Xi Jinping can’t stay—but he may not be able to leave. Behind Zhongnanhai’s image of unity, a three-way power struggle is reportedly paralyzing the Chinese Communist Party. Xi’s allies, conservative Party elders, and reformist opponents all want different outcomes—and none can agree on how Xi should be removed, judged, or protected. Should he be allowed to retire quietly? Blamed only for breaking succession rules? Or investigated for the darkest controversies of his rule? From the secretive Beidaihe meetings to the historical precedents of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, and Zhao Ziyang, this program examines why the CCP is trapped with Xi Jinping—and why any attempt to resolve his fate could tear the regime apart.
The video analyzes a severe political deadlock within the CCP, arguing that Xi Jinping is trapped by a divided opposition. While conservatives seek a dignified exit for Xi to protect elite interests, reformists demand a full criminal reckoning. This impasse is exacerbated by the failure of historical leadership transition models and a shifting power dynamic within the military.
Hello everyone. Hi, welcome. Welcome to Lei's Real Talk. It's Lei's Saturday Night Live.
I hope everyone's weekend has been good so far. Okay, excellent. Well, it's been a while
since we discussed CCP politics. Let me start by saying this. The CCP regime has a Xi Jinping
problem. He can't stay, but he can't safely leave either. His opponents want him gone,
but they cannot agree on how to remove him or what should happen next. This is the political
deadlock now gripping Zhongnanhai. You've been hearing me saying that Xi Jinping's power
has waned and that he doesn't have full control of the regime. Others disagree with me. They argue
that no, Xi Jinping is still very much in control and he is the supreme leader.
From the outside, the regime still looks powerful. The official narrative remains
as unified as ever. State media speaks with almost one voice, and the regime continues
to project an image of total control. But is that really the case? Tonight, let me give you an
analysis to show you why Xi Jinping appears to be in control when in fact he doesn't.
The answer lies in the situation of his opponents. The summer is especially important
because right now we're in the vacation time. It's the
CCP senior leader's summer vacation time, and they are about to convene in Beidaihe.
This summer is especially important because next year, the party will hold its 21st National
Congress, a meeting that could determine not only Xi Jinping's political future,
but also the direction of the party and the country. Senior leaders and retired party elders,
like I said, are gathering in Beidaihe for their annual summer retreat.
Publicly, it's a vacation behind closed doors. It's a season of bargaining, alliance building,
and negotiation over power. The struggle is becoming increasingly complicated because
every faction has its own agenda. On one side are Xi Jinping and the officials, whose careers
and political survival depend on him. Opposing them is a broader anti-Xi coalition
associated with many senior party elders, such as Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao,
Zeng Qinghong, Wang Yang, and some princely heavyweights. But even the anti-Xi camp is
deeply divided. One faction is conservative. These are left-leaning party insiders who oppose
Xi Jinping but still want to preserve the regime, protect their privileges, and prevent a wider
reckoning. The other faction is reformist. It wants not only to deal with Xi but also to reverse the
political direction of the past decade and reopen the discussion of political reform.
So what we're witnessing is not a simple battle between Xi Jinping and his opponents.
It's a three-way struggle among the Xi Jinping camp, the conservative anti-Xi faction,
and the reformist anti-Xi faction. Xi Jinping is taking advantage of this divide
among his opponents. So far, there has been no clear winner. So that's my conclusion to you,
up front. So now let's discuss this political deadlock in depth. So ever since this man,
let me show you if you remember him. His name is Chen Xi. He was one of Xi Jinping's oldest
political allies and the man who controlled the party's personnel system for more than a decade.
He was removed from his semi-retirement position as the president of the CCP Central Party School.
So ever since that, I told you about his downfall, I believe, two weeks ago. So ever since
that news came out, it was official because Cai Xi has already replaced Chen Xi as the new party
school president. So ever since that news broke, the political purges appear to have moved
dangerously close to Xi Jinping himself. Because Chen was not an ordinary official. He was Xi
Jinping's college roommate. He also reportedly helped Xi Jinping gain admission to the Communist
Party. And he became one of the principal architects of Xi Jinping's political team.
Yet even Chen Xi could no longer be protected. So if Xi Jinping cannot protect the man who helped
him control the careers of the entire Communist Party elite, then who can he still protect?
That is why many observers believe Xi Jinping is now in an extremely precarious position.
At first glance, the solution might appear simple. Because if Xi Jinping is prepared to step down,
then the crisis should be over. But CCP's political struggle would not end there.
This is because Xi Jinping may be able to surrender his positions. But what he cannot
easily surrender is the long list of unresolved issues attached to his rule. They are his decision
to abolish the presidential term limit, the public removal of Hu Jintao from the closing
ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, and most importantly, former Premier Li Keqiang's suspicious
death. And then this year, the abrupt removal of two generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli,
and the continuing uncertainty surrounding their whereabouts. Each of these episodes
creates a serious political liability. Those are precisely the reasons why Xi Jinping
desperately wants to hold on to power. But this is also the question why Xi Jinping's
future has become such a dangerous problem for the Communist Party. Because removing him is one
thing. Deciding how to define what he did is something else entirely. And under the party's
own procedures, turning the treatment of a sitting secretary general into an official
political verdict requires several layers of approval. So first, the seven-person Politburo
Standing Committee would normally reach an initial agreement. Then the full Politburo,
consisting of roughly two dozen senior leaders, would review the proposal. Finally, a plenary
meeting of the Central Committee, more than 200 senior officials, would formally approve the
decision. But today, the first two levels appear politically paralyzed. Almost every member of the
Standing Committee was promoted by Xi Jinping. A majority of the Politburo also rose under him.
Several senior members have already fallen into political trouble. Three have already officially
been removed. You have Zhang Youxia gone, He Weidong, the two vice chairmen of the Central
Military Commission, both Politburo members are gone. And then you have Ma Xinrui, the
former party secretary of Xinjiang, also gone. So you're already down from 24 to 23, and more
may be coming. So the people who would normally decide Xi Jinping's fate are either his own
appointees, implicated in his policies, or afraid that they themselves could become the next targets.
So the party has reached a strange and dangerous condition, which is a deadlock.
A deadlock. Xi Jinping may no longer be strong enough to dictate the final outcome,
but his opponents may not be strong enough to impose one either. And behind this institutional
paralysis lies a much deeper disagreement. According to various political accounts circulating
outside China, or many views shared among Chinese political analysts, two factions have emerged
within the anti-Xi camp, and they differ on how Xi Jinping should be handled.
One camp favors a limited judgment, the other wants a full reckoning. The first camp is associated
with this man. Hold on, do I have a picture of him? Oh, there we go. You should be familiar with
him if you have followed my channel for a number of years. So the first camp is associated with,
associated in these reports with the conservative party elders, led by former vice president
who was a key figure in the old Jiang Zemin faction. Their proposal is simple.
Xi Jinping would be blamed primarily for one major violation, remaining in power beyond
the established limits. His record would then be divided into achievements and mistakes.
The formula would work roughly like this. Most of Xi Jinping's record would be preserved,
a smaller portion would be criticized. Responsibility for the worst actions would
be shifted downward. Officials such as Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, or even Li Qiang could be blamed
for designing or carrying out the most controversial measures. Xi Jinping himself would accept
leadership responsibility, step down with dignity, retain his official privileges,
and gradually disappear from state media. The party would turn the page, the system would
continue, and no one would examine the books too closely. Please note that this approach is not
driven by loyalty to Xi, it is driven by fear. Let me explain their fear. Many retired officials
and their families possess enormous wealth overseas. The families of former leaders and
senior officials have long been associated with offshore companies, offshore properties,
and assets accumulated through political connections that could be hiding in overseas
accounts. Conservative leaders, or the party elders in this camp, in the conservative camp,
are worrying that once a genuine political and financial reckoning begins, it will not stop with
just Xi Jinping. Investigators would not examine only the Xi family. They could move on to the
like the Jiang Zemin family, Sun Qinghong family, Jia Qinglin family,
all belonging to the conservative camp. The real principle behind the lenient proposal
by this camp may therefore be extremely simple. Do not open the account books,
punish a few people, lower ranks, preserve the system, and let everyone else keep what they
already have. Okay, that's the proposal by this camp. But the opposing camp wants something much
more severe. The reformist wing of the anti-Xi coalition has been associated with
former premier Wen Jiabao, put his picture on the screen, and other figures linked to
the party's reformist faction, such as Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua. Their argument is that the crisis
cannot be reduced to Xi Jinping's improper third term. They want investigations into the most
serious and controversial events of his rule. They want the death of Li Keqiang investigated.
They want the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli explained. And they want to determine
whether these events represented ordinary political discipline or an organized seizure of power
carried out through force and intimidation. Under that interpretation, Xi Jinping's departure
would not simply be a matter of retirement. It would become or it could become a criminal matter.
There would need to be investigations, possibly trials, judgments, and the recovery of assets.
So you may ask, why would Wen Jiabao's camp refuse to compromise? Well, there are at least
two possible reasons. The first is personal and also political. It's tied to this man,
Li Keqiang. Now, Li Keqiang belonged to the political generation cultivated by Hu Jintao
and Wen Jiabao. He is Hu Jintao's mentee. Hu Jintao wanted Li Keqiang to succeed him,
not Xi Jinping. So Li Keqiang was widely seen as their preferred successor and as a representative
of the reform-oriented faction. So from their perspective, they failed to protect him
because he died under unexplained or mysterious circumstances. His death therefore cannot simply
be erased through a negotiated political settlement. And the second reason concerns
the direction of the entire system. Before leaving office in 2012, Wen Jiabao, then Premier Wen Jiabao,
made a famous remark. His parting words or his parting warning was that without political reform,
the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution could return and that the economic accomplishments
China had already made would be lost. So to his supporters, Xi Jinping's concentration of power
proved that warning correct. And so from that perspective, punishing Xi Jinping is not the
final objective. It's only the beginning. The larger goal would be to roll out what
the reformist camp envisions as China's political reform. In practical terms,
that would mean reversing Xi Jinping's political model, restoring collective leadership,
and reopening the question of political reform. Now, here comes the third
entity. Between these two camps stands Hu Jintao. Do I have a picture of him? I think I do. There
he is. Now, Hu Jintao's instinct has always been caution. Consensus first, action second,
preserve party unity whenever possible. And according to some people, Hu Jintao even
suggested a compromise concerning the investigation of Li Keqiang's death.
What he suggested was to seal the case for the time being and reopen it only after Xi Jinping
himself was gone. But then there is one woman who disagreed with that and disagreed with
them strongly, and that's Li Keqiang's widow, Chen Hong. So since Li's death, Chen Hong and
her daughter have reportedly lived under severe restrictions and have not been permitted to travel
freely. And Ms. Chen is also said to have sent messages to senior leaders such as Wen Jiabao,
demanding a full investigation into her husband's death. Now, whether every detail of these accounts
is accurate cannot be presently verified, but the political logic behind them is clear.
Financial records can be sealed, private deals can be buried, but a disputed death is much harder
to erase. The families of the deceased may not be willing to accept a quiet political compromise.
And that is the obstacle the Lenin camp or the conservative camp cannot easily remove.
As the disagreement becomes increasingly difficult to resolve,
every faction has begun searching through CCP's history for a precedent because they need
support from history to reinforce their own arguments. So the question becomes,
has the party dealt with formal supreme leaders in the past? Well, there are three major models.
I mean, let me go through them. The first model is Mao Zedong. Hold on, let me take a sip of water.
All right. All right. Let's talk about the three models because they're very, very interesting.
All right. So how Mao Zedong was dealt with by the party, they waited until he was dead. Now,
Mao Zedong died in September 1976, but the party did not issue its formal historical judgment
of Mao's rule until June 1981, nearly five years later. By then, Mao's wife, Jiang Qing,
and the rest of the Gang of Four had been arrested. Mao's immediate successor, Hua Guofeng,
had been pushed aside and Deng Xiaoping had consolidated power. Only then did the party
dare to write its verdict. The conclusion was carefully balanced. Mao was described as having
made serious mistakes, particularly during the later years of his life, but his historical
achievements were preserved. The legitimacy of the Communist Party was therefore protected.
Deng Xiaoping famously insisted that Mao's portrait would remain above Tiananmen Square
or the Tiananmen Gate. The reason was not simply affection for Mao. The party understood that it
could not completely destroy Mao without damaging the historical foundation of communist rule itself.
But the 1981 resolution was only one part of the political settlement. Before the judgment
was issued, the Gang of Four had already been placed on public trial. The crimes of the Cultural
Revolution were concentrated onto a living group of people who could be judged and punished. Mao,
who was already dead, received the softer verdict of having made serious mistakes in his later years.
So that's how they dealt with it. They blamed everything onto Madame Mao and the Gang of the
And they only accused Mao of making serious mistakes in his later years. Even Mao Zedong
thought was separated from Mao, the individual. The party declared that it represented the
collective wisdom of Chinese communist movement. Yeah, the party was very smart. The party declared
that Mao Zedong thought was the collective wisdom of the communist movement. The political message
was ingenuous. Basically, it says that the ideology belonged to the party,
the crimes belonged to individuals, and the party survived. This is essentially the formula
now favored by the conservative faction seeking lenient treatment for Xi Jinping.
Place Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, Chen Xi, or other subordinates into the role once occupied by the
Gang of Four. Blame them for the worst abuses. And then describe Xi Jinping as a leader who made
grave mistakes during the latter stage or the later stage of his rule. Preserve his earlier
achievements and protect the communist party from the consequences. That's the idea of the
conservative camp. But there is one major problem. You see, Mao Zedong was already dead when that
verdict was written. But Xi Jinping is still alive, and very much alive. He's only 73,
and he could remain alive for many years. And that makes the Mao Zedong model extremely difficult to
reproduce. Okay, so that's model number one. The second precedent is the Hua Guofeng model.
This man. Okay, now Hua was Mao's chosen successor who was thrown out by Deng Xiaoping. He was not
put on trial. Hua was not publicly condemned through a special party resolution. He simply
surrendered his positions one by one. He gave up the premiership in 1980. He gave up the
chairmanship of the Communist Party in 1981. He was reduced to a lesser position and gradually
disappeared from political life over a period of, I believe, three to four years. No dramatic
verdict was ever issued. No public trial took place. The newspapers simply stopped treating
him as the supreme leader. He retained a formal position in the Central Committee for many years,
until he quietly died in 2008. This was the model of voluntary retreat without a political reckoning.
You resign, we do not prosecute you, and everyone moves on. But could Xi Jinping
accept a similar outcome? I doubt it. Unlike Hua Guofeng, Xi Jinping's rule is connected to
a much longer list of unresolved political, economic, and security controversies,
including the death of Li Keqiang and the unanswered questions surrounding Zhang Youxia
and Liu Zhenli. So, a quiet retirement would not resolve any of them. The Hua Guofeng model
also worked because Hua himself was not known as an intensely ambitious or combative political
figure. He's much mellow and easygoing than Xi Jinping. So, it's almost impossible to imagine
Xi Jinping voluntarily surrendering power and quietly disappearing from public life.
The third precedent is the Zhao Ziyang model. Zhao was formally condemned after the 1989 Tiananmen
crisis. The party accused him of supporting turmoil and splitting the leadership.
But he was never placed on trial. He was never sentenced by a court. Instead, he was confined
to his home for the next 16 years until his death. The political verdict had been delivered.
The legal process was never completed. Zhao became a permanent hostage to an unresolved
political judgment. When he died in 2005, even the wording of his obituary still was
politically sensitive. The party declares that you're guilty, it does not allow you to defend
yourself, it does not complete the legal process, and it leaves you suspended between political
death and formal punishment for the rest of your life. But this model also doesn't fit Xi Jinping
easily. You see, Zhao Ziyang had a genuine political and moral disagreement with the
rest of the party leadership over the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. He accepted the loss
of power rather than carry out orders that violated his conscience. He did not launch
a counterattack. He did not try to hold on to power. He willingly let it go and just
live in confinement for the rest of his life. He understood that although he might lose his
freedom, he could still preserve his dignity and earn the respect of the Chinese people.
Xi Jinping's situation is entirely different. The struggle between Xi Jinping and his opponents
is not fundamentally ideological. Most of the competing factions still want to preserve the
communist rule. None of them is primarily fighting on behalf of the Chinese people.
Even if Xi Jinping were to step down voluntarily, he would not earn the kind of public respect
Zhao Ziyang received, because the reasons for their departures would be completely different.
And also, Xi Jinping is too powerful, too deeply connected, and too embedded in the
present system to be placed quietly under house arrest without creating enormous political and
security risks. It just cannot be done. So, none of the three political models
truly works here. The Lenin group or the Lenin camp wants to copy the Mao Zedong settlement
by selecting scapegoats and preserving the supreme leader's broader legacy. But
Xi Jinping is still alive. And those who favor a peaceful retirement might prefer the Hua Guofeng
model, a gradual withdrawal from power. But too many unresolved issues are attached to Xi Jinping's
rule, and some of them are life and death issues. And Xi Jinping himself appears unwilling to
disappear quietly. The anti-Xi camp is therefore confronting a problem the communist party has
never fully faced before. A living supreme leader who refuses to leave, refuses to cooperate,
and still possesses enough power to resist. So, what does the anti-Xi coalition have?
Does it have any other options? Well, the communist party has never publicly tried a
living formal supreme leader. The Gang of Four were tried, but they were not. They were,
I mean, Mao's wife and then some of his closest associates, but they were not the supreme leader.
And numerous senior officials have been imprisoned, like the former Politburo
standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, who was convicted. But no formal paramount
leader has ever been placed in a courtroom and judged as a criminal. That would create a fourth
model in CCP history. And once that door is opened, it may never be closed again.
Every future leader would know that losing power would lead to prosecution. Every faction would
fight even more desperately to avoid defeat. Every supreme leader would have an even stronger
incentive to remain in power indefinitely. And every political transition would become
an uglier life and death struggle. And that is why the three sides remain trapped in a deadlock,
and why no consensus has emerged. Some viewers have asked me about the Beidaihe meetings.
Every summer, senior and retired CCP leaders traditionally gather at the seaside resort
of Beidaihe. Officially, it's a vacation. Unofficially, it has often served as a venue
for political negotiation, consultation, bargaining, and private deal-making.
Last year, rumors surrounding Beidaihe focused largely on succession. Which retired leaders
have arrived? Who was meeting with who? Which faction was promoting which possible successor?
The political rumor mill produced one dramatic story after another last year.
This year, the message has become much simpler, it seems. According to the same political circles,
the elders may use the August gathering not primarily to choose Xi Jinping's successor,
but to decide how Xi Jinping himself should be judged. Because last year, the anti-Xi camp
was still negotiating with Xi Jinping for a Hua Guofeng model, a gradual phase out from the
power center. And Xi Jinping appeared to have agreed. So the discussion was therefore focused
on his successor. But after Xi Jinping abruptly removed Zhang Youxiang and Liu Zhenli, it has
become clear that Xi Jinping would not go down, would not phase out, or would not step down
willingly or voluntarily. So now the discussion will be about how Xi Jinping himself will be
judged. How does the party, the CCP regime, would evaluate and judge Xi Jinping's legacy?
So that difference captures the entire crisis. Last year, the struggle was about who might come
next. This year, the struggle is about what to do with the man who still occupies the center of the
system. Three historical precedents exist, none of them fits. A fourth precedent would be so dangerous
that no faction wants to be the first to create it. The Lenin camp fears that punishing Xi will
expose the wealth and corruption of the entire party elite. The reformist camp fears that
allowing Xi Jinping to retire peacefully will preserve the very system that made his rule
possible, or preserve the very system that had created so many problems in the first place.
And the other CCP leader who ranks at the same level as Xi Jinping is Hu Jintao. He's the only
living formal CCP leader. He fears that a full-scale reckoning could tear the party apart.
The families of those who suffered under Xi fear that compromise will bury the truth forever.
Xi Jinping is certainly taking advantage of that uncertainty and that divide
among his opponents. But his allies, his own allies, fear that once the protection
surrounding Xi Jinping collapses, they will fall with him. So their loyalty is also very fragile.
That is the real political deadlock gripping Beijing this summer. Xi Jinping may no longer
possess the uncontested authority he once enjoyed, but the party still cannot agree on how to remove
him, how to judge him, or how to survive the consequences. Xi Jinping cannot easily remain.
He cannot safely leave. His opponents cannot openly destroy him. And his allies can no longer
guarantee his protection. So everyone is waiting for someone else to take the first irreversible
step. But no one wants to become the person who creates the fourth verdict in Communist Party
history. And so the entire system remains frozen, caught between the fear of Xi Jinping and the
fear of what comes after him. In the end, the regime may not resolve this deadlock at all.
It may simply begin to buckle under the unbearable weight of its own contradictions if no one
makes that bold step. This is my prediction. If no one is bold enough to do the right thing
in the best interest of the people, then this regime will buckle under the weight of its own.
So you may ask, can a political struggle really remain deadlocked forever?
Will someone ever come out on top? It's really hard to say, but I would say that it all depends
on who controls the military. There's one faction I didn't mention, that's the military.
There's one decisive force over who comes out as the winner from this struggle, and that's
the military. Now, traditionally, the military has tended to align with the conservative
establishment. And then the conservative establishment had supported Xi Jinping for
much of his rule. But since this January, since the abrupt arrest of Zhang Youxian and Liu Zhengli,
the conservative establishment and the military no longer appear firmly aligned with Xi Jinping.
Instead, parts of the military may now be leaning towards the reformists,
because the reformists have emerged as the most determined and formidable forces
opposing Xi Jinping. I cannot tell you with confidence which faction will ultimately win.
But one conclusion is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.
The winner is unlikely to be Xi Jinping's camp, because he does not appear to have
full control of the military. So that's my assessment.
Alright, that's all I have. This is a very difficult subject to tackle, because I know
people have always asked me or even questioned me, you know, you say Xi Jinping has lost power,
but he still appears in the headline, he still travels. I mean, he will be coming to the White
House on September the 24th. And so he still appears as the head of state. So how do you
explain that? And so tonight's talk is just one attempt to explain why he still appears to be
in control, even though his opposition is tremendous. And he's actually taken advantage of
the disagreement within the anti-Xi camp. But I think, who knows? I mean, time is not on his side.
So that's what I have for you. Alright, questions, comments?
Let's see. What do people say? Does that make sense? The three models? I think that the three
models, I think explains things very clearly, in my opinion. Yeah. I made a video, Nicole,
I made a video about the Hua Guofeng model, because that was really the plan the party
elders had for Xi Jinping. That's the consensus, that's the agreement they reached at the fourth
party plenum last fall with Xi Jinping. Little did they know that Xi Jinping, you know,
went rogue and arrested Zhang Youxia. So that changed everything. But the Hua Guofeng model
was what they had in plan for Xi Jinping's soft landing. Yeah, for his step down. All right.
Someone said Lei is always worth the wait. Was it? I hope it's not a long wait. Was it?
It's only a couple of minutes because my internet speed is questionable. I don't know. I need to
look into my internet speed again. Sometimes I know the frame freezes. It shouldn't happen.
But anyways, it's something else I need to take care. All right, questions, comments,
arguments, disagreements, debate? All right. All right. No question.
Wow. No question. No comments. All right. What do we do? Someone said,
someone said, oh, I'm an ordinary citizen in China. What are you discussing?
Love from Philadelphia. Welcome. All right. I'm just scrolling down to see if there are any
questions. No questions. That's good. Wow. No questions. No questions at all. Oh, here's one.
Lei, good morning. Watching here from the Philippines. Welcome. All right. Okay.
All right. I don't see any questions at all. Lei, good job. Thank you. May he maniacs. All right.
Thank you. Thank you for the encouragement. Go zero OT. Lei, I completely disagree with your
analysis. The real game is somewhere else. Okay. That's good. I enjoy people who disagree with me.
So where do you think the real game is? All right. I think different views,
different opinions only make our debate more interesting. So I welcome different opinions.
Yeah. All right. Here's from Hass and I don't know how to say your Hassan.
Congrats on your courage and hard work. Respect and admiration from the city of
Sao Paulo, Brazil. Well, thank you. Thank you. I know China's influence in Brazil is tremendous.
There's a lot of Brazilians working for Chinese companies there. That's what I heard from my
Brazilian friend a couple of years ago. Is that still the case? Thank you for your support. I
appreciate that. Okay. From Rich Honey Ford. Lei, what do you make of Trump calling out Xi Jinping
meddling in elections? Change of tone? I think it's something he needs to take care before the
midterm elections. And I think that the election fraud is always something top on the agenda of
I think they're going to do it regardless of what China says, what Xi Jinping says.
The Trump administration is clearly aware of the role China plays behind Iran.
Yeah. People say the confrontation or the competition between China and the US
is the competition between the world's number one and number two economy. I don't think so.
It's the confrontation between two ideological camps. It's not the confrontation between two
countries. And I don't think the United States is ready to take on the largest communist state
yet as a direct confrontation. No, the US is not ready to do that. Maybe after Iran,
after dealing with Cuba, Venezuela, the smaller ones. I heard this. This is fascinating. Wang
Huning went to visit North Korea. And people were surprised that he went because
in the past couple of months, the high level delegations between North Korea and China have
been quite frequent. The visits between the two countries have been quite frequent. People have
done the math. And so people are curious, what was Wang Huning doing meeting Kim Jong-un? It turns
out, there's a leak today coming from someone based in the US. They said that Kim Jong-un is
ready to sell out Beijing to win Trump's support. So Kim Jong-un has reportedly
revealed the meeting details with the Chinese to the Trump administration in exchange for
leniency or protection or even support or understanding from the Trump administration.
That's what I heard from the Chinese side. I'm not surprised at all. Kim Jong-un does not
trust the Chinese at all. So he may appear eager to meet with Wang Huning and then trying to figure
out what the Chinese want and then sell everything, give everything to the US to gain
Trump's favor. Anyways, that's interesting. Maybe I'll do a program on that. All right.
Questions, comments? No one told me that Wang Huning went to North Korea. This is important.
What? Oh, I almost did a program on that. There were so many speculations. Wang Huning went to
North Korea big time. And actually, he shouldn't be the one who went. The person who should go in
his place was Tsai I-chi. Wang Huning, as the head of the CPPCC, shouldn't be taking a delegation to
visit a communist state. The person who should be going in his place is Tsai I-chi, but Tsai I-chi
didn't go. So the fact that he went caused a lot of speculations. One, people wonder what's
going on with Tsai I-chi. Why is he not going? Why Wang Huning went? And the second interesting
thing was the seating arrangement was so humiliating to the Chinese because you have
Kim Jong-un sitting on one side and then facing alone, facing a dozen officials from the Chinese
side in front of him. And they were all holding a notebook and a pen in their hands, taking notes
as if they are school students listening to the teacher. So Kim Jong-un was the teacher,
and then Wang Huning and a whole bunch of Chinese officials were like school students
listening for his instructions. And the weirdest part is, in the past, CCTV never
showed this kind of footage because they don't want their officials to appear
inferior to the North Korean leader. But this time, Xinhua and CCTV released the photos,
released the visuals, and that was shocking to Chinese viewers because it's so humiliating
for a regime that's so obsessed with its image, with the seating plans, with looking superior.
How could the CCP allow one of its Politburo Standing Committee members to be treated like a
school student in front of North Korea, in front of Kim Jong-un, who is much younger than Wang
Huning? Because the Chinese always see this age as an important indicator in seating arrangements.
Anyways, so that was Wang Huning's visit. Okay, someone asked me,
do you not think the takeover of Venezuela, the control over Cuba and the war with Iran is a way
to weaken China through oil? I do think that is an effective way of weakening China through oil.
Yeah, I do agree. In Chinese, we call Jianqunbian. So when you are facing a formidable opponent,
instead of attacking the opponent directly, you attack the peripherals,
and then you cut out the arms and legs before you attack the main body. That's the Chinese tactic
called Jianqunbian. All right. Someone said, well, the three models you suggested does not
apply to Xi, as no dictator willingly left while they were still alive in history.
Yes, I said that myself. None of the models apply to Xi Jinping. But they are the only models that
the regime has to deal with leaders that they removed. The regime has removed many CCP leaders,
and those were the three models that they used to remove leaders.
So, of course, no one willingly wanted to leave their post, but they were still removed.
I mean, Mao wasn't removed, but his legacy was evaluated and judged by the party five years
after he died. But anyways, and you're right in saying that they do not apply to Xi Jinping
because he doesn't want to go. All right. Oh, I need to tell you about my new video
released in my Looking Glass channel. I think you will all enjoy it. It's about
Elaine Chao and Mitch McConnell. How the McConnell and Chao family rose to the top of
Washington's political apparatus while building their business enterprise.
It was a fascinating story, and I think you will enjoy that.
So, Nicole, if you can copy the link here, I'd really appreciate it.
Senator McConnell, has he passed away or what's his status in the hospital? I haven't heard
anything. Or maybe I missed the latest update. Someone asked me, what do you think of Xi's most
recent statements of active military and economic support for Iran? Did he make that statement?
Where did he make that statement? Officially? I think China is making very subtle diplomatic
shifts because Wang Yi is meeting with a Ukrainian foreign minister, and there are even talks about
inviting Zelensky to visit China. So that's a shift from their previous position of full support
of Russia. But I don't know, where did he make that comment of supporting Iran? I have not heard.
Mitch is alive. That's what I thought. Okay. He's still alive. Yeah.
Someone said my plant is also alive. Okay. All right. Mitch might be in the hospital,
more in the basement, chilling, freshly dead. Okay. All right. That's all for tonight. I don't
have anything else. I feel very good about this program because it's very difficult to explain.
It's extremely difficult to explain what's really going on inside Zhongnanhai or behind the red
walls of Zhongnanhai. But I feel very good about finally being able to explain it to you. So you
don't have to agree with me, but it's one view, it's one analysis, one insight that deserves
to be considered. Let me put it that way. Alrighty. I will see you next week.
Enjoy the rest of your weekend. Bye.