LIVE: IMF Releases World Economic Outlook Update

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25 Video Views·Jul 8, 2026
The International Monetary Fund releases its latest World Economic Outlook at 9 a.m. ET on July 8.
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe global economy is navigating a complex landscape defined by the opposing forces of Middle East conflict-driven energy shocks and an AI-driven investment boom. While a V-shaped recovery is projected with growth reaching 3.4% by 2027, stalled disinflation and geopolitical volatility present significant downside risks, necessitating strict price stability and structural energy reforms.
But before we begin, let me briefly explain what we mean by an update.
For those who may be less familiar with the World Economic Outlook publication cycle,
we publish two full editions each year, in April and in October,
which include comprehensive country coverage and medium-term projections.
In January and July, we publish an update which refreshes the outlook
for a subset of economies rather than for the full membership.
You will find the list of economies included in this update on page 14 of the report.
As always, today's update presents our latest global growth projections,
assesses the risks surrounding our baseline, and outlines our key policy recommendations.
Let me also note that yesterday we announced the appointment of Silvana Tenreiro
as the next IMF Economic Counselor and Director of the Research Department.
We look forward to welcoming her to the Fund when she joins us on August 10.
But in the meantime, to walk us through the latest World Economic Outlook update,
we are pleased to be joined by Petya Cueva-Brooks,
Deputy Director of the Research Department,
and Denise Egan, Division Chief, also with the Research Department.
Petya will begin with some opening remarks summarizing the key messages of the update
after which we will open the floor to your questions.
Without further ado, Petya, the floor is yours.
Good morning and thank you, José. Thank you all for joining us.
The global outlook is being shaped by two powerful forces pulling in opposite directions.
The lingering effects of the energy shock from the war in the Middle East
and a technology-driven investment boom.
Developments overnight illustrate the uncertainty and risks that surround the outlook.
So far, the net effect of these forces vary significantly across countries,
depending on their exposure to the war and their position in the technology value chain.
We are projecting global growth of 3% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027,
broadly unchanged from April on a cumulative basis.
In effect, we expect a V-shaped recovery,
weaker growth this year relative to our pre-war forecast, followed by a rebound next year.
On inflation, the picture is somewhat less encouraging.
Global headline inflation has been revised up to 4.7% this year,
while our core inflation forecast is broadly unchanged.
Put simply, the disinflation trend that has been in place since early 2024 has stalled.
Nevertheless, the world economy has weathered the shock from the war better than feared so far,
with limited evidence of second-round effects.
A larger spike in oil prices was avoided thanks to inventory drawdowns,
expanded production outside the Gulf, and actions to help soften oil demand.
And a steady rise in the renewable energy share,
combined with lower energy intensity than just a few years ago,
has also made many economies more resilient.
And while financial conditions tightened sharply in early April,
they have since eased and remained supportive by historical standards.
Now, our forecast assumes that the Strait of Hormuz begins reopening in mid-July,
with conditions normalizing to the pre-war state by March of 2027.
Commodity price assumptions are based on market pricing as of June 10th,
which implied an average oil price of $89 a barrel for 2026.
Though I'll note that the futures curve since shifted down a bit,
although, of course, developments go in the other direction this morning.
We also assume policy and geopolitical uncertainty remain elevated throughout 2027,
and that the AI-driven technology cycle moderates from here,
with no exogenous boost to productivity.
Now, turning to the risks to this outlook,
they remain tilted to the downside and there's a lot of uncertainty.
A renewed escalation in the conflict could reignite commodity price volatility,
tighten financial conditions, strain policy buffers,
and worsen food insecurity in low-income countries.
A market correction driven by a reassessment of AI profitability
is another key downside risk.
On the upside, faster AI adoption could lift growth,
and a swifter than expected normalization of trade through the Strait of Hormuz
would also be a positive surprise.
Now, turning to policy recommendations,
central banks should remain focused on price stability,
though the appropriate response will vary by country,
depending on how commodity prices, the tech-driven demand,
and inflation expectations interact.
Now, many governments have deployed fiscal tools in response to the war,
so far at limited cost.
But as the shock fades, energy-related fiscal support should be unwound.
And rebuilding fiscal space remains essential given elevated debt.
Over the medium term, advancing structural reforms,
including the energy transition and addressing domestic imbalances,
will be critical to strengthen resilience and sustain balanced growth.
Now, with that, let me stop here, and happy to take your questions.
So, thank you very much, Petia.
And before we open the floor, let me briefly go over a few ground rules.
If you would like to ask a question, please raise your virtual hand
and wait until you are called upon.
When called, please state your name and the media organization you represent.
Please try to keep your questions concise,
so we can accommodate as many as possible.
We have a limited time today.
And today's briefing also is focused on the World Economic Outlook update,
so questions on country programs or institutional matters
are outside the scope of today's event.
And we will also limit questions to the countries that are covered
in this specific World Economic Outlook update.
We are going to begin now with questions on the Global Outlook only,
and then we will be moving region by region and country-specific questions.
So, if you have global questions, please raise your hand,
and I will call upon you.
I see Andrea Shaw from Reuters.
Please go ahead.
Oh, hey, good morning.
Thank you so much for doing this.
Nice to see you.
You know, I'm still sort of hung up on the fact that things were so uncertain in April,
and you had these scenarios.
Now you've gone back to a baseline forecast.
But as we saw just yesterday, you know,
the situation escalated in the Gulf again.
There was a lot of strikes.
And, you know, I just wonder, like, what is your litmus test for volatility
and when you can make a baseline forecast and when you can't?
And then specifically on this flare-up of, you know, tensions in the Gulf,
to what extent does your, like, you know,
what percentage assurance do you have that your forecast is correct?
Like, what's the confidence scale or whatever you call that?
The global economy seems like it's subjected to ever more uncertainty now,
and I just kind of wonder how you put that in in the context of your forecast.
Thank you.
Go ahead.
Sure, okay.
Absolutely, we are faced with a lot of uncertainty at the moment,
and we did have also a lot of uncertainty back in April,
so it's a very good question to ask.
I would say there are times when we see a completely new shock
or something that we had not seen before.
And I think in those circumstances,
and we had the example of that in April of 2025 with the tariff announcements
and then again this year with the war,
it was a type of shock that, you know,
it was very hard to make one baseline assumption
and to pin down the underlying assumptions behind the baseline.
Now, four months into the war,
I think we have a better sense about the channels through which the shock is materializing.
And even though, and we do emphasize that in the report,
there's still a lot of uncertainty.
Risks are still very much on the downside.
And again, an escalation of the conflict is the key downside risk that we point to.
We still think we thought it was better to go back
to the more traditional way of talking about a baseline
and again emphasizing the risks around it.
Now, in terms of the impact of escalation
and if this risk were to materialize,
then it would work through the channels that we had talked about before.
Higher oil prices would, commodity prices would raise inflation.
They would also have the potential to unanchor inflation expectations.
And then of course, importantly,
they could prompt a correction in financial conditions.
Okay.
I see several hands that I want to assume that are global questions.
I'm going to turn to Jorgelina
and then I will go to Beiji and then to where,
but let's start first with Jorgelina.
Jorgelina, please come in.
Hi, good morning.
Thank you so much for your time.
Jorgelina Rosario with Bloomberg.
I just wanted to ask if you could develop a little bit more
on the idea that risks are more balanced.
As Andrea mentioned before,
we see U.S. President Donald Trump saying that they're attacking Iran again.
So how these risks look more balanced today?
Is it because you understand more on the channels of transmissions
than you understood four months before?
Or is there anything else explaining this more balanced risk?
And also, you don't mention that much tariffs risk.
You do mention the risk of trade fragmentation,
but you don't develop as much on trade and tariffs in this particular wheel.
Is this because you don't see this as a major risk right now in the economy?
Thank you so much.
I think we can answer this.
Yeah, we can address those questions.
So first, let me again point out that in our report,
the main statement you should take away on the risks
is that risks are still very much on the downside.
And the statement about being more balanced
was just a comparison with April, where we felt they were even more elevated.
But apart from, again, the channels of transmission and such,
there's another aspect which I think I wanted to draw your attention to,
which is that in our baseline,
which was closed in terms of market assumptions as of June 10th,
we already have oil prices,
average oil prices assumed for this year at $89 per barrel,
which is actually higher than what we had back in April in our reference forecast.
So again, relative to that baseline,
I think given developments we've seen so far,
I think that is one aspect one should keep in mind.
And the second thing to point to is,
and this is the part that did surprise us relative to April,
was the importance and the strength of the technology cycle and the AI investment
and the benefit that that brought to a number of countries.
So even though, again, risks related to AI are also two-sided.
To your question on tariffs and possible fragmentation,
we do consider that, of course, an important risk.
But we also see a risk in the opposite direction.
So this is another case where it's a two-sided risk.
We have seen a lot of new trade deals across bilateral and among groups of countries.
And we do think that if we continue on that path,
there is an upside in terms of what that would mean for the global outlook.
Okay, I see.
Beiji, we are going to go to you, and then we will go to Wer, and then we will go to Doha.
So, Beiji, please come in.
Hi, thanks for holding this briefing in the morning.
I was just wondering,
I wanted to follow up on the uncertainty that you flagged after the flare-ups overnight.
Is there a sense of how long this renewed conflict,
how long would this go on for in order to affect the recovery process that you are forecasting?
And has the latest trend affected your expectations
of how long the disruptions from the Iran war are going to last?
Because I think earlier in your opening remarks,
you mentioned that it appears we still expect conditions to normalize by early 2027.
So I'm wondering if you have a sense of how this might change if the conflict were to last,
and what kind of timeline we might be looking at,
considering that things have not quite reached a steadier situation.
Right.
So, again, what is embedded in our forecast is a gradual normalization of flows,
as you pointed out,
which is basically expected to take about three quarters.
Now, if developments were to go in a different direction,
and if we were to see an impact,
including through much higher oil prices,
higher inflation expectations,
and less benign financial conditions,
then I think the impact of those developments,
including through supply chains, by the way,
would take a toll on the global economy,
again, with the impact being quite uneven across countries.
Now, I cannot speculate in terms of what the future path of the conflict is going to look like,
but what I can say is that we are going to be monitoring developments very closely,
and we are going to be updating our assumptions, if needed,
in our next forecasting round.
Perfect. Thank you, Petia.
We're going to move now to where?
Please come in.
Where? We cannot hear you.
Hello? Hello?
Now we can hear you.
Hello? Hello?
Yes.
Okay. So, I have a question on the monetary policy,
given the renewed escalation of geopolitical tensions.
Given that major central banks around the world are currently revaluating,
if not redoing their forward guidance as a monetary tool,
I would like to know the fund's take on this.
What is your observation regarding the role and the effectiveness of forward guidance
in the current high-uncertainty environment? Thank you.
You can go ahead.
In a highly uncertain environment, I think central bank communications is key
in terms of giving a sense of how central banks think about the shocks
and their impact and on the monetary policy stance.
Now, forward guidance has been a useful tool in the past,
especially at the zero lower bound,
but I think it's only natural as time goes by and as we learn more
to kind of revisit the scope and, again, the modalities of that forward guidance.
So, we are definitely taking note and we hope to engage on this issue in the coming months.
Okay. And I see Doha. Doha, please come in.
Hello, Jose. Thank you so much for taking my questions. Hello, Petya.
I have a question on a global level.
Speaking of the high certainty you have spoken about now,
and in the light of that, the report highlighted that the global economy
is currently shared by two opposing major forces,
a negative supply shock from the war in the Middle East
and a positive technology shock from the AI.
So, how are these cross-currents unequally impacting the oil importers
compared to the economies that are heavily integrated into the technology hardware value chain?
Thank you, Petya.
Thank you very much for this question.
Indeed, these opposing forces are really playing out very differently across countries
and this is something that we emphasize in the report.
While on one hand, the war shock is affecting most countries,
I think the AI technology boom is really much more concentrated in a smaller group of countries.
And in a way, the pattern that we see so far is that the oil exporters,
who are generally the countries in the region that are most affected directly from the conflict,
are the ones that we've had the biggest downward revisions.
Now, there is also a group of countries that are energy importers
and they're not plugged in in the AI investment chain.
And here, a lot of most low-income countries actually fall into that category.
Their prospects are, again, affected quite negatively
and we have, on average, if you compare the scarring that we've seen,
we've definitely seen a lot here.
Now, there is a third group,
which is the countries that are part of that global technology investment value chain
and countries like Korea and Thailand come to mind here.
There, we've actually had upward revisions in our forecast.
And last but not least, there are commodity exporters
who were not directly affected by the conflict and their prospects had also improved.
So again, stepping back, a very large variation in the output.
Thank you, Petya.
And we're going to start moving a little bit into regions and country-specific questions.
I want to remind everyone that we also received some questions in advance through our press center.
And we're going to start with the MENA region.
We have a question from Valentina Pascali that goes as following.
She wants to know a little bit about the growth outlook for GCC countries.
Then we will be moving to other countries in the region.
So if you have questions about countries in the Middle East and the MENA region,
please raise your hand and I will give you the floor right after.
We can start with that question.
Denise, maybe you can go ahead.
Yeah, sure.
So the pattern that Petya explained, the V-shaped recovery,
so slowdown this year and a rebound next year,
is actually most visible in the Middle East and Central Asia region,
especially Middle East and North Africa, I should say.
Here we are forecasting growth to drop sharply from 3.7% in 2025 to 0.7% in 2026.
And we are projecting a rebound of 6.5% in 2027.
And compared to our April forecast, this is a downward revision of 1.2% for 2026
and an upward revision of 1.9% for 2027.
And this is consistent, this downward revision this year and upward revision next year,
is consistent with the longer closure of the strait of hormones than we had assumed in April
and the lower base effects going into next year.
But similar to the global picture, even within the region we have quite a bit of variation.
Countries like Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, those are commodity producers
most directly affected by disruptions to energy output and transport.
And they are projected to experience sharp contractions in their economy this year,
followed by double digit expansions next year.
And we also have countries like Saudi Arabia, which is somewhat less affected
because it's an economy with more diversified export routes
and the growth forecast we have there are 1.7% for this year
and again a rebound of 5.5% next year.
And of course the other country that we have in the region is Iran
and here we have an upward revision for this year actually
and a downward revision next year.
And the dynamics happening with the Iranian outlook
is related to the better outturn of oil exports we observed in March and April
and some relaxation of the restrictions on the country's exports
that's supporting growth this year, although we're still projecting contraction of 5.4%
and a smaller rebound next year because of the small contraction this year.
Let me stop there.
Okay, we are going to continue in the Domena region.
I see Magnus, I see Doha.
So Magnus, please come in.
Yes, hi. Thanks for taking my question.
My name is Magnus, I'm with OCTUS in London.
I wanted to check whether or not the Fund has updated its figures for Lebanon
and possibly any comments tied to the ongoing reform program in the country.
Thank you for your question, Magnus.
Unfortunately, Lebanon is not part of the World Economic Outlook update.
What I can do is I can reach out to you bilaterally
and put you in touch with the press officer that covers Lebanon.
Also, tomorrow we have a press conference from our Director of Communications,
Julie Kozak, and maybe that's a question that could be tackled in that press conference.
We are going to go back to the floor, and I just want to remind everyone
we are just going to be able to answer questions of countries that are included in the update.
So I would recommend you to take a look at page 14 of the document.
I see Doha. Let's go with you, and then we can go to the next.
Thank you, José.
My first question is on the region.
Could you please elaborate more on the intense drop of the regions across
before rebounding significantly going forward?
And I have a question in Egypt.
The report indicates that the Egyptian economy will –
or the IMF raised its projections for the Egyptian economy in 2026 and 2027.
How do these figures differ from April projections of the WEO?
And also, given Egypt is presented in the report on a fiscal year basis
and categorized as a commodity importer in the broader region,
how does the projected resilience align with the report's general outlook
for commodity importers in the Middle East and Africa?
Thank you.
I think that the more regional question maybe you can answer, Denise,
and then we can go with Petia for Egypt.
Yeah.
So just to add some more details on what I had just described,
I said we need to think in terms of different country groups within the region
and the directly affected oil exporters.
In those economies, the contraction we are projecting for this year
as well as the downward revisions relative to April
are reflecting longer disruptions in oil, gas, and refining production
as well as non-oil activity such as logistics, transport, and tourism.
And the trade drought in capacity is providing some mitigation to that
but not for all oil exports in the region.
For oil importers, revisions are much more modest
and they are also a little bit heterogeneous
and they reflect differences across countries in terms of the early 2026 resilience
and the reliance of these economies on oil exporters in the region.
Let me stop there and turn to Petia.
Okay.
And now going to Egypt.
Let me first mention the numbers.
So this year in 2026, we are expecting growth to be 4.6,
which is an upward revision of 0.4.
And then next year in 2027, we are expecting a slight deceleration to 4.4,
which is a downward revision of 0.4.
So part of that is happening precisely because of what you mentioned,
the fiscal year basis.
So 2026 is really referring to the fiscal year 25-26.
And there we had stronger than expected growth in the third quarter,
which offset the initial impact of the war.
And that's why you have the upward revision.
But then for 2026-27 is when we really see the impact of the war,
where the impact of the war is visible.
And that's why you have the downward revision.
And this is due to weaker investment, higher financing costs,
as well as the uncertainty that is weighing on activity.
Okay.
So we're going to continue moving through regions.
And I think that this is the perfect moment to go to Asia.
I see Lalit on camera.
So please, Lalit, if you have a question, please come in.
Hi.
I wanted to ask you about India.
Can you hear me?
Am I audible?
Yes, we can hear you.
It's cutting a little bit, but I hear that you want to ask about India.
What's your impression about India's growth trajectory
and to what extent the economy has been impacted by the recent crisis
in the Middle East,
in particular the obstruction of flow of oil in the state of Indonesia?
Okay.
So you cut a little bit, Lalit,
but I think that you are asking about the outlook for India
given the current global economic situation.
So I think we can go ahead.
So for India, we have the forecast for this year revised down very slightly
by 0.1 percentage point to 6.4.
And growth for next year, for 2027, revised upward by 0.2 percentage point.
And the factors that are underpinning the forecast revisions
are basically twofold.
On the upside, we have the better-than-expected outturn
in the most recent data,
but we also have high-frequency indicators through April
showing quite a bit of resilience in overall economic activity.
But these positive effects are then more than offset for 2026
by the higher energy prices we have in our baseline in the July update,
as well as the greater pass-through of those higher oil prices
to prices at the pump in India.
And moving into 2027, we are expecting a strengthening
with the energy shock dissipating
and the medium-term growth being estimated at around 6.5%,
and output closing, we expect some pick-up there.
Okay, so we're going to stay in Asia.
I don't know if there's any other question on any country in the region,
and I see hands up, but my site does not allow me to get all the names.
But please come in. I think that we have a question on South Korea.
Is that true? Because if not, we will be moving on.
Okay.
Hi.
Here we are.
I'm here. Sorry.
Yeah, South Korea has recorded unexpected growth
driven by AI semiconductor investment growth,
and however, there are concerns within South Korea
that this semiconductor cycle may be peaking now and could soon turn downward.
How do you assess the sustainability of the current semiconductor cycle?
And additionally, do you think Korea economy could face significant shock
when this cycle eventually enters a downturn?
Let's go with South Korea,
and then I have a question on China from the press center.
Okay.
So on Korea, as you said, Korea is one of the countries
that has seen a large upward revision in the July update.
So we are projecting for this year 2.6% growth.
This is a 0.7% point upward revision,
and also we are projecting 2.5%, still a very robust rate of growth,
which is, again, another upward revision, this time for 0.4% point.
The main drivers for that is the very strong activity
that we have seen in the first quarter of Q1,
and that was driven, as you pointed out,
driven by the very impressive growth in AI hardware exports.
Now, going forward, we do not expect a downturn per se.
We do anticipate some moderation,
hence growth from 2.6% this year to slightly moderating to 2.5%.
Having said that, we discuss in the report, not only for Korea,
but more generally, globally, potential risks from a correction
in the AI space, in technology-driven investment cycle,
experiencing a downturn.
And Korea would, as uniquely as it has been placed,
to benefit from the upturn,
it would also be standing to be at risk in case of a downturn there.
So thank you, Denise.
And we have a question that we received through our press center on China
from Tao Xu from CCCTV,
and she's asking about the drivers behind the new outlook for China.
Okay, so for China, what we have is actually another upgrade.
For 2026, we expect the Chinese economy to grow at a rate of 4.6%,
this is an upward revision from the 4.4% we were projecting in April.
And there are two factors shaping this update revision, updated projection.
And on the upside, again, the upturn for the first quarter
has been higher than what we were expecting back in April
at 5% year-on-year growth.
And that automatically raises the growth we are projecting for the year as a whole.
But on the downside, we are now assuming, compared to April,
we are assuming higher global oil prices,
and that's expected to weigh on growth
due to the direct impact that oil prices and gas prices have on the Chinese economy
as well as lower demand from trading partners.
So the net effect turns out to be a positive for this year
since the impact is partially offset with the positive U.N. GDP upturn.
Okay, time to continue moving on.
It seems like we're in the World Cup and we're going around the world.
So now we are going to be moving to Africa.
So I think that we have a couple of questions on the region.
I know that we have Kemi online.
So Kemi, if you want to come in.
Can you hear me?
Yeah, we can hear you loud and clear.
Okay, thank you very much for taking my question.
My question is, given what we are seeing in your latest report
and the situation from yesterday, the announcements, the attack on Iran,
how do the latest changes affect Africa's economics?
And the other question is, given the AI that you mentioned in your report
and the migration crisis that we are seeing in South Africa,
what impact do global immigration policies have on African economic and labor markets?
Thank you.
And before we go to answer those questions,
we have Daduzeel that has been very patiently waiting online.
So please come in and ask your question.
Thank you very much.
I'm from MoneyWeb and I just want to maybe add on to Kemi's point
because the report notes that even though sub-Saharan countries are largely absent
from the AI-driven global technology upswing,
they face headwinds from the decline in official development assistance.
Just on the AI-driven global technology upswing
and African countries being absent from that
in terms of a regional perspective of sub-Saharan Africa,
I do wonder whether you assess the consequences of that and what that will mean.
And in terms of the risks, you also note on page 7,
the last line of the first paragraph,
that AI hype and exuberant financial markets could at the same time
sow the seeds of microfinancial instability.
What does that mean, please?
Okay. I think, Denise, these are all for you.
So let me start maybe with the broader outlook
how sub-Saharan Africa is faring within this picture.
So let me start by noting that we actually had seen
a growth-based pickup in growth in 2025 in the region.
We had an acceleration of growth to 4.5%.
Now the war obviously has clouded outlook for 2026
and we are now projecting a softening of growth to 4.3%
in the region as a whole.
And this is beyond the cost of energy for the region.
What matters is also the increase in fertilizer prices that we have seen.
And this is coinciding with planting season in some countries
and it may hurt the agricultural sector
in addition to all the other impacts of energy prices.
And agricultural sector accounts for a large share
for some sub-Saharan economies.
Again, the overall picture, the softening,
relatively small softening, 4.3%,
is masking substantial divergence across countries.
And this reflects primarily the differences in pulse space,
how reform implementation has been going
even before the shock has arrived,
but also how exposed the different economies has been,
both to the war but also to the technology chain.
Basically what we're seeing is that the oil-importing,
non-resource-intensive economies
are more adversely affected with the higher energy and food prices,
while some larger economies in the region
are continuing to benefit from earlier stabilization and reform efforts,
although they are outside the AI-related or the technology value chains
and they do face headwinds from reduction in official development assistance.
Just to give you a sense of the two largest economies in the region,
Nigeria is expected to grow at 4.1%, quite stable,
and this is supported by improved macroeconomic stability
and favorable terms of trade, with Nigeria being an oil exporter.
At the same time, higher prices,
so there's some offset to that positive terms of trade effect,
because higher prices for essentials
are expected to aggravate poverty and food insecurity.
Growth in South Africa is also expected to remain stable at 1.1%,
and continue to improve on the back of strengthened policy frameworks
and ongoing structural reforms.
When we look outside of these countries,
growth in the rest of the region is expected to slow markedly,
from 5.6% in 2025 to 5.2% this year and next.
In terms of AI, I think what is important to recognize
is countries, in order to benefit, there is the preconditions,
how well they were already integrated into the technology chains,
but going forward, how well they can position themselves
in terms of adopting AI.
And we have done several analysis there,
and one thing to note is while Sub-Saharan Africa
has caused benefits from some of the adoption of AI,
there is need for more investment in infrastructure,
in skills upgrading, in order to reap the benefits even more.
Let me stop there.
Okay, time to continue moving around the world,
and from Africa we go to Europe.
We have received a couple of questions online,
so I'm just going to try to group them.
They're going to be touching on the UK, Italy, Spain.
Yeah, so basically on Spain and Italy,
can you tell us about the new outlook for Spain?
Something similar, this comes from Arturo Lopo from RTVE.
Then we have a bunch of questions on Italy's outlook too,
from ANSA, from Rainews24, Class CNBC.
And then we have another question on the UK
about the outlook for the UK and how high tax rates,
if they are having an impact in UK growth.
This comes from Phil Adwick from Bloomberg UK.
So let's start, if you want, with Italy,
then we move to Spain, then we finish with the UK.
And if there's any question online regarding Europe
or a European country, please raise your hand,
or then we will be moving on to the Western Hemisphere.
I don't see any hands, so let's start with Italy.
All right.
Italy, the forecast hasn't changed since April,
as indicators have held up broadly at the levels that we expected,
although at a weak level.
So we're expecting growth of 0.5 this year and 0.5 next year.
The resilience and recovery plan investment
continues to support activity.
At the same time, higher energy and food prices
and elevated uncertainty are weighing on private consumption.
Now, investment has been revised up
due to the higher reliance on imported energy
and is expected to remain above target through 2028.
Now, the risks to this outlook are downside to growth
and the downside to growth and upside to inflation.
Now, turning to Spain,
this is another country where actually our forecast is unchanged.
We are projecting growth to slow down from 2.8 last year
to 2.1 this year and then further to 1.8 in 2027.
We did observe stronger-than-expected outturns in the first quarter
in some of the energy support measures that were implemented
that offset the negative impact of the higher energy prices.
So again, because of these two offsetting effects,
the forecast is unchanged.
Just to note here that the high share of renewables
has also played a role in Spain's expected domestic demand
to keep supporting growth even as net exports weaken,
as the household savings rate is still quite high
and is expected to come down.
As in Italy, the risks to this outlook are on the downside.
And then finally, turning to the UK.
For the UK, we actually have an upward revision to the forecast for this year.
We're expecting growth to be at 1, an upward revision of 0.2,
and we're also expecting it to pick up to 1.3 next year.
Now, again, the slowdown in growth relative to last year
is due to the higher energy prices, the tighter financial conditions,
and of course the uncertainty that is weighing on private spending.
And the upward revision very much reflects the stronger momentum
that we saw in the run-up to the war.
And then when it comes to the fiscal situation,
just to note that we think that the current fiscal strategy
continues to strike a good balance
between deficit reduction and growth-friendly spending,
including the front-loading of infrastructure investment,
which is in the plans.
And let me stop here.
Okay, so we are getting to the end of this trip.
Now we move to the Western Hemisphere.
I see Paula with her hand up,
so I want to assume that this is going to be a question on Argentina.
Yes, sure. Thank you so much.
Can you elaborate a bit more about Argentina's outlook, please?
Thank you so much.
And before we answer, first of all, congratulations on yesterday's match.
And then we have a couple of other questions
very similar to what Paula asked from El Cronista, La Nación,
a little bit more about what is behind Argentina projections
and especially their resilience that is going on in the country
Sure.
So the forecast for Argentina broadly unchanged since April
and since the completion of the Article 4
and the second review of the program.
So we're talking about growth of 3.5% this year and 4% next year.
And what I can say here is that real activity expanded
by 0.7 quarter and quarter in the first quarter.
But since then, the growth momentum is expected to pick up
for the remainder of the year.
And part of that is due to the primary exports
and the recovery in investment and construction.
Now, another element of the outlook which is important
is that disinflation has resumed
and is expected to proceed gradually.
Inflation is expected to reach 25% by the end of 2026.
And here, the tight fiscal policy and the continued enhancements
to the monetary framework and operations
are expected to support inflation converging
to single digits by late 2028.
And again, the higher energy prices have contributed
to a temporary rise in inflation.
But going forward, the lower oil prices that are expected
could also support the disinflation process.
Okay, before we close, we have a couple of questions
both on the outlook for Brazil and the outlook for Mexico.
And then my understanding is that Andrea Shallal
has a follow-up question.
We will end up with you, Andrea.
But first, we're going to hear a little bit about Brazil and Mexico.
Sure. Let's start with Brazil, where we have upgraded our forecast
and we're expecting by 0.5% this year,
a pretty sizable upward revision, to 2.4%.
And also for 2027, we've also upgraded our forecast to 2.2%.
And we've seen this because of a strong harvest
that contributed to the upward surprising growth in the first quarter.
And of course, the oil exporting status that Brazil has,
the greater fiscal support, policy support and robust private consumption
explain these upward revisions.
That said, risks to the outlook are on the downside.
And then on Mexico, we have downward revisions for this year and next.
We're expecting growth at 1.2% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027.
We saw even that for 2026,
that represents a stronger activity relative to last year.
Now, again, these downward revisions
are because of the weaker than expected first quarter
and the prospects for a more protracted USMCA review.
And as in the other cases, I think the risks here are on the downside.
Okay, we are getting to the end.
Andrea, please come in if you have a follow-up question
and we will end up with you because we are over time.
Okay, thank you so much for coming back to me.
I just wanted to ask you about the inflation expectations.
So you say there's little evidence of inflation expectations de-anchoring,
but that does indicate that there's some evidence of that.
And I wondered if you could tell us what you're going to be looking for.
We've had three quarters of increases in headline inflation.
You know, when we get to four or five quarters,
do you then start to get more worried?
How do you assess that situation with the inflation expectations?
And yes, thank you.
Indeed, what happens with inflation expectations is a critical part
of what would then play a role in establishing
what is the right monetary policy stance.
Now, again, the good news so far has been that at the global level,
these expectations have remained, I would say, fairly well anchored.
Of course, I don't want to generalize to say that this is the case in all cases.
It's not.
We do have examples in which we have seen a drift up in inflation expectations.
But what we will be looking at is not only the market-based expectations
in the near term, in the medium term, and in the long run.
Of course, what is most worrisome is when you see those expectations
drifting up at the medium and long run,
which would make it more difficult for central banks
to bring inflation back to target.
But beyond the market expectations, it's also important to look
at household expectations, at expectations of firms.
And with the availability of more data and newer tools,
I think we're better able to do that now than in the past.
So it's certainly an area that we'll be watching very closely.
And on that note, first of all, I want to thank Petia and Denise for their time.
Also remind you all that if you want to access the World Economic Outlook update,
along with supporting materials, you should go to IMF.org.
Another reminder, tomorrow, Thursday, July 9th, our Director of Communications,
Julie Kosak, will hold her regular IMF press briefing,
and we look forward to seeing many of you there.
And on behalf of the Research and Communications Departments,
thank you for joining us today.
If you have any follow-up questions, please don't hesitate to contact us
at media at IMF.org.
Thank you, and have a great rest of your day.
Transcription by CastingWords
