LIVE: US Secret Service Holds Media Briefing

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1 Video View·Jul 22, 2026
The U.S. Secret Service holds a media briefing at 11:00 a.m. ET on July 22.
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedA Secret Service representative details the agency's rigorous security protocols, emphasizing that every site is independently evaluated. The discussion covers the management of high-capacity events, the evolving global threat landscape—particularly regarding Iran—and the urgent prioritization of drone detection and mitigation technology to protect the president and government infrastructure.
The president's actually been back to the Hilton since. So I think you all know that. Maybe it
hasn't been reported, but he has been. So we're always going to look at past visits and evaluate
them. But no, we're going to get our protectees where they need to go. And if that means going
to a hotel, we will figure out how to segment that off, just like we did with the White House
Correspondents Center. But no, we'll always evaluate every site, even if it's the same site,
again, and send another advance team. Right. And the reason I ask that question, of course,
because the suspect appeared to check into the hotel to use that to sort of set himself up
unnoticed. Yeah. Look, we there is almost two sites the way that hotel is built.
And that's why we'll evaluate it the way we the magnetometers where they were placed
in proximity to a hotel and actual dinner. What I think wasn't reported and what I spent a lot
of time afterwards was explained to people. You're talking almost 120 yards. That's over a
football field away. And, you know, the reality of it is we expect things to happen at the
magnetometers, which is why we set them up. But no, we'll always evaluate every site differently,
even if it's the same site, because things do change at the site.
Going into this Friday, it is somewhat unusual to have an event that is in many ways a redo of an
event where there was a situation. How do you approach this? What is your sense of reassuring
the president, those guests and attendees about how this will be different? Yeah, look, it's
almost what I just answered. We will always evaluate every site. And right now we have an
advanced team there and they will take back and they will set up a plan to set that site up for
success, just like we did at the White House Correspondent Center at the Hilton. That is a
success. That is why we set up checkpoints. That is why we have our teams, our special teams in
place, because we do plan for that. And that's the reality. That's sometimes what people don't
understand. If we didn't need the magnetometers, we wouldn't set them up. We do expect bad people
to show up. It's just a reality of where we are. But we're treating it no different than any other
site that the president goes to. Like I just mentioned, the president has been back to the
Hilton. The president was just up at MetLife Stadium. We had 100,000 people there that we
screened, you know, not only successfully, but we set up a safe environment for all the attendees
there. So we're always going to evaluate the site and set up a good security plan. And that's in
conjunction with our partners. On a broader question, there are threats from Iran. It's
a hostile global environment. The president has talked a few times about his own risk of
assassination. Obviously, he's been through a few attempts. Do you have a concern that your
protectees, whether it's the president or any of the others, feel a greater weight of the risk that
they face? And how do you incorporate that into your plans and how you deal with this? And if you
can give us a picture of the rise in threats as you see them? Yeah, I think the first part of
the question is hard to discuss because they would discuss some personal and private conversations.
But I will tell you that our protectees understand what we do in order to create a safe environment
for them, to include the general public. If we feel that a site needs to be evaluated,
we'll have a discussion with staff and the protectees. But so far, that hasn't been an issue
for us, nor has it been for our protectees. And don't forget, we protect former presidents
as well. So it has nothing to do with party. It has to do with who we're charged to protect.
But we're in constant communication with protectees, the staff, and we are discussing
global events, what's happening at the site, and that's how we come up with our security plan.
How would you characterize how much danger there is today compared to what you've seen before?
Look, I think to start boiling it down to an opinion just wouldn't be a good thing to discuss.
I think just generally speaking, we are in a heightened level of a threat environment right
now. It's no secret. There are things happening around the globe that are always going to impact
how we move, and that's how we evaluate what our security plan is going to be. We do base that off
what's happening, but we're always going to look at the threat environment and where we're going
and just what's happening at the moment. That does fold into the security plan.
Oh, hey, two questions, and thanks for doing this. It's fascinating.
When something like this happens where somebody tried to get into the dinner last time and now
there's a redo, do you find that that inspires copycats? Are there people out there who feel
they want to finish the job? Do you mind if I? Please go.
No, I think there's this mindset that, oh, it's a redo. We're doing the site. Every site is
independent. We're not looking at this going in like, oh, we're redoing the dinner. Yes, of course,
it is a second run for the correspondence dinner. It is another site for us like the thousands we've
done and the dozens we've done since that time, taking it as an independent site. Could it influence
others? That goes back to advanced threat interdiction. What is putting people over the edge?
We learn every single time. In graduations, we like to say a difference between professionals
and amateurs are amateurs examine their successes. Professionals examine everything we do.
So we examine every single site and we change things and get better every single time. We're
not looking at this as a redo of a dinner. We're looking at this as a presidential site
with cabinet members and other protectees there, just like every site we do everywhere we go.
And if I could just add to that, I think it's important to note that the president has been
back to the Hilton since. We have done massive major events since. I know some other people
have tried to take credit for those events, but we have successfully done major events since then.
UFC 250 on the south lawn, game three at Madison Square Garden, the July 4th fireworks celebration
on the mall. That was an NSSC. We pivoted to overseas trips, major overseas trips for the
president. And then we pivoted to the president attending the FIFA along with foreign heads of
state to include 100,000 people at MetLife Stadium. So it's been major events. We have
almost every week, this is what the men and women of the Secret Service are doing.
And they're just incredible at what they do. And it's my sense, please tell me if I'm wrong,
as a Trump reporter, somebody who's been following him around for years, it feels like these days to
go to a Trump event or speech, it takes six, seven, eight hours just to get in, wait. The
security apparatus seems so big now around anything that he does. Is that correct, that feeling,
just that it's been built up so much now? I don't know. I think just some of the events
are just larger. I think not to compare or contrast other presidents, just every president
is going to have different types of events. The current president happens to like large events.
So it will take longer to get 100,000 people into an event rather than a dinner at say-
I'm sorry, I mean even like smaller, like the Mount Rushmore speech or the North Dakota,
Teddy Roosevelt Library, these sort of smaller speeches, whereas before it might have taken an
hour or two, you show up in advance, it's eight hours now. Is that because of the assassination
attempts finally? No, I haven't seen what you're
discussing. I just, you know, I'm out at these events. I monitor the lines. I'm at the
magnetometer lines. I haven't seen what you're saying, but if you want afterwards we can have
a discussion on that, but I just haven't seen that.
Nicole Skanga, CBS News. Thank you so much, all of you, for doing this. I'm happy for anyone
to address these questions. I do have a question on the correspondence dinner, but just first,
since the conflict with Iran began, can you be more specific about the sort of qualitative
change you've seen in threats directed at the president, senior officials, and other public
events, and can you speak to how that might have factored into the decision not to use the new
Air Force One that was donated by Qatar in at least one instance? Are there destinations,
threat conditions, or mission profiles in which that aircraft is unsuitable?
I think, look, we're never going to get into methods or means of how we do business.
I don't want to tip our hand to the enemy of how we do it, so I don't think, again,
if we want to have a conversation offline, I'd be happy to do that, but we are always
evaluating what's going on, both in and around us, and we'll make decisions based on that. I
don't want to get into what we used and what we didn't use. It's just, it's not relevant.
Can you speak more broadly to, since the Iran conflict began, the kinds of threats that you've
seen? I would just say, I don't think it's any secret that it's been in the media that Iran
has publicly said they want to kill President Trump. That is broadly so. Just take that as
media professionals and know there's also other information that we can't discuss,
so that takes into account everything we do, all the time.
And just on the dinner, understanding that what's happening on Friday is a totally separate event,
what was the most consequential finding in the after-action review of the April dinner,
and how did that sort of inform preparations moving forward? I'm also curious, understanding
that many within the Secret Service viewed that as a success, that the threat was stopped before
he ever reached the door. Was the fundamental problem that the outer perimeter was too
close to the protectees, or that an armed person was able to reach even the edge of it
without being detected? No, I'll say it again. I think people don't understand the distance.
We have to start and end our perimeter somewhere. If it were up to me, I'd love to end it at the
bridge, but that's going to inconvenience a lot of people. So we have to take into account
what the environment is. We do blast analysis, I won't get into that, but we look at the site
in very many different ways. We're not going to advertise how we do it, but when you talk about
that one site, it's almost two sites. So how we set up that perimeter and where we ended it
is where we felt comfortable with our special teams as to where we needed to put it. Again,
I'll repeat myself, we're talking almost 120 yards from magnetometers to podium. That's over
a football field. If you look at some of the other government buildings around town, I won't name
them, some of the magnetometers are actually inside the building. We don't do that. We have
standoff distance and that's where our team, which we have on the ground, felt comfortable doing it
and that's where it happened. We do expect things to happen at the magnetometers, unfortunately,
but that's why they are there and that's where it happened and that's where it ended. So it did
work. The system worked. We can't shut down an entire community when we have an event. It's our
job to understand that site and to mitigate the threat and to also allow the best we can business
to also run. And as a very last question, can you speak to the fencing around the White House and
potential plans to make that permanent? What benefit that would have for the Secret Service
and who would determine whether to keep the doors open or closed, so to speak? We're still in talks
about it. If it were up to me, I would put 30-foot fences up everywhere. So yeah, I like fences.
We've got about three more minutes, guys. Hi, thank you. Hi, guys. Thanks for doing this.
Appreciate it. It's fascinating to listen to Owen Jensen with EWTN Global Catholic Network.
I realize you can't reveal operational details, but how concerned are you about
drones being used to attack protectees of yours? Very. So look, just in UAS in general,
no one in federal government or law enforcement is doing more to proactively get after the drone
threat than the Secret Service. Nobody in government. Look, the threat's real. We look at Ukraine. We
look at just basic intelligence. It's a matter of time before it comes to the United States.
It's happening on the border. We know that. So it's absolutely top priority, top of mind,
and it comes down to what we're doing to detect and mitigate. Detection is the key.
I can tell you that Secret Service is leading the way in technology that has been recently deployed
and no other government agency has deployed it in the United States of America.
Obviously, there's a lot of hoops to jump through, FAA involvement. There's
PL-124N in a process to get equipment deployed. But in terms of detection capability and
mitigation capabilities, we're leading the way. We're not there yet, but we are leading the way.
Just to follow up, I, as others here do, we work at the White House on the North Lawn in those
tents there. I'm not going to lie. Sometimes you think, is one of these things coming in
at any moment? And how safe is the White House from a drone attack?
I'll tell you, right now, it's very safe from attack. The technology we're deploying,
and not just the White House, at all protected sites is cutting edge right now for us
and all of government. So it's coming. Detection is the key, but you've got to be able to mitigate.
And the mitigation technology is what the overall defense industry is really working hard to keep
up with new threats. The threat continues to get tougher and tougher. You're talking fiber optic
control drones now, dark drones. So it's a constant chase to keep up with it,
but we're doing a tremendous job to stay ahead of the threat, especially at the White House.
And I'll tell you, we're also moving these assets around with the President,
some of which first time used on American soil ever. So we will use anything and everything.
And that's what I keep telling my agents and officers. There's nothing that we aren't willing
to do. We want them to feel empowered when we do these advances to use what we have at our disposal.
Following up on the drone issue, one of the issues that happened with Crooks is
one of those detective systems went down. There was an officer who had to call the help service
of the company as their efforts to make sure that when there are those systems,
there are backup systems, but also that your officers are trained to the point where
those calls aren't even required to do system resets, but that you're working with assets
that they know backwards and forwards. Yeah. So directors made airspace security division
a priority. So we are light years ahead of where we were two years ago in terms of detection,
only equipment, all the issues that you've identified. We're putting significant dollars
behind robust, they're full teams that go out now. The training, I was at our training center
yesterday, training every day, very good technology going everywhere he goes. That particular issue,
I'm confident it's not going to happen again with this director. Why was it an issue before?
Why was it an issue? I don't think there's a variety of reasons. And some of it was just
deploying the right resources at the right levels, right? At that time, a former president wasn't
getting the resources that they potentially should have been getting. I just own it for
the secret service. That's not happening anymore. I can also tell you, having been there and
knowing and hearing it firsthand, communication, it's critical. We've certainly improved that.
That is critical to me is something that I felt and knew firsthand that we need to be better and
do better, not just us, but with our partners communicating with us. So anytime you see,
we have a major site, we always have a unified command post. We have all our partners are
sitting together, communicating. We're all talking. We're all in the same room,
ensuring that what one person hears, everybody hears.
Director, thank you. Thanks everybody. Anthony, may I ask for one more thing,
please? I'm sorry to do this, but for the benefit of the camera,
is it possible to have you tell us about who the likely perpetrators are now based on this
research that you've done, the mental health piece and the fact that they're showing signs
just so we can get that out to our audiences? Sure, absolutely. Our work over the last 25 years
in the National Threat Assessment Center of researching attacks targeting government
officials, facilities, schools, workplaces, basically all the places that we would be
concerned about as an agency has shown that there is no one specific profile, but we do see common
themes in the backgrounds of those attackers. That includes contextual things that are stressors,
history of possible mental health issues, maybe paranoia, delusions, hallucination, depression,
suicidality, behavior changes, as well as common motives, meaning that by far in all of our
research, we see that the most common motive why someone carries out an attack is typically
related to a grievance, and that grievance could be focused on a person or an idea or an ideology
that becomes a fixation and negatively impacts every aspect of their life to the point where
they want to take revenge, whether they feel they're being persecuted or they feel that
they've been wronged, and that is engaging in violence is the way that they use to solve their
issues. And how are you learning about these threats that is different than what you learned
before, no longer the handwritten note, but different? I can tell you that when I first
started with the agency, I won't say how long ago that was, but at one point we created an
internet threat desk and it probably had like seven people on it, but now with the advent of technology
we do that for us as an agency, our model is how do we identify individuals so that we can assess
and appropriately intervene, and the way that we identify them is typically they either self-identify
you know, they bring themselves to attention, we notice it online, or they show up at the White
House, we call them gate callers, and they self-identify, but the majority of the information
that comes to us is through federal, state, local law enforcement, other government agencies, the VA,
as well as a bulk of the internet concerning behavior and threats that we get comes from
concerned citizens. They see it before others do? Yes, they often see that online, whether it's a comment
on an article, a social media post, they'll either notify local police, they'll notify the FBI, or in
some cases notify us directly. And how do you decide which online threats are over the top and which ones
are just simply free speech? You've got to go. Investigate them all. Yeah, they all get investigated.
If I could just take a moment just to thank everybody here, this is a rare opportunity for us,
as I explained earlier, I'm a pretty private person and quiet, but to be in a room of true
professionals, it's great to get our story out there, and for you to report that, I think it's
great. It's a good partnership. Just ask for, to be fair, because we often don't
toot our own horn, probably should sometimes, but I appreciate everybody giving their time to us
today. Thank you. It's really great. Thank you. Thank you. Yeah. Don't be a stranger.
Hey, thank you. Yeah. Hey. That was so interesting. Oh, thank you. Thank you. Hi, Pierre. Thank you.
Thank you so much. So interesting. Kelly, first of all. Hey, my name is John, too. I'm from New York Times.
Thanks, that was really interesting. Thank you. This is so interesting. I could have gone for hours.
I didn't bring a business card, but I can. Yeah, let me grab mine. Yeah, give me your card.
Thank you for what it's worth.
I just said in a quote, yeah, that was awesome.
I appreciate it.
