U.S. Military Just OBLITERATED Iran's Bridges
KEM BO
312 followers
Quân đội Mỹ vừa phát động một đợt tấn công mới nhắm vào các cây cầu và cơ sở hạ tầng giao thông trọng yếu ở miền nam Iran. Video này phân tích các mục tiêu được báo cáo, lý do tại sao các cửa khẩu này lại có tầm quan trọng chiến lược, và các cuộc tấn công có thể ảnh hưởng như thế nào đến hậu cần quân sự, các tuyến đường tiếp tế và cuộc xung đột rộng lớn hơn xung quanh eo biển Hormuz. Chúng tôi cũng phân tích phản ứng của Iran và những diễn biến mới nhất được xác nhận khi tình hình tiếp tục thay đổi.
#QuânĐộiMỹ #Iran #TinTứcNóngHổi #TrungĐông #Trump #Eo biểnHormuz # TinTứcIran #TinTứcThếGiới #QuốcPhòng #ĐịaChínhTrị
AI Generated·May contain errors
It is July 17th. An overnight footage coming out of southern Iran shows something this war has
not shown before. Not radar dishes, not patrol boats sitting at anchor. Bridges collapsing in
real time. Highway and railway spans folding into the rivers and ravines beneath them,
while surface-to-air missile batteries stationed along the same roads get taken out in the same
strike. Package. This is not another night of degrading Iran's ability to shoot back.
This is something colder and more deliberate. This is the systematic severing of the physical
roads that connect Iran's most important port to the rest of the country. Read that again,
because it matters more than almost anything else that has happened in this war so far.
Picture the geography for a second, because it explains everything that follows.
Bandar Abbas sits at the narrow mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, cut off from the rest of Iran
by mountains and desert, connected to Tehran, and the interior only by a handful of highway
corridors and a single strained rail line running north through Hormozgan province.
Every missile, the revolutionary, guard has threatened to fire at commercial shipping.
Every drone, every spare part, every gallon of fuel needed to keep that coastal war machine running
has to travel down those same roads to reach the coast. Last night, one by one, several of those
roads stopped existing. That is not a metaphor. That is what a bridge strike does. It does not
just delay a convoy, it removes the convoy's route entirely for weeks or months in the middle of an
active war where weeks and months are exactly what Iran does not have to spare. But let's back
all the way up, because to understand what just happened, you need to understand what has been
building since the end of February, when the United States and Israel launched the first
coordinated strikes against Iran following the total collapse of nuclear negotiations.
What began as a campaign aimed primarily at radar sites, missile batteries, and
coastal air defenses has now evolved through six consecutive nights of strikes into something
categorically different. For the first five nights, the target list stayed relatively consistent.
Radar installations, missile batteries, coastal air defense positions, revolutionary guard patrol
boats, revolutionary guard headquarters buildings. Painful for Iran, but survivable. The kind of
degradation a determined adversary can absorb and route around. Last night, night six, the target
set changed entirely. That change tells you the strategic objective of this entire phase of the
Here is where things stand as of this morning, with real numbers, not vague impressions.
United States Central Command conducted its sixth consecutive night of strikes against Iran,
and this time the primary targets were bridges in Hormozgan province, the highway and railway
corridors physically connecting Bandar Abbas, Iran's most important port and the headquarters
of its navy, to the interior of the country and ultimately to Tehran itself. Iranian state
television has confirmed that at least seven people were killed in strikes that hit Bandar
a coastal city along the strait. The strikes destroyed a control tower at Shabahar port on
the Gulf of Oman for a third time, this time reportedly finishing the job where earlier
strikes had only damaged it. A railway junction just west of Bandar Abbas was also struck,
cutting another link in the chain connecting the port to the rest of Iran.
Iran's own government confirmed for the first time in this entire war that its power infrastructure
has come under direct attack, with the energy ministry publicly asking residents in southern
provinces to reduce electricity use during what it described as extreme heat combined with damage
to the grid. When a government that has spent months minimizing strike damage in its own state
to media suddenly asks its own population to conserve power because of attacks on infrastructure,
that tells you the damage is real enough that denial has stopped being a viable option.
And this is where the story changes completely from how most people are still picturing this war.
Fighter jets, aerial drones and naval assets all operate in coordination on a single night to
execute this bridge campaign, which means this was not an improvised target of opportunity.
This was a planned multi-domain operation with one specific objective. Cut the roads and rail,
lines Iran uses to move missiles, fuel and weaponry toward the coast. Think about what
that actually means operationally. Bandar Abbas sits at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.
Everything the Revolutionary Guard needs to keep threatening commercial shipping in that strait,
missiles, fuel, spare parts, replacement personnel, has to physically travel down those
highway and rail corridors from the interior of the country to reach the coast.
Sever those corridors and you do not need a single naval mine. You do not need a single
soldier on the ground. And you have still created a logistical siege that starves the Revolutionary
Guards. Coastal operations of everything they need to keep functioning. This is warfare aimed at
geography and infrastructure rather than at people or equipment directly. And it is arguably more
effective than either because equipment can be replaced and personnel can be reassigned.
But a collapsed bridge takes weeks or months to rebuild even under peacetime conditions,
let alone during an active war. That brings us to the detail that changes everything about how
confident anyone should be that this campaign is close to finished. This bridge-cutting strategy
is layered directly on top of an active naval blockade that Central Command reinstated earlier
this week. On the day after that, blockade went into effect. A very large crewed carrier ignored
multiple warnings and headed straight for Karg Island, Iran's primary oil export terminal.
An American aircraft put hellfire missiles directly into the vessel's smokestack,
disabling it completely. That strike sent an unmistakable message to every other tanker
captain out there running the same calculation, weighing the profit from an Iranian oil run
against the risk of getting hit. And now, less than 48 hours later, the campaign has expanded
from stopping ships at sea to cutting the roads and rails those ships would need resupplied from
on land. The naval blockade and the bridge campaign are not two separate stories. They
are the same strategy, applied simultaneously to sea and land, designed to isolate Bandar Abbas
from every direction at once. This is the part worth sitting with because it explains why a
single disabled tanker matters so much more than one ship's cargo. Every captain moving crewed out
of a sanctioned Iranian terminal is running a constant, ongoing calculation about acceptable
risk, weighing the profit margin on that specific cargo against the odds of getting caught and the
A blockade that exists only on paper does nothing to that calculation.
A blockade that disables a large crewed carrier within two days of being announced changes the
math completely, and word of an incident like that travels through shipping and insurance circles
almost instantly. Underwriters begin adjusting war risk premiums within hours of confirmed
strikes like this one, and at a certain premium level, a voyage simply stops being profitable,
regardless of how much the buyer on the other end is willing to pay.
That is how a single strike on a single ship can do. More to choke off an entire export terminal's
throughput than weeks of diplomatic sanctions ever could, because it does not just threaten
enforcement, it demonstrates enforcement in a way every other captain, considering the same run,
can see for themselves. Read that carefully, because this next part is the detail most
casual coverage of this war keeps missing entirely. Central Command confirmed that more than
50,000 American service members remain positioned across the Middle East, described in its own
statement as vigilant, lethal, and ready. That is not a passive defensive posture. That is a
standing force large enough to support a far more direct phase of this war if the decision gets made
to move beyond air and naval strikes. When you combine a systematic bridge-cutting campaign that
is deliberately isolating a specific port city, an active naval blockade choking off that same
city's maritime access, and a confirmed force of 50,000 troops positioned nearby and described
explicitly as ready, you are looking at every piece needed for a potential ground or amphibious
operation against Bandar Abbas specifically, whether or not that operation is ultimately ordered,
the infrastructure required to support an invasion, and the infrastructure required to simply
strangle a city's supply lines from a distance overlap almost completely. Right now, we only
know for certain that the second one is happening. Iran's response to all of this arrived within
hours, and it escalated in a direction the war has not gone before. Missiles were launched at Bahrain,
Kuwait, Jordan, and Qatar, the last of which has been serving as one of the mediators trying to
broker a diplomatic path out of this conflict. Targeting a mediator's territory is its own kind
of message, whether it was intentional or a targeting failure, but the detail that actually
crosses a new threshold is the strike that damaged a power and water desalinization plant inside
Kuwait. Think about what that facility actually does. In a Gulf nation where freshwater depends
almost entirely on desalinated seawater, an attack on that infrastructure is not a military
strike in any conventional sense. It is an attack on the basic survival infrastructure of an entire
civilian population. Both sides are now hitting infrastructure rather than purely military targets,
and that shift on both sides simultaneously marks a genuine change in the character of this war.
It is no longer a campaign fought primarily against uniformed forces and hardware.
It has become a campaign fought against the systems. Ordinary people depend on to keep
functioning day to day, water, power, transportation, and that kind of war tends to escalate faster and
prove far harder to walk back than one confined to military assets alone. Now let's talk about
the hardware actually making this bridge campaign possible, because the platforms involved are
themselves part of the message being sent. President Trump confirmed that Iran launched 111
missiles at the USS Abraham Lincoln, and every single one of them was intercepted before reaching
the carrier. That number is worth sitting with for a moment. The carrier strike group's layered
defense system combining long-range interceptors, close-in weapon systems, and coordinated support
from escort vessels exists specifically to defeat saturation attacks like this one, and a complete
intercept rate against a launch that size represents a level of defensive performance that fundamentally
changes what the American military is willing to risk in this theater. With two carrier strike
groups reportedly operating in the region and coordinating their defensive coverage, Iran's
to land a meaningful hit against a major naval asset has been reduced to what amounts to an
occasional lucky shot rather than a reliable capability, and reports now indicate Iran's
own missile stockpile has degraded to the point where it can only sustain launches in the range
of a dozen or so per day. A missile force that started this war with the ability to fire in large
coordinated salvos is now being rationed, which tells you the supply chain feeding that force,
the same roads and bridges now being systematically destroyed, was already under serious strain before
last night's strikes even began. That rationing detail deserves a moment of its own because it is
easy to skim past a phrase like a dozen missiles a day without registering what it actually
represents. Earlier in this war, Iran demonstrated the ability to generate mass coordinated salvos
numbering well over a hundred missiles aimed at a single target in a single window. Dropping from
that kind of coordinated saturation capability down to roughly a dozen launches spread across an
entire day is not a modest decline, it is closer to a collapse in sustained defensive tempo.
It means the interceptors defending American and allied assets in the region are no longer facing
the kind of overwhelming simultaneous barrage that saturation defense systems are specifically
designed to be stressed by. Instead they are facing scattered isolated launches that a layered air
defense network can handle with far more margin for error. That shift alone may be doing as much
to protect American assets in the gulf right now as any single interceptor system. Because a defense
that only has to handle a dozen missiles a day is simply a different far more manageable problem
than one that has to handle over a hundred arriving within minutes of each other. On the naval
interdiction side the vessels being targeted are specifically the very large crude carriers moving
Iranian oil hit using hellfire missiles launched from a mix of fighter aircraft, armed helicopters
and unmanned platforms including long endurance reconnaissance drones capable of loitering over
a target area for extended periods before engaging. The strategic logic here is straightforward but
effective. A naval blockade cannot function with ships alone. It requires persistent air coverage
over a wide stretch of ocean to identify and engage vessels. Attempting to breach it and unmanned
platforms capable of loitering for hours at a time make that kind of sustained coverage sustainable
in a way that manned aircraft alone could never maintain around the clock. Pairing that persistent
air coverage with naval assets creates a blockade that can genuinely be maintained for as long as
Washington chooses to keep it in place rather than one that degrades the moment aircraft need to
return to base and refuel. Now let's go inside the actual pressure Iran is under right now because it
is not coming from a single direction. It is converging from three at once and that convergence
is what makes this specific moment more dangerous than anything that came before it.
The first track is financial. Every disabled tanker, every hour the naval blockade holds,
every barrel of oil that cannot leave Karg Island bleeds. Revenue Iran needs to keep
funding this war and everything underneath it. The second track is logistical and it is the
newest of the three. The bridge campaign specifically targets the physical ability
to move weapons, fuel, and personnel from the interior of the country to the coast.
Meaning even if Iran had unlimited money it increasingly lacks the physical infrastructure
to move what that money buys to where it is needed. The third track is what amounts to
outside support quietly eroding underneath Tehran. Congressional and defense oversight
bodies have confirmed that Chinese firms with documented ties to the People's Liberation Army
have been marketing geospatial intelligence products covering American force positions
across the Middle East and that China's Beidou satellite navigation system has
reportedly been used by Iran to help enable strikes across the region.
China has flatly denied direct involvement but the documented pattern of technology transfer
sits there regardless of the denial when financial pressure, physical logistical strangulation,
and quietly degrading outside technical support all converge in the same week.
The effect compounds rather than simply adding up and it explains why this bridge campaign
arrived precisely when it did rather than at any earlier point in the war.
Consider what each of those three tracks actually costs Iran on its own
and then consider what happens when none of them are given room to recover before the next one hits.
The financial track bleeds the treasury needed to pay for everything else.
The missiles, the fuel, the salaries of the personnel operating this entire coastal apparatus.
The logistical track, the newest and arguably most severe of the three,
removes the physical means of moving whatever that treasury can still afford to buy.
And the quietly eroding technical support track means even the targeting and navigation systems
Iran has come to depend on for its own strikes may not be as reliable going forward as they were
at the start of this war if outside partners grow more cautious about overt involvement under this
level of international scrutiny. A country facing only one of these pressures has room to adapt,
reallocate resources, and route around the problem. A country facing all three simultaneously
with no meaningful pause in any of them starts running out of adaptive options
at exactly the same rate it is running out of bridges.
Now let's go inside the actual command structure trying to hold this together on Iran's side
because that is where the real story lives underneath the strike counts.
The Revolutionary Guard does not run Bandar Abbas as an isolated garrison.
It runs it as one node in a supply network that stretches back through Hormozgan Province
into the industrial and political heart of the country. A network built specifically
so that pressure applied at any single point could theoretically be absorbed and rerouted around.
That design assumption is exactly what last night's strikes were built to defeat.
When you cut multiple bridges in a rail junction in the same night rather than one at a time,
you deny the defenders the option of simply rerouting traffic onto the next available road
because there increasingly is no next available road.
The generals responsible for keeping Bandar Abbas supplied are not dealing with a single
severed artery they can work around. They are dealing with a collapsing circulatory system
and every additional night this campaign continues narrows their remaining options further.
That is a fundamentally different kind of pressure than losing a radar site or a patrol boat
because equipment can be replaced from existing stockpiles elsewhere in the country.
A destroyed bridge cannot be replaced from a stockpile. It has to be rebuilt under wartime
conditions while the same aircraft that destroyed it in the first place remain free to strike the
reconstruction effort itself. This is also playing out against a very specific political backdrop
that matters more than most coverage is giving it credit for. President Trump addressed the
American public directly in a primetime address timed ahead of the upcoming midterm elections
insisting the campaign against Iran is going well and that the results would be visible
very shortly. That timing is not incidental. A war being framed publicly as a clear success story
just months before voters go to the polls creates its own kind of pressure on how this campaign gets
prosecuted from here. There is a real incentive to keep visible dramatic escalation happening
rather than allowing the war to settle into a quiet inconclusive stalemate that would be far
harder to sell to an electorate as a win. That does not mean the military logic behind the bridge
campaign is not sound on its own terms because it clearly is but it does mean the timeline for
how aggressively this campaign continues to escalate may be shaped as much by a political
calendar in Washington as by conditions on the ground in Hormozgan province. So where does the
honest strategic assessment land as of this morning? The evidence suggests Iran retains
enough missile capability to keep launching limited daily salvos and enough political will
to keep striking gulf infrastructure directly including water and power systems even as it's
logistics network absorbs sustained deliberate damage. At the same time the specific combination
unfolding right now a functioning naval blockade willing to disable vessels within days of being
announced a bridge campaign aimed squarely at isolating Bandar Abbas by land and a confirmed
force of over 50,000 American troops positioned nearby and described as ready suggests the
strategic objective has moved beyond simply degrading Iran's capability towards something
closer to full isolation of its most important port and naval headquarters. Whether that isolation
is meant purely to force a negotiated outcome over control of the Strait of Hormuz or whether it is
meant to set physical conditions for a more direct operation later is not something that can be
confirmed from what is publicly available right now. What can be said with confidence is that
every piece being put in place at sea and now on land points in the same direction. Here is the
structural risk that should actually keep serious analysts awake tonight more than any single bridge
or any single ship. It is the fact that both sides have now crossed into striking civilian
facing infrastructure directly water desalination on one side power grids on the other rather than
confining this war to military assets. That kind of infrastructure targeting tends to escalate in
ways that are extremely difficult to reverse because damage to a water plant or power grid
does not just affect the immediate moment of the strike it compounds over the following days and
weeks as populations struggle without services they depend on to survive particularly in a region
already dealing with extreme summer heat. If this pattern continues the war stops being primarily a
contest between military forces and starts becoming a contest measured in whose civilian population
can endure hardship longer and that is a far more unpredictable and far more dangerous kind of war
than anything fought purely between uniformed combatants. There's a second quieter risk
sitting underneath the infrastructure targeting and it has to do with what happens once a bridge
campaign like this one runs out of obvious military targets. Bridges connecting a major
port to the interior of a country are by definition a finite list. Once the highest value spans are
gone the next available targets on that same list start looking a great deal more like ordinary
civilian infrastructure than military logistics nodes, smaller roads, local rail connections,
facilities that exist to serve a city's daily population rather than to move weapons to a
coastline. There is no guarantee that line gets respected simply because it has not been crossed
yet. Watching how the target list evolves over the next several nights, whether it stays confined
to the specific corridors feeding Bandar Abbas or begins expanding outward toward infrastructure
with a more purely civilian function may end up telling us more about where this war is actually
headed than any single briefing or press statement from either side. So this morning we are left
staring at collapsed bridges in Hormozgan province, a naval blockade that has already proven willing
to disable a tanker within 48 hours of taking effect, a Kuwaiti desalination plant sitting
damaged in the summer heat, and more than 50,000 American troops positioned across the region and
described in Central Command's own words as ready. None of it is resolved, none of it is finished,
and whatever comes out of whatever room decides the next move in this campaign
it is very likely already being drafted right now, while the dust from last night's bridge
strikes is still settling over the roads leading into Bandar Abbas.
