For years, Xi Jinping's control over the PLA was considered one of the foundations of his power. But several recent developments near Beijing are raising new questions. A trusted Xi ally was suddenly removed from one of China's most strategically important cities. A key military unit responsible for protecting the capital has introduced unprecedented transparency measures that weaken traditional patronage networks. State media has revived the language of "collective leadership," a phrase largely absent during the Xi era. And a curious article praising a general who voluntarily gave up power has caught the attention of political observers. Are these isolated events, or signs of a deeper shift inside China's military and political system? Let's take a closer look.
So today I want to walk you through several recent developments that, in my view,
point to the fact that Xi Jinping is losing the PLA to his opponents.
The first two developments center on the city of Baoding, which is located about 90 miles
southwest of Beijing. Now, Baoding has long been a strategically important city for the CCP leader.
It's not only the outer defensive ring of Xi Jinping's signature Xiongan
but also a key gateway protecting Beijing's southern flank. More importantly, one of
CCP's most politically sensitive and strategically important military formations,
the 82nd Group Army, is headquartered there. So let's start with the sudden removal of
Baoding's party chief. His name is Dang Xiaolong. So he is from Fuping County in Shaanxi province.
Now, in today's Chinese political environment, the words Shaanxi Fuping carry special meaning
or significance. They are associated with Xi Jinping's hometown networks,
political patronage, and personal loyalty. Because Fuping is Xi Jinping's ancestral hometown.
So not only this Dang Xiaolong is from Fuping, he also went to Tsinghua University,
the same college as Xi. He has long been regarded as a trusted political ally.
And in some circles, he has even been referred to as Xi Jinping's political godson.
In Chinese, we say Gan Er Zi. So basically, he is someone entrusted with the responsibility
of guarding the strategic city of Baoding. And there's another reason why this Dang Xiaolong's
removal has attracted so much attention. He also served as the first secretary of the party
committee of the Baoding military sub-district. That role placed him within the political structure
overseeing one of the PLA's most sensitive regions. After all, the 82nd Group Army
is headquartered in Baoding. And this is why some believe his position was far more important
than his formal official rank may suggest. However, despite his background, authorities
suddenly announced his removal. First, it was announced in the middle of the night,
as if the authorities couldn't wait. Second, there's no mention of his next move. In CCP's
political vocabulary, officials who are removed are often given a face-saving phrase,
such as he's assigned to another position, without elaborating what it is. This time,
there is no such explanation at all. There's no mention about anything about his reappointment
or reassignment. And even the most intriguing part of his removal is the identity of his
replacement, a man whose name is called Zhao Wenfeng. A view of Zhao Wenfeng's career reveals
a striking pattern. His most significant promotions coincided with the decade during the
time that the late premier Li Keqiang exercised influence over China's economic and development.
This Zhao Wenfeng emerged from the National Development and Reform Commission system
and is widely viewed as a technocrat rather than a member of Xi Jinping's traditional political
camp. So in many ways, he represents the bureaucratic legacy of the State Council
associated with Li Keqiang's era. Now, you know that Li Keqiang was Xi Jinping's premier for 10
years, but the pair didn't see eye to eye. There are widespread rumors that accuse Xi Jinping
of being responsible for Li Keqiang's mysterious death after his retirement.
Observers quickly noticed the implications. The CCP organization department has replaced
Xi Jinping's political godson with a figure who has strong ties to the Li Keqiang era
technocratic system in one of the most strategically sensitive positions. This does
not look like a routine local personnel reshuffle. Instead, it suggests that control over the areas
surrounding Beijing may be undergoing a broader reorganization in the direction that doesn't
favor Xi Jinping. And that brings us to the second development. So let's talk about Baoding.
The reason Baoding matters so much is very simple. The 82nd Group Army is headquartered there.
Now, this 82nd Group Army occupies an extraordinarily sensitive position
because of its proximity to Beijing. Its importance is such that no faction can afford
to allow it to become anyone's private army. Even a small informal network of political loyalties
within such a unit could have profound implications for the balance of power at the
highest levels of the party. The 82nd Group Army traces its lineage to the famous 38th Group Army,
one of the most elite military units in the PLA's history. And when Xi Jinping took over
the regime, his military reforms renamed the 38th to the 82nd. Although the PLA has undergone
repeated reorganizations over the years, this unit continues to occupy a position of exceptional
strategic importance. Its special operations units possess the ability to rapidly secure key areas
around the capital and also in the capital. And one of the examples that we saw was during the
September military parade last year. The 82nd Group Army played an extremely important role
in securing security inside and also around the city. So whoever commands the loyalty of the 82nd
Group Army possesses one of the closest concentrations of hard military power
near China's political center. According to reports in the PLA Daily, a brigade within
the army has introduced a new system requiring full transparency in sensitive administrative
matters. So to Westerners, this may sound like routine bureaucracy. In reality, it's a big deal
because it strikes at the heart of how power networks traditionally operate inside the PLA.
Some of the most important forms of power within the military have involved promotions,
personnel assignments, budgets, and equipment allocations. Who becomes a company commander?
Who receives funding? Who gains access to desired projects? And these decisions often form the
foundation of this patronage networks. Over time, such networks can evolve into personal
political factions. Let's look at what the 82nd Group Army is doing. So according to the report,
sensitive decisions such as promotions and appointments now require votes and open ballot
counting on the spot. Sealed votes are opened and read publicly. In addition, the entire process is
recorded on video. As if videotaping the event isn't enough, military discipline supervisors
are onsite monitoring the process and must sign off the voting results in person. And the data
is then transmitted directly to higher level disciplinary authorities. So the above is PLA's
definition of full transparency in sensitive administrative matters.
Think about what that means in practice. Commanders can no longer quietly push through
his preferred candidates. They are created through votes. Commissars have much less room
for behind the scene maneuvering. A phone call from a powerful patron becomes less useful.
Because the entire process is now open and visible, input from rank and file personnel
is formally incorporated in the decision making. In other words, the system is being designed to
weaken the personal influence and strengthen procedural control. And I must say, this is not
a reform that carries a Xi Jinping signature. This is why I do not see this as a routine
anti-corruption campaign. I do not even see it primarily as a disciplinary measure. I see it as
a soft political coup inside the PLA, or at least inside the 82nd Group Army. Because this represents
a break from a system in which promotions were often tied to personal preference and political
loyalty, which are hallmarks of Xi Jinping's management style. And this new transparent
process removes much of the space for favoritism to operate. When you put this development together
with the sudden removal of Bao Ding's party secretary, a very interesting picture begins
to emerge. The political gatekeeper outside Beijing, I should say the political and the
military gatekeeper outside Beijing, is replaced. At the same time, one of the most strategically
sensitive military formations surrounding the capital begins implementing procedures designed
to weaken the informal loyalty networks that Xi Jinping has been trying hard to build.
So we may be witnessing a broader effort to reshape who ultimately controls the elite forces
protecting Zhongnanhai and protecting Beijing. Perhaps even more intriguing is the sudden
shift in official messaging. So on May 27th, Xinhua reported that the Central Military Commission
had issued a new document titled, Several Measures on Strengthening the Education,
Management, and Supervision of Senior Military Officers. So some people may argue that, well,
doesn't this reflect Xi Jinping's continuing efforts to tighten discipline within the PLA?
Some people may argue, well, it's a sign that Xi Jinping is disciplining his generals.
After all, the document was issued under the authority of the CMC, Central Military Commission,
and he is the chairman of the CMC. But when you look more closely, both the Xinhua report
and the subsequent PLA daily commentary repeatedly emphasized one particular phrase.
It's called strengthening the collective leadership of party committee. Now for most people,
that phrase may not sound remarkable, but for a long time observer of CCP politics like myself,
it immediately raises eyebrows. Because during Xi Jinping's era, especially over the last decade,
the dominant political language inside the military has always revolved around
one concept. It's called the chairman's responsibility system of the Central
Military Commission. In plain English, that means authority ultimately flows upward to the chairman
or to a single decision maker, the chairman, aka Xi Jinping. So the phrase collective leadership,
leadership of party committee, is something not associated with Xi Jinping. He never uses that
expression because it was created during the Deng Xiaoping era and is a terminology suggesting
party elders legitimate role in political process. It's a code name that many people believe to mean
the central committee's coordination and decision making body, the very organization that was
created last June. So in this round of coverage, the reports made no reference to the CMC chairman
responsibility system, but suddenly dropped the phrase collective leadership. So that term
has returned to center stage. That change is difficult to ignore. It's not helping those
who believe Xi Jinping is still controlling the PLA at all, in my opinion. Please note,
this is not a random PLA editorial that somebody just pushed. This is the formal announcement,
or this is the announcement, the Xinhua announcement, and then the PLA announcement
of a formal internal PLA procedure and rules. So the language here really matters.
The only remaining CMC member, the second vice chairman of CMC, the newly promoted
PLA's discipline chief, Zhang Shengming, he convened what was officially called a meeting
on studying Xi Jinping's military thought. That sounds like yet another political loyalty session.
Right? On the surface, it looks like, well, it's something to glorify Xi Jinping's
military strategic thinking in military affairs. But look closely at who attended.
The room was not filled with theater commanders, service chiefs, or group army commanders. Instead,
it was dominated by discipline inspectors, political work officials, personnel officers,
and carters responsible for reviewing records and conducting investigations. Almost all of the
military's top operational commanders were absent. Only one deputy level commander was in attendance.
So that raises an interesting possibility. So this meeting titled studying Xi Jinping's
military thought was not getting the attention of the PLA's or CCP's military chiefs. It's not
getting the attention of their frontline commanders. It has become more or less a
political study session for the PLA's political staff. Now there's another highly intriguing
development that received not enough attention. On the same day of that editorial, which is May
28th, state media suddenly gave prominent coverage to an old general. His name is Zhu Rui,
the founding commander of the PLA artillery force or the artillery unit. And he was the highest
ranking military officer killed during the Chinese Civil War. But he's best known for
stepping down from a key military role into a teaching job, into a teaching position. So what
was striking was not the discussion of his battlefield achievements. Instead, the focus
was on something else entirely. This general's willingness to give up power and step aside when
necessary. And that's what makes this coverage so interesting. Because the real message was not
about military history. It was about political behavior. The subtext seemed remarkably clear.
Know when to step aside. Retire voluntarily. Give up power gracefully. Leave with dignity
while you still can. And in that sense, the article felt less like historical education
and more like political signaling, almost a form of psychological persuasion. Transfer authority
voluntarily, and perhaps you can preserve your legacy and dignity. So the removal of a Xi Jinping
loyalist in Baoding, the full transparency of a key PLA unit guarding Beijing, the renewed emphasis
on collective leadership, and the signal of a leader's voluntary stepping down. Taken together,
all of these point toward an increasingly sensitive question. Is Xi Jinping still controlling the
military?