An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 13: Rise or Decline of Multilateralism? Current Dynamics in Treaty Negotiation, Cooperation and Withdrawal, by Joseph Crampin, Ph.D, Candidate, University College London.
The Cambridge International Law Journal 9th Annual Cambridge International Law Conference on the theme of ‘International Law and Global Risks: Current Challenges in Theory and Practice‘ was held as an online webinar series due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
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This presentation examines the legal challenges of unilateral treaty withdrawal and the tension between maintaining the integrity of treaty obligations (*pacta sunt servanda*) and the practical authority of international law. The speaker argues that while the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides a balanced framework, the principle of good faith is essential for flexible interpretation and application in complex cases.
Hi, I just want to say thank you to the conference organisers for keeping this
conference running in the current circumstances. In my presentation I'm going to talk about treaty
withdrawal. First, I want to sketch a general problem that international law has had with
treaty withdrawal and I should clarify that I mean unilateral withdrawal as opposed to withdrawal by
agreement. Second, I want to make some observations on the solutions arrived at in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and third, to propose a way of understanding how the principle
of good faith supplements the regulation of treaty withdrawal. In relation to this I want to make
three broad points. The first is that treaty withdrawal creates two problems of systemic trust
in the practice of treaty making. Allowing withdrawal undermines the integrity of Pactus
and Savanda, prohibiting withdrawal undermines the practical authority of Pactus and Savanda.
Secondly, I want to point out that the BCLT provisions C2 and largely do find the right
balance. They're neither too prohibited nor too permissive but they don't solve the problems
entirely. And thirdly, I want to argue that good faith can and already does assist in interpreting
the provisions in the BCLT or specific withdrawal provisions in particular treaties and in applying
them to the facts of the case. And I want to say the way in which it does so is by providing a
degree of flexibility in interpretation and application that enables international law to
balance the competing problems of integrity and authority as they arise in the circumstances.
The background to this talk is obviously the fact that there have been a number of high-profile
treaty withdrawals in recent years but I'm not going to talk about specific cases. These may
create problems for specific regimes but I want to talk about the problems created for international
law in general by the phenomenon of treaty withdrawal, the problems it creates for the
practice of treaty making. The question of treaty withdrawal raises two different problems,
both of which concern with systemic trust in treaty making. The first problem is that a
practice of unilateral withdrawal might destroy trust in the binding force of treaties because
compliance with one's treaty obligations becomes voluntary. Pactus and Savanda is based on the idea
that states are free to determine whether to consent to treaty-based legal rules but once that
consent is given they're bound to comply with their obligations as a matter of law. And the ability of
a state to release itself from its obligations unilaterally would appear to undermine the
obligatory force of Pactus and Savanda or, as the authors of the Harvard draft on the law of treaties
put it, leave Pactus and Savanda with little or no meaning. So what's the fear? It's that treaty
withdrawal will destroy respect for international law and the result is that people who have this fear
argue against the permissibility of withdrawal. The problem with this absolutist view on the
sanctity of treaties is that it undermines their effectiveness or practical authority.
Recalcitrant states, by which I mean states who have decided not to comply with their obligations,
will end up breaching the treaty if they cannot withdraw from it. So by producing a situation
which tends towards the flouting of the law, an absolutist approach also undermines trust in
international law by making it binding in name only. It is better, or so the opponents of the
absolutist view argue, therefore to allow for withdrawal. And both of these views were held
and debated over the first half of the 20th century and they were debated within the International Law
Commission in the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The VCLT,
however, was intended to fix rules precisely in order to settle these questions.
I won't go into the rules in depth but, as I'm sure everyone is aware, the VCLT allows for limited
rights of withdrawal in the rules set out in articles 54 to 63 of the Convention. It also covers default
procedures for withdrawal in articles 65 to 68 and the effects of withdrawal on a state's obligations
in articles 70 to 72. The VCLT rules are a sort of Goldilocks solution and, in my view, they strike a
sensible balance and, in practice, states go on further and often include rights of unilateral
withdrawal within their treaties. And so you might think that the problems are over. The regulation
of treaty withdrawal by international law just requires looking up the VCLT rules or express
provisions in a treaty and mechanistically applying them to the facts of the case. And, for the most
part, I think that's true. Certain points are very clearly settled by the VCLT. For instance, material
breach is in. Necessity is not. But certain other points are not. The VCLT rules and withdrawal
provisions of particular treaties still need to be interpreted and applied, often in quite messy
factual situations. One sort of a problem that's arisen in the context of recent withdrawals
is how to approach domestic constitutional requirements for withdrawal. There's no
equivalent to article 46 for treaty withdrawal, so how does that work? Or another problem is how
far do the VCLT rules actually fill in gaps in expressed withdrawal provisions, which was a
problem that arose in the Whiteman case before the Court of Justice for the EU. So this is where
I argue that good faith comes in to help regulate or, more properly, guide the regulation
of the withdrawal process. The first point about good faith is that it already plays this role.
You can see it invoked in the WHO and Egypt's advisory opinion before the International Court
of Justice, for example. Secondly, what I want to argue is that what it achieves in guiding
the regulation of the withdrawal process, which is one of its main functions here, is in balancing
the competing considerations of integrity and authority. I'll finish, at the time I have,
briefly by illustrating this in the case of the Gab Chikogo-Najimura project case
before the International Court of Justice. I assume that most people are familiar with
the basic facts of the case, but as a quick recap, it's pretty much this. There was a treaty between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia to build a dam. Hungary abandoned the project. Slovakia,
as it had become, decided to go ahead and build a different dam. Hungary complained about this
and withdrew from the treaty. Then they both went off to the ICJ to sort out the rights and wrongs
of it. One of the main issues was whether Hungary was entitled to withdraw, and there are two issues
of good faith that arise here. The first issue is a clean hands point on material breach.
Hungary had abandoned the project first, causing the circumstances in which Slovakia breached the
treaty, and so the court held that it was not therefore entitled to invoke Slovakia's breach
to justify its own withdrawal. But more significantly, my predecessors, the court
rejected an argument that both parties had, by their conduct, effectively abandoned the treaty,
and in doing so it was expressly guided by the fact that such an argument would undermine the
of practice in Slovakia. However, the court was also faced with a problem of the futility
of requiring the parties to actually comply with the terms of the original treaty,
given the factual situation that had arisen as a result of the breaches.
It was just no longer realistic to enforce the original plan as it had been written,
and so the court turned to good faith to hold that good faith, and I quote,
implies that in this case it is the purpose of the treaty and the intentions of the parties
in concluding it which should prevail over its literal application. The principle of good faith
obliges the parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can
be realised, end of quote. And what this entailed was negotiations between the parties as to the
future application of the treaty, and that this, I would suggest, is an attempt by the court to
balance its decision on the continued force of the treaty with the issue of authority in the
face of recalcitrance. So to conclude, good faith provides an existing mechanism for resolving
issues of systemic trust and treaty withdrawal. I'm not saying it's a panacea, but it can help
to guide the withdrawal process in a way that balances problems of integrity and authority.