Xi Has Only 50,000 Troops? Top Generals Revolt, Civil War Before August?

Recent reports claim that the only military force truly under Xi Jinping's direct control is roughly 50,000 troops from the Beijing garrison. It is also said that during the nine months before and after Zhang Yuxia's troubles began, Xi left Beijing only four times. As a result, he is believed to have alienated and angered many senior military figures, as well as much of the princeling elite. According to these claims, they are waiting to see how the Zhang Yuxia affair is ultimately handled before deciding whether to take action against Xi Jinping. Some observers have even suggested that a form of internal conflict or power struggle could emerge around the end of August this year. How much truth is there to these claims? Let's take a closer look in today's program. Does Xi control only 50,000 troops from the guard forces? China's military is currently organized into five major theater commands. The Eastern Theater Command, Southern Theater Command, Western Theater Command, Northern Theater Command, and Central Theater Command. Before Xi Jinping's military reforms, these were preceded by seven major military regions. Hu Liren, a Shanghai-born businessman now living in the United States, said on his self-media program that, according to a source familiar with the situation in Beijing, whom he described as a second-generation military figure with the rank of general and a relative who is a close friend of his, Xi Jinping can no longer be certain of exercising full control even over the Central Theater Command. The forces he is believed to control most reliably are the guard units stationed around Beijing. In the past, the Beijing garrison reportedly consisted of about 30,000 personnel. Today, the total is said to be around 50,000. According to available information, the Central Theater Command is responsible for commanding and directing armed forces in seven provincial-level administrative regions. Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Hubei. Hu Liren further stated that, geographically speaking, Beijing is actually closest to the Northern Theater Command. Inner Mongolia can be reached within a few hours by car. However, he claimed that the Northern Theater Command is no longer aligned with Xi Jinping's faction and is, in fact, the force Xi fears most at present. According to these sources, the Northern Theater Command oversees military forces in Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong. From September 2007 to October 2012, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia served as commander of the Shen Yun military region, which was later incorporated into the Northern Theater Command. One unusual aspect of Xi Jinping's behavior before and after Zhang Youxia's alleged detention is that, barring special circumstances, he has rarely left Beijing. According to Chinese state media, on November 7-8, 2025, Xi Jinping, accompanied by Politburo member and Guangdong Party Secretary Huang Kunming, as well as Governor Meng Fanli, visited Meizhou and Guangzhou for inspection tours and field research. On March 23, 2026, Xi inspected the Xiongnan New Area. From April 29-30, he visited Shanghai for an inspection tour and attended a symposium on strengthening basic research. From June 8-9, he paid a visit to North Korea. Aside from these trips, Xi has reportedly remained almost exclusively in Beijing since November 8, 2025. Hu Liren also claimed that Zhang Youxia was detained in December 2025 and remained in custody until the matter was officially announced on January 24, 2026. He noted that Zhang had been absent from numerous important meetings, including military conferences, and that information about his absence later spread within military circles. Revelation, the military sees Xi Jinping as a traitor. Hu Liren claimed that some members of China's princeling generation, the descendants of senior Communist Party leaders, have conveyed a message to Xi Jinping through his younger brother, Xi Yuanping. The message reportedly stated that However, if he insists on remaining in power on his own terms, the princelings may take action against him. Hu emphasized that the current situation within China, or more specifically, within the Chinese Communist Party, is no longer merely an internal power struggle, but has evolved into what he described as a form of civil war. In his view, once the military becomes directly involved, the situation is already approaching the threshold of open conflict. He said that Xi Jinping has detained a large number of military officers, including not only Zhang Youxia, but also Li Shanfu and others. Many of these individuals possess extensive networks within the armed forces, and a significant number belong to the so-called second-generation military families. According to Hu, some people within the military now regard Xi as a traitor. From their perspective, Zhang Youxia is already over 70 years old and nearing retirement age, and therefore should have been given a way out. Moreover, in terms of seniority, Xi Jinping would traditionally have addressed Zhang as an elder brother. Under such circumstances, they believe that bringing Zhang down is something many veteran military leaders will not forgive. The reason, Hu explained, is that many members of these second-generation military families come from deep military backgrounds. Their parents served in the armed forces, and many of their uncles and relatives died on the battlefield. Such backgrounds have instilled in them a strong warrior ethos, making them particularly sensitive to perceived betrayals within military ranks. In Hu's assessment, this is an obstacle Xi Jinping may find difficult to overcome. Hu also stated that after Zhang Youxia's detention, Xi Jinping's had still not issued any official conclusion regarding the case. Instead, criticism of Zhang has reportedly appeared only through articles published in military newspapers, accusing him of seriously trampling upon and undermining the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. When the Chinese Communist Party came to power, it established a military hierarchy that included the so-called 10 Marshals, 10 Generals, 57 Senior Generals, and 177 Lieutenant Generals. Zhang Youxia's father, Zhang Zongxun, belonged to the group known as the Founding Senior Generals of the People's Republic. He attended the fifth class of the Wampoa Military Academy, and participated in the Northern Expedition, making him a veteran Wampoa alumnus as well. Hu said that Zhang Zongxun came from a professional military background, and enjoyed tremendous prestige within China's armed forces. Zhang Youxia, he argued, inherited much of that standing, and is likewise highly respected within the military. Furthermore, he is generally not regarded as a major corrupt official. According to Hu Liren, Xi Jinping originally promoted Zhang Youxia in order to stabilize the military. The key audience Xi sought to reassure through Zhang's appointment was the group of veteran military leaders. On October 25, 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhang Youxia and Xu Qilin were appointed members of the Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhang Youxia subsequently played a key role in helping Xi Jinping consolidate his leadership position, and ensuring that no military uprising occurred during the 2018 constitutional amendment process. The veteran military leaders who have remained influential since the era of Mao Zedong maintain close ties with one another. They exercised significant influence over military power, and to a considerable extent, over the entire Chinese armed forces. In some respects, they resemble regional military strongmen or warlord-like power centers. For this reason, Xi Jinping's alleged detention of Zhang Youxia, widely regarded as one of the most influential figures in the military, and his attempt to take direct control of military authority, are seen as encroaching on the military establishment's piece of the pie. These figures have traditionally been viewed as part of an untouchable group within the party. Hu Liren further claimed that some believe there are roughly 400 powerful families operating behind the Chinese Communist Party, more than 200 of which have ties to the military. According to him, these families conveyed a message to Xi Jinping through his brother, Xi Yuanping, warning that the detention of Zhang Youxia had gone too far. In their view, the incident has also undermined their own sense of security. The reason they have not yet taken action, Hu said, is that they are still waiting to see the final outcome of the Zhang Youxia case. If they conclude that Xi handles the matter improperly, they could move against him immediately. According to Hu Liren, Xi Jinping's current situation is extremely precarious. He argues that this is also why Xi has left Beijing only four times over such a long period. Xi faces a tiger ride. The princelings may strike back. Another unusual phenomenon has recently emerged. Zhang Youxia's name and photograph reportedly still appear on the official website of the Chinese Communist Party, yet users are unable to click through to view any related content. Hu Liren believes this reflects Xi Jinping's fear of removing Zhang's image altogether. In his view, Xi is caught in a situation often described by the Chinese idiom riding a tiger and unable to get off, a predicament from which retreat is difficult. According to Hu, the Zhang Youxia affair has alienated nearly all of the more than 200 military families associated with veteran generals. The case has allegedly prompted dozens of influential military families to unite in opposition to Xi. Many descendants of these veteran generals are still serving in the armed forces today. Others have left military service but continue to wield influence, maintain extensive networks, and command considerable respect. From their perspective, the Mao Zedong era was a period of widespread confiscation of private assets. Every major family suffered significant losses, and none escaped unscathed. Now, they believe Xi Jinping is steering China back toward Mao-era policies, making the issue one of existential importance for them. Hu argues that Xi Jinping is currently keeping his concerns to himself and avoiding public confrontation. The reason, he says, is that many of the military officials Xi personally promoted lack deep-rooted support within the armed forces. Figures such as Li Qiang, Tai Chi, and Li Xi could, in his assessment, be removed from power at any time. For many members of the princeling generation, the post-Deng Xiaoping reform era established an unwritten understanding. Everyone would have opportunities, share in the benefits of economic growth, participate in power, and avoid threatening one another. Today, however, they reportedly feel that Xi can target them at any moment, jeopardizing both their political influence and economic interests. In their view, John Yoshida's troubles were not limited to his own situation. They claim that hundreds of people connected to him were also detained or investigated. In other words, Hu argues that Xi Jinping has taken particularly harsh measures against the princeling network, and that many within that group now wish to respond in kind. According to Hu, Xi's response has been to concentrate members of these influential families in Beijing. The reasoning, he says, is that Xi still maintains control over the Beijing guard forces, whereas exercising authority over military units elsewhere in the country has become much more difficult. Hu further claims that since Jiang Yuxi's alleged downfall, Xi has also stopped conducting inspection tours of military theater commands around China. Could an internal conflict erupt before the end of August this year? On March 13, 2026, the official account of the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall announced that the facility would undergo interior renovations and be closed to the public from March 16th through August 34th. Hu Liren argues that whether the memorial reopens on schedule by the end of August could become a symbolic indicator of whether the political dominance of the Xi family will continue. According to Hu, the hundreds of influential families within the Chinese Communist Party ultimately derive their power and interests from the political legacy of Mao Zedong. In his view, if they were to abandon that legacy entirely and align themselves solely with Xi Jinping, they would place themselves in a vulnerable position. Under such circumstances, Hu speculates that if the Chinese Communist Party were to descend into a genuine internal conflict, one driven by tensions between Xi and elements of the military rather than by ordinary factional infighting, the consequences could be severe. He suggests that China's nationwide expressway system might be placed under restrictions similar to those seen during the COVID era lockdowns. He further speculates that veteran military leaders may already have prepared ammunition and other resources as a precaution against unexpected developments. Hu contends that Xi Jinping has attempted to manage the military in the same way he manages party and government officials, a strategy that he believes has created problems for Xi himself. According to Hu, Xi initially relied on John Musia to help keep the military under control, but after allegedly removing John, he now faces veteran military leaders directly. Finally, Hu predicts that China may be approaching a period of major political upheaval and recommends that ordinary citizens maintain enough supplies to last for three months in case of emergencies. What do you think of these predictions and speculations? Feel free to leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you for watching and see you next time.