China’s debt problem may be far worse than Beijing officially admits. In this deep-dive analysis, we break down China’s hidden debt system — from LGFVs and local government borrowing to policy banks, pension liabilities, Central Huijin, and the collapse of the land-finance model. Why did local debt surpass central government debt? Why did Beijing’s “front door, back door” reforms fail? And could China’s real debt burden already exceed 170%–180% of GDP — or even far higher if the economy itself has been overstated? Let’s untangle the real size of China’s hidden debt problem.
Hello everyone, welcome back.
Welcome to Ladies Road Talk.
Well, people have been asking me to do more programs
about China's economy.
And one of the biggest issues hanging over the country
is the debt problem.
If there's one word that can describe China's debt problem,
it is obscurity.
Because no one truly knows how much debt the country has.
We can only guesstimate.
And that ambiguity is not accidental.
It's by design.
The CCP's financial system deliberately blurs the lines
between central and local government liabilities,
between public and corporate debt,
and between official obligations and hidden guarantees.
On top of that, corruption, political incentives,
and years of massaged economic data
have made it almost impossible to quantify the real scale
of China's debt burden.
So tonight I'm going to be very ambitious
and trying to untangle the true size
of the CCP's debt problem.
So for those of you who love numbers,
tonight you're in for a data feast.
All right, so here's the interesting part.
Even though nobody can agree on the exact number,
almost everyone agrees on one thing,
China's debt has exploded.
And according to a recent report
by a Canadian research firm called Visual Capitalist,
China's government debt surpassed that of the European Union
for the first time in 2025,
reaching roughly 18.7 trillion US dollars.
And over the past 17 years,
China's government debt expanded
by approximately 15.6 times.
For comparison, US government debt grew
about 3.4 times over the same period.
So China's debt problem isn't just the size,
but also the speed of getting there.
And yet Beijing has consistently insisted
that China's debt risks remain, in its word,
generally safe and controllable.
According to Beijing's own published numbers,
by the end of 2025, China's official government debt
stood at roughly 96 trillion yuan.
For this discussion, I'm going to use yuan
just for simplicity.
I have not converted anything to US dollars.
Everything is relative.
So we're going to use yuan for this discussion.
It's 96 trillion.
41 of it is central government debt.
And then roughly 55 trillion is local government debt.
Now, China's GDP last year was 140 trillion.
And so using these official numbers,
we arrive at a debt-to-GDP ratio at roughly 68.5%.
Now, at first glance, it appears low,
because when you compare that to the rest of the world,
to the G20 countries,
and this is based on an IMF report released last year,
the average government debt ratio among G20 countries
was about 118%.
And then the average among G7 countries rose to 123.
And the US has a debt-to-GDP ratio at 125.
So officially, China appears to be in much better shape
than most major economies.
But this is where things become misleading,
because those numbers mainly reflect explicit,
officially recognized debt.
What they do not fully capture
are the enormous contingent liabilities
or hidden obligations.
Embedded throughout China's systems,
there is buckets of debts backed by the government,
but look like corporate debts,
such as local government financing vehicles,
or LGFVs, state-backed institutions,
policy bank loans, pension obligations,
and other quasi-government entities,
for which Beijing ultimately bears responsibility.
And once those hidden liabilities
are added back to the picture,
China's debt story begins to look very different.
And I'm gonna say, I'm gonna give you a pre-warning.
It's over 300%.
Okay, before we get to that part,
let's go through the hidden debts one by one.
So let's talk about the central government debt first.
Officially, treasury bonds are the core component
of China's central government debt,
but they're not the whole picture.
Broadly speaking, central government borrowing
falls into two categories.
The first category consists of debts
formerly incorporated into the state budget system,
and they're mainly treasury bonds
repaid through central fiscal funds,
loans from international financial institutions,
and loans from foreign governments.
And by the end of 2025,
China's outstanding treasury bonds,
or this bucket, is roughly 41 trillion,
and that's what this 41 trillion at the top is.
But there is also a second category
that's not listed in the fiscal budget,
and these are liabilities
that may not formally appear within the budget,
but they're still tied
to the central government's responsibility.
So examples include foreign debts
owed by central government departments
and affiliated institutions or agencies,
as well as borrowing linked
to major national infrastructure projects,
such as the South to North Water Diversion Project,
but the problem is that Beijing
has never clearly disclosed
the full scale of this category,
so it's difficult to quantify that,
but some people have done their due diligence,
and what they found is that
according to the national audit results on government debt,
officially known as announcement number 32,
and this document is from 2013,
it was more than 12 years ago,
and that document stated that by the end of 2012,
the central government carried
approximately 9.4 trillion yuan in debt obligations,
requiring repayment of that roughly 7.76 trillion yuan
consisted of treasury bond debt.
So in other words, if you do the math,
about 82% of central government debt at the time
existed in the form of treasury bonds.
So if we assume that this ratio
remained broadly similar through 2025,
now we can use the current treasury bond balance
to estimate the central government's
broader official debt burden.
So, well, yeah, I already showed you that.
So here's the math.
So in 2013, 82.2% of central government's debt
existed in treasury bonds.
So if we apply that to the 41% total treasury bonds in 2025,
you get 50 trillion,
and that's basically the broader,
it's an estimated broader central government debt, right?
And that's 50 by the end of 2025.
So the difference is 9 trillion, right?
The difference between the 41 and the 50 is 9 trillion.
And this 9 trillion, according to this methodology,
is tied to central government agency
or debts affiliated with the central government agencies
or those state-sponsored infrastructure projects.
So, and this bring us, keep in mind this 9 trillion,
okay, we'll come back to it later.
And this brings us to another important issue.
Most people have heard about hidden local government debt,
especially LGFVs, but far fewer people realize that
Beijing's central government itself
also carries enormous amounts of hidden or contingent debt.
And the 9 trillion that we just calculated
is only one piece of that.
So now let's talk about
the central government's hidden debt.
CCP has never publicly provided a detailed breakdown
of their contingent liabilities.
So there was an estimate done in 2015,
that was 10 years ago,
that estimated that the central government's hidden debt
was approximately 8.4 trillion yuan.
And that estimate was made more than a decade ago.
And today the real number is almost certainly much higher.
So let's go through them one by one.
There are several major categories.
The first one is called policy bank financial bonds.
Here we have, so these three banks,
these three institutions rely heavily
on bond insurance for funding.
Their bonds are approved by the state council
and distributed throughout China's
state-controlled financial system
under guidance from the central bank.
These policy bank bonds are often described
as secondary sovereign bonds or quasi-sovereign debt.
But unlike, here's the key point, okay?
Unlike formal government debt,
their insurance is not constrained
by official government debt ceilings.
So in practice, they function as a hidden financing channel
for the central government.
And Beijing has increasingly relied
on this mechanism over time.
In 2025, insurance of policy bank bonds
was up nearly 25% from the previous year.
By the end of 2025,
outstanding policy bank bond balances
had exceeded 28 trillion yuan.
And nearly all of those bonds are domestically held.
Foreign institutions reportedly hold
around only 700 billion yuan.
That's roughly 2.5% of the total.
It's very small.
And this is precisely why many people view policy bank debt
as part of China's broader hidden sovereign debt structure.
Okay, so please earmark another roughly 28 trillion yuan
in contingent central government liabilities.
Okay, let's move on.
Let's talk about this company.
It's called Central Huijin Investment Limited.
Now, this company is actually one of the most important
and least understood institutions
inside China's financial system.
On paper, it's an investment company,
but in reality, it functions more
like the CCP's financial holding company,
a state rescue vehicle and a strategic control mechanism
over China's banking and financial system.
It was established in 2003
during China's banking crisis era.
At the time, China's major state-owned banks
were drowning in bad loans
after years of politically directed lending.
Beijing needed a mechanism to recapitalize
and restructure the banking system
without formally placing those losses
directly onto the Ministry of Finance balance sheet.
So the government created this company.
Initially, it was funded
using China's foreign exchange reserves
through the People's Bank of China.
Later, it became a subsidiary of China Investment Corporation
which is China's sovereign wealth fund.
But unlike a traditional sovereign wealth fund,
Huijin's primary mission is domestic financial control.
It's not foreign investment.
So today, this company is a major shareholder
in many of China's most important financial institutions.
In many ways, it operates almost like
a quasi-central bank financial vehicle
and giving Beijing a mechanism
to influence banks and financial markets
through ownership structure
rather than direct administrative orders.
And this is why Huijin matters so much
when discussing China's debt problem.
Officially, many of its liabilities
do not appear as sovereign debt,
but politically, markets assume
Beijing stands fully behind it.
And this company began issuing bonds in 2010
and such insurance has since become increasingly routine.
Now, there's no clear disclosed official figure
for the company's total outstanding bond balance.
So there's no official number,
but based on interbank bond market patterns
and institutional issuance history
and available financial disclosures,
a rough estimate put
central Huijin's outstanding bond balance
at somewhere between 300 billion and 800 billion yuan.
And it could also potentially approach 1 trillion yuan.
So comparatively speaking, it's not big,
but it's still one piece of the puzzle.
And then there's this piece,
China State Railroad Group.
Now, the China Railway, sorry,
construction bonds is another major category
of quasi-sovereign debt.
These bonds were first issued in September, 1995.
So they were issued by China State Railway Group
rather than the Ministry of Finance.
The railway system remains fully state-owned
and continue to enjoy implicit government backing.
As a result, these liabilities are viewed
as part of China's broader hidden fiscal burden.
Now, at one point in 2015,
China Railway Corporation's debt
was estimated at 4.1 trillion yuan.
That was in 2015, 10 years ago.
But what we've seen is in the following decade,
China continued aggressively expanding
its high-speed rail network and infrastructure
including many routes that don't generate much revenue.
So given that continued expansion,
the railway system's total liabilities today
are likely substantially higher.
Again, it's an estimate or guesstimate.
It's somewhere between 7 to 9 trillion yuan.
It can go higher,
but this is based on the 4.1 outstanding balance
that was in 2015.
So a conservative estimate puts it at seven,
between seven to nine trillion.
So when we add everything together,
the picture becomes much larger
than Beijing's official numbers suggest.
I'm talking about the central government, right?
So the hidden central government debt,
here you have the agency debt of nine trillion.
You have the policy bank's bond, 28 trillion.
You have central Huijin bonds up to one trillion,
and then you have the railway system between seven to nine.
And there might be other quasi-sovereign financing structures
that we have omitted here.
This is still not the most dangerous part
of China's debt problem
because compared to the central government,
local governments are far more financially fragile
and far more dependent on borrowing.
So that bring us to the next player of China's debt crisis,
the local government debt.
By the end of 2025,
China's official local government debt
reached about 55, 54.8 trillion.
I just run it off to, what's this number?
55 trillion, yeah, 41 and 55.
Now, that was not accidental.
Oh, if you look at the,
almost 99% or 98% of this 55 trillion
are all formally issued local government bonds.
And this is the result after Beijing
began tightening oversight around 2011
through repeated debt audits.
And then in 2015,
the authorities formally introduced a quota management system
for local government borrowing
and began converting older hidden liabilities
to standardized municipal bonds.
So at least on paper,
China's official local government debt today
appears relatively transparent and tightly regulated.
But a more important point is
in terms of the explicit debts,
China's local government debt
is actually larger than central government debt.
And this happened, I think, in 2010.
So if you look at the numbers, right?
So by the end of 2025,
central government debt accounted for
roughly 43% of the total official government debt,
while local government accounted for 57%,
like 55 and 41.
So local government debt
is greater than central government,
and that's highly unusual.
In most major economies,
central government debt typically makes up
the majority of total government debt
because central governments
possess greater fiscal flexibility,
lower borrowing costs, and greater policy tools.
So China is different.
China has the opposite problem.
Local government is more in debt than the central government
and this is attributable
to the 1994 tax sharing reform
that I told you about in my last program
talking about China's economy.
When was that?
April the 30th.
Remember I told you that
as a result of the 1994 tax sharing reform,
there's a distorted fiscal relationship
between the central and the local governments.
When Beijing centralized revenue,
while local governments retain enormous share
of spending responsibilities.
Now that imbalance also applies to debts.
So local governments are pushed
to be ever dependent on borrowing,
land sales, and LGFVs,
while the central government enjoys a revenue surplus
and a smaller fiscal liability.
And this is the source of the real problem.
This distorted fiscal relationship
between central government and local government,
in my opinion, is the source of China's debt problem.
And this is why this problem will not go away.
It cannot be fixed.
So now let's talk about the real problem,
the local government's hidden debt.
Now in November, 2024,
China's Ministry of Finance announced that
the nationwide balance of local government's hidden debt
stood at only 14.3 trillion yuan at the end of 2023.
That number was widely questioned.
Nobody believed it was so low.
It was only, what, 14 trillion.
Now this January, January 28th,
IMF released a report
estimating that debt tied to LGFVs,
local government financing vehicles,
which is the core component
of China's hidden local government debt,
had already reached approximately 66 trillion yuan in 2024.
And by 2025, that number was approaching 72 trillion yuan.
So here's a question for you.
Why is there such a massive gap
between China's 14 trillion and IMF's 72 trillion?
Or you could say 66 trillion if I compare Apple to Apple.
The answer explains the fundamental causes
of China's debt problem.
According to China's Ministry of Finance,
purely commercial loans taken on by LGFVs
should not be counted as government debt.
The authorities recognize only those liabilities
for which local governments
have explicitly promised repayment.
But the IMF takes a fundamentally different approach.
The IMF argues that many LGFVs invest heavily
in low-return public infrastructure projects
such as highway, high-speed rails,
and these projects have cash flows
that are so low
that they cannot cover their debt obligations realistically.
In other words, these debts function economically
as an extension of government fiscal deficits.
So that's why IMF believes
they should be incorporated
into the broader government balance sheet.
Excuse me.
So you see, Beijing and IMF have different definitions
on what government debt and corporate debt are.
And honestly, the CCP often treats government liabilities
as corporate obligations
in order to keep official debt figures artificially low.
And that blurred boundary
between state finance and corporate finance
is one of the defining characteristics
of China's economic problem or debt problem
because this ambiguity is causing a lot of problem
because there's no accountability.
Basically, it's government debt,
but the government said,
well, it's not mine, it's corporate debt.
But who's the corporate?
The corporate is owned by the government.
You see?
Now, meanwhile, Goldman Sachs produced even higher estimates.
It estimated that China's hidden local government debt
may have primarily tied to LGFVs,
might have reached approximately 91 trillion yuan.
So in essence, local governments can be as high
as 55 trillion front door,
or explicit debt,
plus 91 trillion back door, or hidden debt,
for a total of 146 trillion yuan.
Now, the front door and back door terminologies
are not what I came up with.
They were actually created by Beijing.
It came during 2014,
the authorities revised China's budget law
and promoted what they called opening the front door
while blocking the back door.
So the front door meant formally allowing local governments
to issue legal municipal bonds transparently.
So that's what the 55 trillion
local government bonds were.
And then the back door referred to the illegal
or off-balance sheet borrowing channels, such as LGFVs.
So Beijing tried to shut down the back door debts
by allowing front door debts,
but it didn't happen that way.
Because the problem is that once the back door was opened
in China, in communist China, it can never close.
In other words, the front door was opened,
but the back door never truly closed.
And the debt problem got out of control
through both the front and back doors at the local levels.
All right, so I think I explained this
because the local government debts is something
that everyone, I mean, we're all aware,
but I don't think a lot of people could explain,
at least I haven't seen a lot of people on YouTube
explaining how it came to be.
All right, let's talk about another bucket,
pension liabilities, right?
This is another hidden layer.
And it's also unique to China.
This issue is extraordinarily complex
because it sits in the gray zone
between the local and central government.
It's not clear whose bucket it is.
Legally and administratively,
most pension obligations
remain local government responsibilities.
But economically and politically,
a growing portion is increasingly becoming
an implicit central government liability.
You see how everything is twisted
in CCP's financial systems.
So formally speaking, local governments
still administer and fund much of the pension system.
But because many provinces
are already under severe fiscal strain,
pension payments increasingly depend on transfer payments
and support from the central government.
So in practice, Beijing is gradually becoming
the ultimate guarantor of pension stability.
And then estimating China's pension liabilities
is extremely difficult because Beijing
does not publish a complete long-term
actuarial balance sheet for the system.
And the system itself was never fully funded.
For many years, contributions from current workers
were used primarily to pay existing retirees
rather than being fully deposited
into individual retirement accounts.
And this created massive so-called empty accounts.
There are pension promises that existed on paper
but were not backed by real assets.
And as early as 2015, again,
everything that we could reference was 2015
because there was still some kind of
financial transparencies back then.
Now you can't find anything.
All right, so back in 2015, estimates suggested
that these empty urban pension accounts,
or there's a shortfall of 4.26 trillion yuan at the time,
much, not officially, much of the liability
may sit outside the sovereign balance sheet.
But if the government is ultimately expected
to absorb the burden, then economically,
it behaves like contingent sovereign debt.
So again, what is that number now, right?
If it was 4 trillion 10 years ago or 11 years ago,
what is that number now?
Now, if you look at China,
China's entering an era of rapid aging,
slower economic growth, shrinking labor supply,
and weakening local government finances.
So that liability may fall somewhere in the range
of 15 to 30 trillion yuan
because of China's fast aging population
and the massive loss of young workforces.
So let's put everything together
and now let's add everything up.
So you have central government debt at 96.
You add everything in,
and this is, I think, what I came up with.
What did I do?
Okay, so this is hidden central government debt,
and this is hidden local government debt, right?
So you have LGFVs that are estimated
between 72 to 91 trillion yuan,
and then you have pension liabilities
that are estimated between 15 to 30 trillion.
So if you add everything up,
China's total debt is between 226 trillion
to 264 trillion because you have 132
to 168 trillion hidden debts
between the local and central governments.
Those are not shown in the previous calculation
of debt to GDP ratio.
So if we adjusted the debt to show the fully loaded debt,
then you have the debt to GDP ratio at 170 to 180%,
assuming China's GDP is 140 trillion.
Now, so that has already exceeded
that of the US and the G20 and the G7 countries, right?
Now, those of you who have followed my channel
for several years already know
that I personally do not believe
China's GDP figures are entirely true.
I believe China has been overstating
its real economic growth for a long time.
And I once did a program that estimated China's real GDP.
It's somewhere between, it's half, half of what it is.
So if China's actual GDP is significantly lower
than officially reported,
then the debt to GDP ratio will be far more alarming.
So for example, if we assume
that China's real effective GDP
is only half of the official number,
then the country's debt to GDP ratio
is gonna double at 340 to 360%,
because the denominator is smaller.
And if that's even remotely close to reality,
then China's debt problem may be far larger
than most people currently realize.
That, my friends,
may be the real answer to China's debt problem.
So let me summarize.
In the end, China's debt problem
is not just about how much money was borrowed.
It's about how the entire system was structured.
Over the past three decades,
Beijing built a massive economic machine
powered by land sales, infrastructure expansion,
local government borrowing, state-backed financing vehicles,
and layers and layers of hidden liabilities.
Some debts sit on official balance sheets.
Others are buried inside LGFVs, policy banks,
railway systems, pension obligations,
and quasi-government institutions
like the Central Huijin Investment Company.
Some are called government debt.
Others are labeled corporate debt.
Some are explicit.
Others are merely contingent.
But economically, many of them ultimately point back
to the same place, the CCP state.
And that is what makes China's debt structure
so complicated and potentially so dangerous.
Because once the lines between government
and corporate liabilities,
public finance and state-directed investment,
central and local responsibilities all become very blurred,
it becomes increasingly difficult to know
where the real risks actually sit.
That's why I said nobody can actually tell
how bad the problem is.
So this is my very ambitious attempt
to quantify the problem by being overly,
by oversimplifying things.
But I just want to illustrate how distorted the system is
and potentially how big the problem can be.
I think I just tried to illustrate a point.
And the numbers only serve that purpose, right?
Numbers are only a tool.
They exist to tell a story.
Otherwise, numbers are meaningless.
All right, that's what I have for you.
I said, those of you who love numbers,
you're in for a data feast.
Have I lost people?
If you are a financial analyst,
you would enjoy today's talk.
And Lei was a financial analyst.
All right, I rest my case.
Let's see what people have to say.
All right, let me take a sip of water.
Okay, all right, no questions.
I think I put everyone to sleep already
with all the numbers.
No?
Okay, we have Mao Jing pork today.
What happened to Mao Jing pig?
Mao Jing pork, wow, oh my.
So tomorrow we will have Mao Jing bacon.
We had Mao Jing pig, now we have Mao Jing pork.
Tomorrow we have Mao Jing bacon.
Anyway, all right, let's see, questions, comments?
All right, here's a question
from Lana Lombardo.
At the summit, did Xi Jinping's daughter
serve as a translator for Trump Xi in very private meeting?
I have not heard anything about that private meeting.
So I don't know if she showed up.
No, there's no follow-up on that, yeah.
I am as curious as you are to find out,
but I have not heard anything.
Oh, Mao Jing pork awarded me.
So if you carry the two,
it sounds like the CCP has squandered China's rise.
If you carry the two, what do you mean if I carry the two?
If I carry the two, which two?
Am I missing something?
What do you mean carry the two?
Well, you have to give me another super sticker
for me to answer your question,
but thank you for your support.
All right, I enjoy the humor.
Oh, here's another one.
One could argue that the source of their debt problem
is an uneducated economist
with a master's in nepotism planning the economy.
Actually, I wouldn't say they're uneducated economists.
They have tons of well-educated,
Western-educated economists in their system,
but they wanted their economy to be that way.
They want to have a hybrid of state-controlled,
you know, a quasi-state-controlled
and a quasi-market economy,
because if you have an absolute state economy,
then you will be poor.
You have no money to embezzle, right?
And if you have a pure market economy,
you cannot control the distribution
because the market will control the distribution.
So the fact that China's economic system
is a half state-controlled and a half market economy
gives those at the very top of the system
the freedom to make money
and then the power to control the distribution, you see?
So they get the best of both worlds.
So don't think that this distorted relationship
is the result of their ignorance
or some uneducated economist.
It's by design.
They want to take advantage of both worlds.
If they adopt 100% market economy, they will be poor.
There'll be no money for anyone.
So they allowed some market mechanism
so that the economy can flourish,
so there's money to be made.
And then they also retained state economy
or mechanisms to control distribution
so that they can award themselves
and people in their circle,
in their circles, the bulk of the wealth, right?
They control, because in a pure market economy,
the market controls distribution,
but then they control the distribution.
So it's the best of both worlds.
That's my answer.
All right.
So I think it was purely wishful thinking
for the West to think that by introducing market economy
to communist China,
that they're gonna eventually become a market economy
or embrace universal values and rule of law.
No.
They only incorporated or welcomed
or introduced or accepted aspects of the market economy
that benefit themselves, yeah,
while retaining the state control mechanism.
Everything is to benefit themselves and their circles, so.
Okay.
Ximen Qing.
Wow, Ximen Qing.
Lei, you look like you stepped right out
of a Jiangnan water town today.
Absolutely elegant and graceful.
Gorgeous style to match the brilliant mind.
Well, people commented
that this is a QR code inspired top.
I didn't realize that,
but I thought that it's good.
It's quite fitting for today's talk,
wearing a QR coding inspired top.
Anyways, oh, thank you very much for the compliment.
Do I feel like coming out of a Jiangnan water town today?
Jiangnan Shuicheng.
Oh, I'm from Shanghai, so I guess I am from Jiangnan.
All right, well, thank you very much for the compliment,
Ximen Qing.
All right, Mao Jin Pork.
It's real easy, folks.
CCP lies about everything.
That's right.
Well said.
All right, Lei.
Brett Bayer, line one,
wants to discuss driverless cars.
Brett Bayer, line one,
wants to discuss driverless cars.
Okay, all right.
But not the Chinese ones.
I wouldn't trust the Chinese-made driverless cars.
Jeff Stockwell.
Lei, if the state gives itself a loan,
can it forgive that loan?
Of course it can, but it's very interesting
because one thing I learned from today's research
is the CCP has, you know,
on the surface, everything looks fine,
but you would, I mean, the whole,
when I find out how the CCP set up this company
called Central Huijin Investment,
it set up an investment company,
solve a financial crisis,
and it's almost like a quasi-central bank,
but it's not central bank.
It's a private bank.
So it's very interesting how the CCP
plays with these financial instruments
on the public side and on the private side,
interchangeably, to hide its financial liabilities
or hide its financial crisis.
So of course it wants to forgive the loan,
but it's not gonna do it so
fragrantly,
flagrantly.
What am I saying?
Fragrantly.
Flagrantly, yeah.
So that's why it's not so easy to find out.
Yeah.
Someone said,
I saw the floods from Jason Teddy.
Are they operating out of P.O. Box?
Their banks?
Anyone?
The nation overseas?
The internet connection, the phone lines are so,
the power lines, yeah.
Yeah, the flooding.
China's starting flood season now.
Yeah, I saw some of the,
I saw some of the news.
And then there are two other pieces of news
came out of China.
One is poisoning.
The local water company in the city
somehow had,
has fouled water,
water that smells foul
coming out of water faucet.
And hundreds of thousands of people got sick.
And this happened in one city.
And people don't know what has happened.
And then you have,
I think it's,
I think it's
the result of local government fiscal crisis.
When local governments are running out of money,
when they don't pay people,
then people don't do their jobs.
And then the next thing we see is exactly these, right?
Poisonous water coming out of water faucet,
buildings collapsing, roads collapsing,
bridges collapsing.
So it's scary.
Yeah.
I think it's related to local government fiscal crisis.
All right.
Mao Jing pork.
Jing pig was put down by YouTube and pinks,
and the pinks,
this is my latest creation,
was put down by YouTube and pinks,
little pinks.
Okay.
There are a lot of AI empowered pinks lately.
Yeah.
I was told.
Oh yeah.
Someone asked me about the Ebola outbreak
and furry boss.
Do you know about the risk
that the Chinese workers in mining,
in DRC mining post as Ebola carrier
back to China and the rest of the world?
Yes.
Yeah.
There are tens of thousands of Chinese miner
or workers working in those mines in Africa.
And they pose a great health risk
as they travel between China and Africa
and also other parts of the world.
Yeah.
So China is at risk.
Yeah.
Okay.
Jack Jensen.
Thank you, Jack, Coffee and Paul.
In poker, the house takes a percentage age of the chips
in playing for their service.
It's called the rake.
What's the rake for the CCP?
The missing funds ratio.
I don't play poker.
So what's the rake for the CCP?
The missing funds ratio.
Please ask me because yeah,
I don't play poker.
So I don't know the analogy.
So what percentage of missing funds ratio
that the CCP hides?
Are you talking about some funds the CCP hides for itself?
Or are you talking about,
I'm not quite sure if I understand the missing funds ratio.
What does that mean?
So Robert Short.
Like China and the CCP is doomed.
There's no way to recover without a great reset.
They needed a department of government corruption
and efficiency.
Does China know what an audit is?
China knows what an audit is,
but China right now is incapable of carrying out an audit.
Yeah, because people's mindset has been corrupt.
It's extremely sad to see how many of the people
coming out of mainland China,
they do not, I mean, everything is in a gray area.
They don't see things.
There are things that are black and white,
but in China, everything is in a gray area.
So they're not trained to think that it's black or white.
There's things you cannot do.
So that's why you probably can't even find the people
to do a proper audit because they can't follow procedures.
They think everything is subject to interpretation
and the boss's opinion.
So everything is in a gray area.
So that's why they can't, in theory, you can have an audit,
but in practice, people are not able,
capable of carrying out a real audit.
So that's very sad.
That's my observation.
Okay, all right.
Oh, here's Xi Menqing again.
Does China have an equivalent to the US FDA?
No.
Yeah, it might, but it doesn't do anything.
Look at all the poisonous food people are suffering from.
Didn't the one city that sells Yang Mei,
I don't know what you call that.
It's a kind of fruit that's very popular in China.
And they sell that overseas as well.
Sometimes you see them in Chinese market locally here.
The farmers, they just treat the fruit
with some kind of cancer-causing chemicals
to preserve it longer, to preserve the shelf life.
But it's highly poisonous.
And they do that kind of thing.
Jeremy Thomas,
Lei, with all this data and knowing the CCP has to be aware,
why do they still refuse to lower the offshore exchange rates?
You mean the Chinese exchange rate is going,
yeah, the Chinese yuan is getting more expensive?
It could be for political reason.
I mean, the yuan being more expensive
is not good for China's exports.
But it's good for China's imports.
And it's also good for the political image.
And for the regime, economic reasons are never their priority
but political and geopolitical issues or concerns
are always the top priority.
So, yeah.
I haven't really looked deep into that.
So, all right.
Hopefully we could address that at some point.
All right.
Okay, I think I reached the bottom.
I need to just take one more question
and then that will be it.
Let me see, what question?
D. Glass, 2008.
Okay.
Someone said, in terms of sustainability
of the CCP in China,
how does the financial balance sheet
affect the future of China?
Will China not be able to function
much longer than the CCP?
Well, China and CCP are two different concepts, right?
China as a country will stay
because the country will be there.
People will be there.
The CCP is just a political party.
It's just like the United States will always stay
but the political party may alternate, right?
I mean, they...
So, I think when CCP becomes history,
China will be there.
Chinese people will have a better future.
So, I think those are two separate concepts
and they don't stand for the same thing.
Okay, all right.
That's all for tonight.
I thank you very much for joining
and I'll see you this weekend.
Okay, bye.