More than one million merchants across Heilongjiang reportedly joined a silent revolt against government inspectors. With no leaders, no marches, and no slogans, shop owners simply closed their doors—leaving the authorities with no one to fine and no protest to suppress. This program examines how a survival strategy became one of China’s most unusual acts of collective resistance.
More than 1 million merchants in Heilongjiang joined an unprecedented campaign of non-violent,
non-cooperation, known as Avoid the Plague Gods, Wenshen, and it spread across China's
northeastern corner with an almost suffocating silence. And by plague gods,
they weren't talking about a disease. They were talking about government inspectors.
All right. So according to a team that dedicates itself to tracking social development in China,
and they call themselves the Yesterday Project. And according to them, between April 25th and
June 30th, a period of 67 days, merchants across 34 counties, cities, and districts
collectively closed their businesses. The total number of participating merchants
exceeded 1 million. There was no public organizer, no recognized leader, no written manifesto,
no street march, no slogan. And yet one town after another, one county after another,
businesses shut down or shut their doors with remarkable coordination. It became one of the
longest running and most widespread collective protests seen in China in recent years.
Okay. So let me tell you the story. The movement first appeared in a place called Qinggang County,
a small county in Suihua region of Heilongjiang, and started on April 25th. Merchants across Qinggang
suddenly closed their shops. No one publicly explained why, and the local government offered
no clear explanation. One day later, merchants in neighboring Wangkui County also shut down.
Both closures lasted about three days. At first, it looked like an isolated local incident,
but it was only the beginning. After more than 10 quiet days, the same thing happened again,
this time in Neihe City, roughly 300 kilometers away. Then in late May, the movement began
spreading across the Qiqihai region. Several surrounding counties joined one after another.
In June, the movement had entered a full-scale outbreak. From June 3rd to the 16th,
collective shutdowns spread across the Suihua region, including Beilin District, Anda City,
Zhaodong City, Lanxi County, Qinggang County, and Qing'an County. Soon after the shutdowns
reached Daqing, another major city in Heilongjiang. Multiple districts and counties under Daqing
also saw businesses close collectively. Then came the largest regional outbreak. Beginning
on June 17th, shutdowns swept across Qiqihai, Heilongjiang's second largest city, as well as
many of its surrounding counties and districts. By that point, the shutdowns were no longer isolated.
They were spreading across almost the entire Qiqihai region. For so many businesses across
a major Chinese city and its surrounding counties to close at roughly the same time
was not only rare, but devastating. So by late June, the movement had spread backward to where
it started, the Suihua region. In some places, some businesses developed a strange rhythm.
They open for one day, they close the next. They open again, they close again. So this went on
until finally around June 30th, this large scale movement temporarily came to an end.
By that point, 34 counties, cities, and districts across Heilongjiang had participated,
involving an estimated 1 million merchants. So you may ask, what caused all of this?
Why would merchants across so many different places close their businesses without a public
call to action? Well, the answer lies in that phrase used by many merchants,
the plague gods are coming. According to local business owners and numerous online posts,
the immediate trigger was a message circulating among merchants. It warned that the government's
joint inspection teams were about to carry out concentrated inspections of local shops,
supermarkets, restaurants, and other small businesses. Government inspections are nothing
new in China, but for small business owners, they have become terrifying. Under the banner
of fire safety, public health, food safety, market regulation, business licensing,
or workplace safety, government departments can enter a shop and issue heavy fines.
A relatively small fine may amount to several thousand yuan. A large one could reach tens
of thousands. In some cases, the penalty may exceed 100,000 yuan. So for many small business
owners, this is not a fine, this is a death sentence. In better economic times, a merchant
might have been able to absorb the loss and slowly earn the money back. But today,
with the economy slowing and many businesses already struggling to survive, a major fine
can wipe out a month or even an entire year of profit. And the most frightening part is the
uncertainty. So what exactly counts as passing an inspection? What's the actual standard? Officials
often do not explain it clearly, and merchants themselves do not know. There aren't like
published standards that you could follow, and everything seemed random. But once inspectors
enter a shop, they can almost always find something wrong. A blocked fire exit, improper
food placement, a sanitation detail, a missing certificate, even an incorrect product label.
Almost anything can become grounds for punishment. And that uncertainty left merchants deeply
fearful. Some reportedly said the inspectors were worse than COVID. And once they arrived,
no one knew how much money they might take away. So when merchants heard that inspectors
were coming, they chose the safer option. Close the shop, lose a few days of income,
but avoid a potentially devastating fine. A fine of tens of thousands of yuan could destroy the
business entirely. And that is how the movement spread. It did not need a leader. It did not need
a formal organization. It did not need a public announcement. If one merchant heard that inspectors
were coming and closed, think about it. Nearby businesses immediately sensed danger and followed.
Then the next street closed. Then the next town. Then the next county. Now these shutdowns didn't
just affect business owners. They also seriously disrupted daily life for ordinary people.
Restaurants closed. Grocery stores closed. Barber shops closed. Convenience stores closed. Even
funeral homes were closed. As more shops closed, the inspectors ran into a practical problem.
There was no one left to inspect or find. If a shop remained closed, officials could not enter.
So in many places, the inspection campaigns reached a dead end. Therefore,
local governments began issuing public statements, calling the reports false.
Some even sent propaganda vehicles parading through the streets, broadcasting messages
that there was no large-scale inspection campaign and that claims of enormous fines
were untrue. Unfortunately, these official assurances carried very little credibility.
Instead of calming merchants, the announcements made them even worse. Many, many people kept
their doors closed. But some merchants did trust the government and reopened,
only to face fines soon afterward. Because when you are one of the few businesses that are open,
you became the target. So for 67 days, this became a leaderless, decentralized movement
of nonviolent non-cooperation. And in the end, I think the merchants were successful because
the local government weren't successful in raising the money through inspection fines.
But it took them 67 days, more than two months, to fight this through.
Because if you step back and look at this, it made the authorities very difficult because the
CCP knows how to suppress a traditional protest. If there's a leader, they arrest the leader. If
there's an organization, they dismantle it. If there's a group chat, they monitor it.
If there's a march, they block the road. If there's a petition campaign,
they intercept the petitioners. But none of those methods worked very well here.
There was no public leader, no formal organization, no central communication network,
no fixed gathering place, no banner, no logo, no slogan. So who do you arrest when everyone
is making an individual business decision? Who do you negotiate with? What organization do you
dismantle? That's why I say the local government's hands are completely tied.
And that is why the Heilongjiang movement deserves attention. It took place in a country
with one of the world's most extensive systems of social control. You have facial recognition,
you have a neighborhood grid management system, you have big data surveillance,
social media monitoring, and the preventive control of so-called key individuals.
Actually, according to this yesterday project, the project that released this report,
large-scale grassroots protests in China have become less frequent and harder to sustain
than they were a decade ago. But this movement did not rely on the traditional tools of protest.
It spread through shared fear, shared experience, and shared calculation. It was imitation
born from a common predicament. And that may be one of the few forms of collective resistance
still available under intense political control. I also want to mention that the Heilongjiang
merchants' decentralized strategy, or I should say any decentralized strategy, may remind people
who are familiar with the Hong Kong's 2019 pro-democracy movement, which adopted Bruce
Lee's famous principle, be water, my friend. In 2019, Hong Kong protesters refused to remain
in one place. They gathered quickly, they dispersed when police arrived, then reappeared somewhere
else. Their movement was flexible, mobile, and largely leaderless. And they want to be
like the water. They moved like water, which is formless, colorless, and it adapts to anything,
but it's extremely powerful when they gather together. And so Heilongjiang's merchants,
some people say, if the Hong Kong students, if Hong Kong protesters moved like water,
then Heilongjiang's merchants simply withdrew the water completely.