Triple Typhoon Disaster Hits China: 10-Meter Waves, Million Evacuated!

Multiple dams swept away in Tibet, Nepal. Floods. Three gorges hides a disaster 100 times greater. Triple typhoon disaster hits China. One zero. Meter waves. One million evacuated. Prices crash. Mortgages stay. China stretches home loans to 40 years while owners drown. A wave of people falling back into poverty is spreading across China. Masters graduates can't find jobs. Bosses are falling back into poverty. 57 generals down. Since the 20th Congress, Xi has paralyzed his own army. Welcome to Red Wall, where we examine major world events with clarity, context, and thoughtful analysis. Multiple dams swept away in Tibet, Nepal. Floods. Three gorges hides a disaster 100 times greater. On August 26, an ice and rock collapse on the China-Nepal border sent floodwater from Nepal's Lende River into the Bote-Koshi and then the Trishuli. Levels jumped about nine meters in half an hour. The surge tore through one of Nepal's thickest hydropower corridors. Kathmandu says about 12 operating plants went offline. At least 15 projects still being built took major hits. Dams and pressure pipes vanished in the mud. Hundreds of workers and foreign engineers are missing. Substations and transmission towers were ripped out. The lesson is the cascade. When an upstream works fails, stored water joins the original flood, and the next station takes a wave many times larger. Stations fall in a line. The whole river defense comes apart. That corridor is a fraction of one stretch on China's southwest rivers. The Yarlung-Tsangpo, Jinsha, Longkang, and Yalong drop hard through some of the most broken, active ground on Earth. Valleys there are as steep and unstable as Nepal's, or worse. On that powder keg, the Jinsha section of the upper Yangtze is packed with dams. Count main stems and tributaries, finished and unfinished, and the Chinese Communist Party has poured more than 10,000 concrete dams and power works across the region. Wudongde, Baihetan, Ziluodu, Siangjaba, among them. Below Siangjaba sits the Three Gorges Dam. Almost every side stream is blocked. Pipes lie under almost every valley. The Party's line has been to challenge nature and reshape it. Giant cascades and huge reservoirs on active faults put the projects in the path of events no engineer can schedule. Construction of more than 10,000 plants, tens of thousands of kilometers of tunnels, cut slopes, and roads has already shaken mountain stress. Landslides and collapses become more likely. Density then does the rest. A slide upstream forms a barrier lake. The barrier fails. Every few miles, a small plant is smashed. Concrete, machines, and stored water roll into the surge like a snowball. What arrives at the next giant dam is no longer a river. Nepal was not days of rain. International geological shops point to a big slide or a local seismic chain. In a glacier valley, millions of cubic meters can drop in moments, plug a gorge, and make a lake of loose rock that cannot hold. When it bursts, the product is not water. It is a dense debris wall that turns reinforced plants into rubble. Scale that onto the Jinsha, and the risk is more than 100 times Nepal's. A major quake could drop tens or hundreds of millions of cubic meters off the canyon walls, block the river, and fill a super lake in a hurry. A break would send billions of tons of rock and mud downstream. If one of the big upstream dams failed under that hit, tens of billions of cubic meters would join the chain. Wave after wave would work down the Jinsha. The last piece is three gorges. Its flood pool was sized for basin rain, not a compound debris and reservoir surge. Damage or collapse there would put Gojoba next, then the middle and lower Yangtze Plains and hundreds of millions of people. That is not a thought experiment. From Panjihua to Yibin, the Indian Plate still drives north into Eurasia. Plateau Crust tries to escape east and southeast and slams into the hard Sichuan Basin. Stress piles up on the Hongge-Yuanmo Fault Zone and the Huayingshan Basement System. A 6.1 hit Panjihua-Huili in August 2008. A 6 hit Changning-Yibin in June 2019, with aftershocks above 5. Wenchuan 8 in 2008, Lushan 7 in 2013. Luding 6.8 in 2022, tore mountains and made more than 100 barrier lakes. That is the warning for a Jinsha slide. Three gorges carries its own file. In June 1999, hydraulic expert Zhang Guangdu wrote that Dam Section No. 5 held a large volume of low-strength concrete. A very serious quality accident. Crews drilled it out from inside. New lifts had already been poured on top of some of it, so a remainder stayed in the foundation. Officials called it localized and minor. In 2001, 2002, dozens of cracks showed on the upstream face. Nearly every downstream section cracked, some two to three meters deep, wide enough for a hand. Experts said big pours always crack. The third phase right bank, under strict temperature control, came out with zero cracks. That undercuts the unavoidable line and points to shoddy work. Whether those buried cracks grow under years of pressure, water is the downstream question. The reservoir's 30-meter swing, 145 meters in flood season, 175 in the dry has soaked and drained the banks until landslides, collapses, and fissures number in the tens of thousands. Chongqing has kept about 14,000 hazard sites on the books, thickest in the northeast reservoir. In Kuatang Gorge, unstable rock totals more than a million cubic meters. A fall could block the shipping channel and throw waves tens of meters high. Tsinghua's Huang Wanli warned that a high dam would drop velocity, dump gravel and coarse sand toward Chongqing, raise the bed, wreck farmland, and foul navigation. He was pushed aside. Millions were moved. Money ran short. Some officials stole. Living standards fell. Waste and toxins left on the floor now sit under the pool. Algae blooms. Some Academy of Engineering members have even floated moving another five million people in the next decade. The early claim that relocation would be easy did not survive contact. Huang said the dam's end would be demolition. The party built a cascade on a fault, buried bad concrete, and treated cracks as physics. Nepal showed what one valley can do. The Jinsha is the same geology with a hundred times the water stacked behind it. Triple typhoon disaster hits China. One zero. Meter waves. One million evacuated. Typhoon Soudal came ashore in China after forecasts first pointed at Taiwan, then Japan, then bent west. Ten provinces sit in the wind and rain field. Before landfall, waves more than 30 feet high ran along the Wenling Coast. The sky went a rare fire red. Residents called it beautiful. A reporter on the beach was nearly knocked down. Seawater and rain filled his mouth. On August 27, the storm hit Yuhuan, Zhejiang. Locals said it was the first time three typhoons had landed on the same stretch in one year. The Meteorological Service put center winds at force 12 to 14, about 30 to 42 meters per second. The circulation spans more than 1,000 kilometers. A cloud shield the size of four Zhejiangs. Shanghai was in the path. The Yangtze Mouth, Hangzhou Bay, and the city shore. At 9, 10 a.m., on the 28th, it came ashore again at Longwan in Wenzhou. Chen Ming-Din, former head of Taiwan's Central Weather Bureau, wrote that storms near the island almost never run north to south. A high over central China looked stronger than first thought. A stubborn high south of Japan first hinted at a Japan track, then held and steered Soudal west-northwest. Users said the mainland has become a magnet. Bavi and Dolphin were both supposed to go to Japan. Both turned toward China. Soudal was supposed to be Taiwan's first landfall of the year. It became Zhejiang's third. Zhejiang's chief forecaster warned of wind, waves, an astronomical tide, and rain stacked together. Mountains dump runoff onto the plains, while high water at the coast holds river mouths shut. Saturated slopes raise slide and mudflow risk. Sea walls take a beating. At 8 p.m., on the 27th, the province went to the highest flood response. Coastal parks and venues closed. Migrant workers hauled bags to shelters again. Taizhou alone moved more than 500,000 people. Dinghai in Zhoushan and parts of Taizhou were warned of seawater over the wall, up to about 3.3 feet in low spots. Wenzhou markets emptied. People who arrived late stared at bare shelves. We still haven't finished what we bought last time. How did everything get cleared out again? Since June, the loop has been rain, flood, pump, sweep, rain. In some cities, the first thought is no longer how hard it will rain. It is where it will pond. The National Audit Office has already said the country builds what you can see and neglects what sits underground. After Bavi, a Shen Yun garage wall failed and spilled household garbage and construction waste that had been packed into the fill. In Chongqing's Hechuan District, residents lifted drain covers and found dirt pits and a single pipe from above no network. Zhengzhou in 2021 showed the same mix. Rain beyond design and a system that was never ready. Sudol is not the only problem. The question is whether anyone fixed the last hole before this one opened. Prices crash. Mortgages stay. China stretches home loans to 40 years while owners drown. The market dropped another device into the toolbox. Mortgages can now run 40 years. People who bought in the last couple of years call it treating a dead horse as if it were still breathing. Sell, and the down payment is gone, sometimes more than the down payment. Hold, and the note does not shrink with the price. In Shenzhen's Qianhai, Moon Bay Garden fell from 12 million yuan to just over 4 million in three years. Owners who bought the peak cried in the bathroom. A man who sold two Zhengzhou apartments while renting in Shanghai with a child said he lost more than 1.5 million ten years of early mornings and cheap meals. I thought two mortgages plus Shanghai rent was the darkest moment. There is no worst, only worse. Another unit went from 3.8 million to 1.5 million. He stopped paying. What followed was terrifying. Kunshan's Huaqiao District got a warning aimed at flippers. You can mark steel as sky high. Ordinary buyers will walk. Next, these will be cabbage prices, broken bricks. Wait and see. The old bet was simple. Borrow 300,000, pay a few years, double the price, sell to the next fool. Many of those buyers are the last fool. A 2016 purchase, 1.5 million borrowed, 7,960 a month for 30 years. I didn't dare change jobs. The T-shirt on my back is worn white. Almost everything goes to interest. Nobody wants third ring Zhengzhou. If anyone does, I'll just give you mine. Buildings sold as 70-year rights look used in under 30 peeling walls, tired pipes, towers that do not resell, and elevators that die. Young people are told they will not marry or buy. Do they not want to? They can't afford to. One owner runs the same arithmetic that keeps turning up. Salary 6,000, 500. Mortgage 5,080. Interest 3,000. Principal 2,000. Still owed 1.1 million on a house worth 700,000. Finish at 57. Don't look for the developer, the bank, or a lawyer. Sell, even at a heavy discount. Just get rid of it. A 90-square-meter place bought for 1.2 million. In the owner's group, a raw unit next door closed at 460,000. A bank appraisal five years on, down 800,000. Whatever I do, I lose. Someone almost bought Nantong at $6,000, $7,000 a meter, watched it hit $14,000, $15,000, then watched it fall back. The same decision, two clocks. Agents lowball. I can't go below $700,000. People say no one will buy at $700,000. The problem is I have no money. I've already stopped paying for six months. In October, the bank took six months' interest, about $16,700. A 30% down, $950,000 borrowed at $34,000, would still be paying in the 60s. Bank interest is terrifying. From $16,000 to $38,000, every bit I had went into this. Even water would have paid interest. If I get out, I'm at zero. A woman took the line that a house in her name was confidence if the marriage failed. More than a million on her own paper. Wife gone. Children gone. House sealed. $1.1 million still on a place that will not fetch $800,000. She has not paid in half a year. In Dongguan, a $3 million Changping unit in 2019, $900,000 down, $2.1 million loan. Over $11,000 a month. Stopped in June last year. Remaining balance, $1.92 million. Six years of payments totaled $790,000. Principal repaid only $170,000. The bank sued. Cards frozen even 400 yuan in WeChat. On August 28, the central bank and the financial regulator lifted the cap that had sat at 30 years since 1999. Same $1 million at 3%. $4,216 a month over 30 years. $3,570 over 40, about $600 less each month. Total interest rises from about $518,000 to $714,000. The party has already cut down payments, cut rates, and loosened purchase bans. This stretches the note into retirement. Buy at 30, pay until 70, while Beijing talks about working later. Pension plus a live mortgage is the cash flow problem they are not selling. Banks get a longer interest stream. Households get a smaller monthly number and a larger lifetime bill. Down payments already vanished with the price. A 40-year term does not put the million back. If people do not believe their wages will hold, a cheaper month is still a lock they will not take. The market is not short of tools. It is short of buyers who still think the house is worth the decades. A wave of people falling back into poverty is spreading across China. Masters graduates can't find jobs. Bosses are falling back into poverty. We're finished. We haven't been paid for 21 months. On the street, a man picks bottles. Just enough for living expenses. A rebar worker does the same. Construction jobs dried up. Even having a skill doesn't guarantee big money anymore. Half the people brushing past you, one voice said, already do not want to live. A job hunt in Hangzhou for half a month produced nothing. A 25-year-old with a master's from a Project 985 school said the best offer on the table was a sales slot at 5,000 yuan base, and that was only the interview. I feel the whole world doesn't want me. Another master's from the University of Science and Technology of China said the degree devalued faster than she could finish it. A 985 graduate with TEM 8 English spent a year and a month in a factory. Nights in the park. Head splitting. Crying. Someone else is washing dishes at home. Families cannot put 1,000 yuan on the table. In a compound of 10,000 people, even the hospital breakfast shop failed. A single man in his 30s counts next month's rice and the rent. Delivery orders keep falling. Factory owners will not start the machines. Big firms and small ones cut staff to stay alive. Houses and cars become liabilities the day they are bought. A lot of bosses have fallen back into poverty. It's not one industry. Every industry. One rider made 22 yuan in a day. I can barely survive myself. Another child would just suffer with me. At Y-Day, 10 security guards became two. One man works 12 hours at the old wage, with several times the load. Banu, the hotpot chain, posted kitchen jobs. More than 3,000 master's holders applied. The boss nearly buckled. Your master's is wealth for society, one commenter wrote. Would you let your child cook? Shenzhen social insurance for a couple passed 3,400 yuan a month. Jobs wobble. Shops wobble. Pensions for those already retired still rise. People who can pay, want to pay. Income only covers today. Rice in the field sells for 8 or 9 Mao. Clothing shops set a close date of September 11. A department store is not expected to see the new year. A woman bought an e-scooter this month and got the layoff notice the same cycle. Anhui Normal University, four years. Nearly 100,000 yuan from the family. First salary, 5,000. Save 1,000 a month. And the tuition takes nine years to earn back. What is the point of going to university? Shops run 996. Eight hours becomes 12 plus a weekend day. Work that needed eight people now needs four. The other four are unemployed. A kindergarten open 15 years is empty. When the tide pushes you here, you stop here. Mixu Ice Cream offered 2,600 plus attendance, about 2,900 before tax. One day off a month. 10 hours that stretch to 11 after closing worse than delivery or didi by the hour. Forget it. I'll just scrape by. Contractors still on site after 21 months without pay asked collectors to stop yelling. At midnight, a man lay on the ground waiting for a brick job. Hostile when he has 20 yuan. The pavement when he does not. 50 yuan for a night of work. Another offer. 100 instead of 170. Because if you don't work, these people here won't have food. A bank branch president said two-thirds of last year's new graduates had already quit. Pay that used to climb now sits at 3,000 or 4,000. Promotion needs a stronger patron than the one who got you in. Moments posts are watched. For decades, banks lived on the gap between cheap deposits and dear mortgages, while property ran hot. People now save and will not borrow. The margin shrinks. Banking is an ordinary job again. No trade is easy. Farmers are not easy. Shops are not easy. A man over 30 listed himself by the usual scorecard. Unmarried. No child. No house. No car. No savings. No job. He still counted himself lucky next to left-behind children and people who sleep under bridges. The Chinese Communist Party declared victory over poverty a few years ago. The victory has been walked back. Ordinary households and the middle class are out of cash at the same time. The question left on the street is not a slogan. It is how much longer anyone can hold. 57 generals down. Since the 20th Congress, Xi has paralyzed his own army. Since the Chinese Communist Party's 20th National Congress, 57 PLA generals have gotten into trouble. Analysts say Xi Jinping has found he cannot trust a single senior officer and serving generals have learned that working under him is not safe for anyone. Key posts stay empty. The reason he will not finish rebuilding the top of the party army, some argue, is fear that a new case of political disloyalty will erupt the moment the seats are filled. On the 28th of August, 2026, the 24th session of the 14th National People's Congress Standing Committee ended. A public notice stripped 12 people of NPC deputy seats, including four military names, Zhang Yuxia, Liu Zhenli, Zhu Qiansheng, and Zhang Xiaojun. Two days earlier, the CPPCC Standing Committee revoked Zhao Zhongqi, former Western Theater commander. From 2023 on, authorities investigated and punished 32 generals. Add 25 who have disappeared, and the total since the 20th Congress is 57. U.S.-based commentator Wang Yukun, writing in the Epoch Times, gave four reasons. First, under Jiang Zemin, the military was already rotten. In Xi's first term, more than 160 senior officers fell. Most had been promoted in Zhang's years. CMC vice chairman Xu Kaihou and Guo Boxiong sold posts and set a climate of bribery and sexual chaos. Second, Miao Hua's trade was worse. After Xi removed Zhang Yang in 2017, Miao ran political work and screened every rise to CMC vice chairman, defense minister, theater command, or general's rank. He sold hats, retail, and wholesale. Suspended in November 2024, he is said to have confessed. Of the 57, 46 had been promoted after his assessment. After the 20th Congress and around his fall, 31 were punished and 25 vanished. Third, anti-corruption inside Xi's military became a fight that wrecked both sides. Before the Congress, the struggle was Xi against Jiang. After it, one camp was Xi, he, Weidong, and Miao. The other Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Li Shangfu. They destroyed each other. When he and Miao went down, Xi feared Zhang and Liu would sideline him and kill a fourth term. In late January 2026, he struck them. Then he found no senior general he could trust, and those still standing saw that no one knows who is next. The cycle is purge, insecurity, more purge, worse insecurity. Fourth is Zhang Xiaojun. Xi's military secretary and CMC general office director for 11 years. Removed as an NPC deputy on August 28, he had been reported arrested in December 2025. Chai Shenkun said the He Weidong and Miao cases reached him. Zhang approved every name Miao sent. Miao approved every name Zhang sent. What reached Xi had both stamps. Of nearly 80 generals Xi promoted, few are expected to walk away clean. Many of the 57 likely paid both men. On the 7th of March 2026, Xi told the military delegation there must be no one harbors two hearts toward the party. He keeps demanding absolute loyalty. Australia-based Yuan Hongbing told Vision Times that today's officials will give that loyalty to power, money and beauty, not to Xi. He is merely a stupid yet ruthless tyrant. How many would willingly dedicate absolute loyalty to a solitary autocrat and enemy of the people? After Zhang Yuxiu was stripped as state CMC vice chairman, the government's site showed only Xi and Zhang Shengmin left on both commissions. Of 26 posts that require a full general, six are filled. 20 sit empty, including the second CMC vice chair, joint staff chief, political work director, and almost every theatre and service commander and commissar. Acting Joint Staff Chief Xu Chuansheng is a lieutenant general. Political work is run by Air Force Lieutenant General Chen Demin. Equipment development is under a major general. Commentator Zhang Yuan called it the world's largest incomplete military. A former US Indo-Pacific commander once pointed to 2027 for a Taiwan move. By the end of 2026, the principal officers may still not be in place. Even if a plan exists, Yuan said, there may be no one left to execute it. Xi delays a full rebuild because a finished organ might produce another disloyalty case and a humiliating blow. He cannot wait forever. The two-faced people he cannot escape will stay. We value your perspective. Let us know your thoughts in the comments. If you found this report meaningful, please share it with others. Your support helps us continue delivering independent, fact-based analysis on global affairs. Subscribe and like to stay informed with Redwall. Thank you for watching!