Xi Jinping Is Trapped—but So Are His Enemies

So what we're witnessing is not a simple battle between Xi Jinping and his opponents. It's a three-way struggle among the Xi Jinping camp, the conservative anti-Xi faction, and the reformist anti-Xi faction. Xi Jinping is taking advantage of this divide among his opponents. So far, there has been no clear winner. So now let's discuss this political deadlock in depth. At first glance, the solution might appear simple, because if Xi Jinping is prepared to step down, then the crisis should be over. But CCP's political struggle would not end there. This is because Xi Jinping may be able to surrender his positions, but what he cannot easily surrender is the long list of unresolved issues attached to his rule. They are his decision to abolish the presidential term limit, the public removal of Hu Jintao from the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, and most importantly, former Premier Li Keqiang's suspicious death. And then this year, the abrupt removal of two generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, and the continuing uncertainty surrounding their whereabouts. Each of these episodes creates a serious political liability. Those are precisely the reasons why Xi Jinping desperately wants to hold on to power. But this is also the question why Xi Jinping's future has become such a dangerous problem for the Communist Party. Because removing him is one thing, deciding how to define what he did is something else entirely. And under the party's own procedures, turning the treatment of a sitting secretary general into an official political verdict requires several layers of approval. So first, the seven-person Politburo Standing Committee would normally reach an initial agreement. Then the full Politburo, consisting of roughly two dozen senior leaders, would review the proposal. Finally, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, more than 200 senior officials, would formally approve the decision. But today, the first two levels appear politically paralyzed. Almost every member of the Standing Committee was promoted by Xi Jinping. A majority of the Politburo also rose under him. So the people who would normally decide Xi Jinping's fate are either his own appointees, implicated in his policies, or afraid that they themselves could become the next targets. So the party has reached a strange and dangerous condition, which is a deadlock. Xi Jinping may no longer be strong enough to dictate the final outcome, but his opponents may not be strong enough to impose one either. And behind this institutional paralysis lies a much deeper disagreement. According to various political accounts circulating outside China, two factions have emerged within the anti-Xi camp, and they differ on how Xi Jinping should be handled. One camp favors a limited judgment, the other wants a full reckoning. The first camp is associated with this man. You should be familiar with him if you have followed my channel for a led by former vice president, who was a key figure in the old Jiang Zemin faction. Their proposal is simple. Xi Jinping would be blamed primarily for one major violation, remaining in power beyond the established limits. His record would then be divided into achievements and mistakes. The formula would work roughly like this. Most of Xi Jinping's record would be preserved. A smaller portion would be criticized. Responsibility for the worst actions would be shifted downward. Officials such as Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, or even Li Qiang could be blamed for designing or carrying out the most controversial measures. Xi Jinping himself would accept leadership responsibility, step down with dignity, retain his official privileges, and gradually disappear from state media. The party would turn the page, the system would continue, and no one would examine the books too closely. Please note that this approach is not driven by loyalty to Xi. It is driven by fear. Let me explain their fear. Many retired officials and their families possess enormous wealth overseas. The families of former leaders and senior officials have long been associated with offshore companies, offshore properties, and assets accumulated through political connections that could be hiding in overseas accounts. Conservative leaders or the party elders in this camp, in the conservative camp, are worrying that once a genuine political and financial reckoning begins, it will not stop with just Xi Jinping. Investigators will not examine only the Xi family. They could move on to the families of the others, like the Jiang Zemin family, Sun Qinghong family, Jia Qinglin family, all belonging to the conservative camp. The real principle behind the lenient proposal by this camp may therefore be extremely simple. Do not open the account books, punish a few people, lower ranks, preserve the system, and let everyone else keep what they already have. That's the proposal by this camp. But the opposing camp wants something much more severe. The reformist wing of the anti-Xi coalition has been associated with former premier Wen Jiabao and other figures linked to the party's reformist faction, such as Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua. Their argument is that the crisis cannot be reduced to Xi Jinping's improper third term. They want investigations into the most serious and controversial events of his rule. They want the death of Li Keqiang investigated. They want the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli explained. And they want to determine whether these events represented ordinary political discipline or an organized seizure of power carried out through force and intimidation. Under that interpretation, Xi Jinping's departure would not simply be a matter of retirement. It would become, or it could become, a criminal matter. There would need to be investigations, possibly trials, judgments, and the recovery of assets. So you may ask, why would Wen Jiabao's camp refuse to compromise? Well, there are at least two possible reasons. The first is personal and also political. It's tied to this man, Li Keqiang. Now, Li Keqiang belonged to the political generation cultivated by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. He is Hu Jintao's mentee. Hu Jintao wanted Li Keqiang to succeed him, not Xi Jinping. So Li Keqiang was widely seen as their preferred successor and as a representative of the reform-oriented faction. So from their perspective, they failed to protect him because he died under unexplained or mysterious circumstances. His death, therefore, cannot simply be erased through a negotiated political settlement. And the second reason concerns the direction of the entire system. Before leaving office in 2012, then Premier Wen Jiabao made a famous remark. His parting words or his parting warning was that without political reform, the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution could return and that the economic accomplishments China had already made would be lost. So to his supporters, Xi Jinping's concentration of power proved that warning correct. And so from that perspective, punishing Xi Jinping is not the final objective. It's only the beginning. The larger goal would be to roll out what the reformist camp envisions as China's political reform. In practical terms, that would mean reversing Xi Jinping's political model, restoring collective leadership, and reopening the question of political reform. Now, here comes the third entity. Between these two camps stands Hu Jintao. Now, Hu Jintao's instinct has always been caution. Consensus first, action second, preserve party unity whenever possible. And according to some people, Hu Jintao even suggested a compromise concerning the investigation of Li Keqiang's death. What he suggested was to seal the case for the time being, reopen it only after Xi Jinping himself was gone. But then there is one woman who disagreed with that and disagreed with them strongly, and that's Li Keqiang's widow, Cheng Hong. So since Li's death, Cheng Hong and her daughter have reportedly lived under severe restrictions and have not been permitted to travel freely. Ms. Chen is also said to have sent messages to senior leaders such as Wen Jiabao, demanding a full investigation into her husband's death. Now, whether every detail of these accounts is accurate cannot be presently verified, but the political logic behind them is clear. Financial records can be sealed, private deals can be buried, but a disputed death is much harder to erase. The families of the deceased may not be willing to accept a quiet political compromise. And that is the obstacle the Lenin camp or the conservative camp cannot easily remove. As the disagreement becomes increasingly difficult to resolve, every faction has begun searching through CCP's history for a precedent because they need support from history to reinforce their own arguments. So the question becomes, has the party dealt with formal supreme leaders in the past? Well, there are three major models. Let me go through them. The first model is Mao Zedong. Let's talk about the three models because they're very, very interesting. All right, so how Mao Zedong was dealt with by the party? They waited until he was dead. Now, Mao Zedong died in September 1976, but the party did not issue its formal historical judgment of Mao's rule until June 1981, nearly five years later. By then, Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and the rest of the Gang of Four had been arrested. Mao's immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, had been pushed aside, and Deng Xiaoping had consolidated power. Only then did the party dare to write its verdict. The conclusion was carefully balanced. Mao was described as having made serious mistakes, particularly during the later years of his life, but his historical achievements were preserved. The legitimacy of the Communist Party was therefore protected. Deng Xiaoping famously insisted that Mao's or Chairman Mao's portrait would remain above Tiananmen Square or the Tiananmen Gate. The reason was not simply affection for Mao. The party understood that it could not completely destroy Mao without damaging the historical foundation of communist rule itself. The political message was ingenuous. Basically, it says that the ideology belonged to the party, the crimes belonged to individuals, and the party survived. This is essentially the formula now favored by the conservative faction seeking lenient treatment for Xi Jinping. Place Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, Chen Xi, or other subordinates into the role once occupied by the Gang of Four. Blame them for the worst abuses, and then describe Xi Jinping as a leader who made grave mistakes during the later stage of his rule. Preserve his earlier achievements and protect the Communist Party from the consequences. That's the idea of the conservative camp, but there is one major problem. You see, Mao Zedong was already dead when that verdict was written, but Xi Jinping is still alive, and very much alive. He's only 73, and he could remain alive for many years, and that makes the Mao Zedong model extremely difficult to reproduce. So that's model number one. The second precedent is the Hua Guofeng model. Hua was Mao's chosen successor who was thrown out by Deng Xiaoping. He was not put on trial, Hua was not publicly condemned through a special party resolution. He simply surrendered his positions one by one. He gave up the premiership in 1980, he gave up the chairmanship of the Communist Party in 1981. He was reduced to a lesser position and gradually disappeared from political life over a period of, I believe, three to four years. No dramatic verdict was ever issued, no public trial took place. This was the model of voluntary retreat without a political reckoning. You resign, we do not prosecute you, and everyone moves on. But could Xi Jinping accept a similar outcome? I doubt it. Unlike Hua Guofeng, Xi Jinping's rule is connected to a much longer list of unresolved political, economic, and security controversies, including the death of Li Keqiang and the unanswered questions surrounding Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. So a quiet retirement would not resolve any of them. The Hua Guofeng model also worked because Hua himself was not known as an intensely ambitious or combative political figure. He's much mellow and easygoing than Xi Jinping. So it's almost impossible to imagine Xi Jinping voluntarily surrendering power and quietly disappearing from public life. The third precedent is the Zhao Ziyang model. Zhao was formally condemned after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. The party accused him of supporting turmoil and splitting the leadership. But he was never placed on trial. He was never sentenced by a court. Instead, he was confined to his home for the next 16 years until his death. The political verdict had been delivered. The legal process was never completed. Zhao became a permanent hostage to an unresolved political judgment. But this model also doesn't fit Xi Jinping easily. You see, Zhao Ziyang had a genuine political and moral disagreement with the rest of the party leadership over the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. He accepted the loss of power rather than carry out orders that violated his conscience. He did not launch a counterattack. He did not try to hold on to power. He willingly let it go and just live in confinement for the rest of his life. He understood that although he might lose his freedom, he could still preserve his dignity and earn the respect of the Chinese people. Xi Jinping's situation is entirely different. The struggle between Xi Jinping and his opponents is not fundamentally ideological. Most of the competing factions still want to preserve the communist rule. None of them is primarily fighting on behalf of the Chinese people. Even if Xi Jinping were to step down voluntarily, he would not earn the kind of public respect Zhao Ziyang received because the reasons for their departures would be completely different. So, none of the three political models truly works here. The Lenin group or the Lenin camp wants to copy the Mao Zedong settlement by selecting scapegoats and preserving the But, Xi Jinping is still alive. And those who favor a peaceful retirement might prefer the Hua Guofeng model, a gradual withdrawal from power. But too many unresolved issues are attached to Xi Jinping's rule, and some of them are life and death issues. And Xi Jinping himself appears unwilling to disappear quietly. The anti-Xi camp is therefore confronting a problem the communist party has never fully faced before. A living supreme leader who refuses to leave, refuses to cooperate, and still possesses enough power to resist. So, what does the anti-Xi coalition have? Does it have any other options? Well, the communist party has never publicly tried a living formal supreme leader. That would create a fourth model in CCP history. And once that door is opened, it may never be closed again. Every future leader would know that losing power would lead to prosecution. Every faction would fight even more desperately to avoid defeat. Every supreme leader would have an even stronger incentive to remain in power indefinitely. And every political transition would become an uglier life and struggle. And that is why the three sides remain trapped in a deadlock, and why no consensus has emerged. Three historical precedents exist, none of them fits. A fourth precedent would be so dangerous that no faction wants to be the first to create it.