns and debt risk could increase further.
In Africa, Kenya's tax authorities discovered in 2023 that China Communications Construction Company
had used a complex fraud scheme known as a missing trader arrangement.
The company was accused of using at least six shell companies to fabricate invoices
for construction material purchases,
inflating import value-added tax claims and illegally reducing its tax obligations.
After CCCC transferred large sums listed as material costs to these shell companies,
the funds were quickly moved into US dollar accounts and sent overseas, including to China.
Investigators said there was essentially no local commercial procurement behind the transactions.
In 2024, a Kenyan court found that CCCC had used shell companies
to evade about US$8 million in taxes.
The authorities recovered the funds.
Commentator Yang Bo said that the CCP not only exported substandard construction projects
and created debt risk in many countries, but also exported corruption.
While many countries have repeatedly become victims,
they continue cooperating with the CCP and fail to learn from past experiences.
In his view, this is because key figures in these countries receive benefits from Beijing,
which he described as unfortunate.
