Xi Smells Trouble? Cai Qi Takes Over Party School as 82nd Troops Move Toward Beijing

China Insider TV
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10 days without a public appearance from Xi Jinping. Tanks spotted on the outskirts of Beijing. And Cai Qi has just been appointed to a position few saw coming.
Is it all merely a coincidence? Or are these signs of a crisis that is gradually catching up with Xi Jinping?
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00:00 - Intro
00:23 - Xi Reappears After 10 Days Out of the Public Eye
03:02 - DNA Tests and the Offshore Wealth Crackdown
04:28 - Cai Qi Becomes President of the Central Party School
07:08 - Analysis: Xi Jinping May Be Sensing a Growing Crisis
11:39 - Is Xi Jinping Preparing a Backup Plan for Himself?
#xijinping #powerstruggle
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Ten days without a public appearance from Xi Jinping.
Tanks spotted on the outskirts of Beijing.
And Kai Qi has just been appointed to a position few saw coming.
Is it all merely a coincidence?
Or are these signs of a crisis that is gradually catching up with Xi Jinping?
Let's take a closer look in today's program.
Xi reappears after 10 days out of the public eye.
After 10 days of complete silence, Xi Jinping has finally resurfaced.
During his absence, numerous rumors circulated
suggesting that his health may have deteriorated
and that he had once again been hospitalized.
Some reports even claimed that he had been attacked.
For example, Hu Shijin, a Shanghai-born businessman now living in the United States,
revealed on his program yesterday that a coup-like incident
allegedly took place in Beijing on May 26,
citing a longtime trusted friend who said Xi Jinping may have been the target of an attack.
However, it remains unclear whether Xi was injured or who may have carried out the operation.
Hu speculated that if an attack did occur, those capable of orchestrating it
would most likely be members of China's so-called Red Second Generation,
elite or elements within the Chinese military.
There have also been rumors that on June 3,
two heavy mechanized brigades from the 82nd Group Army,
equipped with Type 99A main battle tanks
and Type 04A infantry fighting vehicles and based in Baoding,
were transported by rail to Beijing's Fengtai District.
Upon arrival, they reportedly confronted railway security units under the Beijing garrison,
which had been deployed to block access to the area.
According to these claims, the order to prevent the 82nd Group Army's
heavy mechanized units from entering Beijing
was issued by Xi Jinping himself and carried out by Commander Chen Yuan.
While serving as commander of the Shanghai Armed Police,
Chen Yuan was reportedly a close ally of Xi.
Following what some sources describe as his role in assisting Xi
during the alleged operation against former Premier Li Keqiang,
Chen was transferred from Shanghai to Beijing and appointed commander of the Beijing garrison.
Meanwhile, the order mobilizing the 82nd Group Army's mechanized forces
toward Beijing was allegedly issued by Liu Yuan,
who is said to be the highest-ranking military figure associated with the anti-Xi faction.
Although none of these reports have been independently verified,
CCTV soon afterward announced that, at Kim Jong-un's invitation,
Xi Jinping would make a state visit to North Korea on June 8 and 9,
the first such visit in seven years.
The timing of the announcement appeared to serve as a response
to growing speculation surrounding Xi's unusual absence,
sending a message both domestically and internationally
that his authority remains intact and that there is no turmoil within Zhongnanhai.
But is that really the case?
DNA Tests and the Offshore Wealth Crackdown
According to Zhang Fen, the anti-Xi alliance has been escalating its efforts
and deploying what he describes as a political killer move.
Perhaps the most chilling development is the Dany DNA genetic testing case,
which Hong Kong media outlets have been covering extensively in recent weeks.
Senior officials associated with the Fujian and Shandong factions
are alleged to have used offshore trust structures in Hong Kong
to leave overseas trust assets worth tens of billions of dollars to their illegitimate children.
The anti-Xi camp has reportedly launched an aggressive campaign in Hong Kong
involving highly rigorous DNA-based paternity testing
while simultaneously conducting in-depth investigations
into the ultimate beneficiaries of these trust funds.
If biological relationships do not match the legal ownership structures of the assets,
the trusts could immediately become subject to legal challenges and asset freezes.
In effect, this approach uses legal principles and judicial procedures
to strip certain families' illegitimate children of their inheritance rights altogether.
The consequences would go far beyond financial losses.
Not only could these individuals lose access to vast fortunes,
but the future prospects and generational wealth of their descendants could also be cut off entirely.
Kai Qi becomes president of the Central Party School.
According to CCTV, on June 5, 2026, the Central Party School held its graduation ceremony.
Kai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and now president of the Central Party School,
attended the event and personally presented diplomas to the graduates.
This marked the first time Kai Qi had appeared publicly in his capacity
as president of the Central Party School.
Prior to the announcement,
there had been no public indications that such an appointment was forthcoming.
As is well known, Kai Qi is one of Xi Jinping's closest and most trusted allies.
Their political relationship dates back to their time working together in Fujian province,
and Kai has remained firmly aligned with Xi ever since.
After Xi rose to the top leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party,
Kai's political career advanced at remarkable speed.
At the party's 20th National Congress, he was elevated directly to the Politburo Standing Committee,
making him one of the seven most powerful figures in China.
Among Xi Jinping's inner circle, Kai is widely regarded as one of the most loyal.
He has been responsible for propaganda, ideology, and public opinion management,
and is often seen as a key executor of Xi's most important political directives.
For that reason, his appointment to lead the Central Party School carries particular significance.
According to political commentator Li Muyong,
the Central Party School is not merely an institution for training senior Communist Party officials.
It also plays a crucial role in shaping party ideology,
cultivating future leaders, and maintaining political loyalty throughout the system.
In other words, whoever controls the Central Party School wields substantial influence
over the training and selection of the party's next generation of cadres.
From this perspective, Xi Jinping's decision to place a deeply trusted ally like Kai Qi in charge
of the institution is viewed as a signal that he intends to maintain a firm grip on the party's
personnel system and ideological apparatus. Xi is believed to want Kai to implement stricter
ideological education measures to strengthen internal loyalty and prevent officials from
becoming passive, disengaged, or outwardly compliant while privately resisting party directives.
The ultimate objective, according to this interpretation,
is to ensure a favorable political environment ahead of the Chinese Communist Party's 21st
National Congress, where Xi Jinping may seek another term in office.
Analysis Xi Jinping May Be Sensing a Growing Crisis
U.S.-based political commentator Heng He stated on his independent media program that Kai Qi's
appointment as president of the Central Party School is closely linked to the level of crisis
currently facing the Chinese Communist Party, CCP. The predecessor of the Central Party School
was the Central Marxism-Leninism Institute. Throughout the CCP's history, the institution's
political importance has risen and fallen depending on the party's circumstances.
Before and immediately after the CCP came to power, the school held exceptionally high status
because the party needed to transform wartime military personnel into government administrators
capable of running the state. In 1943, Mao Zedong personally assumed the position of
From 1948 to 1953, Liu Shaoqi, then the second-ranking figure within the party leadership,
served as head of the Central Marxism-Leninism Institute. After 1953, the position of party
school president was generally held by the party's second or third-ranking leader.
Mao believed that once communist rule had been consolidated, training and educating
senior cadres had become a routine function rather than a matter of strategic urgency.
In 1966, the school was shut down during the Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution
ended, then-General Secretary Hua Guofeng assumed the role of party school president
because the new leadership needed senior officials who were politically loyal to the
incoming leader. Once that transition period passed, the rank associated with the position
was reduced again. The status of the office was elevated once more in the years leading up to the
June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Although only three months remained before the outbreak
of the crisis, growing social tensions throughout China had already convinced many CCP leaders
that the country was facing an extremely serious political challenge. Since then, the presidency
of the Central Party School has consistently been held by a member of the Politburo Standing
Committee. This included both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, who occupied the position during the
periods when they were being groomed as future top leaders. Hu Jintao served as president of
the Central Party School from February 1993 to December 2002. Xi Jinping held the position from
December 2002 to December 2007. It was not until Xi's second term as China's top leader that the
office was effectively downgraded, with the role being assigned to an ordinary Politburo member
rather than a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. From October 2017 until June 2026,
Chen Xi served as president of the Central Party School. Heng Hei argues that this development
suggests Xi Jinping had previously become more confident, believing that the party's senior
leadership had largely fallen in line and remained loyal to him. As a result, he no longer felt at
all necessary to reserve the position of president of the Central Party School for a member of the
Politburo Standing Committee. According to Heng, this illustrates a strong correlation between the
rank of the party school president and the CCP leadership's assessment of political loyalty
within the party, as well as its perception of the overall political environment. The more unstable
the situation and the more divided or disengaged officials become, the higher the rank assigned
to the head of the Central Party School. Heng notes that the position has now once again been
entrusted to Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In his view, this indicates
that Xi Jinping has begun to sense mounting pressures and potential risks, prompting him to
place renewed emphasis on securing the loyalty of the party's senior leadership. He further argues
that if the leadership change at the Central Party School were primarily the result of
factional struggles within the CCP, it would be difficult to claim that Chen Ji was not already
part of Xi Jinping's political camp. Therefore, the real significance of the personnel change
lies not in replacing one ally with another, but in elevating the political status and importance
of the position itself. Is Xi Jinping preparing a backup plan for himself? Political commentator
Tang Jingyuan said on his independent media program that there may be another way to interpret
Cai Qi's appointment. He pointed out that Wang Dongxing, the longtime security chief responsible
for Mao Zedong's personal protection, who later served as director of the CCP General Office,
once briefly held multiple positions simultaneously, including first vice president of the
Central Party School and membership in the Politburo Standing Committee. However, Wang soon stepped down
from his role as director of the General Office. According to Tang, Cai Qi may be following a similar
path. The reason, he argues, is that Cai's simultaneous service as both a Politburo Standing
Committee member and director of the CCP General Office is already an unusual arrangement that
departs from normal party practice, reflecting the high degree of trust Xi Jinping places in him.
Tang compares this exception to Xi's earlier decision to allow Chen Xi, while serving as head
of the CCP Organization Department, to concurrently hold the position of president of the Central
Party School. In his view, Xi's tendency to make such highly personalized personnel arrangements
may soon be adjusted back toward the CCP's traditional institutional norms. Tang further
noted that Cai Qi is now 71 years old. Under the CCP's customary retirement practices, he would
normally be expected to leave the Politburo Standing Committee at the party's 21st National
Congress next year. From this perspective, Xi's decision to appoint Cai as president of the Central
Party School may be intended to extend the precedent established by Chen Xi and secure a
position for Cai in the future, while also creating a political arrangement that could ultimately
serve Xi's own long-term interests. Another noteworthy development, Tang said, is that Chinese
state media did not report any meeting of the CCP Politburo during May 2026. He believes it is
highly unlikely that no Politburo meeting took place. Personnel changes such as Guan Jio replacing
Wang Zhonglin as Hubei Party secretary, as well as Cai Qi replacing Chen Xi as president of the
Central Party School, involve appointments at the provincial and ministerial level or above,
and would ordinarily require approval at a Politburo meeting.
What do you think about these developments? Leave your thoughts in the comments below.
Thank you for watching, and see you next time.
