Why a Democratic China is Xi Jinping’s Only Chance at Survival | Digging into China
In his latest deep dive, Toronto Fanglian challenges the popular belief that Xi Jinping will eventually retire or hand over power. Analyzing the rigid nature of absolute autocracies, he argues that one-man dictators cannot step down safely. Historical precedents like Angola and Kazakhstan show that without collective leadership to maintain institutional rules, a retired dictator’s family faces swift asset forfeiture and imprisonment, even by handpicked successors.
Furthermore, Xi’s extensive anti-corruption purges have created a vengeful "Alliance of Losers" among sidelined elites awaiting retribution. Coupled with the "Loyalty-Competence Paradox"—which prevents him from finding a capable successor who shares his radical vision—Xi has trapped himself in perpetual rule. Ironically, historical data suggests that if his regime collapses, a transition to a rule-bound democracy offers a dictator better odds of personal survival than being overthrown by his own terrified, resentful bureaucracy.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. On October 15, 2012, Hu Jintao walked
out of the Great Hall of the People with his head held high. He had officially wrapped up his 10-year
tenure as both General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission. Now this was a big deal.
He broke the precedent set by Jiang Zemin, who had stepped down as president but clung to the
military chair. Hu achieved the first complete orderly transition of power in CCP history,
arguably the first peaceful transfer of power in Chinese history period. At the time, Xi Jinping
even published a piece praising Hu's noble character and sterling integrity. Back then,
everyday Chinese citizens must have felt like the country was finally moving in the right direction.
But fast forward to today, and in the blink of an eye, we've entered the Xi Jinping era,
an era that has dragged China right back to lifelong tenure. Here's the thing though,
even now with Xi entrenched in this lifetime rule for so long, you will see plenty of people spend
hours debating whether he will finally hand over power, who his successor might be, or whispering
about that whole thing, about the Xi out, Li in rumor. But if you ask me, those guessing games
are completely pointless. Today, let's skip the optimistic theories about when Xi Jinping gets
overthrown. Instead, let's unpack a much darker question. Why is it that even as he gets up there
in years, and even if China's economy hits a total brick wall, Xi will never simply retire
gracefully to enjoy his golden years like so many people fantasize? Why is it that orderly
transitions of the past are pretty much dead and buried in today's China? Honestly, why am I so
certain that Xi will never step down voluntarily? Because at this stage, it's not even about his
personal whims anymore. It's about the brutal logic of the political structure he built.
It really boils down to three main things, the system, the anti-corruption purges, and the
successor problem. Let's start with the first one, the political system. The way China's political
system is rigged right now, if Xi Jinping steps down, his story doesn't end well. A lot of folks
assume he can retire because they are stuck in old way of thinking. They look at Hu Jintao or
Jiang Zemin and think, hey, worst case scenario, the curtains close, the power fades, and maybe
you get escorted off the stage like Hu Jintao. But your personal safety is guaranteed. You get
to live out your days in peace. But if you look at the history, when an absolute one-man dictator
voluntarily steps down, the aftermath is almost always ugly. Take a look at Yuse Eduardo Dos Santos,
the former president of Angola. Dos Santos started his dictatorship in the small African nation back
in 1979. Under his watch, his family made absolute bank. His daughter Isabel Dos Santos used her dad's
muscle to become the richest woman in Africa, its very first female billionaire. Well, cut to 2017.
After ruling Angola for 38 years, Dos Santos was aging, his health was failing, and he was tired.
In a moment of absolute delusion, he decided to retire. Now he wasn't completely reckless.
He hand-picked his successor, Joao Lourenço. Lourenço had been Dos Santos's
loyal mouthpiece in the Angolan military for years, a totally compliant, obedient guy with
zero backbone. Think Mao Zedong and Lin Biao in the 1960s. But guess what happened? Literally the
year after Lourenço took the reins, the reckoning began. By 2018, Isabel Dos Santos was slapped
with corruption charges and the government froze her assets. Dos Santos and his billionaire daughter
were forced to flee to Spain under the guise of seeking medical treatment. The old man ended up
dying in exile in Spain in 2022. And it didn't stop there. Thanks to endless diplomatic pressure
from the new Angolan government, the US and EU eventually sanctioned Isabel for corruption.
Today she's still on the run, hiding out in Dubai. And that's not an isolated incident.
China's neighbor Kazakhstan is putting on the exact same show. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the dictator
who had been re-elected continuously since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
retired a while back. Nazarbayev was basically the Mao Zedong of Kazakhstan. The personality cult
around him was everywhere. His name was literally written into the constitution. And we are not just
talking about how Xi Jinping wrote his thought into the Chinese constitution. The Kazakh
constitution explicitly defined Nazarbayev as the leader of the nation. They even renamed the
capital city Nursultan after him. Nazarbayev was arguably even more cautious when he stepped down
in 2019. He handed the presidency to Qasim Jomart Tokayev. But he built a firewall. He kept the
title of chairman of the National Security Council, meaning he was still the de facto boss.
He wanted to retire on paper but rule from behind the curtain. But the moment the public protests
flared up, Tokayev seized the opportunity. He stripped Nazarbayev of his Security Council
chairmanship and launched a massive purge of his inner circle. Nazarbayev's two nephews, one was
fired, the other arrested. His top lieutenant, the former prime minister Karim Massimov, was busted
for high treason and slapped with an 18-year prison sentence. And you want to know who Nazarbayev's
number one loyalist used to be? It was Takayev, the very guy leading the purge. Today Nazarbayev
is effectively under house arrest. His name has been scrubbed from the constitution and the capital
city was promptly changed back to Astana. Now everyday people might not pay attention to these
historical footnotes. But you can bet a bookworm like Xi Jinping knows them inside out. These stories
show him exactly what happens to a dictator who willingly lets go of the wheel. Even if
Xi picks a loyalist, and even if he designs a perfect institutional shield, his family circle,
his daughter Xi Mingzhe, his wife Peng Liyuan, his sibling Xi Yuanping, Qi Qiaoqiao, could easily
face prison and asset forfeiture. Xi himself would be looking at house arrest or exile.
So you might ask, why didn't Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao worry about this?
Look, it's not that dictators can't retire safely, they can. But historically there is one
major prerequisite. The regime has to be a collective dictatorship, a system of collective
leadership. During Deng Xiaoping's time, he had to share power with Chen Yun and the other eight
elders. During the Jiang and Hu eras, power was split among the nine standing committee members,
what people called nine dragons ruling the water. On the surface, this setup limit the top leaders
power, but it also acted as an insurance policy for their retirement. You see this outside of
China too. Dictators who walked away safely include Boris Yeltsin in Russia, or Du Mois
and a known dark man in Vietnam. Why does this happen? Milan Svojic, a professor at Yale,
wrote a great book called the Politics of Authoritarian Rule. He points out that a dictator
really only faces two enemies, the public and the bureaucracy. Don't underestimate that second
group. Since the end of World War II, only about one third of dictators have been ousted by popular
upsprings or foreign intervention. The other two-thirds overthrown by insiders within their
own regime. To keep elites from tearing each other apart and plunging the regime into chaos,
autocracies usually take care of two paths. Path one, an extreme personalized dictatorship
where a supreme leader builds a secret police state to liquidate all opposition. Path two,
the ruling elite is split into factions that form a broader political coalition to suppress the
public. But to keep that coalition functioning, they have to establish internal rules and red
lines. Sure, collective leadership has its downsides. Policies get bogged down in factional
bickering and efficiency drops. But the massive upside is that because power is distributed,
players develop rules over time and they stick to them. As long as those rules hold, the top guy
can step down safely. The rules guarantee that the next guy will protect the predecessor's life
and family wealth. But a one-man dictator, he destroys all factions and tears up the rulebook
because he becomes the rule. If Xi Jinping announces tomorrow that earth is flat,
the entire bureaucracy just has to grit their teeth and nod. That kind of power feels ultimate,
sure. But it means that the day he steps down, there are no rules left to protect him. He would
have to rely entirely on the personal promise of his successor. And in a dictatorship,
a personal promise is worth less than the paper it's written on. Back in 1927, the famous Chinese
writer Lu Xun wrote a piece titled The Old Man Has Finished His Song. He noted that the people
praising ancient culture were usually wealthy folks living safely in foreign concessions.
They had money and were insulated from the horrors of civil war. But what they didn't realize was
that if the system didn't change, their children and grandchildren would end up lower than the
Lu Xun was calling out the elites of 1927 who enjoyed the status quo but refused to protect
labor rights, oblivious to the fact that they were destroying the future for their own descendants.
The same logic applies to Xi Jinping. The moment he let Hu Jintao be escorted out of the Great Hall,
he shattered the rules. He made it clear that once he steps down, he could easily be the one
carried out. And how do you stop yourself from being carried out? You never leave. Honestly,
being exiled or put under house arrest might actually be a lucky outcome for Xi.
Because compared to other autocrats, he has an even bigger reason why he can't step down. The
he took total control in the first place. And that brings us to our second big reason,
the anti-corruption campaign. What was the very first thing Xi did when he took power?
He launched a massive anti-corruption war. You can say he did it to purge his rivals,
or you can argue he genuinely wanted to save the party. It doesn't really matter.
The objective reality is that it hypercharged his personal power. In the beginning,
these purges were highly selective. Let's be real, if we are talking about corruption in China,
who isn't corrupt? In a system with zero oversight where under the table rules dictated everything,
nobody at the top is clean, not even Xi. But if you look at the big tigers who fell during his
first term, they all shared one trait. They belonged to Zhou Yongkang's faction, the Communist
Youth League faction, or Jiang Zemin's clique. Not a single one was a Xi loyalist. And the people
who filled those empty seats, they were his inner circle, his Tsinghua University alumni,
the Fujian faction, or the Zhejiang New Army. Cleaning out rivals and installing cronies is
exactly how he built his one-man dictatorship. And even today, with absolute power secured,
the purges haven't stopped. It's all about absolute loyalty now. The Wall Street Journal
reported that General Zhang Youxiao faced scrutiny simply because he opposed Xi's promotion of Zhang
Shengming, the military's top disciplined boss, to vice chairman of the military commission.
Xi viewed that pushback as insubordination, and the purge machine spun up again.
Now, does this endless loyalty testing make Xi safer? In the short term, absolutely. Sitting in
a big chair right now after waves of purges, nobody can openly challenge him. He's safe.
But by using the anti-corruption blade to slice away his political rivals,
he has inadvertently created a massive, deeply resentful shadow opposition.
In political science, we call this the alliance of losers. These are the families whose wealth
he seized, the officials he threw into Qingcheng prison. They and their networks haven't vanished
into thin air. They are just laying low, biding their time. And what are they waiting for?
The day Xi Jinping steps down, the second he does, the retaliation begins. Xi knows this
dynamic intimately because his own father Xi Zhongxun lived it. His dad was purged during
the Cultural Revolution, but after Mao died, he climbed back to power and joined the coalition
that dismantled the Gang of Four. Xi watched his dad play the game. He knows exactly how the
pendulum swings. So stepping down voluntarily isn't an option. He wouldn't just have to worry
about his successor breaking promises. He'd have to worry about the gates of Qingcheng prison
opening up and a horde of vengeful elites coming for him. What's he going to do? Execute everyone
in Qingcheng before he retires? That brings us to the third reason, which is less about
self-preservation and more about his grand ambition, the successor problem.
Does Xi think about what happens after he's gone? Of course he does. But it's unrealistic to think
he only cares about his personal safety. When you reach that level of power, money means nothing.
Xi genuinely has a political vision. As terrifying as it might be, he wants to be remembered as the
surpassed Mao Zedong. Therefore, any successor has to be someone who can carry that torch.
Mao faced the exact same issue in his final years, especially after seeing what's happened
in the Soviet Union. When Stalin died, Khrushchev took over and immediately launched a total
denunciation of Stalin's legacy, essentially painting him to a historical pillar of shame.
Mao was terrified of that happening to him, so loyalty became his ultimate metric for a successor.
But by prioritizing blind loyalty, he ended up picking people with zero actual competence.
Mao technically tapped three successors, Lin Biao, Huang Huofeng, and Wang Hongwen. All three
share the same flaw, they were terrible at actually running a country. Lin Biao was a
general but a lousy statesman, which is why he was sidelined right after the founding of the PRC
until he backed Mao at the Lushan conference. And honestly, Mao never really saw Lin Biao as
a long-term heir. It was just a reward for political backing. The first guy Mao actually
liked was Wang Hongwen. Wang was a worker by background, so his loyalty was unquestionable.
But the guy was totally out of his depth. He couldn't even deliver a speech at internal
meetings without stuttering. And his networking skills were non-existent. Mao tried to pair him
with Deng Xiaoping, hoping Deng could help him manage the old party elders. But Wang just picked
a fight with Deng instead, embarrassing Mao completely. Eventually, Mao had to sideline him
too. Then came Hua Guofeng, the definition of a mediocre compromise. Thomas Gates,
who was the chief of the US liaison office in Beijing at the time, described Hua as an
uninspiring, overly cautious character who looked more like a transitional figure than a true
leader. But that kind of outcome is inevitable. Were there brilliant political minds in China
back then? Of course. Deng Xiaoping was right there. But Deng didn't fully back the Cultural
Revolution, so Mao exiled him. You see, you can't have absolute loyalty and absolute competence at
the same time. Georgi Igorov, a professor at Northwestern University, wrote a paper called
Dictators and Their Viziers where he outlines the loyalty-competence tradeoff. The paradox is
simple. The more competent a subordinate is, the more of a threat they pose. So the dictator avoids
giving them too much power. The more loyal and submissive they are, the safer they feel,
but they are usually mediocre. And if someone appears completely loyal and highly competent,
well, chances are, they are just faking the loyalty. This paradox completely traps Xi Jinping
today. Unless he hands power to his daughter Xi Minzi or his wife Peng Liyuan, he needs a
successor who can fulfill his grand national vision. But in a one-man dictatorship, a person
who is both fiercely capable and bluntly loyal literally does not exist. Xi is stuck in a loop.
He is terrified of being purged if he steps down, but he can't find anyone qualified to take over
because everyone looks unworthy of his great legacy. On March 11, 2018, inside the Great
Hall of the People, the 13th National People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment with
2,950 votes in favor, two against, and three abstentions. That amendment abolished the
presidential term limits. The moment that happened, Xi Jinping stepped onto a road with no off-ramps.
He condemned himself to rule indefinitely. But here is a fascinating piece of data to
close on. For someone in Xi's position, if he keeps going until the economy blows up,
the public is furious, and the bureaucracy is pushed to its absolute limit. It turns out that
being overthrown by the public might actually be safer for him than being overthrown by his
officials. The prominent political scientist Hank Gummans analyzed data on dictators who
were forced out of power over the last century. His findings show that only about 20% of ousted
dictators avoided severe punishment, and every single one of those protected cases
happened during a transition to democracy. In other words, if an authoritarian ruler wants
immunity, their best bet is a democratic transition where they can negotiate terms
with the people. This sounds wild because when we think of democracy taking down a dictator,
we're always thinking of Nicola Ceausescu in Romania, who was put against a wall and shot
alongside his wife. But Ceausescu's case is actually an outlier, and technically he was
taken down by a palace coup, not just a popular uprising. During the third wave of democratization
that swept the globe, most dictators weren't punished at all. Out of 56 leaders who lost
power in that wave, only 16 faced legal consequences. Most managed to leverage their old
networks to stay politically active for years, like Li Tenghui in Taiwan, and those who were
penalized often ended up pardoned, like Chun Do-hwan in South Korea. Why? It goes back to the rules.
If a dictator wants protection after the crown is gone, they can't rely on raw power or personal
promises. They need institutional rules. And who creates and upholds stable rules? A constitutional,
democratic government. For a guy like Xi Jinping, Li Qiang and Cai Qi are ultimately far more
dangerous to his survival than the everyday citizens standing in Tiananmen Square. So since
Xi loves reading history so much, I hope he eventually stumbles across that chapter. On the
day he finally can't hold the weight of the regime anymore, I hope he realizes that choosing to
compromise with the people might be the only way he survives the music stopping. Thank you so much
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