So, Fitch just reported a record high for private credit defaults. That would seem to validate what most people think, that the credit downturn is contained inside just private credit.
That is understandable. The most visible warnings have come from there: the record defaults, rising non-accruals, restricted withdrawals, weaker fundraising, and falling business-development-company stocks.
But the word “private” is becoming dangerously misleading.
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI Generated
The credit market is facing a systemic downturn as stress spreads from private debt to public markets. Record defaults in private credit, surging spreads in CCC-rated junk bonds, and rising AI-related credit risks indicate a broader instability. The crisis is characterized by a liquidity crunch, a shift toward maturity extensions, and a growing disconnect between private valuations and public market pricing.
So Fitch just reported a record high
for private credit defaults.
That would seem to validate what most people think,
that the credit downturn is contained
inside just private credit.
And that's understandable.
The most visible warnings have come from there.
The record defaults, rising non-accruals,
restricted withdrawals, weaker fundraising,
and falling BDC company stocks.
But the word private is becoming dangerously misleading
because the same concern is now showing up
in public markets.
Spreads on triple C rated junk bonds
have pushed past a thousand basis points.
These are levels seen at the worst
of last year's tariff panic
or 2024's carry trade blowout.
There is some serious flight from risky junk,
same as investors continuing to sell private credit BDCs,
pushing those stock prices to new lows recently.
And all of it belies the idea
that the broader marketplace is stable or stabilizing.
It isn't.
We keep finding more signs of stress spilling over.
After all, I just went over the bonds
connected to artificial intelligence
and the build out there that were meeting resistance
and the sharp rise in credit default swap prices
for major AI-related companies.
These markets are all looking at different pieces
of the same credit market cycle.
Now, private credit's where most of the noise has been,
understandably, but that's not the extent of the downturn.
Instead, public markets are starting
to do some price discovery.
And what they're discovering are a lot more cracks
across the entire credit market edifice.
So let's start with what's happening in public credit.
Now, a credit spread measures how much additional yield
investors demand to own corporate debt
rather than a safer government bond.
When spreads are narrow,
investors are confident about repayment,
about economic growth, market liquidity.
And when spreads widen,
investors want more compensation for risk.
And right now, the headline signal looks deceptively calm.
Investment-grade spreads remain historically low.
Even the stronger sections of the high-yield market
haven't yet experienced the kind of indiscriminate selling
that normally associates with a major credit market event.
But move down to CCCs, or the triple hooks, as they're called,
and the picture changes completely.
CCC spreads have crossed 1,000 basis points this week.
That's not a small adjustment.
It represents an active refusal by investors
to accept the resilient economy story
where balance sheets are at their weakest.
It's one thing to talk the talk
and hold an investment-rated corporate bond.
It's another to agree with the Fed's public position,
but then put your clients' money on it with riskier debt.
CCC-rated businesses often have limited liquidity,
weak interest coverage, and frequent refinancing needs.
Many can survive only if capital markets remain open
and lenders remain willing to extend maturity.
So this is a warning sign from the public market
that investors are indeed getting pretty nervous.
Public credit is therefore not saying everything is fine.
It is saying stronger companies,
they appear to be okay, at least for now,
but investors no longer want to finance
the weakest companies without being paid
crisis-like compensation.
And that flies in the face of both narratives,
that the market is generally on board
with the mainstream view of the economy
as not great, but hanging in there,
at least with a more positive outlook,
and that the private credit mess
is contained to just private credit.
But the economy, more worries,
and privates becoming more public.
And that public market avoidance makes more sense
when you look under the hood
at what's going on in private credit.
The one is definitely feeding into the other,
which was always the big risk.
Fitch Ratings tracks approximately
1,300 American private debt borrowers.
And according to its latest report, which just came out,
the trailing 12-month default rate
reached a record 6% at the end of the second quarter.
That was up from the previous record
of 5.7% only three months ago.
Fitch recorded 32 private credit default events
during the quarter involving 20 new unique defaulters.
And that total number of defaulters reached 84.
But the most important detail
is how these borrowers defaulted.
Maturity extensions under stress
became the leading source of delinquency,
overtaking PIK, or payment-in-kind arrangements,
or other kinds of interest rate deferrals.
More than half of the quarter's default events
included some form of maturity extension.
In other words, the problem is increasingly moving
from expensive interest payments
to the inability to repay principal on schedule.
An extension can prevent a conventional bankruptcy,
but can also allow a lender
to avoid recognizing the full severity
of a problem immediately.
But extending a maturity doesn't create cash flow.
It just moves the deadline.
Fitch also said industrials and manufacturing
had the highest private credit default rate
at 10.4%, up from 5.9% in the first quarter.
So there's your commentary on the stability
or resilience of the macroeconomy.
These are not isolated accidents.
They indicate stress across sectors
filled with leveraged middle-market borrowers,
the same type of lower-quality corporate risk
that public CCC investors are now themselves also avoiding.
All right, quick shout out to today's video sponsor, Monarch.
Monarch is a financial tool that's worth knowing
because it's a cleaner way to see your money.
It is basically a private ad-free dashboard
that pulls together all your credit cards,
your bank statements, your investments,
and puts it all into one place.
The whole point is to be clear on your money
without turning it into some kind of stressful project.
So here's how it works.
You open one screen and you can see your spending,
your net worth, your trends over time, even recurring bills.
So you're not jumping between five different apps
trying to piece it all together.
What I like about how it's built
is that it's not trying to nag you.
Instead of micromanaging every transaction,
it gives you this clean picture
of where your money actually goes.
It's also read-only encrypted,
so it's tracking and planning, not touching your accounts.
This is the kind of thing that makes sense
for a monthly check-in, a net worth review,
or just, I mean, if you're just kind of figuring out
or trying to figure out where your money's leaking
without turning budgeting into some kind of like second job.
And if you manage your money with a partner,
you can share the same view, the same goals, the same bills,
all with fewer surprises.
Let me tell you this too.
Monarch has a 4.9-star rating,
and it works with over 13,000 financial institutions.
And again, private, ad-free.
So if you want the clarity without the chaos,
and let's face it,
we all need a little bit of financial clarity,
there's a link on the screen for you to follow.
And this warning in the public side of the marketplace
also extends into other places
besides just junk bonds and junk bond indexes,
as we talked about recently.
They're having trouble selling bonds
among some of the biggest names
in the AI hyperscaler build-out.
For the first stage of the AI boom,
investors concentrated on stock.
Now the build-out is becoming a debt market story.
AI-related borrowing has accelerated
as technology companies, data center developers,
and infrastructure funds all compete
for chips, electric equipment, construction capacity,
and of course, power.
Even companies with enormous cash flows are borrowing
because the scale of the expected spending is so large
and it gets larger every single quarter.
And credit markets,
they're beginning to question all of it,
from the projections to the pathway forward.
Oracle, their five-year credit default swap spread
recently reached approximately 215 basis points,
which was compared to 145 at the end of last year.
SpaceX, that protection reached 185 basis points
after rising sharply since trading began.
In fact, there were CDS prices
even before there were bonds to be traded.
And then same thing,
credit default swaps with Nvidia, Meta, Amazon, Alphabet,
they've all moved higher in July.
Now rising credit default swap spread
doesn't mean default is imminent.
These companies are not equivalent
to the distressed triple C borrowers we just talked about.
But what it does mean is that investors are paying more
to protect against outcomes they previously considered remote
when they even considered them at all.
And that same behavioral change
has appeared in bond issuance.
Amazon sold 25 billion of bonds across eight maturities.
And the initial orders,
they were about 62 billion, seemed really well.
But after the offered spreads were reduced,
the order book fell to around 41 billion,
which was enough to complete the deal,
but less than twice the amount that was issued.
And again, that was much less than the average
for investment grade offerings,
which were around four times the offer size.
And Amazon reportedly had to pay
an elevated new issue concession
on some of its longer data maturity.
So Amazon got the money, but the warning again,
investors no longer willing to provide it
at almost any price or without asking key questions.
But now go back to private credit
where some of this AI related stress
is showing up in the worst possible way
in terms of non-accruals
in some of these private credit portfolios.
Harry's Capital, the largest publicly traded BDC
reported that investments on non-accrual status
rose to 708 million during the second quarter.
That was an increase of 15% from the previous quarter
and up 26% from a year earlier.
A loan goes on non-accrual
when the lender no longer expects to receive interest
normally enough to recognize that interest as income.
It's a much more serious signal
than an ordinary mark to market decline.
It says they're losing faith
in the ability of the borrower to pay it back.
Now, to be fair,
Aries said non-accruals were approximately 2.4%
of the portfolio at cost,
which was still below it's roughly 3% historical average.
So it doesn't mean Aries itself is in danger
or their portfolio is exploding with defaults,
but the direction matters, especially right now
with all of these questions swirling.
The amount of trouble credit is rising
and net asset value per share slipped from 1959 to 1935,
all as the industry is confronting borrowers
whose business models may be weakened by AI
and other things like the macro economy.
So you've got many private credit portfolios
that are financing software, IT services,
call centers, healthcare administration,
and other businesses once considered stable and predictable.
That predictability justified their investments
and all this leverage.
But if AI reduces the value of a software product
or automates a service,
maybe it allows a competitor to operate at much lower cost,
yesterday's stable recurring revenue
can become tomorrow's refinancing problem.
That connects directly to the public AI bond story.
One side of the market is borrowing hundreds of billions
to build AI infrastructure and the other side,
discovering that existing businesses
are gonna be disrupted by it.
And credit investors are exposed to both sides of the bet
when it is entirely possible
that neither side fully pays off.
So this brings us back into the publicly traded market
and that kind of weird area in between public and private.
And I'm talking of course about the stocks
of the BDCs themselves.
So private credit portfolios that are traded publicly
on the public stock market.
Business development companies make loans
to smaller and middle market businesses
often in the same private credit ecosystem
that's difficult for outsiders to observe.
So loans may be private, but the BDC stocks are public.
So we do get some indirect price discovery
on those private credit portfolios as a whole.
And those stocks, they have been falling again.
Vehicles associated with some of the biggest names
in private credit from Blue Owl to Goldman Sachs,
they've been moving toward new lows.
Investors are applying larger discounts
because they're questioning future earnings,
dividend coverage, the portfolio marks,
the models and recovery values.
Now falling BDC stock doesn't automatically prove
that it's reported net AV is wrong.
Equity prices can certainly overshoot.
We've seen that before time and again,
but this has been going on for over a year
and the stock market is clearly demanding
a margin of safety that the private portfolio marks
just aren't showing us.
That makes BDCs a bridge between the private
and public systems.
Inside the fund, a loan might be marked down gradually
after a quarterly valuation process,
but in the stock market,
the entire vehicle can be repriced every second.
The BDC investors therefore asking several questions
at once.
How many borrowers will stop paying?
How many have already stopped paying?
How many will receive maturity extensions?
How much interest income will be converted into PIK debt?
And what happens to the dividend
if non-accruals keep rising?
Public BDC prices aren't separate
from private credit stress.
They are the public market's real-time estimate
of that stress.
And of course, we're not gonna go through public
and private credit, the credit cycle overall,
without bringing in Blue Owl,
because we got more reporting from Blue Owl,
which shows, I mean, we already know about the redemptions
that are taking place at the funds,
but on the other side of the account,
fundraising, the amount of money coming in,
according to Blue Owl, has really dried up.
The firm raised just 7.6 billion during the quarter,
which was down from 12.1 billion
during the same period a year earlier.
More importantly, fundraising in specifically
its credit business fell to just 1.8 billion,
about one third of the amount raised a year ago
in the lowest level in three years,
back to when the boom was still in its infancy.
Blue Owl also, as we know, limited withdrawals
from two private credit funds
after receiving the industry's highest redemption request
for a second consecutive quarter.
These funds that offer periodic liquidity like Blue Owl's,
they own assets that could take months to sell,
assuming credible market price exists at all.
If too many investors request their money simultaneously,
the manager has to restrict the withdrawals.
It has to raise cash or sell assets at unattractive prices.
Those are the stage two, stage three behaviors.
So this explains why fundraising matters so much.
Fresh capital provides the fund with flexibility.
It can fund new loans, support existing borrowers.
It can help meet the redemptions
and reduce dependence on forced asset sales.
But when fundraising slows
while the withdrawal requests rise,
that flexibility declines, if not disappears.
And again, this is key stage two confirmation.
Stage two is when doubts spread beyond existing investors
trying to get their money out
to potentially new investors who take a look
and decide never to put their money in in the first place.
The problem is not necessarily an immediate collapse.
It's that private credit's ability
to absorb its own troubled loans becomes weaker
just as default rates are reaching a record high.
And naturally the question is,
if all this is happening
and starting to spill over in public markets,
why are we seeing record low or near record low spreads
on the investment grade side?
And the answer starts with
because credit cycles rarely hit
every borrower simultaneously.
There's always this type of sorting and tiering.
Large investment grade companies
usually have better access to cash, longer dated debt,
more diversified revenue and less urgent refinancing needs.
Their bonds also benefit from pension demand
and insurance company buying,
passive funds and a limited net supply.
Those technical flows can keep spreads compressed
even as fundamental concerns grow elsewhere.
The important mistake is assuming
tight investment grade spreads
somehow cancel the triple C, triple hook warning.
They don't.
The divergence tells us investors
are becoming more selective
rather than universally risk averse.
They want credit exposure,
but they prefer borrowers capable of surviving
at least slower growth and tighter financing conditions.
And I don't mean higher interest rates.
The weakest companies are losing access first.
That's what happens in these cycles.
That's how many credit cycles begin,
not with every market collapsing together,
but with lenders withdrawing from borrowers
that require continuous free financing.
Once spreads exceed a thousand basis points,
some triple C companies
effectively lose normal market access.
They could turn to private lenders
or maybe exchange debt or sell some assets,
but private lenders are already reporting record defaults,
rising non-accruals, slower fundraising,
and redemption pressures all their own.
The supposed escape route from public credit
is therefore becoming constrained
at exactly the same time
because that's what happens in credit cycles.
And there's another big reason why private credit stress
is not likely to remain private exclusively.
And that is the role of regulated banks
in this entire ecosystem.
The Financial Stability Board
says its member data captures approximately 220 billion
of drawn and undrawn bank credit lines
to specifically private credit funds.
Commercial estimates suggest the amount
could be more than twice that much.
And relative to total bank assets and capital,
these exposures are manageable.
They're not really huge, but the uncertainty here,
that's what's significant.
And direct credit lines are only one connection.
Banks provide borrowing-based facilities
against portfolios of private loans.
So banks, they need to be willing to fund these things
in order for these funds to continue operating.
The banks provide revolving credit facilities
to the companies that also borrow the private credit funds.
So they're on both sides of it here.
The banks participate in strategic partnerships
with asset managers.
They hold senior tranches
in some of these financing structures
that are supported by pools of middle market loans.
The borrowing-based facility
depends on eligible collateral.
If loans deteriorate, the collateral values can be reduced,
and that can produce a borrowing-based deficiency,
forcing a fund to contribute cash, add more collateral,
or repay part of the facility at a time
when the fund really can't afford to repay it.
This is the transmission mechanism,
the liquidity part of it.
Private borrowers miss payments or extend maturities.
Funds mark the loans down.
Banks advance less against those portfolios.
Liquidity dries up, so BDC earnings weaken.
Investors demand wider discounts in the public market.
Public junk bond buyers see deteriorating recovery
in free financing conditions and require even wider spreads.
No single connection needs to be catastrophic,
but altogether, they make the description
private credit increasingly inaccurate.
The loans may not trade publicly,
but their leverage, the funding, and the valuations
are connected to public institutions
and public market prices.
Now, with the triple Cs crossing
that magical 1,000 basis point threshold,
it doesn't guarantee something like a traditional recession
or financial crisis.
That's not the signal we're actually getting here.
The signal that we're really homing in on
is what it means as far as specifically
the broader credit market cycle.
That signal tells us something more precise.
Market participants are actively avoiding
the riskiest public credit,
and that matters because credit investors care less
about whether a company has an exciting story
and more about whether it can make the next payment,
refinance at the next maturity,
and preserve value during that entire restructuring process.
The AI credit signals reinforce the same shift.
Even prestigious borrowers
are encountering more price sensitivity.
Investors are purchasing protection
before even new bonds arrive.
At the bottom of the market,
companies are being charged yields
that can make refinancing impossible.
Meanwhile, private lenders are extending maturities,
they're restricting redemptions,
they're reporting now higher non-accruals,
and even raising less new money.
These are not separate narratives.
They are different stages of the same repricing,
from concern about private marks,
to falling BDC stocks, to wider triple C spreads,
to higher credit default swap premiums,
and more difficulties for public bond offerings.
So the popular story says
the downturn is a private credit problem.
The evidence says the word private
describes where many loans are held,
not where the consequences end.
Fitch's private credit default rate
has reached a record 6%.
Industrials, manufacturing, and some healthcare,
they're showing especially high stress.
Maturity extensions, that's a key.
They've replaced simpler payment deferrals
as the leading source of default.
Aries reporting higher non-accrual loans.
Blue Owl's credit fundraising has fallen sharply,
while redemption requests have forced withdrawal limits.
BDC stock prices are reflecting even worse investor doubts
about portfolio values and future incomes.
And now the public credit market is also responding.
The triple hooks above 1,000 basis points
show that investors are withdrawing
from the weakest borrowers.
AI-related credit default swap prices
and the bond offerings show growing caution
even among the stronger names.
Investment-grade spreads remain calm,
but that calm is increasingly concentrated
among borrowers least exposed
to immediate refinancing pressure
and macroeconomic conditions.
It's not proof of a system-wide crisis,
but it is proof that the credit cycle, at the very least,
is no longer confined to private portfolios.
Private credit supplied financing
when public markets and banks were unwilling to do so,
but now private lenders face their own defaults,
liquidity limits, and funding constraints.
Public markets are noticing,
and when markets start asking who can really refinance,
which collateral can be trusted,
and which valuations are real,
the problem is no longer private, it is simply credit.
The economy moves through four distinct regimes,
and each one rewards
a completely different portfolio strategy.
So join us for a free webinar
where we're gonna go over how to identify
which regime we're in now, which one might be coming next,
and how to position your portfolio
for growth, inflation, recession, maybe even deflation.
Register now for the four economic regimes
and how to position your portfolio for each one.