In this Stanford CS183B lecture, Kevin Hale, co-founder of Wufoo and partner at Y Combinator, shares essential insights on how to build products that users truly love. He covers first impressions, support-driven development, building long-term user relationships to reduce churn, and leveraging customer intimacy to drive sustainable organic growth.
The speaker explains how to build beloved products by applying human relationship metaphors to development. Using Wufoo as a case study, the talk emphasizes that sustainable growth comes from \"enchanting quality,\" customer intimacy, and a support-driven development culture that treats users as partners rather than metrics.
All right.
So when I talk about making products users love,
what I mean specifically is how do we
make things that has a passionate user base,
that our users are unconditionally
wanting it to be successful, both on the products
that we build, but also the companies behind them?
We're going to go over tons of information.
Try not to take too many notes.
Mostly just try to listen.
And I'll post a link to the slides on my Twitter account.
And on that link, there will be a way
for you to annotate the slides.
And you can ask me questions.
And so if we don't get to them, I'll answer them after the talk.
So you guys have been listening to and hearing
a lot about growth over the last several weeks.
And to me, I feel like growth is usually fairly simple.
It's the interaction between two concepts or variables,
conversion rate and churn.
And the gap between those two things
pretty much indicate how fast you're going to grow.
Most people, especially business-type people,
tend to look at this interaction in terms
of a very calculated and a mathematical sort of way.
And today, I want to talk about these things
at a more human scale, because at a startup,
when you're interacting with your users,
you have a fairly intimate interaction
that you have in the early stages.
And so I think there's a different way
of looking at this stuff in terms
of how we build our products.
And we'll look at a lot of different examples of that
and how it's executed well.
My philosophy behind a lot of things that I teach startups
is the best way to get to sort of a billion dollars
is to focus on the values that help
you get that first dollar, to acquire that first user.
If you sort of get that right, everything else
will sort of take care of itself.
It's a sort of faith thing.
So I came to be a partner at YC by way of being an alumni.
I went to the program in winter of 2006.
It was the second ever program.
And I built a product called Wufoo.
Wufoo's an online form builder, helps
you create contact forms, and online surveys,
and simple payment forms.
It's basically a database app that looks like it's
designed by Fisher Price.
What's interesting, though, is that because it
was fairly easy to use, we had customers
from every industry, market, and vertical you can think of,
including a majority of the Fortune 500 companies out there.
Ran the company for five years, and then
were acquired by SurveyMonkey in 2013.
And at the time, we were a very interesting acquisition.
We were only a team of 10 people at the time.
And while we acquired funding out here in Silicon Valley
through Y Combinator, we actually
ran the company from Florida.
We had no office.
Everyone worked from home.
And we're an interesting outlier.
So each dot here represents a startup
that exited through IPO or acquisition.
And we're this outlier to the left.
The bottom is the funding amount they took.
And the vertical axis is the valuation
of the company at the time.
To sum it up, the average startup
raises about $25 million.
And their return to their investors is about 676%.
Wufoo raised about $118,000 total.
And our return to our investors is about 29,000%.
So a lot of people are very interested in what
makes Wufoo a little bit different,
or how do we run the company very differently.
And a lot of it was focused on product.
We weren't interested in building software
that, I guess, that just people wanted to use,
that reminded you that you've worked in a cubicle.
Because it was a database app at its core.
We wanted a product that people wanted to love,
that people wanted to have a relationship with.
And we were actually very fanatical about how
we approached this idea at the point
where it was almost sort of a science-y way.
So what we said was, OK, what's interesting about startups
in terms of us wanting to create things that people love
is that love and unconditional feelings
are things that are difficult for us to do in real life.
And at startups, we have to do it at scale.
So we decided to start off by just looking at, OK,
how does real relationship work in the real world?
And how can we apply them to how we run our business
and build our product that way?
So we'll go over basically these two metaphors,
acquiring new users as if we're trying to date them
and existing users as if it was a successful marriage.
So when it comes to dating, a lot of the stuff
that we uncovered had to do with first impressions.
All of you often talk about your relationships
in terms of the origin story.
If I ask you to tell me about the first kiss,
how you sort of met, how you proposed,
these are the things that we say over and over and over again.
They're basically the word-of-mouth stories
of our relationships.
And they're the same kinds of things
that we do with companies.
Human beings are relationship manufacturing creatures.
We cannot help but create and anthropomorphize
the things we interact with over and over again.
So whether it's the cars we drive, the clothes we wear,
the tools and softwares we use,
we eventually prescribe characteristics to it,
a personality, and we expect it to behave a certain way.
And that's how we sort of interact with it.
Now, first impressions are important
for the starting of any relationship
because it's the one we tell over and over again.
And there's something special about
how we regard that origin story.
I'll give you an example.
If you're on a first date with somebody
and you're having a nice dinner
and you catch them picking their nose,
you are probably not gonna have another date with them.
But if you're married to someone for about 20 to 30 years
and you catch them on the barking larger
digging for gold,
you don't immediately call your lawyer
and then say, we have a problem here.
I need to start drawing up papers for divorce.
You shrug your shoulders and say,
at least he has a heart of gold.
So something about first time interactions
means that the threshold is so much lower
in terms of pass fail.
So in software, and for most products
in internet software that we use,
like first impressions are pretty obvious.
And they're the things that you see
a lot of companies sort of pay attention to
in terms of what they send
their marketing people to work on.
My argument for people who are very good at product
is they discover so many other first moments
and they make those something memorable.
The very first email you ever get from Lisa's software,
what happens when you first log in,
the links, the advertising,
the very first time you interact with customer support.
All of those are opportunities to seduce.
So how did we think about
sort of like making first moments on there?
And we actually took this concept from the Japanese.
They actually have two words
for how to describe things when you're finished with them
in terms of saying like, is this a quality item?
And the two words of quality are
atarime hinshitsu and midiukiteki hinshitsu.
And the first one means taken for granted quality,
basically functionality.
And the last one sort of means enchanting quality.
Take for example a pen.
Something has midiukiteki if the weight of the pen,
the way the ink flows out of it,
the way it's viewed by the people
reading the handwriting from the pen
is pleasurable both to the user of the pen
and the people who's gonna experience
the byproducts of it.
Taking it to the sort of next level.
Start with some examples.
So this is Wufoo's login link
and it has a dinosaur on it,
which I think is awesome.
But if you hover over it,
the spec has the added benefit of having a tool tip
that doesn't explain how to log in or what it does,
but basically rar.
And what we notice about this in early usability studies
is this put a smile on people's faces,
like hands down, universally.
And I think a lot of times when we are assessing products,
we never think about hey,
what is the emotion on the person's face
when they interact with this?
This is Vimeo's login page.
This is actually a couple iterations ago.
It's the one I find to be the most beautiful.
But it lets you know that when you're starting out
on this journey with Vimeo
that this is gonna be something different.
They do this all over the app.
If you search for the word fart,
as you scroll up and down,
it makes fart noises as you do this.
There's something different.
Like this site interacts with you.
It's a little bit magical.
It's a little bit different.
And it's something that you wanna talk about.
You don't have to always do it with design.
This is the sign up form for Quark,
which used to be a social network
for people who love to drink wine.
On it, it says email address.
It's also your sign in and it has to be legit,
first name, what your mom calls you.
Last name, what your army buddies call you.
Password, something you remember but hard to guess.
Password confirmation, type it again.
Think of it as a test.
It's literally a poem as you fill out the form.
This is the kind of thing where you're like,
oh, I like the people behind this.
I'm gonna enjoy this experience.
Now what does it say when you fill out a form like this
on Yahoo about what the personality
of this site is gonna be?
And what's disappointing to me
is like Yahoo forces every product and service
under them to use this exact same login form.
Flickr, I had thought, had one of the best
sort of call to actions.
It was get in there, right?
This is for Roku's sign up page.
I think this is an older version.
But what's remarkable about it
is that what you start getting a feel for
is like, oh, scaling up my sort of server
and backend services is as easy
as just sort of dragging up and down
different sort of knobs and levers.
It's gonna be beautifully used
and it looks fairly easy to scale.
Since we're in a room full of computer science people,
I think you'll appreciate this.
This is Chocolat, this is a code editor.
And they only have one call to action.
When the time limit is up, they say,
everything in terms of all the features
are exactly the same except we changed
the font to Comic Sans.
And what they're basically saying is like,
hey, we know who our users are,
who our real customers are.
And they're gonna be the people who care about this.
This is Hurl, this is a website for checking HTTP requests.
And sometimes the places where you get errors
are opportunities for first moments.
If you hit a 404, this is what you get.
When we need help, oftentimes what we do
is we create really beautiful marketing materials.
But when you actually need documentation,
we sort of skimp out on design features.
And this is a point that you see happen over and over again.
A company that gets this right is Mailchimp.
And what they did was they redesigned all their help guides
so that they look like magazine covers.
And overnight, basically, readership goes up
on all these features and customer support
for these things that sort of help people
optimize emails goes down.
Speaking of documentation, Stripe,
what's interesting about an API company
is that there is no UX.
The UX is actually just documentation.
And there's opportunities, even in documentation,
sort of to enchant and amaze.
So one of the things that I love about them
is their examples are wonderful.
But if you're actually sort of logged into the app,
one of the things that is a super pain for most people
when you're dealing with most people's APIs
is like grabbing your API credentials and keys.
And what Stripe does is it says,
oh, if you're logged into the app,
we automatically put your API credentials into the examples.
So you only have to copy paste once
when trying to learn their API.
When Wufoo wanted to launch the third version of our API,
we realized like, okay, that finally this is good enough
that we want people to sort of build on top of it.
We're trying to figure out like,
how do we launch this out to the world
that sort of has our personality behind it?
Because a lot of people,
they usually do things like a programming API contest,
and they give out iPads and iPhones.
And it makes you look like everyone else.
And so in our company, one weird value they have
that's a quirk of us is that the co-founders
are big medieval nuts.
And we would take everyone out to medieval times
every single year on the anniversary
of the founding of the company.
And so we said, we have to do something in that flavor.
And so we contacted the guys at armor.com.
We said, can you forge us a custom battle axe?
And what we said was, if you win our programming contest,
you would win one.
And the result is like, people wanted to talk about this.
It was something that people wanted to work on
because they wanted to be able to say like,
I'm programming for a weapon.
And what's cool is we had over 25 different applications
created for us of quality and quantity
that we could not have paid for on the budget
and the sort of time that we had for this.
We got things like an iPhone app, an Android app,
and WordPress plugins, right?
And all because what we did was we changed
how people want to talk about the origin story
of how they're interacting with one of our services.
We can go like all day long going over these examples,
but I'm gonna shortcut this by saying,
you should just subscribe for little big details.
It's just basically tons of screenshots of software
that's just doing it right,
that shows that they're being conscientious
of the user and the customers.
When it comes to long-term relationships or marriages,
the only research that we ended up having to read
is the stuff that was done by John Gottman.
He's been featured in This American Life
and Malcolm Gladwell's books.
He's a marriage researcher up in Seattle
and he has an interesting parlor trick that he can do.
He can watch a videotape of a couple fighting
about some issue for 15 minutes
and predict with an 85% accuracy rate
whether that couple will be together or not
or divorced in four years.
If he increases that video up to an hour
and asks them to also talk about their hopes and dreams,
that prediction rating goes up to 94%.
They show these same videotapes to marriage counselors,
successfully married couples, sociologists,
psychiatrists, priests, et cetera.
And they can't predict with random chance
whether people are gonna be together or not.
So John Gottman understands something fundamental
about how relationships work in the long-term
and that basically how we fight,
even in a short-term period,
can indicate sort of the whole system
and what it's gonna look like.
And one of the surprising things he discovered
is not that successfully married people don't fight at all.
It turns out everybody fights.
And we all fight about the exact same things.
Money, kids, sex, time, and others.
And others are things like jealousy and in-laws.
To bring this around,
you can actually attribute every single one of these
to problems that you see in customer support
when you're building out your products.
Right?
So this costs too much.
I'm having problems with the credit card.
If you're building a service
that helps people deal with their clients,
they're very sensitive about anything happening with that.
Performance, how long you're up and how fast.
Others are, I said, jealousy and in-laws.
Right?
So that's competition and partnerships.
Anything weird happening there,
people are gonna write to you about.
And the reason I like to think about this
in terms of customer support
is that in everyone's sort of processing
of like a conversion funnel,
customer support is the thing that happens
in between every one of these steps.
It's the reason why people don't make it further down there.
It's the thing that prevents conversion from happening.
Now, as we were thinking through all these ideas
and as we were building up the company,
we realized that there's a big problem
about how everyone sort of starts their company
or build up their sort of engineering teams.
And that is there's a broken feedback loop there.
People are divorced from the consequences of their actions.
And this is a result of actually the natural evolution
of how most companies get founded,
especially by technical co-founders.
Right?
Before launch, it is a time of bliss,
nirvana, and opportunity, right?
Nothing that you do is wrong, right?
By your hand, which you feel is like God,
everything that you write, every line of code
feels perfect, right, and is a genius to you.
The thing that happens is after launch,
reality sort of sets in,
and then all these other tasks sort of come into place
that we have to deal with.
Now, what technical co-founders wanna do
is get back to that initial state.
And so what we often do and what we often see
is that companies start siloing off all these other things
that actually is what makes a startup or a company
sort of real, right, and have other people do them.
In our minds, these other tasks are inferior, right,
and we have other people in the company do them.
And so for us, what we're trying to figure out
is how do we change software development
so that we inject some values
that we don't talk about enough.
Responsibility, accountability, humility, modesty, right?
And we call this, like a lot of other people,
we had an acronym, support-driven development,
and basically it's very similar to TDD
or other agile practice.
It's a way of creating high-quality software,
but it's super simple.
You don't need like a scrum,
you don't need a bunch of post-it notes.
All you have to do is make everyone do customer support.
And what you end up having is you fix the feedback loop,
right, the people who build the software
are the ones supporting it,
and you get all these sort of nice benefits as a result.
So one of them is support responsible developers
and designers and people who build the stuff
that give the very best support.
Now we're not the first person to think of this.
Paul English was a big purporter of this at Kayak,
and what he did was install a red customer support
phone line in the middle of the engineering floor,
and it would just ring with customer support calls.
And people would ask him oftentimes,
why would you pay engineers $120,000 or more
to do something that you can pay other people
a fraction of to handle in like a call center?
And he says, well, after the second or third time
that that phone rings and the engineer gets the same problem
they stop what they're doing, they fix the bug,
and we stop getting phone calls about it.
It's a way of having QA in a sort of nice, elegant solution.
Now, John Gottman talks about the reason that we
often break up with one another as due to four major causes,
and they're warning signs.
He calls them the four horsemen.
Criticism, contempt, defensiveness, and stonewalling.
That criticism is basically people starting to focus
not just on the specific issue at hand,
but on the overarching issues.
You never listen to users,
or you never think about us all the time.
Contempt is when someone is purposely trying
to insult somebody.
Defensiveness is not trying to take accountability,
trying to make excuses for their actions,
and stonewalling is basically shutting down.
Stonewalling, to John Gottman, is one of the worst things
that we can do in a relationship.
Hold up.
And oftentimes, we don't worry much about this
in customer support, criticism and contempt.
Defensiveness, you see this all the time in companies,
especially as they get older, but stonewalling,
this is something I see happen with startups all the time.
You get a bunch of customer support sort of coming in,
and you just think, I don't need to answer it.
I don't need to respond, right?
And that act of just not even getting back to them
is one of the worst things you can do,
and it's probably some of the biggest causes of churn
in the early stages of startups.
This is how support worked at Wufoo.
When we were acquired, we had about 500,000 users
on the system.
Five million people used Wufoo forms and reports,
whether they knew it or not, and all those people
got support from the same 10 people.
And usually, it was only one person dedicated support a day
or any shift.
Resulted in about 400 issues a week.
That's about 800 emails.
But a response time from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m.
was between seven to 12 minutes, right?
And from 9 p.m. to midnight, it was an hour.
And then on the weekend, it would be no longer
than 24 hours.
And we carried this up all the way up to this scale.
What a lot of people forget about,
and often talk about with Airbnb,
is how, like, oh, they did this interesting thing
where they went up to New York
and offered professional photographers,
and the founders would go out there
and actually take pictures of the people's apartments
to help them sell more.
Focusing on the stories around conversion.
What most people don't realize is a lot of times
when I saw Joe in the early days of Airbnb,
he had a phone sort of headset stuck to his head
all the time because he was doing phone support nonstop.
Churn is a story that we don't like
to talk about all the time.
Airbnb's sort of growth really started picking up
once they figured out how to match capacity
to the demand or the phone calls they were getting
into their support system.
At Wufoo, we actually constantly did experiments
around support because we were so obsessed with it.
One experiment we did was we heard Cathy Sierra
do a talk about there's a disconnect
between the emotions that we have when we need help
and sort of the content and the reactions we get
from people when we get help from them,
especially online, because they just don't see
all those nonverbal cues.
So she said, unless there's face recognition on the web,
we're just always gonna be disconnected from our users.
Our feeling was like, well,
we're not face recognition experts,
but I think there's another way of getting empathy.
So as form builders, we added a dropdown.
And what we said was like, hey, what's your emotional state?
And our hypothesis was that no one
was gonna fill this out.
We basically thought, oh, okay, you know what?
This is gonna be pretty, a lame experiment,
but we'll see how it sort of goes.
And it turned out the emotional state dropdown field
was filled out 75.8% of the time.
The browser type dropdown field, just in comparison,
was filled out 78.1% of the time.
So people were basically telling us,
for my technical support issue,
how I feel about this problem is just as important
as all the technical details you need
to sort of figure out how to debug it.
Now, we didn't prioritize things
or triage things by emotion, right?
And for the most part, people didn't game the system.
One of the interesting byproducts of it
was that we noticed that people started being nicer to us
in the customer support.
It was something sort of subconscious.
We just were thinking like, wow,
our users are so much better now.
What's going on?
And we went back and looked at the data
and we did some text analysis.
And what we realized is that, oh,
when it comes to only communicating with people
over written words, like email,
there's only three ways that you show strong emotions,
right, exclamation marks, curse words, and all caps.
And sure enough, on all three of those metrics,
they've gone down in sort of the way
people were talking to us in the customer support.
Once people had a simple outlet for their emotions,
people would be a lot more rational
and it made our jobs a lot more pleasant as a result.
The other byproduct that is awesome
is that you actually build better software
when you do this, far better software.
This is actually backed up by tons of research.
Jared Spool at User Interface Engineering,
which is sort of the big players in this space,
says like there's a direct correlation
to how much time we spend directly exposed to users
and how good our designs sort of get.
He says it has to come in a specific way.
It has to be direct exposure, right?
It can't be something where someone generates a report
or through a graph.
You have to be interacting with them somewhat real time.
It has to be a minimum of every six weeks
and it has to be for at least two hours.
Otherwise, your software will get worse over time.
Our developers, our people who are on Wufoo,
we're getting exposed to our users
four to eight hours every single week.
And what it does is it changes
the way you sort of build software.
Jared Spool has another way of talking
about how we build products, right?
And let's imagine that this represents
all the knowledge needed to sort of
use your app on a spectrum, right?
This is like no knowledge, right?
And this is all the knowledge needed, right?
And these two lines are pretty much
your interaction with users,
what you're trying to get them to.
This is currently where their knowledge point is
and this is the target knowledge point
that you're trying to get them to
to understand and use your app.
The gap between those is called the knowledge gap,
Jared Spool calls.
And what's interesting about this
is there's only two ways, right, to sort of fix this.
That gap represents how intuitive your app is, right?
You either get the user to increase their knowledge
or you decrease the amount of knowledge
that's needed to use your application.
And oftentimes, as engineers and people
who build and work on products,
we think let's add new features.
And new features only means
let's increase the knowledge gap.
So for us, we actually focus a lot
on the other sort of direction.
And so what that meant is we spent a lot of time,
30% of our engineering time was spent on internal tools
to help with our customer support stuff.
But oftentimes, it was spent helping people help themselves.
Things like frequently asked questions, tool tips,
things like if you just click the help link, right?
Instead of taking you to the generic help
sort of documentation page,
you go to the specific page where you're looking at
that's gonna be most sort of appropriate
for what you're working on.
We redesigned our documentation over and over again.
AB tested it constantly.
One iteration of our documentation
reduced customer support by 30% overnight.
It's one of those things where like overnight,
all the people that work on the product
immediately had 30% less work to do.
Now what happens if you have everyone work
on customer support constantly
and thinking about it in terms of a remarkable way?
Well, I talked a lot about in the very beginning,
growth is a function of conversion and churn.
This is WeView's growth curve for the first five years.
What's interesting is we paid no money
on advertising, on marketing.
All of it was done by word of mouth growth.
And the interaction between new users
and downgrades are this.
It's so slight what it takes, that gap,
making that sort of work.
And what a lot of people keep forgetting
is that there's almost no difference
between an increase in conversion rate,
1% increase, and a 1% decrease in churn.
They do exactly the same thing to your growth.
However, the latter is actually much easier to do.
It's much cheaper to do in your apps.
And a lot of times we neglect this to way far along, right?
And we usually have our B team
works on these sort of products and services.
This is actually not the graph
that we track most of the time at WeView.
It's not even the one I'm proud of.
This is the one I'm proud of.
Because even though we had this sort of nice,
awesome curve of growth,
this is what allowed us to scale.
Keep the company small, have an awesome culture.
And that required doing a lot of these things
to help people sort of do what they need.
So John Gottman noticed there was a different type
of behavior for relationships and why people divorced.
Basically, there would be some subset of people
who would stay together 10, 15 years,
and then all of a sudden, they divorce.
And there was none of the other indicators
which sort of show that this is what was gonna happen.
And he was looking through the data,
and he realized, oh, there's no passion,
there's no fire between these people.
When it comes to relationships,
they kind of follow the second law of thermodynamics.
In a closed energy system, things tend to run down.
So you have to constantly be putting energy
and effort back into it.
Now, the way a lot of people sort of think
about showing people that I care about you
in products and in companies is to do things like,
let's have a blog, let's have a newsletter.
The thing is, we'd look at these rates,
and basically, it was such a small percentage
of our active users that it was like,
most of our users have no idea all the awesome stuff
that we're doing for them.
So we built a new tool,
we called it the WooFoo Alert System,
and what it allowed us to do is just timestamp
every new feature that we're building for users,
and then every time they would log in,
we would look at the difference between their login time,
or last login time, and the new features
that were implemented, and we had this message show up.
Hey, since you've been gone,
here's all the awesome stuff that WooFoo did for you.
Hands down, this was the most talked about feature
I've ever had every time I went out to talk to users.
They'd say, dude, I love that since you've been gone thing,
even though I pay the same amount every single month,
you guys are doing something for me almost every week,
and it's totally awesome,
it makes me feel like I'm getting maximum value.
The other thing that we did,
in addition to having everyone support the people
that paid their paycheck, is have them say thank you,
and this was a large part due to us injecting humility
and modesty into the equation.
Every single Friday, we would get together,
and we'd just write simple handwritten thank you cards
to our users, and I know there's tons of people
who would not be excited about doing this,
but it was a ritual that made all the difference
in terms of having a team that was very tightly knit,
also, and working on stuff that they really cared about.
They always constantly knew what the mission was for,
and why we did what we did.
These aren't fancy thank you cards, right?
They're just simple handwritten stuff on an index card,
we threw in a sticker,
and slapped on a dinosaur on the front of it.
What's interesting is, we started this practice
as a result of the early days of starting WooFoo.
Chris, Ryan, and I were talking,
and we're trying to figure out,
what are we gonna do to show our users
that we appreciate them around Christmas,
and Chris came up with this idea where he said,
hey guys, so a couple years ago,
my mom made me write thank you notes
to all of my relatives for my Christmas gifts,
and I didn't really like to do it,
but the following year, all my presents were super good,
so I think we should try this for our business,
and see how it goes.
So that first year, we wrote handwritten Christmas cards
to all of our users that first year.
Second year rolls around, and we have too many customers,
and it's still just the three founders,
and we were going like, we're kinda screwed,
I don't know what we're gonna do,
and we read a book called The Ultimate Question,
and in it, he talks about,
hey, just focus on your most profitable users.
If you just send them, and take care of them,
things will work out.
So we're like, all right, that makes sense,
that's scalable.
So that year, we only write to our highest paying customers,
and the January rolls around that second year,
and one of our long-time loyal users writes us,
and he's basically like, hey guys,
I really love that Christmas card you sent me
the first year, and I just wanted you to know,
I haven't received my second card yet,
and I'm just looking forward to it,
I know you didn't forget about me.
Thanks a lot.
So we're like, ****, because best way
to sort of exceed expectations
is not to send anything to begin with,
so we were sort of in this conundrum.
And what we decided, after thinking about it for a while,
is that we need to stop doing it just one time a year.
It needs to be something that's part of the culture,
it happens every sort of week, even.
And even though we'll never catch up
to all of our customers, just the practice of doing it
will make all the difference.
I talked a lot about a bunch of lovey-dovey stuff
and sort of touchy-feely things
that I think a lot of engineers
don't like to think about too often.
And so I'll end on some sort of hard business data
or research.
There's an article that was put out
by the Harvard Business Review several years ago
by Michael Treacy and Fred Wieserman,
and in it, they talk about the discipline of market leaders.
They say there's only three ways
that you achieve market dominance,
and depending on how you want to achieve
that market dominance, you have to organize your company
in a very specific way.
Best price, best product, and best overall solution.
If you want to be the best price out there,
you focus on logistics, so Walmart and Amazon.
If you want to be the best product out there,
you focus on R&D.
Apple's usually a quintessential example of that.
Best overall solution, it's about being customer intimate,
and this is the path that you see followed
by luxury brands and hospitality industry.
What I love about this path towards market dominance
is that the third one is the only one
that everyone can do at any stage of their company.
Requires almost no money to get started with.
Usually just requires a little bit of humility
and some manners, and as a result,
you can achieve success as any other people
in sort of your market.
That's all I got.
Thank you very much.
Yeah, let's take some questions.
You guys have any?
Right in the back there.
What are the products that users love?
You might have multiple different types of users.
How do you build one product that all users love?
Maybe there's a feature that one really likes
but detracts value from another.
All right, so what do you do when you have a product
with lots of different type of users, right?
Some users will love one thing and another will another.
And I agree, there's an interesting fine line for that.
What I always usually tell people
is focus on the people who are the most passionate,
especially in the early stages, right?
Whoever's, whatever niche it's gonna be,
that's who I focus on completely.
Things that a lot of different products did.
I think Ben Sullivan of Pinterest
started off with design bloggers, right?
Curtail your thing for them,
and eventually you'll figure out sort of universal values
that will appeal to a lot of other people.
So just start one at a time.
And a lot of the examples that you see up there,
a lot of people make the mistake is like,
oh, I'll just make my app funny.
Humor is like really difficult to do, right?
When you want to shoot for something sort of witty.
And quite honestly, you have to get functionality right.
So like the Japanese quality.
If you don't have atatame on there, right,
don't try to do anything witty, right?
Because it will backfire on you.
So hands down, our number one focus
is make it as easy to use as possible for Wufoo.
And anything else on top was polish, right here.
So I'm a co-founder of ReachOut.io.
So everybody says that focus on your product.
I'm also a dev guy.
I love to build product, and I love to make it the best.
But we are at a certain point
that we are focused on our product,
but we don't get customers, right?
So I mean, second thing,
so how much we should focus on product,
but because we should do now marketing,
we should get some other customers,
and start talking to customers.
But when you are too focused on your product,
like users are not coming, right?
So what exactly do you guys mean
when you are saying like focus fully on your product
and give the best product?
So what exactly?
So the question sort of is,
how do we balance this sort of thing
where we want to be obsessed with working on product,
but all the other skills and sort of tasks
that are needed by a company,
like marketing and branding and all that stuff,
and how do we sort of balance that?
And the thing is like,
with startups you're juggling like tons of things
constantly in the air.
The thing is, if you're working on product,
like you should also always have this flip side
is when you're talking to users, right?
And for us inside of Wufoo,
the way we got people to talk to users
is they just did customer support,
and they got to see firsthand right away
whether that feature sucked or not,
and also impacted everyone else in the company
because everyone had a customer support ship.
So you have this sort of social incentive
to sort of make everything work.
And so like I said,
there should be no point where you only focus on product.
You should always have time where you work on product,
and then you see sort of what users say to you.
And you should always have this virtual
like feedback loop on there.
So be careful when you don't have that.
Usually what ends up happening, if you're lucky,
in terms of marketing and sales,
like usually my feeling is like
you having to spend money on marketing
and advertising and all that stuff,
it's usually a tax you pay
because you haven't made your product remarkable, right?
Word of mouth growth is the easiest kind of growth,
and it's how a lot of the great companies sort of grow.
So figure out how to like have a story
that people want to tell about your product,
where they're the most interesting person
at the dinner table, right?
And then that person is your salesperson, right?
That person is your sales force for you.
Right here.
Like what is the crystal clear customer or user need
and the demand is there and it's the right solution.
How do you communicate with engineering and design
to make sure the execution?
Because sometimes people in the team have ideas,
and but still at the end of the day,
they have to make a decision of where to go.
Oh, so how do you make a decision on product
and communicate that with your sort of engineering team
when there's like lots of different directions to go?
My feeling is that,
so for us, we just looked at support,
and it was really easy because you often just saw
what are the things that people are having
the most amount of problems with,
or people asking all the time.
You cannot help but get feature requests from people.
No matter like whatever opening
or office you have in your product or app,
people will like jam feature requests in there.
So you're easily gonna know sort of what they sort of want.
Your job as a product person, an engineer,
is to not just do what they say
because that way you'll just be a slave.
It's to figure out sort of deeply
what are the reasons why underlying those things
and sort of solve that deep underlying reason.
The thing is if everyone wants to have a different way
to sort of go, then ultimately it comes down to like
someone's gonna figure something out.
But also, make the smallest version of each little idea.
No longer than a week or two weeks to build it out there,
and then you can try them out
and see sort of what works or don't work.
I think it's dangerous to have
multiple different product directions
that requires lots of time to sort of figure out.
Sam?
Related to that, can you tell the story
of how the King for a Day thing
did you get it with Google?
Yeah, okay.
So I don't like hackathons.
I think they sort of suck
in terms of the ones done inside of companies
because you spend like 48 hours
like working on something really hard
that you're sort of passionate about,
and 99% of them never make it to production, right?
And it's sort of like super sad.
So for us, we like flipped the knot on its head
and we came up with an idea that we called King for a Day.
And it actually worked over the weekend.
But how it worked is,
someone randomly in the company got drawn
and they got to be the king.
And the king got to tell everyone else
what to do on their product.
So everything that was bothering them
about WooFoo, about the customer support stuff,
or some feature they really wanted to have built,
they got the engineering resources,
the marketing resources, the advertising resources
of everyone inside of the company
to make it sort of happen.
And of course, we'd work with them to figure out
what can be actually done in 48 hours.
But we would do this one to two times a year.
And it was like a huge hit,
and it was a boost to morale
because what people most love
is working on things where it's like,
oh, I made a difference to the app, right?
And so for us, that's one way
that we would sort of divide time
for product direction.
It's like sometimes the people that work for you,
they have a strong opinion about where it should go.
And it's a good way to sort of democratize it a little bit
by rotating it around.
Yes?
You said you guys all work from home.
It usually seems like a nightmare.
You didn't have an office.
How did you make that work?
Okay, so we all work from home.
So we'll tell you this.
We all still work within the Tampa Bay area.
We would allow anybody to work from anywhere,
but usually, as we tried to recruit them,
they'd sort of meet our team,
and they'd just decide,
okay, we just want to come and move here anyway.
Remote working is especially tricky.
A lot of people like to romanticize it,
especially people who are like employees.
But the thing is, an office gives you
a lot of sort of benefits and efficiencies
that you now have to compensate for
when you have remote working.
But remote working also have
these other sort of efficiencies in place.
For example, I don't have to worry about my employees
losing two hours of their day to commuting, for instance.
So the biggest thing that we had to do for remote working
is to respect people's time.
And so the way we had it set up is,
we actually had a four and a half day work week at WUFU.
Half day on Friday was for all the meetings and stuff.
We said no biz dev deal, meetings,
no talking with other outside parties.
They often be done on Friday, on that half day.
It couldn't be done in the middle of the week.
And then also, one day of everyone
was already dedicated to customer support.
So everyone in our company effectively only had three days
each week to actually build or work
on whatever they were doing.
But I actually firmly believe
that if you have three solid days, eight to 10 hours,
where you're only working on what you need to build,
you can get a ton of ---- done.
And so what we said was,
you have to respect everyone's time
during that three day period,
if they're in that three day period.
And what we came up with is a 15 minute rule.
And the way it worked is,
you could have a discussion,
like a chat or a phone call or whatever with someone,
but it could go no longer than 15 minutes.
So if you have some complicated issue
that you couldn't figure out,
we'd say, at 15 minutes,
you are to immediately table that item, right?
And have us discuss it on Friday,
and you'd move on to the next item on your list, right?
To enhance productivity.
More often than not, I would say 90% of the time,
the item never got brought up on Friday.
Because usually what would happen is people would sleep on it
and then they'd just magically say like,
hey, I found a solution.
Or like, hey, that's not a big problem whatsoever.
Because most problems inside of company,
they don't need to be solved in real time.
Or right away.
The only things are when the site is down
or payments aren't working, right?
Everything outside of that is basically kind of luxury.
So focus on your priorities as much as possible.
And as a result, our 10 person team did far more
than many, many other companies as a result.
But it takes extra work to make remote working happen.
We are an extremely disciplined sort of team.
And I would have to say,
there's almost not many YC companies
that actually have been able to replicate sort of what we do.
I think there's only two other companies, I think, in YC
that sort of have the same sort of disciplined working style.
It takes more work in a very different fashion, right?
An office allows you to be a little bit lazier, right?
In terms of all these things around productivity.
Over here.
Just to build off that question,
as the leader of the team,
how did you manage to instill a company culture, right?
And also have accountability for your employees,
especially because they're in the same working space.
Okay, how do we set up accountability
for employees as a manager?
All right, so at Wufoo,
we were profitable nine months after launch.
So we had profit sharing, right?
And so it makes sense, it's pretty simple and clear.
It would be a multiple of whatever bonus pool
that we sort of had.
And the performance measures would be based on sort of
how they did in customer support, right?
On their duties there.
And sort of what they said
they were wanting to accomplish or do.
I don't like process and I don't like lots of tools
to help get people to be productive.
So the only thing that we had for helping people manage
sort of their projects is to-do lists.
And that is like simple text files
that we shared in a Dropbox account.
Each person had their name on it
and you got to see every time someone updated
their to-do list.
What we said is every single night,
you just said everything that you did that day, right?
And then on Friday, we would just go over,
okay, this is what you said last week
that you were going to do.
This is what you actually got done.
What are sort of the problems at hand?
And it's super simple, right?
It creates this like nice written trail
for how to sort of handle stuff, right?
And I don't have to worry about managing them, right?
They sort of set the tone
for how they want to be sort of assessed.
And it makes it really simple.
And for people who are excellent at what they do, right?
It works very, very well.
And then when you actually have problems,
it's very easy to fire people.
I was fortunate that I never had to fire anyone at WeFu,
right, but we were able to correct
a lot of people's behavior very, very quickly
because we just kind of look at this
and it's like, look, this is your pattern of behavior.
You finish a fraction of the items on your list.
You do most of the items
at the last second right before Friday.
That's a problem.
You've got to manage your time better.
And this is evidence that you've provided to us.
All we have to do is sort of describe it back to you.
And because everyone in the company sort of sees it, right?
There's social pressure that's put in the place
that helps make it all sort of happen.
Right here.
How did you hire people that you felt
would be able to work remotely
in this kind of environment that's not standard?
So how do you hire people that can work remotely
and then sort of work in this sort of fashion?
So pretty easily you have them work
on a side project for you.
So you contract them out
and they have to work remotely as such.
Usually the projects I like to have them work on
is about a month long, right?
I could do things much faster for a week,
but usually get a good sense of like
how well people sort of manage themselves
and work on things from a project like that.
So that was always the first assessment.
Like we never did anything just by interviews.
The other thing we had to sort of screen them for
is their ability to do customer support.
Because not every engineer sort of has empathy skills
to handle that stress.
So sometimes I would have people write
breakup letters to me, right?
In an interview and just like,
hey pretend like you have to break up with me.
You have 15 minutes to write it down there
and you can only write it by hand.
What are you gonna say?
And so you get a good sense of sort of their writing skills
because like 90% of what you do in customer support
is tell them bad news.
Like we don't support that feature,
sorry that's not gonna work
or it's not gonna be available.
And so people have to have sort of tacked at that.
One question.
Right here, the glasses.
So it seems like you have all these like tricks
and experiments that have really helped the company.
Do you have any stories of ones that didn't work out?
Have all these tricks and experiments to help the company.
Are there any ones that didn't work out?
All right, I'll talk about one.
So one of the things that we did early on
to try to motivate ourselves was try to get,
like we understood this idea of like crunch mode
and that it's really bad for people.
Like if you're doing a subscription business,
you need people to last for the long term.
And video games, a lot of times they like crunch people
all the time for like a specific deadline
or have multiple sprints every two weeks
and you have to shoot up to this deadline
and it's like exhausting.
And so because when it's happening,
it's like you might get an increase in productivity
but the recovery period that you need for people
is always greater than the productivity you gain.
And in a company where you need everyone
doing customer support and being on their game
and constantly pushing out features,
you don't have time for recovery.
So we were thinking about, okay,
we want to build like a company vacation
into how WooFoo sort of works
to reward our users every single year.
And we said, okay, if the vacation is sort of built in there
for the recovery, we can have one crunch period
before that vacation set up
and we'll just only do customer support
that will sort of scale with people.
So the way we did the very first crunch mode
is that it was just between the three founders
and we had each of us draw up a 10-item to-do list
that would be fairly aggressive
and the first person to get through seven of their items
would win and the last person to get through
seven of their items would become what we called trip bitch.
And trip bitch meant that you carried
the other person's luggage and got people drinks
when you're on the company vacation.
So we did that and during that period,
everyone was pretty excited about it and motivated
and in the winter got to choose
the next company vacation the following year.
And then all of a sudden,
Ryan had basically poorly estimated the items on his list
and he realized very quickly, I'm going to ******* lose.
And so he was just like, uh, I give up.
And he just sort of stopped.
So crunch mode turned out to be blah mode for him
because he knew he was gonna lose
and became pretty demoralized.
So as a result of doing that,
we decided not to do it in that similar fashion anymore.
Good idea that we like to talk about
but it's one that we never did again.
All right guys, thanks a lot.
You can email me at kevin at ycombinator.com.