This insightful documentary explores the world of quants, the mathematical geniuses and computer programmers who design the complex financial products powering global markets. It details how the global financial system became deeply reliant on mathematical models to quantify economic behavior, a trend that ultimately brought Wall Street close to collapse. The video examines the tech revolution of light-speed trading and algorithmic systems, questioning the systemic risks of treating the economy as a machine and losing the human element in banking.
This video examines the rise of \"quants\" on Wall Street and the systemic dangers of relying on complex mathematical models over real-world volatility. It analyzes how the disconnect between theoretical finance and human behavior, driven by greed and a lack of oversight, fueled the 2008 financial crisis and continues to create risks through high-frequency trading and algorithmic \"black boxes.\"
If you're close to the money, you know, like an oyster farmer, I eat a hundred
oysters every week. How many people eat a hundred oysters a week? Well, I eat them
because they're there. If you're in the business of making
money and moving money around and counting money and it's in the units of
trillions, of course you're gonna make more money. And then you become so
isolated from the real working world of the average person who doesn't have this
ability and is struggling to make it, to keep his job, to pay his mortgage, to, you
know, feed his kids and send him to school. It's the best part of my job. The
Making a lot of money is like taking a drug. You feel good head to toe. It's
like, it is very similar to a drug. When somebody hands you a million dollar
check or a five million dollar check, you want more. Yes. Oh, if I'm making five
million, I should be making 50 because I'm a genius. No question in your mind
that you are a genius and that the rest of the world owes, you know, you're just
so much better than everybody else. A bottle of beer is a pound, but you're
having a party, so you need to have a hundred bottles of beer. So how much is a
hundred bottles of beer? One bottle is a pound. Tell me, how much is a hundred
bottles of beer? A hundred? No, no, no, no, no. Paul Wilmot, also known as the
smartest of all quants. A mathematician and author of many
handbooks. A quant guru who has been warning for years about the danger of
a sudden collapse of the financial markets initiated by mathematicians.
You go to a shop and you try and buy a hundred bottles of beer, you may get a
discount. They may say, okay, you know, for bulk. So one bottle of beer is one
pound. A hundred bottles is not going to be a hundred pounds. It might be eighty
pounds. And that's the example of non-linearity. You don't just multiply
the one by a hundred. Or it could be that the shop that you're buying the
beer from, it's late at night, it's the only shop that's open, they know that you
need a hundred bottles and they say, I'm sorry, we're only allowed to sell one
bottle of beer. But if you give me two hundred pounds, then okay, you can have a
hundred bottles. So it might be eighty, it might be two hundred, but it's not
going to be a hundred. And that's the real world. But that's not in
99.9 percent of finance models. A quant is somebody who uses
quantitative techniques, mathematics, statistics, computer science to try to
model the value of financial securities and how to structure them, how to hedge
them. Emmanuel Durman, also known as the Einstein of Wall Street, was once a
quant pioneer who worked as a theoretical naturalist for Goldman Sachs.
Now he's leading new quants at Columbia University in New York.
I moved to this field in 1985 when there really weren't a lot of them and it was
sort of a free-form business. We were all amateurs now, you can be a
professional quant, but in those days quant was sort of a derogatory word.
It was a bit like geek, sort of, which is like, I don't know,
slang for sort of computer nerds or computer geeks.
There's a lot more respect for quants now. A decade or so ago they were seen as
these very geeky types who didn't really understand the business. Well, they are
the business now. Manhattan, New York, a beautiful and
powerful place where I have a tremendous history and
roots, but also a city where money places a heavy hand on daily life,
now more than ever. I used to be a computer programmer at a major player on
Wall Street that is no longer among us, for obvious reasons. I was creating the
plumbing of finance. I would write not the models themselves,
but the infrastructure surrounding the models.
I could do it sleeping. Some of my co-workers were self-satisfied,
complacent, with a lazy state of mind. In my better jobs I got to sit on the
trading floor, which was energizing. Most of my career I sat in a
nondescript cubicle farm, but I was physically close to the quants,
the structurers of CDOs and similar products,
the traders. I saw what they were doing and I felt attracted.
They seemed to be solving difficult problems and working
at the center of the action. I felt like I was looking in through a window,
watching, yet separate. This really made me want to do the job.
The pay is good too.
Just as they view the market itself, different employers have different views
on these topics. I don't want our agreement or lack of
agreement on these issues to be a factor in my job search.
That is why I decided to stay off camera and anonymous.
One of the first ever equations in finance that I derived
is still one of my favorites. Beauty is having the right level of
complexity, but not too much. The key thing about this is
it looks very simple, but having a modulus,
an absolute value sign, it makes it what's called non-linear.
That in itself is very nice. One of the problems
with finance at the moment is almost all the equations you get
are linear, which is boring and not realistic.
What financial models do for the most part is ask you
for some input, like what will interest rates be in the future, or how volatile
will interest rates be in the future, or what will prepayment rates be in
the future, and then tell you what something will be worth today or later.
Financial models always ask you for some view of the future and then
translate that into a price. They can't predict things in an
absolute sense. They can only predict things given your view of the future.
People call that prediction, but they're putting the input into there.
In that sense it's not a correct word, prediction.
Yeah, I don't think it's a correct word. People like to say that this
great financial crisis, global financial crisis that took place
is a consequence of bad models, but I don't think...
I mean, there are a lot of things that caused this, but I don't think
models are by any means a major part. I think it's much more a question of
incentives and the way the whole system works,
rather than somebody foolishly relying. I mean, there are
people that foolishly relied on models. Nobody can predict with accuracy how
people are going to prepay their mortgages in the future, or
how many companies are going to default on their bonds. There's always some view
that's driving a financial model.
Well, my models... I wrote a piece of software
that you brought in all the elements, the mortgages, what your assumptions about
defaults and prepayments are. And so when you achieve that sort of
golden moment where everything works, it's the numbers are correct, it's
easy for the individuals to use, you know, that is a
great moment. Because you walk down the aisle, you see
all the people using your software. You know, they may not appreciate all the
work that went into it, but you know, and you see it working. And then in our
case, we were able to sell this software to
all the major investment banks in the world. I think
we sold one to the... ABN AMRO was one of our customers.
And, you know, all the European and Asian banks, and
the American banks.
Mike Osinski worked on Wall Street for almost 20 years
as a software programmer who cut bad mortgages
into attractive financial products. Computer programs
where banks invested billions and where billions came out.
But the input into these were all what's called prime mortgages, mortgages to
people that had jobs. So they were secure,
they were stable, people were making their mortgage payments.
It then grew into this vast enterprise and,
you know, I guess maybe it started to
blossom around the late years of Clinton.
And I left in 2000. After that, it just went
nuts, you know. They were issuing subprime mortgages,
a lot of subprime. It was a policy of the government.
Both Clinton and Bush agreed that the government should
force the banks to issue more subprime mortgages. And, of course, the banks were
totally in agreement with that because they could, on a subprime deal, they would
make a hundred times a profit that they would
on a prime mortgage deal. So they were very eager to issue these kinds of debt.
Now, whether the buyers and clients for these bonds
really knew what they were buying is a good question.
CDOs actually are fantastic instruments in the way that they take all these
mortgages and package them up and then you slice and
dice so that you've got each person can take as much or as little
risk as you want. Fantastic idea, brilliant idea. If you're
going to sell these things, you have to have a really big
profit margin because that profit margin, it may be profit margin, but it also
is a margin for error. So it may have a theoretical value of this, but you've got
to sell it for this because this covers possible errors.
And once people start competing with each other,
the profit margin shrinks. That's what happens when there's competition.
And then suddenly everybody's buying and selling CDOs and it becomes the biggest
instrument on the planet and there's no profit
margin, there's no margin for error. Combined with quants and quant tools
saying, don't worry about it, and then poof.
Here I have to apologize to the planet. I don't know, should I apologize to the
planet? I did warn about the dangers in
credit derivatives and in mathematical modeling. It is
clear that a major rethink is desperately required if the world is to
avoid a mathematician-led market meltdown.
What you're supposed to do, if you've got a warning, you're supposed to take
your warning and write it in book form. You're supposed to write 300 pages
about the dangers of etc, etc. I'm a mathematician.
What mathematicians do is they take something that
is maybe 300 pages and they try and condense it into
one equation, and that to them is beauty.
6 30 a.m. on my way to the library. We'll stay there for the next 12 hours.
Today's work, menial computation, abstract manipulation of symbols by hand
with a pencil, which could add up to another 25
handwritten pages. I like to learn new things, solve really
difficult problems. I like the challenge of representing a
portion of reality with logical symbols and systems.
I must have been 13 years old when I realized that you could calculate the
volume of a bowl by breaking it into smaller and smaller
rectangles. The flow of crowds. I like to observe the
motion of crowds and sense relations and forces that
operate upon them. Heavily trafficked public space, crowds
appear and disappear with the rhythm of the daily schedule.
I have the ability to see patterns in abstract mathematical symbols.
What's the obsession with this particular formula?
It was the formula that crashed Wall Street.
As a mathematician, it's a combination of the sublime and the ridiculous,
I'd like to say. Sublime because it's got a lot of beautiful mathematics in there,
but ridiculous because ultimately you have to use the thing.
So it just relates the probabilities of defaults happening in two different
things to the behavior of two
companies going independently and then via what's
called a correlation. Is it a problem that I don't understand most of what
you're trying to explain me? You don't? I don't. We were really
dumbing it down, weren't we? Yeah, we did. Oh dear. Suppose you've got
one of these CDOs and the way the CDO works, you've got let's say a thousand
mortgages and all these mortgages are piled into
this contract and the risk is whatever. The key thing is
you've got a thousand different mortgages
and you have to model these thousand different mortgages and within this
copula model there's an assumption for how these
mortgages interact with each other. The relationship between
Mrs Jones' mortgage and Dr Smith. How many correlations are there in a
two by two combination of these things? The answer is
1,000 times 999 divided by two, which is approximately half a million.
How do you know? How do you know what these numbers are, these half a million
numbers? You don't. So what the copula boys do is they say
let's assume the numbers are all the same.
It's too complicated. Let's just assume the number is 0.6.
That's completely ridiculous. You've got a really complicated model there. You've
got these complicated interactions between all these people.
So that's from the sublime mathematical modelling to the ridiculousness
of just saying they're all 0.6. Most senior people in banks don't
necessarily have a clue what they're doing because
all these these quants have all these multiple PhDs
and the people above are just management types.
They won't understand the technical ideas that the quants know all about.
And that itself can lead to problems because if the quant says
something, well what's the manager going to do? The manager just has to
believe the quant. And you'll hear stories about
quants basing their models on four or five years worth of data.
And you think that's not really representative of the
the economic cycles within the housing market.
And what's that going to do for your mathematical models?
Because anybody who's over a certain age will know that well actually house
prices can very easily fall. There was a moment I remember in 2007
I had a friend in the business socially making a social call and I remember
she said the Fed has got to lower interest rates
or we're all screwed. And I remember thinking I sold all my stocks and bonds
you know and I thought geez this is really going to be a lot
bigger than people realize. If you look around you there's a mortgage on every
house, there's loans on every car, it's a big market
your credit cards. And if it was failing you know they kept
issuing debt. People didn't realize. People
wanted to believe that everything was always going to go up.
I think they were blinded by the the amount of compensation that they were
getting every year. They're clean they're clean yeah yeah
yeah no don't bother. I mean these are huge numbers to make millions five
million ten million no that's a lifetime's worth
of money you don't ever need to work again and everybody wanted that.
You know I could quit working this year I made enough money in one year I'll
never have to work for the rest of my life and that was the goal of everyone.
It appeared to me.
This is money okay and Espen's talking about making money
making money making money every year you're making money and then one year
you blow up. Now the difference between this being your money and it being
a hedge fund is if this is your money fantastic you're making money
you're down here you're bankrupt. If it is somebody else's money if it's a
hedge fund that does this every year they're taking a percentage
they're taking some of that as profit as a bonus effectively so they
make some of that they make some more they make some more
all of this money they're putting into their own bank account
and then when they lose money that's their client's money that's lost it's
not their money so you've got you can see why it's very
easy for people to abuse this kind of thing. I think it's
fantastic that people who take risk should be compensated for taking risk
but only if they they are actually taking risk themselves.
Taking risk with other people's money you should not get compensated for I'm
sorry I don't know where that fits into
economic theory but taking risk with other people's money does not get
rewarded. Sadly though it does in this business.
That's enough for now.
There was a moment when I thought when uh
I questioned why I was ever involved in uh
Wall Street. Get the ice I need it right now on the double
ice. That's something I thought that people would be more judicious
and more conservative in their lending and I was involved in it
and I thought well wait a second these guys are out of control totally.
The piece of software per se you know that's a sort of inanimate object
yes people used it but you know if people had used it and put
good mortgages into it it never would have caused a problem at all
but when you put you know mortgages that you have a
fairly high uh certainty that people cannot repay
and then half of all the mortgages issued in a given year that type of
Yes the industry has gotten out of control.
Trillions of dollars a year basically went through that model.
These bonds within two and three years of being issued
went from AAA to Unradar. I mean just catastrophic collapse.
A lot of trading firms that kept these uh the riskier pieces in their
portfolio saw them drop to next to nothing and given the leverages
the amount of leverage and the amount that the banks had borrowed
they were suddenly in a financial panic.
Saturday after midnight, still studying. I know long hours will not stop when I
enter a future job as a quant. Because I was primarily a technologist I
did not fully understand what was going on.
I think part of my motivation post crash for becoming a quant
is to gain that understanding having been through the personal experience of
seeing the destruction of my firm. Looked again at my resume that I put out
there. The same headhunter called again today
to see if I would like to take a job in my former field
as a financial technologist. I declined again of course.
No invitation for a quant job yet. People that are
in the business right now probably refuse to talk to the public. If they
were to talk to the press they would be fired.
So only a limited few people in the business
have the option of talking to the press. Once you're in the world
right I mean your phones are ringing you know from the moment I woke up in the
morning and I remember you know a lot of these
guys I knew quite well and they try to wake me up six o'clock.
Oh I thought you were asleep you know and you'd be up till
11 o'clock. You have to be wired. You have to be alert every second.
You have to be engaged and and you have to be perfect and you have to be right
all the time. The software fails people lose millions
or billions. Can't happen. You can't be you can't be
wrong. You have to be perfect. It's it's you know it's it's a lot of stress.
My wife was in the business with me. We both would wake up in the morning
and describe similar nightmares. Phones were ringing and we couldn't answer them
and then we sort of grew out of that and we both realized
that we didn't know what day of the week was.
Hey Joel. Oysters. Banking has completely lost touch with its
purpose its original purpose and is now becoming dangerous. It used to
be that when some of these derivatives were first
invented they were to help your farmer for example hedge the value of
his crop so he was he wasn't speculating on the price of
wheat he was busy growing it. Now there are more
people trading these these commodity derivatives
than are actually involved in the production of the commodity
so which is completely bizarre. I know a lot quite a lot of people in
this business who are feeling a bit jaded
now. People are starting to ask questions.
My nice friends are starting to ask questions about the role in society.
You may be making lots of money but are you is it something to tell your
grandchildren oh you know I was a banker. I was there when I I caused the
the 2008-2009 crisis etc. What are they actually doing with their
lives or just moving this money around?
This isn't necessarily such a business to be proud of.
I think that's probably plenty 30-35 pounds.
Responsibility is just not a one-way street. When it's successful you're
responsible. Well you can't be unresponsible when the same
same item is is a failure. You have to have some type of responsibility.
I mean I could say I wasn't but I was involved.
I made a comfortable a very comfortable living
and I was proud of what I'd done. I never
I myself never saw this kind of debacle. Pretty big muscles you see. A little
wilder. This is a you know they're yellow on the
inside. Different color. A chef in the city loves
this wild taste you know. I only do it for one chef because if I
did too many there wouldn't be enough you know.
The model is Hippocratic Oath. I will remember that I didn't make the world
and it doesn't satisfy my equations. Now that's obviously that that's that's
about having a a mature appreciation that whatever you do
that the models are never going to be perfect. I will never sacrifice reality
for elegance without explaining why I have done so. So it's again it's a
competition between the real world and the elegant world of
mathematics and sometimes the real world is just
dirty. Nor will I give the people who use my model
false comfort about its accuracy. Instead I will make explicit its assumptions and
oversights. Quants are asked the following by some
trader. They're saying well look you've just measured the risk in this
portfolio. It's too big. Okay to quant. Back to the
drawing board. I want you to redo your numbers and come up with a
smaller risk. It doesn't mean change the portfolio. It
means change the maths to make it look less risky. People can use
the models to hide risk. Though I will use models boldly to
estimate value I will not be overly impressed by
mathematics. People make finance too mathematical. So
mathematical that many people who have to implement the
models don't understand what's going on. And once you have too much mathematics
it's difficult to see where the mistakes are.
I understand that my work may have enormous effects on society and the
economy. Many of them beyond my comprehension. So
this is a serious business. This is what it's saying.
The quantitative finance banking has become
so enormous it's outstripped all other
businesses. And really it should just be a service
for these other businesses rather than we are
everybody is now working to essentially service the banks.
It's what it feels like. It's completely changed
the nature of the world. All this banking.
So there's a nice picture in the book of
me and Emanuel Dermott with our Karl Marx beards on.
Because obviously the inspiration was a kind of
communist manifesto. You combine the communist manifesto with
the Hippocratic Oath and this is what you've got.
When I first came to the field I was sort of optimistic about using
quantitative methods on the financial markets. And
I don't think they're useless but
I'm trying to think how to say it. I don't think you can use quantitative
methods to explain markets either. People like Bohr or Einstein or
Schrodinger or Feynman discovered things that
that seem to be God's truth almost. Even if they're not
100% accurate. And I don't think that's possible in
finance. I sort of think it's an illusion.
The financial world and the world of people is changing the whole time.
History doesn't repeat itself. Whereas in physics history
repeats itself all the time. You can do the same experiment over and over again.
So I don't know. Somewhere after five or six years in the field I
began to realize that it wasn't the same thing as doing physics.
In physics if you wake up in the morning and
think of an equation or think of some theory
you actually have a small hope in hell that you might actually be right.
But in finance if you write down some set of assumptions and you look at
yourself honestly it may be useful but you know it's not
going to be right in some absolute sense. Because you're dealing with people and
people don't work that way.
Another weekend trying to remember all the parts of the city I haven't seen
since I started the course. Longing to visit art galleries,
eat out every night, to live. The day at the library seemed to
have more hours than the normal 12. Studying alone with other people doing
the same thing I feel like a monk in a monastery.
It's peaceful. The library is quite old. Sometimes we have to cover the air
conditioner with old soviet mathematical journals
from the 60s. Once I dreamt of doing pure science
working on rocket ships, working at a small startup company.
There has to be a way to be creative as a quant too.
Like designing new financial products and the math to price them.
Do you think it's always possible for people to express
a worry they have about the things they're building
or writing? It's possible. People may not listen to them in the end.
Most of these people are employees and people don't always listen to you.
But yeah it's possible to do it and I think people should do it and I think
people who use the model should understand that. But I don't
honestly believe that the models are responsible
for what happened in the world. I think what's responsible for what happened in
the world is that there have been an increasing number of
crises since 1990. Financial crises in the world since
1994 and every time people are used to
constant growth and acceleration and every time it slowed down
the government stepped in and tried to stimulate it again by lowering interest
rates just like they're doing now. And so you get these sort of a rise and
a collapse and then people don't like the collapse so they
lend money cheaply and force a rise again and each time the
the oscillations get bigger and bigger and they're doing exactly the same.
I have no idea what's the right thing to do but they're doing exactly the same
thing now which is trying to stimulate the economy
every time it looks like it stops growing fast.
It shocks me that as a person who runs many businesses that
we can talk about an economy shrinking by
one percent. It's awful. Growing by one percent is fantastic.
There's a difference of two percent. How can that
difference of two percent have such a big impact on the world around us?
One percent plus or minus in my businesses I won't notice.
Economists, they think that they're scientists
so they come up with these what they call laws.
They're not laws. Laws of gravity, that's a law.
Anything that Isaac Newton comes up with is a law
but when the economist comes up it's just a framework, an idea, it may work, it
may not, sometimes it doesn't. That's not a law but they think they're
laws and so they build up this whole edifice of theory based upon this
very shaky foundations and they get all sorts of
nonsense coming out of it.
I think that the natural world is something you learn to appreciate
through a struggle. In the financial world,
you know, money is a man-made phenomenon, right? It's like a game,
right, where you make the rules. Well money is a is a game that people make
the rules for but out there the day-to-day activity
is not about making money. The day-to-day
activity is trying to grow an animal, a healthy animal
or a group of healthy animals. That's a big difference.
That is beautiful, believe it or not, that is beautiful. The beautiful thing
about this is it says that in the risk-neutral, now I've got to
keep emphasizing, this is the risk-neutral version where mu equals r.
If it was the real world, if this was the real version, it would have some
dmu dt's in it. Now let's do some manipulations. Now some of these
manipulations are straightforward. Six over z, in which case there are no
z's in there at all, if you see what I mean.
The d by d big T version because we want to, we are trying to find the stochastic
differential equation not for log z, so you're going to end up
with mu minus a half sigma squared. Let me backtrack a wee bit
here and we have a stochastic differential
equation for z, then we can also write down
There was a very, very short period of time when
quants were in the doghouse, so to speak. People were saying that
banking has changed forever, quants have finished,
there'll be no more of these credit instruments and I said, you know,
hang on a second guys, you really don't know your history, you don't know human
nature. This will all blow over in a matter of
months and of course we're back to the big bonuses. Everything goes back
to as it was. If people don't complain now,
then it serves them right when the next financial crisis happens.
Twelve hours to go before the evening classes start.
I feel united with my classmates by the enormous workload.
It's actually the fees that we're trying to maximize,
right? Of course we have to maximize returns,
we have to do a good job in managing their money, otherwise we're
going to do pretty poorly at collecting those fees.
I wanted to feel challenged again and enrolled in a quants program.
It cost me sixty thousand dollars tuition, which means more debt that I now
have to take on. The incentive fee structure basically
means that maximizing the TWR is like maximizing fees.
Think about that, that's kind of tricky. This course is a year and a half full
time. One and a half years, no salary, expenses
living in downtown Manhattan, plus paying full-time tuition. So no
alcohol for me, not a drop, at least till the end of the
first semester. I can't afford to lose a day to a hangover.
Hardly any social life for the time being.
Most of the other students are Asian or East Europeans.
Math is their first language and our common language.
We Americans are the minority. Maximizing the number of times that we're going to
penetrate the previous high water mark, we're actually
maximizing incentives. So you can see that this
this type of optimization is very hedge fund like.
Does everybody get it so far? Used to be the physicists were splitting the atom.
Who's splitting the atom these days? Building bridges. Who are the people
building bridges? Everybody wants to move into this field.
Scientific creativity is becoming financial creativity,
which is all a bit bogus. Quants are essential
to modern banking because so much of it is based upon
new techniques, like the latest thing is the algorithmic trading, the
high-frequency trading, for which you need
math skills. It used to be, you know, historically you just have like floor
traders and brokers, you know, screaming and shouting down on the
floor of exchanges and trading stocks, you know, and the order came down and
they would run up and they sort of a muscle their way out and
wear different color jackets, you know, the classic pictures we've all seen.
Matthew Goldstein, research journalist for press office Reuters,
who was one of the first to map the consequences of high-frequency trading.
The reality is so much of this doesn't even take place there. I mean that's
becoming such a lesser part of trading and what goes on. It
goes on in the back rooms and it goes on in these
these modelings where these programs are put together by computer geeks
basically. So high-frequency trading is just about
taking all this data, analyzing it very very rapidly, and then putting on trades
that may last milliseconds. What worries me the most is
I was disturbed to hear that some firms get faster access to the markets
than other people. I forget what they call it now, but people get like a
tenth of a second advantage, big firms, which I think is unfair.
Hedge funds try and get the black boxes as close to an exchange as possible
because it takes time for the signal to get from the black box to the exchange
to buy or to sell. Now of course that is dictated by the
speed of light. Now we're talking about trading at the
speed of light. The classic
crash was the 1987, the 19th of October 1987 crash. That happened within a day
or the big move, the 20% fall in the S&P 500
was within a day. The next crash could be within minutes.
So what is a black box? A black box is just
something that it has inside some kind of formula,
maybe secret or maybe not, that takes in
lots of data. And the data might be stock prices, it might be other
information, and it tells you what to trade, what to
buy and sell. And my favorite is Google search terms,
trading based on what people are searching for.
It's not a black box in the sense that,
you know, if you saw the algorithms you could figure, well,
you and me might not be able to figure it out, but wiser minds maybe could and
computers can certainly read it. So it's a black box in the sense that
it's almost hard for the human mind to get their arms around, you know,
wrap themselves around to really understand what's going on.
And, you know, people have said for years that Goldman itself is a black box.
We don't really know how it makes all this money and the billions of dollars
and, you know, the big bonuses we hear about.
The New York Stock Exchange is building this big facility out in New Jersey,
which is, you know, right near New York, and
basically it's being built for high-frequency traders so they can have
their equipment very close in a very, you know,
tightly knit factory essentially to do high-frequency trading.
Well, who gets to have their server? Where is there going to be a lottery?
You know, you know, does someone pay more to get closer? I mean,
it's sort of absurd when you think about it. This is what it's come down to.
The battleground is ultimately going to be who has the most resources,
who can pay the best salaries, the higher the best brains.
In reality, we're talking maybe about a dozen or so really top players,
you know, and not everyone can be a customer of Goldman Sachs.
Not everyone can be a customer of Morgan Stanley or, you know, Barclay.
Also, the high-frequency trading means people are more concerned
with the price of something and not its value.
Value means what it's really worth.
Price is just what people buy and sell for.
And if you buy something now, sell it a second or two later,
all you care about is the price you sold it for
is greater than the price you bought it for.
It's actual value. Who cares?
It sort of flies in the face of what we sort of think about
what the markets are really about.
The companies themselves almost don't matter.
What they do doesn't matter.
It's just the fact which way their stocks move is all that matters.
And what's sort of frightening about it that I've seen from the standpoint
is the systemic risk that might be involved.
So much of this trading just takes automatically
and just takes place so quickly
that the human element gets more and more divorced from it.
The human beings are obviously responsible for writing the programs,
but there's no human being interstepping between these trades.
And we saw this a year ago with United Airlines.
There was a false bankruptcy rumor.
Some wire service inadvertently transmitted an old story
about a UAL bankruptcy filing.
The problem was all these newsreading algorithms saw that
and immediately started sell, sell, sell.
In a matter of minutes, United Airlines stock is cut in half.
That is clearly a case where the computers have gone wild.
Banking is taking over the entire planet
and is having such a major impact on the man in the street,
and it really should not.
Banking is supposed to be to take money from people with too much
to give to people with too little who maybe want to start a business.
They've got a business idea,
but that's not what banking is about anymore.
Banking is just about gambling on these numbers,
not realizing that behind these numbers,
there are human beings with jobs.
There's always been a joke about the New York Stock Exchange
becoming a museum at some point,
and they'll just have it for like a show there
and people running around.
This is the way we used to trade stocks.
You know, isn't it so quaint and everything?
At the same time, one can argue though,
that if there's this big backlash in high-frequency trading,
we may see revival to some form of human element inside
that people may say, you know, as flawed as human beings are,
we don't want to give everything over to the machines either.
Just walked past a crowded Wall Street full of Chinese tourists
asking me if this was the actual Stock Exchange.
Wall Street as a location is not any longer what it was.
Many banks moved their front offices uptown
and their back offices to newer and cheaper spaces in New Jersey.
Now Deutsche Bank is the only major firm left on Wall Street proper.
Nearby is Goldman Sachs with no name on the door,
also about to move.
There are almost no large firms headquartered in the neighborhood
that was the cradle of American finance.
Only the New York Stock Exchange remains.
Its facade, one of the most iconic symbols of global capitalism.
I'm always trying to encourage young people to do what I'm doing.
I mean, it's a young person's, you know, it's pretty physically intensive.
They really haven't grown that much.
I may not make it to Christmas here.
You know, I like a bigger, we sell a much,
we typically sell a much bigger oyster, right?
What do you find more satisfying?
Well, software is a much more mental,
you know, the pleasure and the mental exertion is pretty intense.
Like a million lines of software is a lot to me
and you have it all memorized, right?
And there's the pleasure of like a scrabble,
doing that kind of word puzzle kind of thing.
Although it's not that healthy.
You sit in front of a machine, you have the terminal face effect,
you know, it's not the same as this.
You know, this is pretty, not good.
I mean, a day like today, it's pretty idyllic, right?
You're just out in the water, a nice feeling, bringing food in.
I think we sell about 150,000 oysters,
which is, that's a hundred thousand dollars.
You know, of course I live off interest, you know,
so I don't, this is nice to have,
I make some pocket money, et cetera, et cetera.
And the overhead here is pretty small.
You have to come to grips with nature,
like these oysters should be bigger.
Every year, the ones that I pick in September and October
are ready by November.
Why they aren't, I don't know.
And there's nothing you can do about it, right?
Where in software, you can do something about everything.
You can modify, you can get, you can make,
you know, this virtual world, you can make what you want.
Here, you know, you have to live constrained by,
you know, the real world.