NATO Chief Holds Pre-Ministerial Press Conference

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4 Video Views·Jun 17, 2026
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte holds a press conference in Brussels at 5 a.m. ET on June 17 ahead of a meeting of NATO defense ministers.
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Good morning everyone, it's good to see you. We will start with a statement from
the Secretary General and follow with your questions.
Good morning everyone, it's great to see you. Tomorrow NATO defence ministers will gather
and this will be for the last time before our summit in Ankara in July.
We will start today with a meeting of NATO's nuclear planning group with those allies involved
followed by a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at 32 where we will discuss final
preparations for the summit. In the afternoon there will be a meeting of the Ukraine Defence
Contact Group, the UNCG, co-chaired by Germany and the United Kingdom. We have a lot to talk about.
We continue to face a dynamic security environment and allies are consistently
working to ensure we are prepared to deter aggression and defend ourselves against any
threat. And here I really want to welcome the deal made by President Trump with Iran.
US action to prevent the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and degrade its ballistic missile capability
improves security for all. And the deal President Trump struck has created an opportunity
to ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon. The restoration of free passage through the
Strait of Hormuz will be a massive step forward. And I know that many allies,
through the initiative led by France and the United Kingdom, are ready to support.
Looking to our agenda for defence ministers tomorrow,
allies will demonstrate progress on building a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. We need more
forces, more resources and a much stronger industrial base. That means making steady
increases to defence investment. And more fairly sharing responsibility for our collective security.
Ahead of the summit in Ankara, allies will highlight how they are delivering on commitments
made in The Hague last year. Investing 5% of GDP in defence by 2035. That's what we agreed.
So I expect nations to present clear, concrete and credible plans to reach that goal.
Ideally well ahead of the agreed timeline. And many are already showing that they are doing
exactly that. The numbers are clear. We saw a massive increase in defence investment in 2025,
with European allies and Canada increasing their core defence investment by over $90 billion.
That is an astounding figure, amounting to a nearly 20% increase in a single year.
With further increases already on the books for 2026.
These significant investments are producing real capabilities. And we are already seeing
that European allies and Canada are more capable and take more responsibility for our security.
This includes taking on more key leadership roles in NATO's military structures.
As well as shouldering more in the context of what NATO might need to deter in peacetime
and defend in crisis or conflict. And here I want to highlight what is truly a sign of success
in how NATO is evolving. You will likely have seen news of the US adjusting its contributions
to the NATO force model. In some cases this has been cast as a problem, as the US pulling away
from its allies. But that is not the reality. It has obligations around the globe that it needs
to account for. We have looked at the division of labour in the context of conventional forces.
And we see that European allies and Canada are ready, willing and able to do more.
Based on this, the United States has adjusted its pledges to the NATO force model.
This is not primarily about where forces and assets are currently,
but about who would do what if our defence plans were activated. Historically this was
overly reliant on the United States. Now the US has adjusted its pledged contributions
and other allies have stepped up to contribute more. And this is fair. This makes us stronger.
And this is what NATO 3.0 is all about. A stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.
So we are seeing more investment. We are seeing better burden sharing. And we also know that as
we increase investment, it's not the money alone that matters. We need to ensure our men and women
have what they need to keep us safe. Ramping up defence investment means ramping up defence
production. And we need this across the whole of the Alliance. On both sides of the Atlantic.
And we also know that the security environment is evolving. And NATO is evolving with it.
We must harness the power of innovation. We are working hand in hand with industry to ensure that
supply meets demand. So that this Alliance maintains its cutting edge. NATO can do it
because it's not just home to some of the biggest defence companies in the world,
but also some of the most novel and innovative. This makes us stronger and more secure while
also creating jobs and economic growth. It is a real win-win. Finally, with Russia's war in its
fifth year, providing support to Ukraine remains a priority. Ukraine is demonstrating
that the Russian war machine is not unstoppable. And is shifting the dynamics on the battlefield.
Together, Allies have given billions in artillery and ammunition and aid.
But it is crucial to continue this support. To help Ukraine maintain its advantage.
This will be my message at the UDCG. So as you can see, we have plenty on the agenda.
And I will be back tomorrow to tell you how it went. But in the meantime,
of course, I'm ready to take your questions. Okay, let's start here in the second row AFP.
Thank you very much, Secretary General. Max Delaney from AFP.
How are you? Coming back to the force model,
which you gave a long explanation to. You didn't mention the timeline, though, for the US
plans to reduce their commitments to the force model. Is this from tomorrow? These US assets
would not be available if NATO's defence plans were activated? Or is it over a longer time to
give the Europeans the ability to replace them? And if there is a war, you just said that the
defence plans, the US will have a lesser role in it. Do you not expect the US to come all in
in Europe, if there's a war with Russia? Again, let me start by saying, this is not
about where forces assets are currently located. It's about who would do what,
if our defence plans were activated. So let's say in case of an Article 5 situation.
And what the Supreme Allied Commander Sarkar has said is that when it comes to the capabilities,
the United States will no longer pledge. There are largely capabilities available that other
allies already have or will have in the near future. And we have already seen that as the
United States has adjusted its pledge contributions, other allies have stepped up to contribute more.
In some cases, completely. In some cases, nearly. But there are also areas that require more work.
But the overall picture is looking good. Okay, next question. Let's go here. Third row.
Hello, Secretary General. I have a question about the Strait of Hormuz, actually. Because two days
ago, during his meeting with Trump, French President Macron offered to help reopen the
Strait of Hormuz if they're requested by the regional actors, including the United States,
and also say that European forces could be rapidly deployed to the area. I wonder what
is the NATO's vision as well as position in this regard? Thank you. Well, of course, this is
legally and literally speaking outside NATO territory. But it is absolutely clear that
we have case in the United Kingdom and France are coordinating all of this. We are really seeing
massive pre-deployment of assets over the last two months by European allies and others
close to theatre, particularly when it comes, for example, to demining, radar and other
technologies necessary. And as I understand it, what I'm hearing from the G7 is that this was
discussed. So what could this UK French led initiative with so many countries involved,
could they do post this whole deal which has been struck between the United States and Iran
to make sure that they help to deliver on this commitment of making sure that the freedom of
navigation is fully restored. But this is all in the making. But the good news is that these
discussions are ongoing. Whether NATO will play a role there, yes or no. If helpful, of course,
we will play a role. But if they can do it without us, also okay. So we are always ready
to help if so wanted. Okay. Coming here, third row in the towards the centre, Politico.
Hi, Victor Jack from Politico. Thanks for the press conference. I have a question on defence
spending. So some allies defence spending is set to flatline this year, while others,
Czechia, Slovenia, Hungary, for example, is actually likely to fall below 2% of GDP this
year. What's your message to these allies, given the commitments that they made last year?
Thanks. Well, again, when you look at the, the increases, they're really, they're really
staggering. So in total, this is this is over 90 billion in one year 2025 90 billion more spent on
defence than the year before. When you look at all 2%, almost all allies are on 2%. Last year,
Albania, Czechia and Slovenia were not, but they have clearly committed to reach more than 2% this
year. So so and then these three countries, when you look at the overall picture, it is a really
small number, there's 800 million, they would, they are not spending when it comes to the full
2% compared to a total defence spend of 571 US dollars. So 800 million less than 1 billion US
dollars, compared to 571 US dollars, including this over 90 billion increase, almost 20%. So
this is really great news. And what we are getting in is reports from all allies that they are really
ramping up and we have seen so many already on the 5%, the 3.5%, the Germans, reaching it in
2029, having doubled their defence spending compared to 2021 over 150 billion. So this
picture really looks good. And it is necessary because we have to defend ourselves. Okay,
second row, Reuters. Thank you. Secretary General, you actually dodged Max's question on whether the
reductions in US commitments to NATO's defence plans is effective immediately.
Could you tell us whether these reductions are in effect as we speak now? On that specific
question, it is very difficult to answer the yes or no, because this is not about, let's say,
this is about the what and the when, if Article 5 will be triggered. So that means that the US
saying we have adjusted our contributions to the NATO force model, that means that
other allies have to step up. And there we see the picture positive, generally, which is some
already filled, some nearly, some still more work to do. But it's not that you can answer that
question with a yes or no, it's clear that the US has adjusted its commitment to the NATO force
model. But it's in technical terms, it is not a yes or no. And on those allies that you mentioned
are stepping up right now, are you confident that all these capabilities that have been reduced by
the US now will be backfilled by the Ankara summit? Again, it's a very technically complicated issue.
But what we are working on is to make sure that what the US has been providing so far
will be filled, that we fill that gap. And again, that looks very good. A lot of it done,
some of it nearly, and some of it requiring more debates and discussion.
Okay, coming over here, second row on the aisle.
And just one short question on clarification, because you said that the USA no longer provides
capabilities that the European allies can provide. And have they consulted before? So
have they asked them what capabilities do you have? So which one can we take out?
Or was it the list that was just presented, and now they have to go with it? And then my
main question on the Strait of Hormuz, do you have any indications what the US actually
requests from the allies in NATO, if like this French UK initiative will be enough and quick
enough? Yes, on the first question, at a technical level, these discussions are going on
for really some time now. It's one of the reasons, of course, why as an alliance,
we have committed to reach the 3.5% core defence spending as part of the overall 5%
defence spending. Because it is fair that the United States has to take care of multiple
theatres, not only Europe, but for example, also the inner Pacific. And knowing that in case of a
situation where they need their assets in both theatres, the assets will be spread too thinly.
It's only fair, of course, that the Europeans take on a bigger share of the burden when it
comes to the defence of Europe. As I said before, we have 600 million people living here
to defend ourselves against 140 million Russian population. Now not the population,
they are not the problem, but a country with 140 million people led by somebody
who is an adversary of NATO and of Europe and the whole of NATO territory. And it's a bit strange
that we still need so much help from another country, eight hours flying from here on the
plane with 350 million people to defend ourselves against 140 million. So that over time, the US
stays involved conventionally. And of course, when it comes to nuclear umbrella, but over time,
when it comes to these contributions to the NATO force model that the Europeans take over a bigger
share of the burden is totally right. This is part of the bigger discussion of the 5%, which we
decided on in The Hague, which equalises the defence spending in Europe with the defence
spending in the United States, which is taking out this big pedal in the shoe of irritants
on the US side since Eisenhower. It has been solved by President Trump and by the other 31
allies. When it comes to your second question, the French and the Brits are leading this coalition.
The discussions are ongoing as far as I understand, but obviously this is not NATO
leading it. It's very much a French British participating to help to make sure that the
freedom of navigation is restored. And that discussion is ongoing. It has been discussed
in the G7, as you have seen. And my understanding is that, to a big part, this is about demining,
because this is one of the big issues. The mines there and the Europeans are sitting on a lot of
demining capacities, which the US is lacking to that extent. So that is one of the areas where
Europe has more than the United States. So I guess going forward, we will see that discussion
further evolving. But obviously, I know what's happening. We are listening in,
but we are not leading it. This is really led by the French and the Brits with the Americans.
Okay. Staying in the second row, third one in.
Good morning, Secretary General. My name is Ruslana Bryanska from Radio Kyiv.
What can Ukraine expect from the NATO summit in Ankara? And maybe is Ukraine
likely to receive the proposed 70 billion euro in support?
Well, you already saw some very positive, I think, statements coming out of the G7
yesterday. I think also what the G7 agreed on Ukraine was extremely important. And let's
welcome that. I at least would very much welcome what the leaders agreed on. And when it comes to
Ankara, but also the defence minister tomorrow, we will focus particularly, of course, on what
Ukraine needs to maintain the fight. And that is all the crucial flow of equipment into Ukraine
that's coming from Europeans, but also this flow of essential stuff, which only the U.S. is able
to provide. For example, the interceptors for the Patriot systems, which are so crucial to defend
your cities and your crucial infrastructure. And there is a big commitment on the U.S. side,
on the American, on the European side, to keep that flow going, to make sure the money is there.
This is this famous Pearl program. We will have now the Ukraine support loan on the EU side
kicking into gear. So that will help. I'm not going to give you numbers at this moment,
but I'm pretty confident that collectively we will make sure you have what you need
as far as the Europeans and Americans can help to defend yourself.
All right. Fourth row in the very centre.
Thank you. Very good morning. Good morning.
News Agency Interfax, Ukraine, Irina Sommer. Actually, follow up to my colleague question
regarding Ankara summit. Can we expect NATO-Ukraine council? We know that Zelensky is
invited already, but how about council? And if yes, on which level? And by the way,
why don't we have council during this ministerial? Thank you.
Yes, well, during this ministerial, we already have a Ukraine defence contract group meeting.
We also have an MPG, so a nuclear planning group meeting. So the programme is already packed.
And we had a NATO-Ukraine council in Kyiv only two weeks ago at the level of the ambassadors,
which was an impressive visit with the Ukrainian president being there and addressing all the
questions and issues ambassadors raised. It was a moving experience to have that meeting
in the presidential palace in Kyiv. We assume for the Ukrainian president during the NATO
summit to have a programme similar to what we had last year in The Hague. So
many meetings, but no sit down with all the 32 leaders, because we will have one session with
the 32, which is at a level of the 32. Okay, coming here, third row.
Thank you. Good morning. I have a short follow up what my colleague from Politico asked about
spendings. We heard Czechia's Prime Minister Babiš saying that his country will miss 2%
this year, but he don't see here any problem because he's in a good relationship with Donald
Trump. So I want to ask you, do you think it is enough to have good relationship with Donald
Trump not to reach what agreed? And I have a question on nuclear deterrence. We know that
already nine countries joined France initiative of nuclear umbrella. Would you say that this
initiative is an ambition to one day be able to replace United States with nuclear weapon or it
could be as addition to what we have already? Thank you. Well, that's not the ambition of the
French initiative. So I very much welcome the French initiative. It creates an additional
strategic dilemma to the Russians. But it's not to replace the nuclear umbrella from the United
States, which is the ultimate guarantor of our freedom in Europe. So that will stay in place.
But the French nuclear capability, of course, being important, and not being formally part of
the MPG process, because the French have decided to stay out of that. But of course, we regularly
update, we know what's happening. And this latest initiative by the French President, I think,
is welcomed by all the countries involved, including the United States. And also the
French made clear this has nothing to do with replacing the US nuclear umbrella. When it comes
to your first question, without commenting on individual leaders, I have a very good relationship
with Andriy Babich. We know each other for many years. And I know that the Czech Republic is as
committed as everyone to what we decided in The Hague. Czechia did not reach the 2% last year,
but I know that the Czech government is working very hard to make sure that when it comes to a
credible trajectory, it will be there. Okay, we're going to go to the back now.
A question on deprecision strikes. It appears that with the USD commitments to the NATO force
model, this issue becomes front and center now of discussions among member states. Yet
two years ago in Washington, an initiative was already started by four countries, meanwhile,
six. So far, we have seen nothing concrete from that, as it was called. So I'm wondering,
does it need more steering from NATO? And what is your thinking about deprecision strike
capabilities? How important is this? And what kind of capabilities does NATO need to develop
or European allies need to develop to replace some of the U.S. effects?
Thank you for that question. When it comes to the NATO force model, I've seen some reporting
on numbers and all that. As you know, we never comment on that because we will never make
our enemies wiser on what we are doing. So all that reporting, of course, that's the media.
You can do that, but we will never comment on it because we want to make sure that we keep
a maximum of secrecy and keep it secret to what we are doing, etc., when it comes to concrete
numbers. When it comes to DPS, of course, that is an important part of your overall
portfolio of systems and weapons we have at our disposal as NATO. And there's always,
when it comes to all these systems, there is a division of labor who is doing what.
I know the ELSA initiative. I know what the previous U.S. administration agreed with Germany.
So, of course, we are looking very much into that, trying to wherever we can be helpful to
participate in those discussions. But also there, I have to tell you that I have to do that with a
little bit holding back on telling you everything we are doing because also here, this news press
conference, of course, might also be listened in by the people to whom this might be directed,
if necessary, when we have to defend ourselves.
All right, let's come over here. Third row, NTV.
Yes, Secretary General. Gül from NTV Turkey. I have two short questions. So,
the Max raised the timeline issue. There is a timeline issue with regards to industrial
production at the time when the U.S. is scaling down its presence in Europe. European defense
industries are a bit like Chanel or Yves Saint Laurent. So, the quality is tremendous,
but the production is limited. So, this is creating a gap, particularly for the appetite of
Russia, a growing appetite for Europe. So, do you think that in due course, through three years,
we are able to ramp up this production? And second question is with regard, for the last six
months, there were some ups and downs in relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. Since now,
there's an agreement on Hormuz. Do you think that the Ankara summit will be a kind of, you know,
kiss and hugs amongst the ally or not? Well, on the first question, we have that
problem across the alliance. I don't mean the Chanel problem, but I mean the lack of defense
industrial output. So, I leave the Chanel comment with you. But when it comes to the overall defense
industrial output, this is a problem for the whole alliance, the United States, Europe, Canada,
we all are facing this issue because we are not producing enough. I have every confidence that
with all the extra money coming in, look at the 90, over 90 billion extra Canada and Europe spending
on defense in 2025, which is really staggering, which is historical. And again, when I look at
the numbers coming in for 2026, and we know that a big part of that will be spent on defense
industrial output. This means that companies like in Turkey, where you have, I think, over 3,000
defense industrial companies, they know the market is there. The same for the German, the French,
the Dutch, and all the other defense industrial bases in Europe and Canada and the United States.
What I'm concentrating on is two things. One is to make sure that we ramp up the production.
And yes, I'm confident that we will be able to do that in time to make sure we are strong. We are
strong at the moment, but also in the mid and the longer term, we can defend every inch of
NATO territory. The second thing I'm working on is to make sure that it's transatlantic. Because
Europe cannot do it alone. The US cannot do it alone. We need each other when it comes to the
investments, when it comes to innovation, when it comes to making sure that you figure in the
latest technologies, for example, learning from Ukraine on drone technology. We have to do this
together. And also with Europe, it's important that countries like Turkey and Norway and the
United Kingdom are participating as much as possible in what Europe as a whole is doing,
again, in a transatlantic spirit. Your second question, this is a democratic alliance.
That means you will always have debates. And that's what makes us so strong. But you also know
that now for 77 years, we always come together. And we find common ground. Because this is about
our defense, which is task number one of every government. And we are there to defend the United
States, Canada, Europe to make sure that nobody would ever mount a successful attack against us.
Okay, let's come over here. Fourth row, Terry.
Thank you very much, Terry Schultz with DWI. Are you concerned by reports most recently voiced by
Kayakalis, that China is training Russia that the involvement of China is greater than was
previously was previously known? I mean, they're not. Is this lethal assistance or not?
We are constantly trying to follow exactly what China is doing. Of course, we know already that
Russia is not alone that they get vital support from North Korea, from China, from Iran, that
four countries are closely working together and that are mutual agreements. Maybe not always
legally on paper, but who is doing what for the other? And what do you get in return? For example,
when it comes to North Korea, they're getting vital ballistic missile technology from the
Russians in return for their support for the war effort of Russia, this crazy
war of aggression against Ukraine. But when it comes to China, what we know, of course,
is the sanctions circumvention, the dual use goods, etc. We are not naive. We follow everything
exactly. I cannot tell you more at this moment, or at least in this open press conference, but
you can be assured that we follow every... Yeah, so we have to do this in a private meeting,
but then still you want to report it. So I might still have to hold back a bit.
Okay. And just next to her in the green. Good morning, Alice Taddy for Euractiv.
I want to go back briefly to the Ukraine fund. Has the US indicated that it plans to participate
in this fund? Because I understand they stopped all donations to Ukraine a couple of years ago.
So will they put money on the table? And then second question, apart from this fund,
which could be one of the main deliverable of the summit, we're three weeks away,
what does a successful summit outcome look to you? For me, the most important thing is that,
and I think you can already see it today from the G7 statement, is that the Western world,
all NATO allies are completely committed to make sure that Ukraine maintains its position
in the fight against Russia, is able to defend itself, is able to, whenever it comes to peace
negotiations, to have these negotiations from a position of strength, that's what we're aiming
for. When it comes to the money part, the US has been very clear that they continue to provide
all the essential help for Ukraine as they have been doing in the past, including when it comes to
weapon systems only the US can provide. For example, when it comes to the air defense
systems from Patriot and other systems, and this is this program, which is paid for
by European and Canadian allies. So I think the US rightly said, we are not going to put
in the money there. Sometimes you have Congress deciding on amounts of money for Ukraine,
but when it comes to the big sums of money needed for Ukraine, it's coughed up by the
Europeans and Canada. But it's crucial that the US keeps on supplying, that even today,
with all the pressure, when it comes also to the United States, to make sure that they can
maintain all theaters they are active in, this vital support of interceptors continues
flowing into Ukraine, but paid for by Europeans and Canada. Now, I tried to answer to saying,
for me, the successful outcome is that there is an absolute ironclad commitment by the whole of
the Alliance, as we did in The Hague, and what you've seen since The Hague, with the pillar
program, with all the support still going into Ukraine, Ukraine also sharing more and more of
their battlefield insights with the Europeans, Canada and the United States, for example,
through our joint center in Poland, JTAC, but also other ways to basically share all these insights
when it comes to drone technology and modern warfighting, where NATO also can learn, of course,
and Ukraine can still learn from NATO. So this is exchanging all these insights, it is still
investing in Ukraine's defense industrial base, making sure the Czech ammunition initiative is
up and running, Pearl is up and running, making sure all the bilateral support is there,
and particularly focused on the concrete needs of Ukraine. So not just on what countries might
be able to provide, but really reacting to and acting on the concrete demands from Ukraine when
it comes to what they need to stay strong. Coming over here, second row.
Morning, it's still morning, I'm checking. Ksenia Polska, Russian Ukrainian service,
Secretary General, considering the need for the European allies to take over more responsibility
from the United States and invest more in their own defense. How do you make sure this does not
compete with continuous military support to Ukraine? It doesn't, to be honest. I think we
can do it, it has to be end to end. And everybody realizes that. On the one hand, we have to make
sure that the support for Ukraine is there in terms of the money needed to get the weapon systems,
to make sure we produce them on time if we do not have them in our stockpiles.
But at the same time, making sure that we build up as rapidly as possible our own.
I think, are you from Poland yourself? You're from Ukraine. But I think about Ukraine, of course,
is a case in point that you under immense pressure of a full war effort, where so many
Ukrainians are paying the ultimate price, that you were able to maintain the country
in the fight against an adversary, which is much bigger. Now, maintaining this longer this fight
than the first World War, four and a half years now, is testament of your immense resilience.
But when you look at Poland, for example, it's also clear Poland is rapidly ramping up its
defense production, is rapidly ramping up its defense expenditure, making sure that
they can defend themselves. At the same time, they continue their support for Ukraine. So
just one example. Sorry, I thought you were from Poland, but Poland is an example of how
their support is maintained. Okay, we're nearly out of time,
but we'll take just a few more questions. We'll come to the center here in the third row.
Hi, good morning. Good morning. Alexandra Filipenko, The Breakfast Show,
Russian independent media in exile in Lithuania. So Ukraine is now successfully striking deep
inside Russia, thanks to its own technologies. But in Washington, especially after the Sunday
talks with President Zelensky and with Putin, Washington expressed that those
strikes might hinder peace talks. What does NATO want to Ukraine to continue the pressure
or to hold back for those talks? Well, let's start with answering the
question why Ukraine is doing this. This is because Ukraine on the 23rd, 24th of February 2022,
was confronted with a Russia which started a full scale invasion. Of course,
after already in 2014, starting the war with capturing Crimea. So, and this was unprovoked,
totally reckless. And of course, Ukraine has to defend itself. This is what we all
think and find and do, and try to Ukraine to help with. And I think the G7 statement yesterday
signed by all the heads of state and government present in this beautiful French town is very
clear on this. So maybe I can just refer to the statement. And I think it gives you the
clarity that we agree on this, that we have to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to stay
strong. Last week, NATO stated that security situation in Kosovo is stable,
allowing the adjustment of optimization of the core mission. What does that exactly mean?
Especially if we speak about a certain minority in North Kosovo?
Yeah, so a good question. When you look at the security situation in Kosovo,
what we're seeing over the last years is that it has continued to improve. So that's good news.
And that is why NATO ceased in January the deployment of reserve forces to the Kosovo
force. And this was after two years of continuous rotation. And at the same time,
we are constantly looking at what is the best posture for KFOR going forward.
At this moment, you see that KFOR has an overall size of about 4,700 troops.
What we will do is go back to the pre-2023 levels. Of course, and depending on the circumstances,
you will see a KFOR going forward with between 3,000 and 3,500 troops. And that is, I think,
reflecting the improved security situation, where the KFOR mission, of course,
stays absolutely focused on its core mission. Good morning, Secretary General.
President of Finland Alexander Stupp has spoken about reopening channels of communication with
Russia. Last week, he said that contact should be established within the coming months.
What is your view on this? And what might a future dialogue with Russia look like?
Clearly, this is something debated among allies. Absolutely. You also see this discussion
in the European Union. And of course, the President of Finland is also participating
in those discussions, the Prime Minister and the President. And at the moment,
this is not a discussion we are having in NATO at the political level. It's really a discussion
playing out in the EU at the moment. And of course, we are following that and we'll be
supportive wherever we can. Okay, final question. Second row here,
gentleman in the blue jacket. Daniel, Kyiv Ukrainian TV. Does Ukraine
have a stronger hand right now, both at the negotiating table and on the battlefield?
And after this G7 summit this weekend, this week, is President Trump moving closer to Ukraine's
position? What is your feeling? Are you more positive about US position in that?
Well, to be honest, I've always been positive about US position because I always felt and still
think and have the conviction that it is only the United States who was able to break the
deadlock originally when President Trump came back into office last year in February.
He consistently has been working with his team, with Steve Whitkoff and Jared Kushner,
Marco Rubio, with Pete Hexhead to do everything possible to bring this terrible war to an end.
When you look at the battlefield situation, obviously, it has changed somewhat in terms that
Russia is not making advances at the moment on the battlefield, it seems, and you are doing
well in the battle. It's not that you are getting big pieces of land back, but at least the front
line is more stable and the advances by the Russians have been halted much more than,
let's say, two or three months ago. So of course, that's important. And we are seeing that
you are able, as Ukraine, to kill or seriously wound between 30,000 and 35,000 Russians a month,
which are really impressive numbers, of course, terrible for the families, etc., of all the men
in Russian armed forces. But hey, Ukraine didn't ask for them. You have to defend yourself. So
this is what happens in wartime. And you are extremely successful in doing this. And
that means that Russia has more and more problems to refill all those gaps in their armed forces
necessary to maintain the fight in Ukraine. And the numbers, when you compare them,
I said it before, it's really staggering because 30,000 to 35,000, that's basically
in three weeks what the Russians lost in Afghanistan in the 1980s, in 10 years,
they now lose in three weeks. That is in five weeks what America had in casualties in Vietnam
in 15 years. In five weeks now, Russia is losing those numbers in Ukraine, in fighting Ukraine. So
on all these fronts, I think Ukraine is really doing better. But still, I think we all want
this war done and together bring it to a peace deal. But to get there, you need to TUTANGO.
Your president is willing to TUTANGO, is willing to get to a negotiating table. But clearly,
the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, so far is not. And here,
the American president is, I think, playing a very positive role now for a year and a half
in trying to get this war done. He wants to get it done, and I completely support him.
All right, that's all we have time for, for now. But we will be back this afternoon with the Prime
Minister of Latvia. You can join us very early tomorrow morning for the doorstep before the
ministerial meeting, after the ministerial, tomorrow afternoon.
We'll see you then. All right. Thanks, everyone.
Thanks.
