Is Putin Getting Fed Terrible Information … AGAIN?

It's like déjà vu all over again. A three-day special military operation that began because the Kremlin was overconfident in its chances of success continues on to roughly day 1600 because the Kremlin is overconfident in its chances of success. Or at least that is what it seems on the surface, following a meeting last week between Russian President Vladimir Putin But perhaps not everything is as it seems, and there is an interesting comment from the meeting that might just reveal the true purpose of this stage performance. Call it Vladimir Putin's hidden tell. So today, I want to begin by covering the portions of the meeting that have received the greatest attention in western media. I will then spend a couple of minutes fact-checking the confirming why so many speculate that Putin is up to his old miscalculating ways. Then we will flash back to the start of the invasion and refresh our memory of how the informational issue is more of an institutional problem than a Putin-specific problem. Finally, I will examine some better ways to interpret what happened at the meeting, including a dissection of that aforementioned tell. But let me start with the recent developments. The inspiration for the latest discussion was this July 3rd meeting between Putin and senior military leadership. Ostensibly, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the current military state of affairs in Ukraine, though hold that thought until the end of the video because something else was probably the real focus. Rather than have me start with my own interpretation of what was discussed, let me instead directly quote from the key parts of the meeting. Here is Putin's overview of the situation. And try not to let his finely manicured fingernails distract you as we go through this. Since the beginning of this year, Russian forces have liberated 133 settlements and established control over more than 3,000 square kilometers of our territory in the Donbas and Novorossiya. Novorossiya just means New Russia. Also, interesting use of the word our in that sentence. Russia's chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, then took over. In June, 29 settlements and a total of 636 square kilometers of territory were liberated. Unable to achieve results on the battlefield, the Kiev regime, that is actually what they call Ukraine, is making attempts to persuade its western sponsors that it has regained the initiative and made significant advances. To achieve this goal, the Kiev regime is conducting an information campaign, highlighting the alleged successes of AFU formations, while concealing territories liberated by Russian troops by describing them in neutral terms as moved into the gray zone. And for all of us map lovers out there, we have a nice representation of what Russia thinks, or wants us to think, is the current frontline. Now, is it a good idea to leave factually accurate maps just sitting on a wall like that? Probably not. But neither is it a good idea for you to have personal information just sitting out there on the internet for anyone to find. That is where the sponsor of today's video, Incogni, comes into play. They will help you go into battle against data brokers to hammer away your home address, employment industries, employment history, and your family. That's a mistake in the script. They will hammer your public family records. They will not hammer your family. Anyway, it is how you get a leg up against scammers and shady people looking to personally track you down. Plus, Incogni has a custom removal feature if you need to pull out a map and draw your own defensive line. Just send them the link, and they will do their magic. So take back your personal data by heading to incogni.com slash William Spaniel. Use coupon code William Spaniel, all one word, to get 60% off an annual plan. Unlike most everything else in this video, that is not a bluff or a mistake. It is real savings. So thanks again to Incogni for sponsoring today's video. Now back to Russia's claims. The problem, as you have likely gathered, is that almost none of them are true, and that slight element of truth still requires us to carve out a generous interpretation. These are the exchange figures for the first six months of 2026. The specific data come from the Institute for the Study of War. I should note that various other sources will have slightly different figures here, but the overall picture is relatively the same. The first couple of months were good for Russia, consistent with what had been happening for the last couple of years. The war then took a turn in March, as a combination of the Starlink shutdown and improved Ukrainian logistics strikes caused Russia to stumble on the battlefield. Ukraine continued to make gains in April and May, before Russia retook the aggregate initiative in June, though only barely. To be abundantly clear, Gerasimov's point about the gray zone has some truth to it. Trackers that are more sensitive to movement in the gray zone saw greater swings in the months that went well for Ukraine. They were switching small Russian ingresses, which Russia never truly controlled, from Russian hands to Ukrainian hands. Note that this is slightly different from what Gerasimov was saying, as it was not Ukraine occupying gray zones that generated the gains. It was Ukraine clearing out gray zone areas that sensitive trackers had already put in the Russian column. Regardless, none of these coding quirks change the fact that the war's momentum switched, at least on part of the battlefield. Indeed, as I have mentioned many times before, the battlefield runs in opposite directions depending on whether you are in the north or the south, with Russia doing better in Donetsk and Luhansk, and Ukraine having the outright initiative in Zaporizhia. What we most certainly do not have are 636 square kilometers of Russian territory gained in June. It is probably closer to 30, and the various coding systems have converged around there because Ukraine is no longer messing around in the gray zone. There is more variance for the total 2026 changes so far, but they range from 73 to 458 square kilometers. Note that that range is nowhere near the 3,000 claimed. As a result, we are now surrounded by conversations regarding the state of Vladimir Putin's information bubble. But before we try to understand what is happening now, we ought to head back to the beginning of the invasion and understand the proper framing of these informational concerns. What remains the best explanation for why the invasion began was a disagreement between Kiev and Moscow. No, it was not on how to pronounce the former. Rather, it was regarding the expected outcome of the war. This was the subject of one of my most viewed videos of all time, which I turned into a legitimate peer-reviewed publication, and is also the key framing of the beginning of my book about Ukraine's survival. That was a complicated way of me saying that I think that I have a pretty cool job. Anyway, the message that Putin was receiving from his intelligence officers and military command was that the war would be straightforward. Ukraine, in contrast, believed that there would be hope, and thus Zelensky did not buckle at the bargaining table. The irony of the situation is that Ukraine was ultimately better informed about Russia's own military capacity, and has since demonstrated that reality by surviving for more than four years now. Too often, though, this conversation devolves into analysts putting Putin's competence on trial, rather than it being an indictment of autocratic institutions more generally. Putin was not naive about the problems with Russia's military, especially the legacy of In fact, the issues were widely understood in Moscow following the Georgian-Russian war. Russia achieved its objectives in that war, but the post-mortems indicated that Russian troops underperformed relative to expectations. This led to anti-corruption initiatives to resolve the problem, which were humorously befuddled by the head of one such commission himself dismissed under shady circumstances. Note to self, do not loiter around in my mistress's apartment when she is holding more than a million dollars in valuables. Fast forwarding to 2022, you had a situation where Putin was aware that things might be problematic for the Russian military, but he could not be sure. This, again, is a product of autocratic institutions. It is dangerous to suggest to the leader that things are not going so well, because it might reflect poorly on you, and perhaps result in negative consequences involving windows. Meanwhile, the media, which normally would serve as a buffer for the less extreme problems that arise in democracies, is fundamentally enfeebled by the government to ensure that revolutionary thought stays silent. Thus, Putin was far from naive. He was just in a situation that any ordinary autocrat might find himself in, where he knows that a problem existed, and that efforts were made to resolve the problem, but he does not know the result of those efforts. Fast forward again, this time a few months. Putin got a clear answer. Those lofty expectations of perhaps a three-day special military operation were all for naught. Russia had to withdraw from Kiev, and progress on the eastern front was not going as well as anticipated either. That is when Putin began cleaning house to try another round of resolving the corruption issues. It took another half a year or so before the new crowd got situated and began to reverse the problems. Notably, this was not before Ukraine had gone on its Kharkiv-Anharsan counteroffensives. Still, the problem here is less about personnel and more about autocratic incentive structures. The new blood came in promising to right the wrongs of the previous staff. They had a clear mandate and clear benchmarks for success. However, with two years gone by, those clear benchmarks have started to fade away, and the new blood has become entrenched in the same autocratic system as before. Any military problems that persist today are now their problems. Thus, they have the same incentive from four years ago to hide the issues from Putin. And that is why it is plausible that Putin remains reading overly optimistic war assessments. Again, this is not a story of Putin's naivete. It is a story that any of us would experience, and any other autocrat out there does experience right now, given the incentive structures of the That said, we now need to transition to our final topic for today, which is whether that is actually the case. Because, pointing back to this meeting, the maps on the wall, and the absurdities of the claims, we do not actually have proof positive evidence of a Putin information bubble, as much of the online commentary indicates. Let me offer you three alternative explanations for what was actually happening at that meeting. Possibility number one is that the contents of the meeting were meant for us, Western observers. It was a piece of disinformation propaganda designed to alter the narrative that Ukraine is currently doing well. You can see why they would schedule the meeting around this time, given increasing optimism in the West, both from Ukraine's successes along the Zaporizhia access, as well as the ramp-up in attacks on Russia's oil infrastructure. Plus, there was a phone call to Trump the next day. If that is what is happening, I would describe it as a waste of everyone's time. I am not sure who is looking at Vladimir Putin as a neutral arbiter of good information. It is certainly not someone whose mind is not already made up on whether to support Ukraine. The second possibility, and the one that I would place my money on, is that this was a performative exercise for the Russian domestic audience. And I think performative exercise is the right phrase to use here. Putin came to the meeting This was not the first time that he has done something like that. I will now cycle through old b-roll of him doing the same thing. Putin wants to look like a militarily competent leader, guiding the Russian Federation to an inevitable victory. If you take the whole thing literally, the meeting had massive, this-could-have-been-an-email vibes. And there was definitely no military need to record it, unless they were trying to appease me and my insatiable appetite for more b-roll. Still, unlike the Western media landscape, Putin's word has meaning among some portion of the Russian domestic audience. And the timing here is critical. The war has now come home for more Russians than ever before. The message that Putin is trying to convey is that he understands that there are attacks happening on internationally recognized Russian soil. He understands that the Russian people are now encountering hardships. But he also wants you to understand, dear Russian citizen, that these sacrifices will not be made in vain. Russia is marching to victory inside of Ukraine. He just needs you to stick out a few more years of the three-day special military operation for it to all come to fruition. Coming back down to reality, Putin knows what he is saying is factually inaccurate. But what do you expect him to do? Tell the Russian public that everything has turned to chaos and that the Kremlin is no longer in control of the situation? Here is another window into that thought process, again straight from the meeting. Putin said, the more strikes the enemy attempts against our civilian infrastructure, and of course, our foremost priority is to do everything necessary to protect these facilities and civilian population. The more such attempts they make, the larger the security zone we will be compelled to establish in the adjacent territory. Especially since this area, like the other territories we have discussed today, is historically Russian land. That all sounds sensible on the surface, if you accept the premise that Ukraine is actually Russia. But let me emphasize the actual argument being made here, because this is that major tell that I referenced at the start of today. The more strikes the enemy attempts against our civilian infrastructure, the larger the security zone we will be compelled to establish in the adjacent territory. This makes zero strategic sense. None. At least within the confines of Russia's capacity constraints. And that is clear to anyone, Russian military staff and Putin included, who understands the very basics of this war. If you want Ukraine to stop bombing your oil infrastructure, you broadly have two options. One is to take over the entirety of Ukraine. The other is to negotiate a settlement. We know that is incapable of doing the former. The best thing for the average Russian citizen then, is for the Kremlin to do the latter. But Putin wants to press on, hence his argument about the Donbas. And even though grabbing more sections of the Donbas is not going to help with the oil infrastructure, because Ukraine can launch its long-range missiles and drones from anywhere in the country. Thus, this is a bait and switch for the benefit, or non-benefit, of the Russian public. Help us secure the Donbas so we can achieve our goals, and trust us that I will help you at the pump. It is not a good argument. The final possibility is the one that is the most strategically complicated. Putin has an incentive to signal to Western audiences that he has a vastly inflated expectation of the war outcome, as a means to obtain an upper hand in negotiations. Imagine that Ukraine was completely aware that this is the expected outcome of the war, and that the spaces to the left and to the right reflect the respective costs of war for Ukraine and Russia. Everything between the yellow and red lines is therefore mutually preferable to a war fought to a complete conclusion. However, you will notice that there are distributional consequences for choosing one of those borders versus another. Ukraine, for example, would really like an end distribution that looks like this, very close to what Russia's true bottom line ought to be. But imagine that Russia could successfully convince Ukraine that the Kremlin's own assessments look more like this. Then the deal that we put on the table a moment ago looks unacceptable for the decision makers in Moscow. If Ukraine wants to secure a settlement, then perhaps it needs to offer something like this instead, which is enough from the Kremlin's feigned perspective to get a deal done. Note that it is also better for Ukraine than sticking it out, fighting the war to a military conclusion, and proving that Ukraine was right and Russia was wrong. Sure, Zelensky succeeded in making Putin look like he had egg on his face, but that is a Pyrrhic victory if you have to suffer the cost of war to accomplish that goal. And thus, I feel a need to tap the sign and suggest that perhaps we are all better off completely ignoring anything that went on during that meeting. Sorry I wasted more than 15 minutes of your time. Hopefully the strategy was interesting at least. Anyway, I guess we should get to the takeaway lines. It is perfectly plausible that Putin does not have a good picture of the current situation. This is far more likely to be the result of autocratic institutional design than out of naivete. Still, the meeting that is getting all of the attention is better thought of as a media circus for someone's benefit, whether it is us, Russian citizens, or Ukraine. Thanks again to Incogni for sponsoring today's video. Go to incogni.com slash William Spaniel and use coupon code William Spaniel to save 60% on an annual plan. And if you enjoyed today's video, then please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you tomorrow. Take care.