China may be facing a banking crisis that looks nothing like a classic bank run. Instead of crowds rushing to withdraw cash, money is becoming harder to move, small rural banks are being dissolved or absorbed, and more bank funds are tied up in local-government debt. At the same time, Chinese banks are doing very strange things to attract customers — turning branches into coffee shops, football lounges, pet centers, reading rooms, and even marriage-registration venues. But beneath the absurdity is a much darker story. I also revisit the Henan village-bank scandal and a disturbing case circulating online involving a delivery worker allegedly linked to deliberate poisoning. I look at what a “slow-motion bank run” really means, why hundreds of small banks are disappearing, how China’s banks became increasingly entangled with local governments, and what happens when financial anger begins spilling into society. A bank run may already be happening in China — just without the run.
Hi everyone. Okay, I hope everyone is doing well.
All right, let's talk about China's banking crisis and what it actually looks like.
This is the long-awaited program. Well, I must tell you something strange is happening to banks
in China. You're used to walking a branch and ask, what's the interest rate? Now you might ask,
can I get a coffee? Where do I watch the football game? And apparently at one branch, you could ask,
where do I get married? I'm serious. Across China, banks are turning themselves into something
they're not. In Tangshan, a branch of the Postal Savings Bank of China converted about one-third
of its banking hall into a coffee bar and lounge. Here we go. I actually have a picture for you.
There it is. And then in Yunnan, Fudian, I think there's a bank called Fudian,
Fudian Bank in Yunnan took the coffee idea even further. It offers a coffee tasting area,
exhibits, and even special loans for coffee growers, processors, estates, and exporters.
Do I have a picture? Yeah, this is the bank, Fudian Bank in Yunnan. So yes, in China today,
you can literally get a coffee loan from a coffee bank. If you're not into coffee,
in Nantong, one Postal Savings Bank branch became a football fan zone. And then in Hangzhou,
another bank created a pet-friendly branch with pet rest areas. I think I have a picture of that.
This is the pet bank. They have pet-themed bank cards and social events for pet owners.
And then in Tianjin, one bank branch now hosts marriage registration. Here we go.
There we go. Yeah, you can walk into a bank and walk out married with a marriage certificate.
So Chinese netizens joked, forget saving money for interest. Now you can save money and get a spouse.
So what's going on? Why are Chinese banks suddenly trying so hard to become something
other than banks? Well, Chinese banks are dealing with increasingly empty branches
due to loss of population and increasing online banking. So Chinese banks are increasingly
talking about what they call scenario-based transformation. But this may look like a quirky
business story. But it points to a much bigger problem. What is actually happening inside China's
banking system, I think, is a banking crisis. And China's banks are not doing well.
So tonight, I want to talk about what a banking crisis actually looks like in China.
It doesn't necessarily look like the banking crisis we're used to seeing here in the West
or in other countries. You may not see thousands of people rushing into bank branches
or crowds of angry depositors banging on the doors. China's version could be much quieter,
much slower. The money is still there. But gradually, it becomes harder and harder for
you to move it. Some people call this a slow motion bank run. And once you understand the
idea, a lot of strange things happening in China's banking system begin to make more sense.
So what a slow motion bank run looks like? Well, let me give you a few examples. The first
is something Chinese homeowners have already complained about. Trying to pay off your mortgage
early becomes very difficult. Normally, you would think a bank should be happy when you
repay a loan early. They get their money back. But today, that may not be what the banks want.
Because once you repay that mortgage, the bank has to figure out where to lend the money next.
And in a weak economy, such as the one in China, with businesses struggling and both interest rate
and demand for good loans falling, lending out money isn't easy for banks.
So from the bank's perspective, a homeowner who keeps paying interest for another 10 to 20 years
is much more valuable because you are the bank's milk cow. So that was the first sign.
The second sign is that large withdrawals become more difficult. There are now more
administrative steps. Maybe you need an appointment. Maybe you need to explain what
the money is for. Maybe there are more forms, more approvals that you need to obtain.
There are longer waiting periods. Every additional step has the same effect.
It slows the money down. That's the second sign. And the third sign is that some wealth
management products may be delayed. Your principal was supposed to come back today.
Maybe it comes back later. Your interest payment was due. Maybe that gets pushed back as well.
And the fourth sign is that smaller local banks may impose tighter transfer limits,
especially when they're worried about money leaving too quickly.
Now, if you live in China, or if you follow China news, ask yourself, how many of these
situations have already happened? The answer is quite a lot. We've seen examples of them
across China over the past couple of years. That is why people call it a slow-motion bank run.
If everybody tries to withdraw money tomorrow, the bank has a problem.
But what do you do if you want to prevent that? You slow everybody down. Appointments,
transfer limits, waiting periods, more approvals, more procedures. The liquidity problem remains.
But instead of exploding in one afternoon, the pressure gets stretched over weeks,
months, or even years through these administrative measures.
I mean, there's a good historical analogy that explains this. Think about the rationing system
China used during periods of severe shortage, especially after the Cultural Revolution.
If pork becomes extremely scarce and you let the market operate freely, the price can shoot
through the roof. But with rationing, the official price may look stable. The shortage has not
disappeared. It has simply been converted into coupons, long waiting lines, and restrictions.
You have money, but money alone is no longer enough. You also need permission, a coupon,
and time. Bank liquidity can work the same way. You have money in the bank, but moving it becomes
increasingly difficult. So instead of an explosive bank run, you get a slow one.
Okay, that is only what customers see. Now let's look at the other side.
What is happening inside the banks themselves? Again, the key word is liquidity. Except this
time, the money is being locked up somewhere else. And one of the biggest places it's being
locked up is government debt. For years, Chinese commercial banks have been the enormous buyers
of local government bonds. By the end of 2025, commercial banks reportedly held roughly 80%
of outstanding local government bonds. And that works out to be around 44 trillion yuan.
And that's not all. That's only the visible part. China also has a huge amount of
so-called hidden debt, hidden local government debt,
most commonly known as local government financing vehicles, or LGFS. And how much is it? Well,
according to IMF's 2025 Article 4 report, published in January this year, estimated LGFV debt
was roughly 71 to 72 trillion yuan at the end of 2025, which was about 51% of China's GDP.
It's actually more than China's GDP, because we know China's GDP is inflated.
So once you include all of that, the exposure of Chinese banks to local government-related debt
becomes much larger. And this is where the banking crisis and local government debt crisis
begin to merge into one problem. Why are banks still buying this debt? You might ask,
if local governments are already in financial trouble, which is a fact known for quite a while,
if that's the case, why would banks keep lending money to them? The answer is actually very simple.
Because everything else may look even worse. Now, I know it's hard to understand, but imagine you
are running a bank in China today. You can lend money to a private developer, but that looks
dangerous. You can lend money to a struggling small business, not very attractive. You can
lend money to an indebted company in an industry with falling prices and increased competition.
Again, that's problematic. Or you can buy a bond backed by a local government.
The local government may be deeply in debt, but it's still the government. And in CCP China,
the government reigns supreme, and its borrowers are still perceived as having enormous power
and resources. So from the bank's perspective, that can still look like the safer option.
This is very important. The banks are not necessarily being dragged into this
completely against their will. Because many people believe that, because the banks are
controlled by the government, so therefore their hands are tied. They are obligated to loan money
to the governments, but that's not the case. In many cases, buying government debt may actually
look like the rational choice, and that creates a trap. The 10 trillion yuan debt rescue. Starting
in 2024, Beijing launched what became known as a 10 trillion yuan local government debt relief
program. The basic idea was to take expensive, opaque, hidden debt and replace it with cheaper,
longer-term official government bonds. That reduces the immediate repayment pressure.
But now comes the important question. Who buys many of those new bonds? The banks.
Think about what just happened. Local governments have old debts they're having trouble paying.
So those debts are replaced with new, longer-term government bonds. And many of the same state-owned
banks that were already exposed to local governments buy the new bonds. So the form
of the debt changes. The maturity changes, the interest rate changes, the immediate risk may go
down. But the relationship between banks and local governments becomes even tighter. The banks are
still funding the government, and that creates a deadlock. Beijing wants banks to lend more money
to the real economy. It wants them to support companies, because if companies grow, they hire
workers, they generate profits, and they pay taxes. Then local government finances improve.
That's how the system is supposed to work or is supposed to escape the trap. But the banks look
at the economy and say, why should I lend to a weak private company when I can buy a government
bond instead? So more money keeps flowing toward government debt. Less reaches businesses.
Businesses remain weak. Tax revenue remains weak. Land sales remain weak. Local governments remain
under pressure. So local governments borrow more, and the banks buy more of that debt.
You see the circle? The government needs the banks. The banks increasingly depend on the
government. The government borrows because the private economy is weak. The private economy
remains weak, partly because banks prefer lending to the government. Then the government becomes
even more indebted, and the banks become even more exposed to the government. They're tying
themselves together tighter and tighter. As long as the government can keep issuing debt, the system
can continue. But it also means more banking liquidity becomes tied up in government financing.
And if local governments eventually reach the point where they truly cannot
service the debt, then the banks have the same problem. They sink together.
So what does a bank become in this system? Let's answer this question because Chinese banks are
different. If you really think about it, in a normal commercial system, a bank is supposed to
take deposits and allocate capital to productive borrowers. It evaluates risk. It lends to companies
and households. Ideally, money flows toward productive parts of the economy. But when banks
become deeply entangled with government financing, their role begins to change. Increasingly, they
become financing vehicles for the state. And this is where fiscal policy and banking begin to blur
together. The government needs money. The banks have money. But where did that money originally
come from? People, from depositors, from households and businesses, from the savings
of millions or billions of people. So follow the circle. The public puts its savings into the banks.
The banks buy government debt. The government uses that money to support local finances
and refinance old obligations. And the banks become even more deeply tied to the government.
In essence, people's savings are not necessarily flowing into the real economy.
More and more of that money is being used to support government financing. Or put it another
way, the government is increasingly relying on people's savings to keep the system afloat.
The government, in the end, has access to the resources of the entire society
to keep its machinery afloat. And then administrative measures are used to prevent
the entire system from unraveling. This is how the Chinese government appears to have bottomless
resources and why its financial crisis is happening in slow motion. The crisis does
not necessarily appear as one giant explosion. It appears as money becoming gradually less mobile,
less available, more restricted, and more deeply tied to government financing.
And this is what people mean by a slow motion bank run in China. The money may still be
there on paper. The question is, how freely can you actually use it? And perhaps more importantly,
who is really using it? Now, the problem becomes visible. And this is where the story becomes much
more concrete. Because if banks and local governments are becoming increasingly tied
together, where should we expect the pressure to show up first? At the weakest level of both
systems, county-level governments and small banks that serve them. And that's exactly what
we're seeing now. At the end of 2024, China has about 1,500, 1,538 village banks, to be exact.
Last year, more than 300 exited through mergers, restructuring, or disillusion. Then the process
accelerated in 2026. By late July this year, only about 1,035 village banks remained. That means
China lost roughly 500 village banks in just 19 months. About a third of the entire village bank
sector disappeared as independent institutions in less than two years. And just this year, by late
July, another 140 had reportedly been approved for dissolution, and then another 45 for merger.
And this is not a normal pace of consolidation. It's a deliberate restructuring campaign.
Most of these institutions have been absorbed by larger banks. Their deposits, loans, branches,
and employees are transferred. The old legal entity disappears. The business continues.
It's a controlled cleanup. Let me give you two examples so that you understand the scale of
this kind of consolidation. On August 31st, regulators in Ningxia approved the dissolution
of 19 rural commercial banks. All of their assets, liabilities, businesses,
employees, and branches are being taken over by Huanghe Rural Commercial Bank.
Here's what makes that number so striking. Those 19 banks represented essentially all of Ningxia's
county-level rural commercial banks. So in one move, 19 independent banks disappeared into one
larger provincial institution. Basically, all county-level rural commercial banks disappeared
in this one move. They all got rolled up in one provincial bank. And Ningxia is not an isolated
case. In the beginning of this year, Jilin Rural Commercial Bank absorbed 56 institutions across
the province, eight rural commercial banks and 48 village banks. Again, dozens of independent banks
disappeared and became branches of one larger institution. Different places, same direction.
The small county-level banks are disappearing and their assets and risks are being transferred
upward into larger institutions. Why? Well, because these banks sit at the center of county economies.
They're exposed to local businesses, property, households, and crucially, local governments.
So when property market weakens, land sales, I should say land sale revenue disappears.
Local businesses struggle and county governments run out of money.
These small banks get hit from every direction at once.
In that scenario, Beijing, instead of allowing hundreds of small banks to fail individually,
Beijing consolidates them. But the problem has not disappeared. It's just that you put
all the problems together. You consolidated the problems. The container has become bigger,
but the problems are not going away. And it's interesting to mention that if you really think
about, I mean, here's a question. What are these banks actually worth? Because mergers and
acquisitions happen in every country. So on paper, they look like normal mergers and acquisitions.
Sure, if smaller banks are not doing well, we have larger banks, or a larger bank
takes them over. That looks like normal mergers and acquisitions. But the question is, how much
are these rural banks worth? And there's another way to measure how worried people are about these
smaller banks. Don't just look at the bank's report. Look at what investors are willing to
pay for them. Because right now, in some cases, the answer is, these smaller banks are not worth
much at all. Some stakes in small Chinese banks are being put up for auction again and again.
The prices keep falling, and nobody wants to buy. And that tells us something the official
balance sheets cannot. Beijing Business Today, it's a daily newspaper called Beijing Shangbao.
I think its English name is Beijing Business Today. It reported last week that judicial
auctions of small bank shares are repeatedly failing, even after prices are cut again and again.
One example is Bank of Ningxia. About 12 million shares were scheduled for a fourth
auction. The first three auctions all failed. The asking price started at 2.8 yuan per share,
then it was cut to 2.5, then to 2.3, then 2.1. That's a discount of almost 30%
from the original asking price. But after three attempts, nobody had placed a bid.
The auction attracted plenty of views, but watching is not buying. And Bank of Ningxia
is not alone. Similar auctions involving stakes in Jiangxi Guangxin Rural Commercial Bank
and Zhongyuan Bank also failed to attract buyers, even after substantial discounts.
It's like there's no one bidding. Why? Well, because investors are asking a very simple
question. Why should I buy part of a small bank when I don't know how much money it will make,
how bad its loans really are, or whether it may eventually be merged into another institution?
But I think this is an important signal. Official statistics can tell us what a bank report
looks like or what the bank or what its assets are worth, but an auction tells us something
different. It tells us what somebody is actually willing to pay. And right now, in many of these
auctions, according to state media, according to Beijing Business, its paper, Beijing Business
today, the answer is nothing. No one is willing to pay. People are not willing to put down the
money. So what does China's banking crisis look like? Put all of this together, at the customer
level, money becomes harder to move. At the bank level, more liquidity becomes tied up in
government financing. At the local level, weak banks are absorbed into larger institutions
instead of being allowed to fail openly. And in the market, investors are increasingly reluctant
to buy stakes in some of those banks, even at steep discounts. So China's banking crisis may
not look like one dramatic collapse. It looks like a long process of restriction, consolidation,
and risk transfer. The crisis is not resolved. It's being managed, delayed, and pushed upward
or pushed elsewhere, which leaves us with one key question. How far upward can the risk be
transferred before there's nowhere left to transfer it? Well, people are paying the real
price of this slow banking meltdown. I want to take this story away from balance sheets,
bad loans, and government debt for a moment, because banking crises ultimately don't happen
to banks. They happen to people. And there's a disturbing story circulating in China that
brings that home. About two weeks ago, several videos appeared online showing a food delivery
worker. Oh yeah, here's the bank that offers a reading room. Oh yeah, here we go. So there's a
video showing a food delivery guy apparently using a syringe to inject liquid into customers' food
and drinks. In one video, the bottle appears to be labeled Paraquat. Is that how you say it?
It's a toxic herbicide. It's a very toxic herbicide called Paraquat. Text added to the
video says, brothers, adding ingredients again, or I'm adding ingredients again. Another caption
claims more than 7,000 deliveries tampered with. Apparently, this food delivery guy has
been deliberately injecting small doses of Paraquat into people's food. But according to
people discussing the case online, the man is one of the victims of the Henan Village Bank scandal.
And that part brings us back to something very real. Remember back in April 2022,
four village banks in Henan suddenly stopped customers from withdrawing or transferring
their money online. Not only online, in branches as well. Hundreds of thousands
of depositors were affected. Many had been attracted by relatively high interest rates
offered through online platforms. Then suddenly their money was frozen. The money still appeared
in their accounts. They just couldn't take them out or take it out. Remember how I began this
program? I said China's banking crisis may not look like a classic bank run. The money can still
appear to be there. You just can't move it. For the Henan Village Bank depositors, that wasn't
a theory. It actually happened. Depositors traveled to Henan demanding their money back.
Some protested. I think two years later, I've seen videos, there were thousands of people
protested. And then even a few years later, there were hundreds of them. Some petitioned
the authorities again and again. The government later said a criminal group had illegally
controlled the banks and siphoned off funds. A repayment program eventually returned money to
many depositors. But some people said their funds were excluded. And years later,
some were still fighting to recover their money. According to online accounts now circulating,
the delivery guy who injected Paraguay into people's food and drinks was one of them.
He reportedly lost access to his savings, fell into financial hardship, and eventually began
working as a food delivery driver. This story is extremely disturbing
because it shows that the banking crisis has spilled outward. A man believes the system took
his money. He cannot reach the people he holds responsible. So his anger is redirected toward
somewhere else. The customer ordering lunch, the person drinking milk tea, a complete stranger,
and then as people were still reacting to the story, not knowing how to take it,
then another anonymous claim appeared online. A person, yeah, here we go. A person claiming to
be a doctor working for a major Chinese hospital said Paraguay poisoning cases
had surged dramatically over the past year. He said in the past, he saw a few cases every year.
But in the past year, there were thousands of deaths and more than 10,000 severe cases.
The person also claimed that many cases followed food deliveries and that hospitals have been told
not to discuss the numbers. I have not seen independent evidence supporting numbers on that
scale. But even without those allegations, the Henan village banking scandal tell us something
important. We talk about banking crisis in terms of liquidity, bad loans, government debt,
bank mergers, restriction on moving money. But behind every frozen deposit is someone's savings,
someone's retirement, someone's family, someone's sense that the rules still mean something.
And when people lose not only their money, but also their belief that there's a fair way to get
it back, the damage can spread far beyond the banking system. And that may be the darkest
risk in China's slow motion banking crisis. In a traditional bank run, everything happens fast.
In a slow motion bank run, the pain is stretched out. The uncertainty lasts longer. The losses
become harder to measure. And the anger has more time to build. It's not just that money gets
trapped. Anger also gets trapped. And eventually it has nowhere to go. And that may be what makes
a slow motion bank run more dangerous or very dangerous. Now, just right before this program,
I saw a video appearing online. And apparently there's an entrepreneur who went to ICBC,
the largest bank in China, and also the largest commercial bank in the world by assets,
to get money to pay his 500 employees. The bank doesn't have money or doesn't have
enough money. So it gave all kinds of excuses to prevent the guy from getting the money.
And then this happens. Let me remove this. Let me add this. Hold on. Sorry.
It's still sinking. What happened? Why is it taking so long? Oh, here we go. This is the
video showing the guy, the food delivery guy, showing his operation or parts of the video.
All right. It looks scary. And the next scene is what happens in Zhengzhou today.
This is right at the ICBC branch. The entrepreneur couldn't get money from the bank to pay his 500
employees. He got angry. And this is what happened, according to online claims and this video.
By the way, ICBC is not a small rural bank. It's not a village bank. It is the largest bank in
the world by assets. And this is what happened. All right. Yeah, that's just what I saw today,
right before this live stream. I think this is a very comprehensive program on China's banking
crisis. And yeah, and I'm glad that I explained the banking crisis without too many numbers.
So yeah, it's very surreal, shall we say. All right, let's see. Someone said, Ferguson,
is it true that China's GDP is actually 50% of what it states? I did a program a couple
of years ago to quantify or to adjust or to normalize China's GDP. And it's between a third
to a half. I also did a follow-up program on China's GDP, not only China's GDP, but also US
GDP. And I think starting in maybe 2020, US GDP also seems to be overstated. I did a program
showing the curves looking very interesting. But anyways, yeah, to answer your question,
China's GDP is, in my opinion, between a third and a half of the official number. It's overstated.
Okay, well, thank you for the question. Let's see. Okay, here's a question from Jay Litka.
There is a report of a lady having 1,000 yuan or $1,000 equivalent in a Chinese bank. The bank
took her money, loaned it to another person. That person defaulted. The lady tried to get...
There are all kinds of strange things happening at China's banks.
Yeah, sometimes people would find... I mean, I've seen people claiming that
they're large deposits, and they're not personal accounts, they're business accounts.
There was a woman calling the branch manager, confirming the safety of the transfer. She was
in the process of doing a commercial transaction. She moved, I think, eight digits, tens of millions
of yuan into a commercial account before paying it out to close her transaction. And she called
the branch manager just to confirm, to say, I'm going to move this amount of money into my account,
make sure everything goes smoothly because I need this money to close the deal. And the branch
manager promised her. Guess what? Her money disappeared. And we're not talking about 1,000
yuan. We're talking about eight-digit numbers. Yeah, not seven-digit, eight-digit. So it's crazy.
All right. Chris forwarded me a question. With all the banking crisis and that debt,
how come China still has money to build more warships, aircraft carriers, stealth fighters,
missiles, space programs, et cetera? Like I said, it has access to,
if you follow my program, it has access to the entire banking system of China. I mean,
here in the West, the government has its own accounts. The government has access to its
tax revenue. The government cannot dip into personal savings or private banking accounts.
But in China, the commercial banks are so closely tied with the government. That was the point I
was making. So in a way, private economy or the financial activities tied to the real economy is
so small, comparatively speaking, with government financing. So in a way, the government has
access. The government is using all private money to finance its activities and ambitions.
In other words, the line between private and public funds or financing is so blurred
that essentially the Chinese government has access to wealth. The entire Chinese society
has accumulated. That's just a very quick and dirty explanation of the problem. But I explained
that in the program for a good 20 minutes. I was on that topic. Yeah. This is exactly
why the CCP has the, that explains why CCP has so much money to access.
See, Calvinist, my heart goes out to the people of China, but I'm so thankful I don't live there.
Yes, I'm thankful too. It's not looking good. So I know a lot of people are complaining about
this country, but we should be still very grateful for being able to live here. No system is perfect,
but this is still much, much better than the one across the Pacific. It's still a lot better than
many countries in the world. Americans don't appreciate what a great country this is.
Yeah. Well, I shouldn't say all of them. Some of them, some of them do. Some of them don't.
All right. The question coming to me says Chinese have no way to protest. Very sad. Yeah. But if
you watch my program, the Chinese people protested, made fun of Huawei. Did you watch my
program released last night? I thought that was funny. They use humor to directly attack Huawei.
They have their way, indirect ways to protest using their consumer power, their very
minimum consumer power to make a statement, but they did. And that's, in my opinion,
tremendous because we didn't even see this during zero COVID. We didn't see this last year,
but 2026 is a very different year. We started to see collective endeavors by private citizens
to make a statement without getting themselves into trouble. Okay. All right. Let's see. Question.
Oh yeah. Here's the Huawei video Lei mentioned. Yeah. Chris just put it up there. Take a look.
And also I released some videos about how people protested. There was that
silly little cartoon called Niu Lai. The cow is here. The bull is here.
I mean, that's another ironic way for the Chinese people to protest.
So they are coming. I've seen them. They're coming, this summer particularly.
I loved your program on Huawei and the cicadas toy. Yeah. And I also watched the program on
the cartoon, Niu Lai, and how the Chinese people went out of their way to support a fugitive.
A suspect on the run and treated him as a hero. These are all major social development in China
that Western media is not picking up. Kaz Flanagan. Oh, thank you. I listen to you
often. Well, thank you, Kaz. I appreciate that. Okay. And here's the film about Niu Lai. Chris,
thank you, Chris. Yeah. I utterly enjoyed making that video about Niu Lai, the silly little cow.
Yeah. All right. Let's see. Questions, comments?
Here's a, not Huawei. It must be foreign. I read somewhere that Huawei's profit tanked by 40%.
I don't know if it's first half of this year. It's probably first half of this year.
Yeah. That's significant. It's 40%. That's a lot of money. Sassy Fraz. Thank you.
Watching and listening very much your podcast from Yugoslavia, Philippines, Yugoslavia. Thank you.
All right. Is that all? Shall we end it here? This weekend, we should talk about CCP politics.
We should talk about Xi Jinping's busy international itineraries everywhere.
He was in Kyrgyzstan, and he's now in Egypt. He will be going to India,
and then he will be coming to the US. But at home, personnel reshuffling is happening
amid intense political struggles. So I should talk about that. And also the PLA,
with the announcement of Zhang Youxian and Liu Zhenli, the PLA is reacting. This is what I heard.
The PLA officers are not happy with how they handled Zhang Youxian. But they feel like their
hands are tied, because they have been resisting the announcement on January 24th, when the PLA
daily announced the removal of the two generals. But since then, no service branch, no command
theater has issued any statement in support of that PLA editorial. So people have been quietly
resisting, but now with their NPC delegate status removed, some PLA generals feel that their hands
are tied. They wonder if they can continue to resist the central government's handling of
the two generals. So morale is on Xi Jinping's side within the PLA.
All right, let's see. Someone said, Chuck Shabono. Hi Lei, I'm in Ontario, Canada,
and I feel our PM Carney is in bed with China, and he is the worst thing possible for Canada.
In a way, I still think Justin Trudeau is better than Carney. I don't know why. I think
in a way, Justin Trudeau is, because Justin Trudeau is a politician. Carney is half politician
and half academic, right? So I know, I think sometimes a politician, I mean, a politician
I don't know who's actually better for Canada. They're both, probably both are not good,
but I don't know. Carney doesn't. What happened? What happened to Canada?
Look up Trudeau and Castro. Yeah, he does look like Castro a lot. Someone asked me,
Lei, what happened to the invitation to Zelensky to visit Beijing this month? Is it real?
I don't think so. I have not heard anything. I think if the invitation is out there, I think
Zelensky probably wants to wait a little bit until after Xi Jinping meets Trump in the White House,
which is going to happen at the end of September. So why does he rush himself to go to Beijing?
So I think he's going to wait. Let's see what happens. I have not heard anything.
Carney is a globalist. All right. Okay. Let's see how those Chinese EV cars do in Canada in a year,
in Canada's winter. Let's see how they do in winter time. All right. I shall end it here.
I thank you for joining me. I appreciate those who gave me super stickers. They put a smile on my
face. And I shall see you this weekend. All right. Bye.