LIVE: Fed Chair Warsh Delivers Keynote Remarks at Jackson Hole Symposium

Live News Network
1.4K followers
212 Video Views·Aug 28, 2026
Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh delivers keynote remarks at 9:45 a.m. ET on Aug. 28 at the 2026 Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe 49th Jackson Hole Economic Symposium explores the intersection of financial innovation and monetary policy. Fed Chair Kevin Warsh discusses the \"Wild West\" nature of AI and fintech, critiques the reliance on forward guidance, and emphasizes a data-driven, humble approach to achieving price stability and maximum employment amidst a resilient but inflationary economy.
Welcome to the 49th Jackson Hole Economic Symposium.
This year's symposium will focus on financial innovation
and the implications of rapid developments
in digital currencies, central bank digital currencies,
financial technology for payments,
monetary policy, and the international financial system.
Jackson Hole, part of the American frontier
in Wild West of the 19th century,
is an ideal setting to discuss this new frontier
of financial innovation.
The American Wild West was defined by a gap.
The frontier expanded faster and less predictably
than governance could follow.
Settlers staked claims, prospectors chased gold,
and enterprising figures built fortunes in territory
the law had not yet reached.
Some struck it rich, many were ruined,
and for a number of years, the frontier operated
largely based on self-enforcement
within local jurisdictions.
Recent financial innovation shows many of the same features,
including the diversity of practices across countries.
Stable coins, decentralized finance, AI-driven trading,
and the rapid growth of private credit
represent a genuine frontier,
territory expanding faster than the regulatory apparatus.
In some areas, we're beginning to see
the first railroads and telegraphs,
the Genius Act stable coin framework,
the BIS work on Project Agora,
and the ECB's role under the digital euro.
But the gaps in our understanding about the implications
and what comes next are even larger
than the blank spaces in the early settlers maps.
So we have much to discuss over the next two days.
What are the implications of these frontier innovations?
How should policy navigate the tension
between innovation and oversight,
between opportunity and risk?
What are the trade-offs from the different approaches
being adopted by different countries?
The stakes are huge.
As the early settlers learned,
some frontier experiments ended badly,
while others built the prosperity we see
in places like Jacksonville today.
So to get us started, I am delighted to welcome Kevin Warsh,
Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board,
to provide opening remarks.
I've known Kevin for about 25 years
when we initially worked together in the White House.
Kevin, even during those meetings many years ago,
you were willing to push frontier thinking.
And we look forward to hearing your thoughts
on the latest developments in financial innovation
in central banking.
Kevin, come on up to the stage.
Good morning, Kristen.
Thank you for that super kind introduction.
It was 25 years ago that we were colleagues.
I'm honored to share the stage with you.
It's great to be back here in the Valley again.
I see so many familiar faces from academia,
my last tour of service, and from my first 100 days,
which is just this weekend.
I've been looking forward to this weekend.
And before I go further, I want to thank Jeff Schmidt
and his team for the incredible hospitality.
Everybody here is in debt to you and to your colleagues
here at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Jeff, our thanks to you and your team.
Now, he and the other planners here
have some recreation options lined up for later today.
I'd advise you to be very careful with your choices.
As I learned years ago,
you can take two different kinds of hikes
on the trails around Jackson.
I can sum up my hikes with former Vice Chairman Don Kohn
with two words, I survived.
These steely marathon death marches
revealed the sign of Don that I was not ready for.
But there's another kind of hike.
This one was with former Chairman Ben Bernanke,
another dear old colleague.
But then it was a much more leisurely pace,
easy stroll along the wandering trails
of the Rockefeller Preserve.
So before setting out today,
my recommendation is do a wellness check.
Ask yourself, is this a cone day or a Bernanke day?
The best thing about this gathering
is that it helps us all get out here to the mountains
and clear our minds,
think straight about our world and our time.
For me, it feels like the right place
and the right audience for real engagement
on the ideas that matter most.
Innovation, as Kristen mentioned, is the conference theme.
And I believe the public and the markets understand
that innovations in the conduct of Fed policy
will help deliver price stability alongside full employment.
So here's a quick overview
of what I'll cover in my remarks this morning.
We'll call it an outline, we'll call it a trail map.
Please just don't call it forward guidance.
First, I'll touch on a few of the longer term questions
we're asking at the Fed
about the latest general purpose technology AI
and where it might take the economy.
Then I'll reflect a bit on the practice of forward guidance
and the interaction between the central bank
and financial markets.
Next, I'll present some of the key principles
that I believe should guide the conduct of monetary policy.
And finally, I'll give you my assessment
of what's happening in the economy.
So first, I think we should try to prepare a bit
for future policy conjunctions.
With the unchanging picture of the T-TOMS as our backdrop,
we are here to survey an economic landscape
that is anything but static.
It wasn't so long ago,
we were looting in rooms like this
in the run up to the crisis of 2008
and over the decade that followed,
economists and policy makers
were speaking of secular stagnation,
speaking of a global savings glut.
It's a widely held view that an excess of capital
would sit on the sidelines for a very long, long time.
Because there just wouldn't be enough
compelling investment opportunities.
All the good stuff, you'll recall, had been invented.
So growth would be low and slow.
Well, times sure have changed.
We've come to a hinge point in history.
Borrow a phrase, a framing from my former mentor,
George Shultz, to cite the clearest example,
progress in AI, 80-year-old name for the newest technology,
has been faster even than its evangelist predicted
just a couple of years ago.
The potential for substantially higher growth
is on the rise.
Ever-expanding pools of capital,
pouring into AI-related infrastructure of all sorts.
Kind of super Moore's Law seems to be playing out.
Scaling laws, too, are changing both the method
and speed of innovation.
Capital and labor have combined
to create large-language models at the heart of AI.
Users buy tokens to gain access to these models.
Reports put annualized token sales
for the two leading labs alone at more than $100 billion,
an increase of 500% from just 12 months ago.
We at the Fed, we watch all this attentively.
We recognize that AI is a new variable,
potentially a new factor of production
that will have consequences both for the economy
and for the conduct of monetary policy.
It opens up some major lines of inquiry.
Will the application of AI cause a significant
sustained rise in productivity across the economy?
If so, when?
Will token usage be complementary or competitive to labor?
Will the next generation of AI models
demand even greater capital intensity, too?
Or will the models themselves help devise
a capital-lite solution?
Among the other yet unknowns
is the resulting market structure.
Who gets to make the money?
It's not obvious where the returns on capital will land
or on what time scale.
Early on, how much of the surplus
goes to owners of scarce assets?
The AI labs or chip makers or energy producers,
cloud providers.
Over time, how much of that value
accrues to businesses and consumers?
And importantly, what are the implications for workers
and for the employment side of the Fed's mandate?
Likewise, we don't yet know the equilibrium price
of the tokens that give access to these markets.
Might there be a heterogeneity of tokens
such that growing sums will be paid
for the access to the best models, those at the frontier?
Will token prices for older models
fall to the level of their marginal cost?
Well, we'll be thinking through these matters
with the help of a task force on productivity and jobs.
Our early check-ins with the leaders of that task force
and the rest have been very encouraging.
To be clear, though, their recommendations will come later.
They have no bearing on decisions we make
in the current policy conjunction.
But I believe that for future policy challenges,
this intellectual investment today
will leave us much better prepared for tomorrow.
Next, let me say a word about forward guidance
and its substance.
As our task forces go about their work,
as you might know, I'm not waiting
to introduce innovations at the Fed
to help make us fit for purpose.
To highlight one example,
I've set out to change the form and function
of the Fed Chairman's so-called forward guidance.
You might know about my longtime discomfort
with early pronouncements of future policy decisions.
I much prefer another path,
and now we'll make the case for it.
Transparency in communications
about future policy decisions
is not an end unto itself.
Communications must be in service
to the Fed's paramount responsibility.
What is that that's getting policy right?
Forward guidance as a regular practice
was adopted by my colleagues and me
during the global financial crisis.
It was essential at the time,
and we introduced it with much fanfare.
But as with other legacies of crises past,
I believe the practice has outstayed its wealth.
In normal times, the role of forward guidance
should be limited and circumscribed.
Otherwise, it risks creating ambiguity
in the name of clarity.
Oversharing policy deliberations,
over-committing to future decisions
can leave markets, businesses, and households astray.
And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments
on interest rates throughout the cycle,
we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls
when it's time to decide.
To get policy right,
we also need to get the relationship right
between the central bank and financial markets.
The markets, excuse me,
the Fed needs clear market signals,
as unfiltered as possible,
from market internals,
from the level and change in asset prices across sectors,
the prices and trading volumes of treasury securities,
foreign exchange value of the dollar,
cost and availability of credit,
broad set of commodity prices.
These and other indicators
should inform the Fed's near-term outlook
on economic activity and inflation
throughout the business cycle.
They should also reveal
the state of broader financial conditions
and the risks and uncertainties of the financial cycle.
At the same time, market participants themselves
should be tracking real information about the real economy.
They should draw their own conclusions,
form their own expectations,
things like output, employment, and inflation,
and they too should stay sharply attuned to risks.
In my view, the Fed should be humble and never naive.
The Fed plays an essential role in the economy.
Our tools are powerful.
We determine the path of short-term interest rates,
and market participants will always try to anticipate
what we will do next.
But we should not indulge a regime
in which market participants are looking primarily
to the Fed for their next trade.
The economic literature has long described
the distorting effects,
what it called the hall-of-mirrors problem.
If markets rely materially on the Fed's guidance
and the Fed relies on market prices,
we're more likely to be blinded to new developments,
more likely to be caught unprepared,
and more likely to commit errors in policy-making.
Now, perversely, market participants are unlikely
to bear the biggest costs of the hall-of-mirrors problem.
The most serious harm is likely to befall those
without any financial assets.
If the Fed gets inflation wrong
and judges the economy wrong,
who gets the worst of it?
Not the financial high-flyers.
Hard-working Americans are the ones left
to deal with inflation that's too high,
or jobs that suddenly appear less secure.
So, if forward guidance is ill-suited to normal times,
how about the new Fed chief commits,
at a meeting just like this,
to some explicit reaction function?
Surely he could tell us his interest rate path,
if, say, the data were to come in hotter cold.
Well, I wish our understanding of the economy
were so precise, as to provide a mechanical,
tried-and-true answer.
That some simple function, like a Taylor rule,
could be rigorously reliable.
But our knowledge just does not extend that far,
at least not yet.
And other factors, most relevant to the proper conduct
of monetary policy, may change over time.
Providing forecasts to illustrate
the Fed's reaction function works better in theory,
than in practice.
Better in the lab, than in the field.
I am not alone in noticing that forward guidance in 2021,
to cite just one example,
might well have slowed the policy response to high inflation.
In my term as chairman, my colleagues and I
will endeavor to construct more reliable models,
more robust rules, and we'll do this,
knowing that accuracy in forecasting,
is still just an aspiration.
With so much changing so fast,
in our geopolitics, supply chains, technology,
it's wise to be modest about what we can and cannot know,
as we sit here today.
In the same spirit, we should receive the full range
of ideas on matters that may inform
the Fed's monetary policy discussions.
If the aim is optimal decision-making,
and it should be, we should not crowd out views
on the economy.
How then, to chart a better path to policy?
In the balance of my remarks,
we'll share with you some key principles,
guide my thinking on the appropriate
conduct of monetary policy,
and then I'll offer my promised assessment of the economy.
So let's turn first to principles.
First, I've noticed in this line of work,
yesterday's news, as a way of getting mistaken
for what's happening right now.
Challenge is to know the difference.
In other words, we must interrogate reality.
Make sure we're not setting forward-looking policy,
based on stale or inaccurate data.
Nor should we rely on isolated data points.
Trends matter most.
The Fed's a decision-making agency.
We make choices amid uncertainty,
and the data upon which we draw must be relevant,
temporaneous, accurate, and as actionable as possible.
Second principle, the Fed's actions are intended
to ensure that the aggregate demand side of the economy
is broadly consistent with aggregate supply.
However, all we observe directly is activity.
We never see, and can only infer,
what's really happening on the supply side.
Hence, evaluating the current and expected balance
between aggregate supply and aggregate demand is imprecise.
Third principle, there should be no misunderstanding.
The Fed's price stability objective of 2%,
as measured by the PCE price index,
is a firm, fixed target.
I may be equally clear about another aspect
of this objective.
Price stability is not self-executed.
Nor is inflation necessarily need reverting.
It's the Fed's job to deliver stable prices, no excuses.
Fourth principle, the Fed also bears responsibility
for maximum employment.
Achieving both sides of our mandate over the medium term
is not an either-or proposition.
I do not believe the Fed's dual mandate
works at cross-purposes.
After all, high inflation itself
is very harmful to economic prosperity.
Fifth principle, short-term interest rates
are the predominant tool to achieve the dual mandate.
Unconventional policies to spur economic activity
may suit genuine crises of which we all have much experience,
but they should otherwise be used sparingly, if at all.
Sixth, money matters.
I know it's not fashionable these days,
but my view is that money has something important
to do with monetary policy.
We should pay attention to money created by the central bank
and money that comes from the banking and financial system.
It's true that financial innovations,
the subject of this conference,
and other factors alter the mechanics
that link the monetary base, the velocity of money,
and the broader economy.
But that is scarcely a reason
to ignore the ultimate effects of money
on financial conditions and prices.
Finally, a quieter Fed,
a more purposeful Fed in its communications,
is better able to meet its objectives,
and we can be held accountable for delivering on our remit,
the only true test of our credibility.
To borrow a line from General Chuck Yeager,
at the moment of truth,
there are either reasons or results.
So having heard a little bit about AI
and general purpose technologies,
I've heard a little bit about the next policy conjuncture,
a little bit on principles,
let's turn to the economy today.
Given those principles, how do I read the economy?
What's really going on outside the window?
It's a little ironic, there are no windows in this room,
but there are big ones at the Federal Reserve.
And we've been using those in my first 100 days,
and I expect we're gonna continue to use those
in the period right ahead of us.
Now you may have read in the July minutes
the unanimous view of the FOMC.
Labor markets were stable, output solid,
but inflation remained too high.
A good majority of my colleagues and I
thought the wiser course was to await new information
in the inter-meeting period,
especially given possible developments in supply chains,
investment flows, and geopolitics,
before deciding whether a change
in interest rate policy was advisable.
And we expressed our joint readiness to act
as circumstances, excuse me, required.
For my part today, as we sit here,
I'm impressed by the overall performance of the economy,
which appears to have strengthened.
One indicator of strength is how well
an economy holds up under stress,
how well it holds up under shocks.
On that score, both Main Street and Wall Street
have been remarkably resilient.
Several other observations, business capex is rising rapidly.
The four-quarter change in investment
in equipment and intangibles has been around 9%.
It's highest growth rate since 2021.
And more than half of the capex growth
likely be ascribed to the build-out related to AI.
What about profits?
For the firms in the S&P, profits have grown
more than 20% over the past year alone.
Profit margins are quite elevated, relative to history.
Overall equity and market volatility, quite low.
We're staying keenly focused on market internals,
watching performance across sectors.
Expectations for both growth in capex
and corporate earnings are running quite high.
Continue to watch the change in the growth rates,
second derivative.
Follow-on effects on asset prices, business confidence,
consumer incomes and spending,
are equally important to gauge.
Credit spreads on corporate bonds and leveraged loans,
are near the low end of their historical average.
Issue volumes this year, quite strong.
Looking beyond fixed income markets to the banking business,
in the July so-called SLU survey,
banks tell us that standards for C&I loans
on the easier end of their historical ranges,
helps explain their growth
that we've seen this year in these markets.
In my view, credit and loan markets
are showing few signs of policy restraint.
Now certain sectors like housing and agriculture
are showing strengths, but on balance,
I would be hard pressed to describe
broad financial conditions as restricted.
Real consumer spending has been healthy
despite these shocks, increasing more than 2%
over the past four quarters.
If you combine consumption with the brisk investment
we talked about earlier,
private domestic financial purchases have also risen.
These purchases have increased to the pace
of nearly 3% or so, so far this year.
It's a measure that typically carols more signal than GDP.
Friend here too, positive.
So on the employment side of the Fed's dual mandate,
the country's doing well.
Labor markets are quite stable.
The jobless rate at 4.1%,
remains low by historical standards,
hasn't changed much in a couple of years.
Unemployment claims, a four week moving average,
empirically robust real-time indicator,
near their lowest level in decades.
In my view, the relatively low turnover
in today's labor market is partly a result
of the significant rematching between employers
and employees that happened in the post-pandemic environment.
But when labor supply is barely growing,
monthly job gains are naturally going to run low.
There are always area of concerns in the labor market.
For example, among recent graduates.
In general though, people wanna work by and large,
holding or finding jobs.
We may well be concerned about future labor disruptions,
but as of now, I believe the labor markets
are broadly consistent with full employment.
But on the price stability side of our market,
the numbers are more concerned.
The Fed's preferred measure of inflation,
the one I talked about earlier,
12 month change in the PC price index,
stands at 3.7%.
The six month change, a little above four.
The comparable measures from the CPI index
are also elevated, as are core measures
both of PC and CPI.
None of these measures are perfect.
But they all tell a similar story.
Inflation is running above our 2% target.
So the Fed's predominant focus,
right now, should be on prices.
So what's our job?
The job for policy makers
is to capture underlying trend inflation.
Easier said than done.
We wanna gauge whether underlying inflation
is rising, falling, or seems to be stuck in place.
We also wanna understand not just the direction of travel,
but the speed.
Each of these broad inflation measures
have fallen significantly from their highs
of a few years ago.
But progress in the last couple of years
has been more modest.
And while this summer's PC and CPI readings
were better than expected,
they do not tell me that underlying trends
have meaningfully improved.
The data also show moderate wage growth.
But in my view, in tracking underlying inflation,
wage growth has not proven a reliable indicator
of future inflation for a very long time.
So to try to gauge underlying inflation,
I wanna tell you about a couple of things
I've always looked to.
I find it instructive to disaggregate
the 199 individual components of the PC price measurement.
Over the last 12 months,
54% of goods and services in this basket
showed price increases above 3%.
This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77%,
but it remains well above the level of 32
in a couple of the decades that preceded the pandemic.
Looking over just the last six months,
the conclusion is similar.
49% of goods and services in the PC basket
showed price increases above 3%.
And this is well below the post-pandemic highs,
still elevated, quite elevated.
Recent rise in overall commodity prices also bears watch.
What we need to judge is whether the trends we see
indicate upside inflation risks.
Now it matters too,
whether the inflation readings of the past five years
have seeped into expectations.
The good news is that measures of inflation expectations
in the medium term, by and large, look stable.
And inflation compensation measures from the swaps market
send a strong and similar message.
Especially in light of recent developments,
it's a credit to the Fed as an institution,
consistent with the best of the Fed's traditions,
that market prices show confidence
that we will deliver price stability.
And I can assure you, they're right.
The thing about market measures of inflation expectations
in economic history,
I know some economic historians in the audience,
is they all tend to look really strong and durable
until they don't.
These expectations are not pushed around easily.
And right now they are very well anchored.
But they must be closely minded.
And it's the Fed's job to make sure
that inflation expectations do not get unanchored.
Now there is one signal nobody can miss.
Responsibility for 65 months
of sustained elevated inflation
sits squarely with the central bank.
And that's where it belongs.
So here is my standard.
We must be confident that underlying inflation
is moving to our objective,
clearly and at sufficient speed.
Otherwise, we have work to do.
That's our job, that's our mandate,
and that's our charge to keep.
So I've covered quite a bit of ground
in the last 25 minutes or so.
Let me see if I can conclude this way.
I stand here today committed to a discipline,
not a decision.
My Fed colleagues and I are hardly the first
to hold these positions in a time of great consequence.
We are determined to redeem the time
by doing our very best work.
For those of us, those of you that know us,
you'll know the following is true.
We take our responsibilities seriously,
with humility and with resolve.
We know so much depends on the choices we make.
Sound monetary policy helps households
and businesses to prosper.
When carried out effectively,
it broadens and deepens the momentum of our economy
and helps to secure America's leadership.
And I know that our country needs us
to think carefully and wisely, perhaps now more than ever.
It's a tremendous honor to serve once again
in the Federalist Bureau.
I'm truly grateful for the encouragement,
good counsel, and warm reception I've received
in my first 100 days with my colleagues.
I'm also honored and grateful for the views
that I've gotten, solicited and unsolicited,
from so many of you in this room.
For that, and for your kind attention this morning,
I say thank you.
Let's get on with the rest of the program.
Thank you very much, Kevin,
for getting the conversation going.
Could our first set of panelists come up to the stage?
Well, so Kevin.
