The August 26 Himalayan disaster struck both Nepal and China — but the rescue efforts looked dramatically different.
Nepal, one of Asia’s poorest countries, deployed tens of thousands of soldiers, police, helicopters and local volunteers, while China’s much larger military response raised serious questions about rescue speed, helicopter deployment, command structure and transparency.
In this program, I compare how Nepal and China handled the same disaster — from local rescue efforts and military deployment to missing-person data, media access and censorship — and ask what the contrast reveals about the PLA and China’s highly centralized political system.
This video analyzes the contrasting disaster responses of Nepal and China following a Himalayan disaster on August 26, 2026. Despite China's vast economic and military superiority, Nepal's response was far more effective due to rapid mobilization and transparency, whereas China's efforts were crippled by centralized bureaucracy, political instability, and a priority on image control over saving lives.
Hi everyone, welcome. Welcome to today's Real Talk. It's September, September 1st.
Wow, 2026 will be over in less than four months. Well, today marks the sixth day since August 26th
when the same disaster struck both sides of the China-Nepal border. On one side was Nepal,
a poor country with a small military and very limited rescue resources. On the other side was
China, the world's second largest economy with one of the largest militaries on earth.
So which side would you expect to mount the stronger rescue? The answer seems obvious,
but that's not what happened. Nepal mobilized quickly. Helicopters flew. Soldiers, police,
villagers, and volunteers joined the rescue. On the Chinese side, the response looked very
different. And that raises a bigger question. How could a poor country with so little resources
respond better than a powerful country with almost every advantage according to its own
leader? Maybe the answer is not just about money, equipment, or even the size of the country. Maybe
it's about the system behind them. So today, I want to compare how two very different countries,
two different political systems responded to the same Himalayan disaster. And I will
particularly discuss the state of the Chinese military because one comparison or one part of
my comparisons will be from the military perspective. So first, let's talk about who
got there first. Let's start with the people because in a disaster, the first rescue team
is usually not the army. It's the people already there—your neighbors, your relatives, the village
next door. On the Nepal side, local communities began organizing almost immediately. Young men
formed stretcher teams and clearing teams. People who knew the mountains helped search for the
missing. Women set up makeshift kitchens and brought food and water. Local volunteers joined
soldiers, police, and rescue workers. They did not wait for everything to be centrally organized.
They started helping. And there's a reason for that. People living in Himalayan mountains
or in Himalayan mountain communities are used to harsh conditions. Landslides happen. Roads
disappear. Tourists and climbers sometimes need to be rescued. Many residents have worked as guides,
porters, or mountain workers. And the people trapped may not be strangers. They may be
your cousin, your childhood friend, or someone from the next village. And you don't need an
order from the capital to tell you which person needs help. You start digging. And that is what I
mean by a society's ability to organize itself. It sounds abstract, but it's not. Ordinary people
organize. They divide up work and act without waiting for permission. During the first 24
to 48 hours, that can make an enormous difference. Now look at the Chinese side.
Since birth, Chinese citizens have been told that they cannot organize themselves
unless the government allows them to. Any rescue system is centralized. Government agencies
take over. The military takes orders. The armed police takes orders. Local officials report
everything upward and wait for instructions. Outside rescue teams and volunteers cannot come
on their own. They need approval. Independent journalists face restrictions. And civilian
groups cannot simply drive into a disaster area and begin operating. So in China, it may look
orderly from the outside. At least that's what Beijing wants us to believe, that it's orderly.
Everything is handled in an orderly manner. But it creates waiting. Waiting for instructions,
waiting for approvals, waiting for equipment. And during a disaster, waiting is costly,
because by the time a large rescue force arrives, the most important hours may already be gone.
So the first difference was not really about resources or technology. It's about
who was able to act. On the Nepal side, rescue began from the bottom up. On the Chinese side,
it depended much more on instructions from the top. And they're completely different.
This is because priorities for the two political systems are different. In Nepal,
it's about saving human lives. In CCP China, it's about protecting the regime's image and reputation.
Human lives come later. Alright, so that's the first comparison. The second is the very different
systems. Nepal began publishing detailed rescue information almost immediately. On August 27,
just one day after the disaster, Nepal released a nationality breakdown of the missing.
And basically, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a table showing 596 foreign nationals
from 33 countries were still missing. And with country by country numbers,
showing how many had been found, and how many remained accounted for. And as early as the 26th,
the day of the disaster, Nepal's government-linked disaster database
was already listing rescued people by name, age, gender, and location. And by the 28th,
district authorities were adding missing person records with the names, home districts,
municipalities, ward numbers, and in many cases, where the person had last been seen or worked.
Those records were continuously updated as people were rescued, found,
injured, or confirmed dead, or remained missing. Now China handled information very differently.
Its official reports remained as total. The CCP released aggregate numbers. China's initial death
toll was 3. Then it went up to 5. Then to 7. By the 29th, China said 16 people were dead and 546
were missing, including 261 foreign nationals. But China did not release a comparable nationality
breakdown until August 30, four days after the disaster. And officials said the 261 missing
foreigners came from 23 countries. There were 104 Nepalese, 49 Indians, 18 Americans, 15 British
nationals, and others. As of today, China still had not published a comparable public database
identifying all missing people individually by name, age, and status. Nepal released information
person by person. China released mainly total numbers. And because of the lack of detailed
information, Chinese families began turning to the internet for help locating missing relatives.
Many of their posts were censored or deleted. Out of frustration, some people then tried to use
Nepal's government disaster information website to search for information. But access from inside
China was quickly blocked by Beijing. Chinese authorities do not allow its citizens to access
Nepal's government's website for information and updates. So Chinese families are facing
an extraordinary situation. Their government doesn't provide them with updates. Detailed
information existed just across the border, but they could not freely access it from inside China.
Now look at the rescue manpower. On August 27, roughly one day after the disaster,
Nepal's prime minister said 13,295 security personnel had already been deployed for search
and rescue. By the 29th, that's still roughly within the first 72 hours, the number had risen
to 15,431. And the details are 6,755 Nepalese army, 4,473 Nepalese police, and 4,203 armed
police force personnel. On the Chinese side, it said that it had mobilized more than 2,100
rescue personnel overall. But by August 29, roughly 72 hours after the disaster, China's
CCTV reported that only about 70 firefighters were conducting search operations inside the core
disaster area at Jirong Port. Much of the larger rescue force was still clearing roads, moving
supplies, monitoring hazards, or trying to reach the site. And then look at the rescue results.
Nepal had deployed close to 20,000 security personnel and had rescued nearly, the latest
I heard is nearly 10,000 people. On the Chinese side, roughly 2,000 rescue personnel had been
mobilized, and the authorities have publicly reported only two people were rescued alive.
The two countries had vastly different resources, but the poorer country deployed far more people,
released far more detailed information, and rescued far more survivors. Now you could argue
that Nepal had a larger affected population, so naturally it needed a larger rescue operation,
and that's true. But the Chinese disaster zone was not limited to Jirong Port.
Satellite images show the affected area extended well beyond the border crossing, actually.
Satellite images show that the flood also backed up nearly more than five kilometers upstream
along the Jirong-Zangbo River, and that puts places such as Labi Village close to, or potentially
inside, the inundation zone. Other settlements, including the Chongse Village and areas around
Sale Township, were also part of the broader disaster region. And along that river corridor
are smaller settlements, roadside buildings, and work sites that received almost no attention or
no media attention. So we should not think of the Chinese side as simply one destroyed border
crossing, even though that image stayed with us. But there are other areas severely affected in
China, we just haven't heard about them. And so satellite imagery suggests a much wider disaster
corridor. One Chinese citizen put it this way, he said, this is not really about whether a country
is strong or weak, it's about whether the government actually cares whether its people
live or die. And that brings us to the Chinese military and its helicopters. So the question
becomes, where were China's helicopters? And this may be the most visible difference.
A Chinese military analyst wrote a detailed analysis to compare military involvement in
the rescue efforts by both Nepal and China, pointing out the problems in the Chinese PLA.
Now, we know Nepal's military has fewer than 100,000 personnel, far smaller than the Chinese
PLA. And its helicopter fleet is also very limited. It may have, according to the analyst,
only three helicopters purchased from the US, two each from France and Italy, three light helicopters
from India, and six Mi-171 helicopters from Russia. Although it is unclear how many of
these aircraft are actually operational. According to his cited global firepower
report, Nepal's military has a total of 10 helicopters and seven fixed-wing transport
aircraft, with only about 50% of its helicopter fleet considered combat-ready. So this analyst
estimated about six to seven military helicopters were used in rescue efforts. It's far from enough.
Now, there are other sources that have said that Nepal's government rented 29 private and
commercial helicopters for the rescue effort. So there are about roughly three dozen
helicopters deployed in Nepal. They evacuated injured people, elderly residents, students,
and other stranded civilians. They moved supplies. They transported bodies from isolated areas.
And we've seen those videos. Now compare that with China. China has one of the largest military
helicopter fleets in the world. China has spent years talking about the PLA's high-altitude
operations and all-weather capability. In recent years, the Chinese military has built up a large
and diverse helicopter fleet, including its own Z-series, Z-8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, Z-20.
It also operates Russia's Mi-series, the Mi-8, 17, and 171. They were purchased from Russia,
or the former Soviet Union, along with some helicopters acquired from France and the US.
Now, Beijing has claimed that the PLA has formed 15 army aviation brigades,
which operate around 1,500 helicopters, second only to the US military. Remember that number,
1,500 helicopters. With a fleet that large, you would expect the PLA to be able to send
helicopters into the disaster zone in large numbers, search for the missing, evacuate
survivors, and even offer assistance to rescue operations on the Nepalese side of the border.
So when hundreds of people disappeared in a Himalayan disaster, you would expect Chinese
helicopters to be everywhere, right? But what actually happened was very different.
On August the 26th, the day of the disaster, Chinese military media said the Western
Theater Command sent a drone to survey the affected area. Ground forces were also sent
toward the disaster zone. So they were sent. They were mobilized, but they didn't reach there.
And there was no report of a large helicopter rescue operation. The next day, the 27th,
the Tibet Military District sent helicopters, not to rescue, but to survey the disaster.
By noon that day, Chinese military media said the military rescue operation had involved
just four helicopter sorties. Four, okay? Then came August the 29th. More than 72 hours after
the disaster, two military helicopters were sent toward Jirong Port, but their reported mission
was not to rescue people. They were delivering supplies. At the same time, ground rescuers were
still struggling to reach the core disaster area. This is all according to state media.
Three days after the disaster, Chinese state media said crews had cleared 2.6 kilometers of road.
They were still 1.7 kilometers away from the disaster area. And that is precisely when
helicopters should have mattered most. China does have an explanation, actually, about why they
didn't deploy helicopters. Officials say the Chinese side has very steep terrain, few landing
areas, unpredictable mountain winds, poor visibility, and dangerous weather. All of that
can be true. Flying helicopters in the Himalayas is dangerous. But Nepal is also in the Himalayas.
Nepalese pilots faced bad weather, clouds, mountain winds, and difficult landing zones too.
And yet helicopters there kept flying whenever conditions gave them an opening. So the question
is not whether flying was dangerous. The question is why was helicopter activity so different
on the two sides of the same disaster? One country had very few helicopters
and appeared determined to use them. The other had vastly greater aviation resources.
But during the golden rescue period, its military helicopters were barely visible.
And that points to something bigger than equipment. Actually, before I talk about
the political system or the different motivation between the two countries, actually someone said
that the Chinese PLA was afraid to deploy their helicopters for fear of accidents.
They fear that because they are preoccupied with making errors. If they do nothing,
they will not be accused of anything. But if they deploy their helicopters, and they could be the
Chinese-made series, and what if they had an accident? And then it will become international
news for sure. And then that would be a disaster. That would be a PR disaster for the PLA and for
Beijing. So they avoided helicopter rescue missions. That just shows you their confidence
in their own equipment. But this is according to one view. So what happened to China's so-called
People's Army? According to Chinese state media, Xi Jinping and the party leadership issued rescue
orders immediately. And supposedly the military responded quickly. But the actual timeline
raises questions. 72 hours after the disaster, road clearing crews were still 1.7 kilometers
away from Jirong Port. Only about 70 firefighters had reached the core disaster area. PLA ground
forces were still trying to get there. And the helicopters had made only a handful of appearances,
mainly for reconnaissance and limited supply drops. No large-scale searches for missing people.
So either the PLA was unable to fully carry out the order to, quote, make every effort to search
for the missing, or those orders were never translated into a full-scale military rescue
operation in the first place. And the timing makes this even more interesting.
Remember two days after the disaster hit on August the 28th?
Remember what happened on that day? China's National People's Congress announced that
Zhang Youxia had been removed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission,
and Liu Zhenli had been removed as a CMC member. Let me show you a picture. There you go,
this dynamic duo who have remained missing since late January, January the 20th.
So after their sudden disappearance and removal in January, the PLA and the whole country,
the rest of the country, waited seven months to finally learn that their two highest-ranking
generals are officially removed. However, no explanation was offered in the announcement
on August the 28th. So while this rescue operation was unfolding, the PLA was going through
another major round of political upheaval at the very top. I haven't really talked about the
impact, the political impact of the announcement of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. That requires a
full 30 to 35-minute explanation. It's actually, the announcement is not good news to boost
PLA's morale. And many people fear that the two generals died. If they have lived,
if they are still alive, then the way that the regime would deal with their downfall might have
been different. But that's a separate topic that I'll address later. But anyways, the announcement
about their removal from the Central Military Commission happened two days after the disaster.
Of course, that timing doesn't prove the military turmoil caused the weak rescue response. But it
raised an obvious question. How functional was the command system within the PLA at the moment?
If the PLA was not resisting orders from Beijing, then another possibility is that the orders
themselves were largely political messaging, strong language for public consumption,
without a corresponding decision to mobilize the military at full scale.
And there are other possible explanations too. Now, Beijing may have been extremely cautious
about large-scale troop movements during a period of military instability. I should also add
political instability. This is a critical time before the party's fifth plenum in October,
where Xi Jinping's political succession plan may be top on the agenda.
So, the regime may have wanted tighter control over helicopter and drone operations at this point.
There may also have been concerns about safety, weather, high-altitude flying conditions,
and the reliability of Chinese-made equipment. Like I said earlier, some people were seriously
concerned with the reliability of these Chinese-made
helicopters. They will probably not deploy western-made or imported equipment, more advanced
equipment for this purpose. They will use the Chinese-made equipment because there are more of
them and they're cheaper, but the reliability becomes a question in such weather conditions.
But whatever the explanation, the result was the same. China possessed enormous military
aviation resources, and yet during the most important rescue window, those resources were
used only sparingly. Now, in disaster rescue, there's always a trade-off between protecting
rescuers and taking risks to reach victims before time runs out. In this case,
Beijing appears to have chosen caution very heavily. Well, I shouldn't say Beijing. Maybe
the PLA leadership appears to have chosen caution or safety for the rescuers and their equipment.
Now, there is also a structural issue inside the PLA, and that may have hindered rescue efforts.
The Chinese analyst explains it very well. He said, in 2016, Xi Jinping abolished the old
military regions and created five theater commands. The reform was designed to strengthen
joint operations and centralize military control. But Tibet remains unusual. The
Tibet military district is not simply under the Western Theater Command in the same way as
ordinary operational units. It has its own command relationship through the PLA army
and the Central Military Commission. The People's Armed Police in Tibet also answers
through a separate chain of command through the armed police system. So during a disaster like
this, several organizations may be operating in the same region without sitting under one simple
local command structure. You have the Western Theater Command, the Tibet military district,
the Shigatse military sub-district, the armed police, the PLA army, which
has a direct link with the Tibet military district, civilian emergency agencies,
local government. That creates coordination problems, even under normal conditions.
And these are not normal conditions. China's military leadership has been undergoing one purge
after another. Senior commanders have disappeared, CMC positions have been emptied,
command relationships have become increasingly uncertain. So when this disaster happened,
the PLA was not entering the crisis as a stable institution. It was entering it in the middle of
its own political crisis. So this is the analysis from the Chinese analysts. Again,
we cannot prove that the rescue operation alone, or from the rescue operation alone,
that military turmoil caused the slow response. But the contrast with Nepal is hard to ignore.
Both militaries were responding to the same disaster. Nepal had far fewer helicopters,
far fewer troops, and far fewer resources, yet its military appeared much more visible
in the actual operation. China had vastly greater capacity, but much of that capacity remained
surprisingly absent during the most critical hours. And that may tell us something important.
A military can have enormous numbers on paper, but how reliable it is in actual situation,
or in a crisis situation, is a different matter. What matters is whether the command system can
actually turn those impressive numbers into action. And in this case, we've seen that the
Chinese PLA has failed. The Chinese system may have moved slowly when it comes to rescuing
survivors, but when it comes to controlling speech and policing the public, it showed remarkable
efficiency and speed. So now let's talk about media transparency, Nepal versus China.
Think about how many videos we've seen from Nepal on social media in the past six days.
We've seen, I mean, there were many sad videos, right? Destroyed villages,
helicopter rescues, survivors, families searching for relatives,
rescue workers digging through mud, a lot. Now think about the Chinese side.
Other than the dramatic CCTV footage on the Jirong Port, which is now censored in China,
and carefully selected official rescue footage, how much have we actually seen from the ground
inside China, from those villages and settlements, for example? Very little, almost none.
But isn't that strange? So what happened in the villages near the Jirong Port? What happened in
smaller settlements along the river? How badly were they damaged? How many people were there?
How many survived? We don't know. We haven't seen anything. Is that because the Chinese people
didn't take any videos or send out any messages asking for help? I highly doubt it. I think the
Chinese authorities have completely censored all information coming from Tibet. Now let's compare
how information was handled. On the Nepal side, journalists were able to enter affected areas,
interview survivors, photograph destroyed villages, speak with families searching for relatives,
and report directly from rescue sites. Reuters reporters were already on the ground on August
26, interviewing survivors and photographing the destruction. Nepalese authorities also
released detailed information very quickly. By August 26, tourism officials were already
giving the media nationality figures for missing foreign tourists. And the next day,
Nepal provided a country-by-country breakdown of missing foreigners. Nepal also allowed survivors
and families to speak publicly. That matters because the public was not dependent on one
government account of what was happening. Government numbers could be compared with
what journalists, families, hospitals, rescue workers, and humanitarian groups were seeing
on the ground. You need everyone's input and help at this point. Now compare that with China.
Chinese journalists were barred from entering the disaster zone and from interviewing affected
families. Foreign journalists and independent investigators could not enter at all. As a result,
most information coming from China or coming from the Chinese side came through official channels.
There's a BBC China correspondent. Her name is Laura Bicker. In her August 28 report
on the Tibet floods, she wrote that as a journalist who had covered North Korea,
it had often been easier to contact interviewees in Pyongyang than in Lhasa. That's what she said.
On August 30, while rescue operations in the disaster zone had still made little substantial
progress, China's cyber police issued a high profile announcement saying they had imposed
administrative penalties on 10 people from around the country for spreading rumors.
If you look at the so-called rumors cited in the notice,
they were essentially public estimates and speculation made out of anxiety and common sense,
such as more than 1,000 people were buried by today's mudslide. Maybe around 500 people have
died. In a situation where authorities had not released a full list of the missing and access
to the disaster area was tightly controlled and independent verification was extremely
difficult, public concern and estimates about the scale of the disaster became
grounds for punishment by CCP's cyber police. On August 31, a video went viral in China. It
came from Tibet Daily's official Weibo account. I shall play you the video at the end,
but let me show you a picture. It has this image. The video showed a group of firefighters
lying fully closed beside the road. The caption said,
firefighters collapsed by the roadside at the rescue scene, resting only so they can fight
again. But Chinese viewers immediately noticed something strange. If these firefighters had
been fighting through a mudslide disaster zone for days, why were they so clean? Why
let me make this bigger. The picture on the left is taken from the Chinese propaganda video,
and the picture on the right is actually from Nepal, from actual rescue workers.
So people were asking, why did they look so clean? I'm not talking about their jackets.
Even the bottom of their shoes appears clean. Now compare that with actual rescue scenes from
Nepal. And look at the ground, mud everywhere. And some of the badly flooded hydropower sites,
rescuers were literally pulling people out of thick mud. And then there's another problem.
The video's own voiceover said the firefighters had been carrying out continuous high intensity
road clearing operations and were covered in mud before collapsing beside the highway to rest.
Covered in mud? The pictures don't seem to match the description at all. We don't know if the CCTV
reporters were intentionally doing this so that people know that it's a lie,
or they were so ignorant that they didn't even care what they were saying.
The problem is that China's CCTV has been caught many times before for staging disaster
rescue scenes before. So many Chinese viewers are very familiar with that.
So when they look at these official videos, they don't believe they're real at all. They believe
they're staged. Now, let me actually play the video. Let me play the video. Yeah, this is the
video. They look so clean. Everyone's clothes is clean, so clean. Their shoes, look at the shoes.
And they look like they're staged. And these people are searching rescuers by hand.
Look, the moving rock, this is staged. How could they work like this? Anyways,
towards the end of this clip, I found a clip. Somebody uploaded a clip, a video
showing the inside of these hydropower facilities in Nepal. This was a video clip
uploaded. Okay, this is still rescue. What you're looking at is still rescue.
Where's that hydropower clip? It's coming up. Yeah, this is all staged.
This is a clip uploaded by some Chinese workers who have worked inside hydropower facilities in
Nepal. And this is their footage. It shows you the scale, the massive scale of these facilities
from inside the mountains. Let me play. We don't know the time when this was taken. And we also
don't know the location of this. But look at this. This is inside the mountain. It's all empty.
Isn't that terrifying? Here we go. Let me play this again. The mountain was basically drilled,
was empty. It was an empty shell. Yeah, someone uploaded this. And the people that you see
working here are Chinese. All right. So, Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world.
Its military is small. China is the world's second largest economy. The economic gap between the two
countries is enormous. Nepal's total GDP is only about one four hundredth of China's.
It's not even one percent of China's. It's a quarter of one percent. Yeah, that's how small
Nepal's GDP is. Its GDP per capita is about one ninth of China's. And yet, when disaster struck,
this poor small country showed remarkable resilience and efficiency. The contrast is
striking. Many media outlets have noticed the contrast, but they didn't say why the contrast.
It lies in their political systems. Here's my answer to this contrast. This is the most
important part of my talk tonight. Nepal is small, but is a democracy with a multi-party
parliamentary system. Its democracy is far from perfect. Governments change frequently,
corruption remains a problem, and press freedom is not absolute. China, on the other hand,
is the world's second largest economy and the largest communist state. It is governed by
one-party rule, under a highly centralized political system, with no press freedom.
The state also plays a dominant role in the economy. I know there are many people in the
West who are disappointed in their own governments, and some even lost confidence
in democracy. But the Himalayan disaster proves how a poor democratic country with so little
managed to do some of these things much better than a powerful communist state with almost
everything in terms of hardware. When the same catastrophe struck two very different political
systems, the poorer democratic country with fewer resources, fewer helicopters,
and a much smaller military still showed that ordinary people, local communities,
journalists, and institutions could act with a degree of freedom and flexibility that mattered
when human lives were on the line. While the CCP's so-called institutional advantage,
a.k.a. its centralized system, completely failed. Right before the program, actually,
I saw a report from someone from inside China send a report claiming that the CCP's alarm system
actually went off five minutes before the landslide arrived at Jirun Port.
But due to human negligence, the staff on duty brushed it off and assumed that it would be the
same type of landslide or mudslide as the one in July 2025. And they didn't send off alarms
or report it upwards, causing the tragedy. But if they had five minutes, five minutes could save a
lot of lives at that crossing, the border crossing port. To me, it happened because of
CCP's political system. The reason that this disaster happened was attributable to CCP's
failed governance. When the party wants to control everything, the result is nobody can control
anything. Nobody follows rules. No rule will be respected and followed. Nobody can control
anything. It's a chaos. The only thing the party can control is its reputation and its image.
But that's a fake one because nobody believes that reputation or that image.
And so, I did this follow-up program just to show you. I mean, everyone noticed the drastic
difference in the rescue efforts. But very few people, very few outlets are talking about why,
if there are still people in the West critical of a democracy and praising a communist or socialist
regime or system, then this example should wake them up. This perfect comparison should show them
no system is perfect. I'm not saying democracy is perfect. But at least in the face of human
disaster, their priorities are different. One is about saving human lives. The other is about
saving the regime's image and reputation. So, as far as which system is still better,
I think people should have an open debate. People can have an open debate, but there should be
one example serving that purpose. And that's why I did this program.
It's my third program in a row about this disaster. Okay. All right. Let's see what people
say. Let me first address the individuals who awarded me with super stickers. I saw some
colorful stickers flying by. Let me see. Oh, here we have one. Pam Quack. Well, thank you.
I believe you're from Singapore. Yeah. Well, thank you very much. All right. Mark Urban. Well,
thank you, Mark, for recognizing my effort. Lisa M. Well, thank you, Lisa. Thank you,
everyone. All right. Let's see if people have questions for me. I know you probably have
burning questions about Xi Jinping's visit to Kyrgyzstan, and also now he's in Egypt.
What's special about them? Well, there are several things that have stood out. One is his wife
traveled with him. That's unusual because if you study the travel itineraries of all CCP leaders
before Xi Jinping, and including Xi Jinping himself, who traveled outside China to attend
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit outside China, they never bring their wives,
not once. But this time, Xi Jinping's wife traveled with him.
Some people attributed it to Xi Jinping's declining health, especially when he descended
from the airplane. After landing, he relied heavily on his wife to walk down the stairs.
And also CCTV cut away that clip. CCTV avoided showing his descending the stairs.
And then the second incident people noticed was that he missed, there was a game, what is it
called, the Nomad Games at the end of the summit. All heads of state attending the summit
attended the opening ceremony of the games, but Xi Jinping missed it. And that's highly unusual.
Anyways, he's now in Egypt, and I haven't really followed up on the latest development of what's
happening in Egypt, but I'll take a look tomorrow. Maybe I'll talk about it on Thursday.
All right, let's see. Peter Weiner Rock, lay excellent perspective. Your concise and
accurate reporting makes me an excellent armchair Chinese expert. I'm glad that I could help you
become armchair Chinese expert. Excellent. That puts a smile on my face. Thank you. All right,
let's see. What else? What else is burning on your mind? Let's see. All right, there's a question
with all the people with all the people running around. Could a quick thinking Chinese person
slip into Tibet or Nepal and disappear? This is a major disaster. Could a quick thinking Chinese
people slip into Tibet and Nepal had disappeared? Oh, yeah, that reminds you, you brought up a good
issue. I saw an internet post claiming that a rescue team that went to Tibet actually
escaped into Nepal and reappeared somewhere in Europe. I couldn't verify that. I just saw that
some people, obviously, maybe Tibetans, maybe there are Tibetans, they
use the rescue as an excuse to slip into Nepal and to escape China. From there, they
went on to other parts of the world. I don't know if that's true or not, but if
the Chinese are looking for every possibility to escape their country, then rescue could be a very
good reason for them to do that. All right, let's see. Let's see, questions, comments.
Someone said Lei has no fear. Sometimes I do have fears, but I think fear is a self-inflicted wound.
And it's impossible to say that I don't have fear. It's just that we have to know how to
handle fear, right? Yeah. Okay, let's see. Jason Teddy, maybe Mel Brooks, history of the world,
part two, the epic. Why do we know over there? And of course, the woman to hiss and spit at the
Zionist age that is trying to physically save women. It's beyond me. I'm not familiar with
Mel Brooks, history of the world, part two. Sorry. But thank you for asking me a question
that I don't know. It just shows that there are things that I know. There are a lot of
things that I do not know. Especially in the past six years, I have been absolutely focused
on China affairs. And sometimes I wonder if it's good or not. All right, let's see. Okay,
questions, comments, there's nothing left. Frank Knapp, the Titanic was thought to be
unsinkable. The World Trade Centers were designed to survive airplane strikes.
Is the Three Gorges Dam indestructible? No, it's not. The Three Gorges Dam
has construction quality issues, and the CCP knows that. Its design also is not perfect,
not to mention construction quality. So the Three Gorges Dam is not indestructible at all.
Oh, by the way, beautiful earrings. Oh, thank you. So yeah, I have made a couple of videos
in Lace Looking Glass talking about the situation with the Three Gorges Dam. Actually,
the regime is very concerned with the future of the Three Gorges Dam. And they have done simulation
exercises to study the impact if the dam collapses. And there are also official narratives
discussing the possibility of taking down the dam. Rather than waiting for the time bomb to
take off, they're talking about taking proactive measures to take down the dam.
But I don't think any CCP leader would have the determination to take down the dam,
because it's a huge political liability for anyone to do that. So they would just
let the time bomb sit until it explodes. All right. Okay. I answered that question.
Jason Teddy. No, I'm not sending anyone to help unless they have... Oh, that's not addressed to me.
All right. I reached the bottom of all questions. I thank you for joining. Is there any questions
that you would like me to answer? Someone said, let's keep CCP from any civil engineering project.
I would go even one step further to say, keep the CCP away from any of your projects,
whether it's civil engineering or other projects. Keep them away from touching anything in your
country, or you will be in trouble. Not just civil engineering projects, anything. All right.
That's my last comment for the day. All right. I'll see you in a couple of days. Okay. Bye.
Thank you. Bye-bye.