Including the Responsibility of Economic Actors into Transitional Justice Processes

Global Affairs Academy
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1 Video View·Jun 5, 2026
Dr Sabine Michalowski, Professor of Law, University of Essex, speaking on Panel XIII: 'Including the Responsibility of Economic Actors into Transitional Justice Processes'.
Cambridge International Law Journal 7th Annual Cambridge International Law Conference, ‘Non-State Actors and International Law’.
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AI GeneratedThis presentation examines the challenges of integrating economic actors into transitional justice, specifically within the Colombian experience. It analyzes the tension between the state's duty to prosecute human rights violations and the practical difficulties of holding powerful corporate entities accountable during a negotiated peace process.
Well, first of all, I have to apologize for my slides because I wasn't well organized enough
to actually have them ready when they were requested, and I'm really sorry. I looked at
them this morning and I thought they are not as good as they should be, but they are what they
are, so apologies. What I'm going to talk about is really a work that I have been doing with
colleagues in Colombia over the past two and a half years, and this is my personal... I'm
just finishing an article and it's my personal reflection, so that we've just finished a book
in Colombia in Spanish on this, and now this is just my personal take on it, trying to make sense
of some of the issues that came out of this work. So, well, I'm not really going to talk about,
like everybody else, about business and human rights, so there is a link to business and human
rights, of course, but what I'm really concerned about is more transitional justice, and in the
context of transitional justice, to what extent, well, corporate actors, but in particular,
individuals, because I'm going to focus on criminal liability, criminal responsibility of
economic actors for their role in armed conflict, to what extent that can be addressed by transitional
justice. So maybe briefly, because I'm not sure that everybody is familiar with transitional
justice, very, very briefly, transitional justice is really... well, one can talk about the
definition forever, I don't have the time, but what it is mainly about is a society trying to
come to terms with a period of mass human rights violations, usually either in transitions from
conflict to peace, as in Colombia, or from repression to democracy, like, for example,
in Argentina, Chile, and other countries in Latin America. So in these situations, what we face,
first of all, is, of course, lots of problems in terms of administering justice, because this
morning, the Colombian colleague, I think, has just left, but this morning we heard about Colombia,
and we heard about the massive scale of the human rights violations. We are talking about
millions of victims, and we are talking about thousands of perpetrators, and so, of course,
if you think about that scale, it's already clear that you cannot bring everybody to court,
you cannot really have criminal trials against everybody, you can't really have reparations,
full reparations, as you would have under normal circumstances for the harm you cause someone,
so you have to already, there are lots of trade-offs involved in trying to, in thinking
about how do you deal with this. Colombia faces the additional problem that this was a negotiated
piece, so as we again heard this morning, those of you who were in this room and listened to the
Colombia presentation, what we heard there is that, and what, of course, most of you will know,
is that in Colombia, there was, well, basically in Havana, there were several years of negotiations
between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group, FARC, and so they negotiated this
peace agreement, which causes, of course, its own problems because of the compromises that
you have to reach in this process. So now the negotiating parties for the government and
the leaders of the FARC, but what they came up with, well, maybe let's talk about, sorry,
let's talk about the more general issues first of all, and then I'll come to Colombia.
So in general, and this is a problem in the context of Colombia, as we've heard about over
these two years, international law and transitional justice as maybe part of international law,
although that's debatable as well, and to what extent it is even law, a special area of law,
but it's based on international criminal law and international human rights law and international
humanitarian law, so it has basis in international law. Of course, as we know, international law is
very much state-centered, and this is why normally transitional justice processes focus on the role
of state actors and then in the context of conflict on the role of the armed groups,
but it doesn't usually focus on anybody else. And so we don't really have in international,
first of all, we don't really have international precedents really telling us how do we actually
include these other groups if we think they played an important role in the conflict.
If they did, then there might be a good reason to actually want to include them and hold them
to account as well, but we really have very, and this came to light very much in the context of
the Colombia work, there is very little international experience and very little
international precedent. In fact, I was invited, and I felt like a total cheat, I was invited
several times to meetings as a so-called international expert, and I was always asked
to talk about international experience, and I always had to say, well, there is very little,
I'm so sorry, but there is very, very little you can actually draw on. And including the academic
debate is very much at its beginning, how can you actually include, should you include, and if so,
how these actors in these already very precarious transitional justice processes. But one of the
reasons why in Colombia this came up was because Colombia really tried to negotiate a peace
agreement, whatever one might think about it, but what they were definitely trying very hard
was to negotiate a peace agreement that would stand up to international scrutiny. And part of
that was the awareness, and particularly in the context of the inter-American system,
of the state obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish, and that that includes all actors. So
it does not just include state actors, it doesn't just include the crimes committed by the armed
group, but if there are other actors who had a role to play and had an important role to play,
the state obligation extends to them as well. And so this is why from the very beginning,
already during the negotiations in Havana, the question arose how to do it.
Now, very, very briefly, because Colombia is interesting because they have, they already,
they have an ongoing transitional justice process, the justice and peace process,
I don't really have time to say much about it, but this started in 2005, and this is a peace process
that focused on the demobilization of the paramilitary group, and it offered paramilitaries
to demobilize alternative sanctions of five to eight years of imprisonment for truth and
reparations, very simplified version of this. But what happened in, so it was only limited to them,
it excluded everybody else. Now, one of the problems with that was that in the context,
so they got these alternative sanctions, but against these very, very broad confessions.
So during these very, very long confessions, they came up with all sorts of information about all
sorts of other actors. So they might have, they might say, you know, we did this, that, and the
other, but all of these different economic actors, partly companies, partly small business, partly
landowners, all sorts of different groups, they actually paid us, they partly, they asked us to
do this, they gave us logistics, they were the beneficiaries of the land grabbing and the land
displacement, et cetera. So a lot of information came out, but because they were not included in
the transitional justice process, the problem was that the transitional justice, the specific
tribunal set up with these alternative sanctions, they didn't have jurisdiction over them. So they
then had to refer these cases to the ordinary jurisdiction, which caused, well, a fragmentation,
yeah, I'm a bit reluctant to use the word after this morning, but it caused a fragmentation of
the process and lots of problems with it. And partly because, of course, for the economic
actors, because they were excluded, there were no incentives whatsoever to confess, to the contrary,
because to them, ordinary criminal sanctions would apply. So that was the situation when they
thought in Havana, they thought about how to deal with this. And basically one of the reasons,
so one of the reasons why they in Havana did think about including them was because the
information was there. In the justice and peace process, a lot of information had come out
about the important role of these actors. So the question was how to deal with them rather than
whether to deal with them. And very, very briefly, because I am conscious of time,
these are just a few of the aims and of the objectives of the special jurisdiction for
peace, which is the criminal justice component of the transitional justice,
the current transitional justice system, the one that followed the peace agreement with the FARC.
So they want to satisfy the victim's right to truth, offer truth to the Colombian society,
protect the rights of victims, contribute to achieving a stable and lasting peace. And already
we can see there are quite a few tensions between these various objectives, even if we
leave outside the more complexities like bringing in other actors. Now, when the special jurisdiction
for peace was, when it was first established and when the peace agreement thought about how
it envisaged it, it was given jurisdiction over everybody. Everybody who had any role in crimes
that had a relationship with the conflict, with the armed conflict, was under the jurisdiction
of the special jurisdiction for peace, including then, of course, economic actors. So once that
came out in December 2015, this was decided. So then we spent about two years trying to figure
out how this could possibly be implemented, because as I said, there is very, very little
international experience on what does that actually mean. So they have jurisdiction.
But if you see this, this inclusion of these actors in the context of the Colombian
peace process, which gave largest possible amnesties to the guerrilla fighters and to then
at the same time included everybody else, the question was, what does that mean? So what it
seemed to have meant, and I'm saying all of this in the conditional because quite a few things have
changed since then, what it was meant to mean at the time was that they should get
furthest reaching waves of criminal prosecution against truth and reparations and only really in
the situation where they were the most responsible for the most serious crimes,
then they would actually face criminal sanctions, but they would get exactly the same
possibilities of alternative sanctions as the primary perpetrators. Now, then this caused
enormous fractions, and of course, economic actors are a very powerful sector of society.
They did not like the idea at all that they were included, which is interesting, because
actually, I always thought, look at me, how am I doing for time? You're okay, you've got another
five. Oh, fantastic. I was just misinterpreted here. Okay, perfect. Great. So basically,
I thought this is actually good for them. If they go, most of them are going to get,
they are actually going to get out of this legal certainty in the form of a waiver of
prosecution, the large majority of them would get it. And maybe very, very few might potentially
face criminal sanctions, but if they do, what they would get is these alternative sanctions,
which are much better of what some of those got who actually were, there were very, very few cases
in the ordinary jurisdiction in parallel to the justice and peace process. But there was, for
example, a case where several company directors were convicted, and they got punishments of 14 to
16 years, which is, of course, quite a lot more than what they would get here. But they are such
a powerful group, and they had such a powerful lobby that they managed to almost derail the
transitional justice process in Colombia. And in the end, in November 2017, the Constitutional
Court intervened, and the Constitutional Court had to actually, it had to decide whether or not the
implementing legislation was constitutional. And what they decided was it was unconstitutional
what had been decided in Havana and was then part of this legislation implementing the peace
agreement. And that now the Special Jurisdiction for Peace only has jurisdiction over these third
party actors, including economic actors, if they voluntarily go. So now we have a system whereby
they can decide, if they want to go, they can go, they can confess, they can pay reparation,
and then depending on the level of the responsibility, they either get a criminal
sanction, a lower criminal sanction, or they get, in most cases, the waiver of prosecution. If not,
they can take their chances in the ordinary jurisdiction, and there is widespread impunity,
and so it might be a good bet unless there is a lot of information about them in particular,
then it might be a good way. But also, of course, we now again have parallel jurisdiction, and we have
some problems. So coming to some first lessons, of course, this is all happening. The
Special Jurisdiction for Peace only started working on the 15th of March, so it's a bit early to really
have a lot of proper lessons from Colombia. So this is really just more about the process and the
discussions and the problems. So first of all, what we have is economic actors did play an
important role in the conflict. What we don't really know, and what I think the jurisdiction
should try and figure out, is to what extent were they actually responsible for the crimes, and to
what extent were they actually coerced, because of course, a lot of, in many cases in Colombia,
they can actually rightly say there was extortion, there was coercion, etc. So we really need to be
able to distinguish very clearly. But what we can learn from Colombia, then, is if there was a
special transitional justice process, like what they are doing now, the main possibilities of
dealing with these economic actors are, as far as I can see, and would be interesting to see what
you think, three. Either we leave them outside completely, as was done in Justice and Peace,
or we include them as they tried, and treat them exactly the same as the state actors and
the combatants, or we have this hybrid system that we have now, and they have the choice
to go either to take part in transitional justice or stay outside of it. These are probably the main
ways of dealing with this. So now just some, and I might not have time to go through all of this,
if you leave them outside of the transitional justice process, of course, it doesn't mean
that therefore they cannot be held accountable, which is why I personally always thought it wasn't
beneficial for them, because if they go, then they get legal certainty, but if they stay outside,
then of course, what we are dealing with here, maybe just to give the context,
I'm just too focused on the legal side, but if you think about, for example, financing,
so we're talking very much about complicity in this context. So we're talking about, for example,
that this is maybe the most well-known case, Chiquita, and the allegations are that they
spend millions and millions of Colombian pesos per month paying both sides, in fact, and they,
of course, use this money to carry out very serious criminal offences. So then the question
is, how do we actually deal with this? But what we do know is these are crimes against humanities
and their involvement in that will not prescribe, it's not statute bar. So therefore, if they don't
go, 30, 40, 50 years later, people can still bring them to court, and this is what's happening in
Argentina at the moment, 40 years after the military dictatorship, there are criminal trials
against various company directors. So that is part of the problem, so therefore, I always thought
it was actually positive for them. Now, including them, then, well, let's maybe not even focus on
the reasons why they are easier to just imagine, but some of the problems is, of course, first of
all, the fierce resistance of these actors, who really have a lot of power in this very fragile
situation. So then the question is, is it really the best way of dealing with this, that you
include them from the outset, when they actually really can spoil the whole process, which they
almost, sorry, can I just have half a minute? Okay. But then also, a big problem is the lack of
clear legal criteria, because we have a lot of experience in thinking about how do we define
the responsibility of the direct perpetrators, those who actually carried out the torture,
the killings, the displacement, etc. But how do we actually define the level of responsibility
of those who gave money? Is it really at the same level? Is it something different?
So there are all sorts of open questions here, and this is why I am still, after all this time
working there, I'm still a bit torn about, so at the moment, my personal lesson is more
that I appreciate the complexities and the problems, because I really think there is a lot
to be said about trying to include them, but at the same time, there is also a lot to be said about
thinking about sequencing and actually leaving them outside, and then thinking about, further
down the line, how to deal with these actors. But what I do think is, and with this I finish,
that it is not an option simply not to do anything and ignore their role. The question has to be,
how do we address it? And Columbia can, I think, tell us a lot, but obviously,
we'll have to wait and see how it develops. Thank you.
