Jus Cogens | International Law

General Principles of Law
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3 Video Views·Dec 10, 2024
Welcome back everybody to the last two lessons on the subject of the sources of public international
law. We're going to focus a little bit on the nature of certain principles within international
law that do form part of the sort of sources element and the sort of sources question,
but not just general principles of public international law that are of paramount
importance and relevance for us who are studying public international law, but for those of you
who are studying other areas of international law such as, for example, international criminal law
or even international humanitarian law, you will also find these principles and you will also find
these lessons particularly important to examine as well. These are the final lessons in which we're
going to be looking at the final principles of international law of particular importance.
We'll talk in this lesson about the concept of a jus cogens obligation within international law,
and then we will also talk about the ergo omnes principles in the next lesson as well. So what do
I mean when I suggest that a certain principle or that a certain provision or that a certain idea
within public international law is a jus cogens obligation? Well, the principle of jus cogens
is sometimes described as a preemptory norm of general international law. Now, that's really the
official, inadvertent commas, definition of what we mean when we think about jus cogens obligations,
but of course that doesn't really prove or help us in any meaningful sense because we don't know
what it means to call something a preemptory norm of general international law. Well, in a nutshell,
the general idea here is that there exists certain rules within international law that are so
fundamental on the one hand, but also so universal on the other, that states have no choice but to be
bound by them. And this therefore means that any attempt on the part of a state to bypass the idea
of this preemptory norm would essentially render that whatever provision void and unable to be
applied or applicable or enforceable. It also bypasses the concept of state sovereignty,
since states do not have the ability to just opt out of a jus cogens obligation and perform
something in violation of a certain jus cogens norm. And we can see this when we look at the
actual provisions of treaty law itself. When we look at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
we can see in article 53 the sheer strength of this provision and the sheer strength of what a
jus cogens obligation essentially enshrines onto us. It says, quote,
a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a preemptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present convention, a preemptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by subsequent norm
of general international law having same character. So, obviously, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties is conceptualizing a jus cogens obligation within the broader context of the
law of treaties. It's talking about how we apply this principle to a law of treaties. So, fundamentally,
if a treaty conflicts with a jus cogens norm, a preemptory norm of general international law,
then according to article 53 here, this therefore makes that treaty void. Fundamentally,
it becomes non-enforceable. But for the purposes of the present convention, the treaty also
gives us a definition of a preemptory norm of general international law. They note that it is a
which is recognized by the international community of states from which there can be no derogation
permitted. You cannot derogate, you cannot fail to uphold a jus cogens obligation, a jus cogens norm
within international law. In addition to that, modification of such an obligation or such a norm
can take place but could only take place with another jus cogens norm. So, if one jus cogens
obligation exists, the only time that could be modified is if there is another jus cogens
obligation which modifies it. And that's fundamentally the beginning and ending of how
the concept of a jus cogens obligation applies. I can draw your attention now also to another
provision within the Vienna Convention, namely article 64 of the law of treaties convention,
which suggests that if a new preemptory norm of general international law emerges,
any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. This is a very,
very powerful obligation and a very, very powerful provision. Because what this does is it not only
applies prospectively, in the sense that if we have an obligation that is established today,
any treaties that will subsequently be created in the future has to adhere to and cannot
conflict with that jus cogens norm. It's not only prospective, but it is also retrospective,
in the sense that if we create a new jus cogens obligation today, any treaty that has ever existed
in the past that is still in force that conflicts with it will also be void and terminates. And this
really conflicts with some of the basic principles of the rule of law that you may understand when
looking at a domestic municipal legal system. When you look at, for example, the way the UK
constitution operates within the rule of law or the US, for example, in the rule of law,
they basically apply a principle of non-retrospectivity, such that if I committed
some act that wasn't considered illegal and then subsequently then did become illegal,
they can't then go and fine me or prosecute me for the act that I did prior to it becoming
unlawful. That is what non-retrospectivity essentially refers to. However, jus cogens
obligations are not bound by the same rule of law basic principles, such that if a new
obligation arises today, any treaty that has previously existed which may conflict with that
obligation will become void and will therefore terminate. So from the language of the treaty,
the Vienna Convention, specifically the reference to quote general international law,
it appears to be the case that a jus cogens obligation will develop out of custom. It
will develop out of customary international law. So it is therefore suggested that a prerequisite
for a rule to become a jus cogens rule, a jus cogens norm, is that it must also have been a
rule which exists in customary international law. And you can also make the conclusion that
regardless of its origins, regardless of where a jus cogens obligation comes from, if something
becomes a jus cogens obligation, it is by necessity and by extension also just a basic rule of
international law, basic rule of customary international law specifically. Because if we
take the traditional definition of customary international law, a state practice which is
done with the assumption of it being a legal obligation, the idea of state practice plus
opinio iuris, we can then come to the conclusion that a jus cogens obligation is also a state
practice which is done under the assumption that it is a legal obligation. And so as a result of
which it is by extension necessarily also just customary international law. A jus cogens norm
that comes out of international treaties could still exist as well as this, and we can see this
when we look at the ways in which treaties and provisions within treaties also codify international
law from a customary perspective as well. So for example the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, specifically Article 2 at least of the Crime of Genocide,
defining what genocide is and outlawing it as a crime, Articles 2 and 3, seems to both be
customary international law on the one hand but also seems to be a jus cogens obligation to prevent
and punish the crime of genocide. And this is something that of course comes not from customary
international law originally but comes from a treaty originally, it comes from the 1948 Convention
and then from the 1948 Convention it is sort of crystallized into customary international law
and then as therefore by extension of which has also become a jus cogens obligation.
