LIVE: House Administration Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Election Security

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The Committee on House Administration's Subcommittee on Elections holds a hearing at 2 p.m. ET on May 20 titled “Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security.”
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis congressional hearing examines the critical need to strengthen U.S. election security through enhanced funding, modernized technical standards, and improved physical protections. Experts emphasize the role of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in providing guidelines and training to combat evolving cybersecurity threats and ensure the safety of election officials.
The title of today's hearing is Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security.
I note that a quorum is present. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time.
Also, without objection, the hearing record will remain open for five legislative days,
so members may submit any materials they wish to be included therein. Thank you,
Ranking Member Sewell, members of the committee, and our witnesses for participating in today's
hearing. Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the different ways that states
can strengthen election security. The best practices that we'll cover today include
enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity. Addressing potential vulnerabilities
improves voter experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience strengthens the
integrity of our election systems because it prevents an issue before it arises. I look
forward to discussing best practices for securing elections and how Congress can be supporting those
efforts. I'd first like to highlight the different resources the federal government makes available
to elections administrators for election security. The resources include federal grants,
testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance Commission. One great example is the
EAC's Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers voluntary
security standards and evaluations for non-voting systems like poll books, election day reporting
systems, or other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a baseline certification for new voting systems
to evaluate functionality, accessibility, and security. There's also great work that many states
and localities are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against threats to their
elections. For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida hosted a cyber tabletop exercise
with county supervisors of elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize responses to
potential threats to election cybersecurity. To quickly disseminate information about cyber
threats, North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach which allows agencies, cities, counties,
and localities to have access to the same statewide system. In North Carolina, the National Guard and
State Emergency Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond to cyber
threats. To respond to physical threats, several states have implemented common-sense integrity
measures like tamper seals for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at polling
locations. What's great about these physical security upgrades is that HAVA grants can be
used for this exact purpose. I am very interested in hearing more about how these grants are
administered and what the results of past grants have been in states across America. Another
important measure that increases voter experience and voter confidence is access for election
observers. The Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff to serve as election
observers for U.S. House races and ensure elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and
individual candidates also deploy observers because their presence at polling places
builds trust with voters and allows for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties.
While no two states administer their elections the exact same way, one thing should be universal.
Election officials must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure elections.
They should consider every factor to minimize security risks. By implementing strong risk
management approaches, they not only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and
transparency. And when voters feel confident in elections, turnout increases. That's a good thing
for our democracy. The best practices we'll discuss today can help every state improve their election
security efforts. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and I look forward to our
conversation. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Sewell for an opening statement.
Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are
gathered here today for your testimony. As Ranking Member of the Election Subcommittee,
I take very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our constituents and to the
to ensure that our elections are fair and secure. Our elections are the foundation of public trust
in self-government. Every American, regardless of race, religion, party, or ideology, deserves
confidence that their votes will be counted accurately and that their election will be
administered fairly. Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an alarming pace.
Voters at home see their right to vote targeted, whether by hostile state legislatures or
really aggressive courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from radical
groups at home and abroad. Moreover, our president and his allies have widely spread debunked
conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed to undermine our collective belief in
democracy. And now the conservative Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Calais
has ignited a five-fire alarm to the voters of this country. As this hearing occurs,
Republican state legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South are frantically
redrawing Jim Crow-era maps that would erase Black political representation at all levels
of government. And as this administration continues to perpetuate the lie that the 2020
presidential election was stolen, voter suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch.
Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer finance slush fund for January 6th
insurrectionists who violently tried to overturn the results of the 2020 election.
I think this is hypocrisy at its highest degree. We are here today doing important work to guarantee
that election workers have the financial resources they need to do their jobs effectively, all while
this president is paying out to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers'
dollars. During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election officials across the country are
being asked to administer elections while Republican state legislatures change the rules
of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our election officials must navigate
these changes while also suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding streams.
In my home state of Alabama, local election administrators and county officials are
responsible for running elections across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and
outdated equipment that must still meet modern security standards. Federal support
through the Help America Vote Act has helped Alabama and other states improve voting systems,
strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election administration. Since Congress passed that act,
billions of dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election administration
improvements. But even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained federal funding
would provide Alabama and other states with much needed assistance to better support county
elections. Congress has the responsibility to act before vulnerabilities become crisis.
The cost of prevention is far lower than the cost of repairing public trust. Our democracy is one of
the most important institutions we have, not just as members of Congress, but as American citizens.
Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in American history with resolve.
As primary elections are currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm elections,
Americans must know that our elections will be fair and secure. Let us stand up for democracy.
Let us stand up for the truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let us provide
every state with the tools, resources, and sustained federal support necessary to protect
the sacred right to vote. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well as
the work that this committee, this important subcommittee, will continue to provide.
I want to thank Chairwoman Lee and yield back to the balance of my time.
Without objection, all other members' opening statements will be made part of the hearing record
if they are submitted to the committee clerk by 5 p.m. today. Today, we have one witness panel.
I will now introduce our witnesses. First, we have Election Assistance Commissioner Chairman
Thomas Hicks. Next, we have EAC Vice Chair Kristi McCormick. We also have the third EAC
Commissioner, Benjamin Hovland. And finally, we have former EAC Commissioner Don Palmer.
Each witness will have five minutes to provide an opening statement. I now recognize Chairman Hicks
for the purpose of giving an opening statement. Thank you, Chairwoman. I ask that my full
statement be accepted into the record. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the election security work of the United States Election Assistance Commission.
As an independent bipartisan agency, the EAC often offers trusted sources for the
grounded in federal law and responsive to the practical realities of state and local
election officials. We appreciate the subcommittee's important oversight
and your close engagement with the EAC. Election officials have been the first line of defense
against escalating security threats and cannot be expected to defend their election systems alone.
These are our neighbors, PTA members, and part of our congregations,
armed not with guns or bullets, but with the law and the Constitution.
Many officials describe their work as increasingly technical and security focused.
Even though they do not have dedicated cybersecurity personnel,
and their budgets have remained stagnant. In recent years, demand for assistance has
grown significantly. Since the establishment of the agency under the Help America Vote Act,
the EAC has engaged with officials from jurisdictions of all sizes to support
ongoing election security work, spanning four core areas, physical security, cybersecurity,
personal security, and contingency management. Election officials work daily to meet the
demands of an increasingly complex security environment. As the public profile of elections
has grown, election infrastructure has become an active target for a broad range of bad actors.
Physical security and cybersecurity measures focus on the protection of infrastructure
in the backbone of election security. These measures include chain of custody, bipartisan
teams, and protections against phishing and other cyber attacks. Election officials across
the country have also faced a growing number of threats to personal safety, including swatting
incidents, suspicious packages, and bomb hoax threats targeting election officials and polling
places, even yesterday with the incident that happened in Pennsylvania. A 2024 national survey
of election officials found a third have experienced harassment in connection to their work,
while half knew of someone who had left the profession due to safety concerns. The EAC
has helped to facilitate a sharing of best practices between state, local, and federal
government partners to improve the overall security of U.S. elections. These efforts
promote safe, secure, accurate, and accessible elections for every voter. While we offer online
and in-person training on topics such as chain of custody, physical security of election facilities,
and contingency planning, for many jurisdictions, especially smaller and rural offices, these
trainings are the only source of nationally recognized nonpartisan election security guidance.
So far, more than 7,000 officials who serve more than 100 million voters have participated
in EAC training. This direct, no-cost support represents about 1.6 million dollars in savings
for local offices. One of our most popular resources is the election scenario test decks,
which provide real-world scenarios to election officials so they can use to participate in
training and evaluate their incident response. To date, more than 5,500 decks have been distributed
nationwide. The common thread through all the work is the human element. Election officials
are the best tool for ensuring elections are secure. While HAVA was enacted with security in mind,
the threat landscape and the presence of malicious actors has grown. Today, state and local officials
are incorporating cybersecurity protections and physical security measures into nearly every
aspect of election administration, even under significant staffing and funding constraints.
For the United States to continue to be a world leader in election best practices,
the federal government must support and invest in our election infrastructure. I have full
faith and confidence in election officials to carry out their duties. The EAC will remain
a dedicated federal partner through 2026 and beyond, so thank you for convening this important
hearing and for your ongoing support. I look forward to continuing our work for the American
people, and I'm here to answer questions you may have. Thank you. I now recognize Vice Chair
McCormick for the purpose of giving an opening statement. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell,
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome the chance to highlight
the ongoing work of the Election Assistance Commission, the EAC, to bolster election
security. This hearing demonstrates your commitment to election integrity across America,
and we thank you for your efforts. The EAC partners with states to support secure,
effective administration of federal elections. Strong election security depends on proven
practices like pre-election testing, auditing, and paper ballots, along with constant vigilance
against evolving threats. Through practical tools, best practices, and direct support,
the EAC helps election administrators protect the systems and processes that sustain public
confidence in our democracy during the 2026 midterms and beyond. HAVA funds help states in
this endeavor by allowing them to invest in security resources that strengthen election
infrastructure. Grant reports show that states use funds to support sustainable security practices
such as network monitoring, endpoint protection, multi-factor authentication, automatic system
backups, physical security, and cybersecurity efforts. Over the past year, the EAC's Election
Technology Office modernized the nation's voting system infrastructure by certifying two voting
systems to the latest voluntary voting system guidelines, VVSG 2.0, and we have five additional
systems under test. Some of the enhanced security requirements of VVSG 2.0 include use of paper
ballots, increased support for auditing, improved cybersecurity requirements like air gap systems,
enhanced access controls, and secure system updates, upgraded physical standards limiting
unauthorized access and what can be connected to the systems, and preventing undetectable
changes in the software that could alter results. VVSG 2.0 also emphasizes transparency, reflecting
what election officials are already doing to secure systems, and managing risk through measures
like tamper evidence seals, two-person integrity, chain of custody procedures, and continuity
planning. The Testing and Certification Division has also drafted VVSG 2.1. This initiative reflects
the agency's commitment to continual improvement of election systems and the modernization of
guidance centered around election integrity. Realizing the value that the VVSG certification
process has provided a value to states, the EAC launched the Election Supporting Technology
Evaluation Program, or ESTEP, in 2023. This started a focused EAC effort to research best
practices around election supporting technologies that are used year-round, such as electronic
poll books, electronic ballot delivery, voter registration, and election night reporting systems.
In May 2024, the EAC launched the nation's first federal voluntary electronic poll book
certification program. The program has already certified three systems with two more systems
under test. The value of this process is proven by the fact that just weeks after certifying
the first electronic poll book system, North Carolina adopted the agency's certification
requirements for its own certification program. As jurisdictions continue to modernize their
equipment, the EAC is analyzing emerging election technologies and translating those findings into
practical guidance, such as list maintenance, grants, and physical security. In all of this,
we strive to be transparent while ensuring the safety of all involved in the electoral process,
from administrators to co-workers to observers. With security top of mind for election officials,
the EAC will continue to move forward in our work to protect the election infrastructure that
supports America's representative democracy. We are a small agency, but one exclusively devoted
to fulfilling the promise of the Help America Vote Act and meeting the evolving needs of election
administration across the country. Thank you for your support of the EAC and your tireless
commitment to state and local election officials and to election integrity. We look forward to
collaborating with you on these and other important matters, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you have. Thank you. I now recognize Commissioner Hovland for the purpose of giving an
opening statement. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important topic
and the work of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. When Congress created the EAC with
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, it charged the agency with a clearinghouse function to look at
best practices across the nation. The EAC has embraced this part of our mission in recent years,
particularly as election administration has evolved. My colleagues and I work with state
and local election officials from all 50 states, five territories, and the District of Columbia.
From that experience, I can confidently say that no one cares more about the security and
integrity of our elections than the Americans who run them. The challenges faced by election
officials today would have seemed nearly unimaginable to the officials serving when
HAVA passed. The reality is that administering elections is harder and more expensive than it
has ever been before. Our state and local election officials do an amazing job with limited resources.
In the years since HAVA, Congress has provided significant funding which helps support essential
aspects of elections, such as secure and accessible voter registration, accurate ballot tabulation,
auditable results, and safe and secure election facilities. Federal funding, however, has covered
less than five percent of the estimated total cost of running elections during that time.
Similarly, the EAC tries to help fill some of those gaps, but is often limited by our level
of funding. Last fiscal year, the EAC saw a 15 percent reduction in agency funding at a time
when demand has only increased. We've been doing our best to respond by sharing best practices,
creating resources that help election officials, and offering technical assistance where possible.
In fact, this past month we held meetings with our advisory boards made up of election officials
from across the country and other key stakeholders. We heard resounding enthusiasm for the EAC's work
and the direction we are heading, but the agency is nearing a point where funding cuts
will impact what we can accomplish and the support we can provide election officials,
especially related to election security. My colleagues spoke about our election technology
and field services team. They are doing amazing work, but they're a team of only 10 people.
With over 8,000 election jurisdictions in the United States, there are limits to our capacity,
but not to our desire or commitment. We continue to work creatively and thoughtfully to respond
to election officials' needs. We are piloting a number of efforts, including those to enhance
election security and technology in a way that informs future programs and allows for
rapid scaling if appropriate funding is provided. This is also part of why we designed the EAC's
learning lab to release new content on a rolling basis and provide asynchronous trainings
accessible to election officials anywhere in the country at no cost.
Additionally, one of the agency's most significant accomplishments was the development and adoption
of the 2.0 version of the voluntary voting system guidelines. As Vice Chair McCormick noted,
there are now two systems certified to this standard and five more in the testing process.
A report that we shared with Congress this week notes that much of the voting equipment in use
is nearing the end of their recommended lifespans and conservatively estimates a cost
of $2.7 billion for jurisdictions across the country to make this transition.
I mention this because we must consistently invest in our election administration infrastructure.
Too often we're bailed out by the innovation and hard work of the public servants that run
our elections. Many seasoned election officials have left the profession,
taking with them valuable institutional knowledge. To fully meet the challenges of this moment and
ensure our elections remain secure, there needs to be greater support for elections at the local,
state, and federal levels. We know this investment matters. Since 2018,
states report using HAVA security grants to replace paperless voting systems,
harden statewide voter registration databases, increase cybersecurity training,
and enhance physical security. Many of these improvements to election security
were made possible because of the federal funding and congressional support. At the EAC,
we are committed to continuing to do everything we can to ensure elections are safe, secure,
accurate, and accessible. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about our work
and the challenges facing election officials. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
I now recognize former Commissioner Mr. Palmer for the purpose of giving an opening statement.
Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee and Ranking Member Sewell. As you know, I recently moved to
the Heritage Foundation as a senior legal fellow for election integrity, and the views expressed
today are my own and should be reflected on the Heritage Foundation. But I really do appreciate
the opportunity to talk about cybersecurity and the election security of the voting systems and
the election systems that we use, election officials use. We want them to be able to
concentrate on administering the election and not worried about the back-end security
of those systems, and that's why I really appreciate the work that my colleagues to
my right have done over the last decade. But as I sit back and I think about,
you know, since I moved on, what are some of the recommendations that I would provide to the
committee, and I have a few. I would, number one, support the existing secure IT concept
that would add a formal vulnerability testing program. There's great work that's done on the
testing of voting systems, but there needs to be, we need to add to that concept. The Secure IT
Act was made a part of the National Defense Authorization Act. It required penetration
testing, and it was the first step to simulate real-world attacks on election systems and voting
systems where you tabulate votes. Unfortunately, there was no appropriation attached, and obviously
that's going to slow the work, and in my mind, things need to be going quicker, not slower.
The work is way too slow to stay ahead of our adversaries in this area. The window to secure
elections and increase voter confidence is urgent on your mind. That window could be closing,
and that's why this is the most rapid approach, using a vulnerability testing program to do that.
So I think there should be a fully funded vulnerability testing program. That should
be the highest priority, and that every voting machine needs to go through that process.
The second recommendation is that we heard a lot of great information on the E-STEP program,
both from the chair and from the EAC commissioners. That's a very positive program.
That really should be expanded. The Congress should look at expanding that. There's huge
success stories with the certification of electronic poll books. That's been a concern
of the Congress for a number of years, and now there's actually a functioning program with
systems being reviewed that should be expanded. The third recommendation I would make is that
we prioritize voter registration system security and modernization. As the committee is aware,
voter registration system is really one of the core functions of the Help America Vote Act.
It holds all the voter registration data of the citizens that will vote,
and we want to make sure that's secure and it's accurate. So there has been bipartisan concern
over the years over the security of those voter registration systems, both in the Congress and
from outside groups, and even more so, there's been documented instances of vulnerabilities
being identified and those vulnerabilities being exploited. Now, we know, and most of the breaches
of a voter registration system that's outward facing to the internet doesn't necessarily mean
results are going to be changed, but the impact on the public could be very negative. So we need
to do everything we can, I say we, the country, needs to do everything we can to secure those
voter registration systems. But I can tell you right now, we are not doing everything we can.
We should be doing everything we can, but we are not doing everything we can.
My next recommendation is that we encourage coordination between the federal partners and
the EAC. That just makes a lot of sense, that there be a sharing of responsibilities
and coordination that would save tax dollar money. CISA has reduced its footprint in elections,
but election officials want more election focus on the products. And I think the EAC realizes that
and has tried to step up to the plate and provide scenario training and coordination with other
federal partners. So I think targeted funding to the EAC, which would allow additional coordination,
would be helpful and provide additional cybersecurity offerings that are election related.
My last recommendation is obviously local governments and local law enforcement are the
most critical aspect of physical security of local election officials. The FBI has really
stepped up with the trainings and the significant trainings, particularly on bomb threats,
for example. So how can Congress help? I would just use you one example. Targeted assistance
to increase the accessibility of polling places, that was a congressional initiative. And I think
the same can be done for the physical security of polling places and election offices. Thank you.
Thank you. I'll now begin our questions today, followed by the ranking member. I now recognize
myself for the purpose of witness questions. Chairman Hicks, I'll begin with you. From 2020
to 2023, the largest share of election security grants were dispersed for cybersecurity. Can you
share with us some of the uses of those grant funds and your assessment of whether that investment in
cybersecurity was valuable? Thank you, Chairwoman. I do believe that that investment was valuable.
The one criticism I would have is that it was not enough. The fact is that most of these
jurisdictions use this money to protect IT systems against foreign attacks. I don't want
to remind the committee how we are in conflict now with a very dangerous adversary, and that
attacked our systems back in 2016, 2020, and 2024. That's nothing that's secretive to anyone.
There are also other foreign actors that are out there who want to do the U.S. harm.
So we provided the jurisdictions with money to strengthen and harden their systems,
but that was not enough. They've updated their voting systems in certain jurisdictions. They've
improved the accuracy of their voting rolls as well. But I do believe that in order to ensure
that we combat this foreign threat over and over again, more resources will be needed. Thank you.
In 2024, the EAC authorized the use of HAVA grants for physical security. Can you share with us
some of the expenses that would be covered under that new guidance?
We also authorized things in 2022 for the personal safety of election officials,
similar to what Congress did to ensure that their members have been safe. So in 2024,
we basically offered more trainings for election officials, but we also ensured that they can use
this to upgrade systems that they have, basically harden those systems, whether or not that's two
step authentication or other aspects as well. And Vice Chair McCormick, you discussed VVSG 2.0
during your testimony. Would you share with us some of the key distinctions between 2.0 and 1.0?
Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. VVSG 2.0 includes major improvements to cybersecurity
guidelines, including requiring air gapping from any kind of public network. We have
prohibited wireless technology in the machines. We've also provided that there must be
multi-factor authentication for all the systems. Another thing we have done is that we've required
physical security and data protection requirements. Those are strengthened significantly
to make sure that there's no intrusion on the systems that cannot be detected. And as well,
that goes to our software independence, which is now required. Software independence
helps us identify whether there's been any compromise to the systems. We also now are
requiring penetration testing before the systems even come in for test. So we've done a number of
upgrades to the VVSG 2.0. As I said, we have two systems that have gone through this process and
have been certified by the EAC now. Those are now hitting the market for the first time. We have
five systems under test. And we're also looking to upgrade from 2.0 to 2.1 and looking at things
such as barcodes and wireless technology and other ways we might be able to continue to strengthen
the security aspects of our guidelines. Mr. Palmer, you just mentioned during your
testimony you gave several really interesting recommendations, but one related to helping
state and local officials with cybersecurity. You touched on the evolving role of CISA,
where CISA has a reduced footprint in the elections arena. Is there another agency? Is it the EAC? Do
you think there is another entity that could step up to help? Or would your recommendation be that
CISA reengage in a different way? Thank you, Madam Chair. I think that CISA is reducing its
footprint. And the EAC, because it's the agency that focuses on elections primarily or solely in
its core mission, that we have a responsibility to provide services across the board to election
officials. And so many of those services have been picked up by the EAC. Sometimes it's the
federal agency coordination or its trainings that have been going on across the country.
In discussions with CISA that I've had, those services are still available. Sometimes I think
the EAC could serve as a translator and work with CISA in coordination with CISA to provide those
services, because election officials like it. They like to have election-centric services. EAC
has former election officials that serve on it. Many of its commissioners have been involved in
elections. And so a very professional group of former election officials that can, you know,
sort of translate for the rest of the federal government what they want from the federal
government. Thank you, Mr. Palmer. We are out of time. I now recognize the ranking member
for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for your
testimony. You know, I truly believe, and we've hear over and over again in this subcommittee
that we're not funding the Election Assistance Commission and election security and integrity
infrastructure enough. And I wanted to ask you, Chair Hicks, I know that administering the
federal election security grants is one of the biggest responsibilities that you all have.
And am I correct that the Congress has gone from providing a high of $425 million
in recent years to a low of $15 million in 2025 in those grants? Yes, you are correct,
Ranking Member. And so how has that decreased? That's a big decrease.
How has it manifested itself in our states? What are you seeing in terms of what
is not going funded that should be going funded because of this reduction?
States are basically trying to make sure that the federal government pays its fair share
and the biggest footprint on the ballot and so forth. But I believe that officials that I've
talked to have said that they would remain safe and secure. Ms. McCormick, I know that we
appropriated about $45 million in 2026. And I'm hearing from lots of secretaries of state that
that's simply not enough. And directly from election administrators that that's simply
not enough. What are you seeing is going undone because of the decrease in the amount of funding?
So $45 million has to be distributed between the 50 states and the territories. And so
that turns out to be about what, $200,000 per state? I'm sorry. That $45 million turns out to
be about $250,000 per state. I mean, the total is $45 million, right? Right. It's a minimum amount
of money. And states can't use that money to do things like purchase new voting systems,
which a lot of them are in the position of needing to do at this point, to strengthening the systems
that they already have, to provide training for their personnel. They need to do physical security,
physical barriers, cameras, card readers, secure transportation for voting systems and ballots,
cybersecurity risk assessments, incident response, threat testing, threat monitoring on social media,
and again, securing their voter registration system. And all of that costs money, right? Yes,
it does. And right now we're not funding that. And the federal government is just a drop in
the bucket. Yeah. You know, Mr. Palmer, you, I know you're a former commissioner, but I think
hindsight's 20, 20 vision, right? So what would you recommend to this committee and to Congress
in terms of funding, adequately funding the commission? And what do you see as the biggest
threat? Well, we're talking about the commission. I think that many of the programs that we've
talked about, like the E-STEP program and the vulnerability testing program, there's already
a framework to do that. The Congress has set that up. We're, I mean, I know the EAC. Are we funding
it? No, it's not being funded. And it's coming out of the nickels and dimes that we're finding in
this, that the EAC is finding in the SOFA, trying to keep that alive. And so I just think that
that's a critical piece of national security, vulnerability testing, that it just makes a lot
of sense. It's an, it's an investment for the rest of the election community, a very small
investment that would have huge dividends. Absolutely. Commissioner Hovland, what would
you say is the, the most essential function that the commission runs and whether, and, and how do
you see the reduced funding affecting that mission? Thank you for the question, ranking member. I think
that, you know, again, we have our four core mission areas, but as we look to expand the
clearinghouse function, as well as our election technology initiatives, there is really a need,
again, we've provided information to Congress to appropriations on how many of these programs are
sort of ready and turnkey because we've done pilots, because we have done the work to see
how best to spend this money and how it can have an immediate impact. And again, as I mentioned in
my opening remarks, when you look at the 8,000 jurisdictions across the country, really the scale
that we're talking about is significant. And so right now, do you think that $250,000 is enough
per state to be able to adequately fund elections? On the grant side, again, I don't think that's
sufficient. I know from election officials that every, every dollar matters. But again, when
you're talking about capital purchases, whether that's replacing voting equipment or upgrading
the security of statewide voter registration databases, you know, one of the things that we
often hear about from Congress is the unspent funds. And often when the amounts are lower,
they're waiting, the states are waiting to make those capital purchases,
like replacing their statewide voter registration database or making those significant investments.
Madam Chair, thanks for indulging me for going a little over. I would like to request a unanimous
consent to submit for the record a letter from 84 voting, civil rights, faith, labor,
environmental, and disability rights organizations led by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the
Leadership Conference that call on Congress to allocate considerably more funding for election
administration in FY27. Without objection, so ordered. Thanks. I now recognize the gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Murphy for five, or Dr. Murphy for five minutes. Thank you, Madam
Chairman. They gave me a cheat sheet for your names because I'm too old and I can't read
everybody's name down there. Thank you very much for convening this, the committee subcommittee
hearing. Obviously, this is a bipartisan issue. We want people to have access to,
to what is a tremendous right that we're given here in the United States to vote. And we want
to make sure that they're safe and secure. I was just reading, I was not aware of what happened
in Pennsylvania. So thankfully nobody was injured. I would like to go just a little bit quick off
script, um, to ask Mr. Hick or Mr. Palmer rather about what, what, what's the deal going on with
Maryland? My understanding is they sent out 500 wrong mail-in ballots. Oops. Well, I mean,
uh, I saw some of the conversation about that, sir. And I would say that, um, you know, it's a
mistake. It's just cannot happen. That type of mistake cannot happen. 500,000. It's a lot, sir.
And it's a, it's a, it's a very, um, it's a huge mistake. I know the people that, you know, and
then obviously you can point at the vendor and say, well, the vendor made them a mistake, but
the buck stops with the election officials. And I, and I, and I, you know, I, I have sympathy for
them. I've been in a position where one mistake can have an impact on the election, but it's that
type of thing that hurts confidence. And so, um, I, I have, um, I have hope that continued training
and professional training will, um, you know, sort of, this is where, again, this committee
in Congress, it's better, you know, one way or the other supposed to provide oversight and their
responses. Well, we'll send another 500,000 out. What could go wrong there? No, it's just,
it just shows that there are problems with our election system and it's okay for us to question
it. It's okay for us to do due diligence, all these types of things. So, um, that's just amazed
me. I've known some patients of mine who've come in and said they got mail-in ballots and they've
gotten them for people that lived in their residence three and four years or five times
before. So they're, they're obviously problems that go on with this. I want to talk a little
bit about cybersecurity. We live in a world of a digital world where now there's AI, there's
quantum physics that are pushing out insane amount of data and, um, uh, really jeopardizing
our systems. We live in a dangerous time, their world, their enemies that want to destabilize,
divide us at home. We've seen this in so many different instances. So, uh, Commissioner
I just want to ask about the EAC. Um, how does it work to stay informed of the constantly evolving
cyber threats? What does it do to not only figure these out, but also to communicate to,
you know, state, local levels to, to, to make sure that people know what's going on.
Thank you for the question. Uh, you know, it is a real challenge. Often one of the biggest
challenges when you talk about the, uh, the scope and scale of, uh, 8,000 plus jurisdictions across
the country is communicating to that last mile. Uh, one of the ways that we've been doing that,
we communicate a number of things, but, but really so much on cybersecurity is about the basics.
You know, even when we look at threats from artificial intelligence and AI, so much of the
prevention comes down to being good at the basics. And so that's why we address that with, uh, both,
uh, resources that we provide, uh, various, uh, you know, training guides, et cetera, but also,
uh, pieces of our learning lab, uh, some of the trainings in that platform, uh, walk through best
practices. Can you guys communicate state and local as literally as currently, how often do
you guys do that? What is your relationship with those folks? Uh, we have regular contact with
election officials all across the country in a number of ways. What does regular contact mean?
Uh, every day, uh, you know, again, it depends, but we have a monthly newsletter,
uh, dedicated to election officials. We have a platform to communicate with election officials.
Our board meetings that I mentioned earlier are have state and local officials from every state
and territory in the country. Uh, and so through those processes, we get a very widespread feedback,
small jurisdictions, large jurisdictions, state officials, local officials, uh, and that really
helps inform our work, uh, and makes it better. Okay. Great. Mr. Hicks, just one question. And I,
cause I never understand what, I don't know what the answer to this is when people say,
I've never had an idea when, you know, taxation, this, that, and the other stuff.
How much is, in your opinion, should the federal government be paying versus what should the state
be paying as far as elections? What is the fair share number? That's a hard question to answer.
You're the one that brought it up, but I agree. I agree. Uh, but I would say that elections
overall costs close to $6 billion, um, per election cycle. I think adding, uh, two years
ago for the Congress to appropriate 15 million is not enough. So, um, if, if I had my dredgers,
I would say the federal government should pay 100% of federal election, but that's not for me to
decide. That's, um, that's for Congress to decide. So fair share, I think is, is a significant
amount. Okay. All right. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. I now recognize the
gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Miller for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee,
for hosting this important hearing and to the witnesses for taking time to be here.
American citizens deserve secure elections and to know that their votes are guaranteed. They're
tired of fraud and their faith in our elections is dwindling. We all know the Democrats want to
cheat by not passing the Save America Act, but I will continue to fight every day to get that
piece of legislation to the president's desk. In this committee, we passed H.R. 8721, the
Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act that makes important changes to
our election laws by prohibiting foreign nationals from funding ballot harvesting and ballot
collection efforts. This common sense bill put forth by my colleague will help the American
people gain confidence in their elections while curbing foreign influence that seeks to undermine
our institutions. I look forward to the continuing good work that this committee is doing. And my
first question is for Mr. Hicks. What steps has the EAC taken in an effort to mitigate illegal
voting by non-citizens? States run the elections. It's illegal for non-citizens to vote. And so
what we do is we don't play an active role. Right. It's illegal for them to vote?
Correct. It's illegal for illegals to vote. So my question is, what steps has the EAC taken
to make sure that illegals are not voting in our elections? Non-citizens are not voting
in our elections. The EAC does not run elections, so we can't do anything to ensure that. That's a
state issue. You should be taking steps, though, to mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens.
And also, if you want the federal government to pick up the tab for elections, then maybe the
federal government could say you have to have a photo ID and you have to be a U.S. citizen.
Mr. Palmer, how does poll worker training contribute to election integrity and voter
confidence? And what does poll worker training look like? Poll worker training is, I mean,
that is the front lines of helping voters cast the ballot. And so that poll worker training is
imperative. And what it really means is officials at the county office, as well as other poll
workers who are long-term, have served a long time, they provide guidance in the different
missions that take place inside a polling place. If it's confirming the identity of someone,
if it's getting them the right ballot, making sure that there's calm and no chaos in a polling
place, that's the importance of a poll worker. I'm just curious, how do you train a poll worker
to keep non-citizens from voting when they don't have to show an ID?
Well, poll workers, they're going to follow the rules of the jurisdiction. It's up to us
as the policymakers, it's up to the Congress to set the rules, the state legislature set the rules
of the eligibility of who's going to be casting a ballot. We expect the poll workers to follow the
of the legislature. And so in some ways, I don't want to put that onus on them,
they'll follow the rules and procedures that's provided to them.
Which is why it's so important that we pass the Save America Act. Ms. McCormick,
as jurisdictions modernize their elections, what steps can they take
to proactively ensure the security of their systems?
Thank you for the question, Congressman Miller. There are a number of things that election
officials can do. First thing that they can do is rigorous testing of the election equipment,
both before, during, and after an election. They can also engage in stringent auditing practices.
All states now require the elections to be audited, and we now have 98% of the country
using paper ballots. So the best way to do that is to do a hand examination of the ballots to
match the results. I agree with you that we have a crisis in election confidence right now,
and we need to be able to assure our voters that our election outcomes are accurate, they are fair,
they are secure. Part of that is to allow observers into the polling places to be as
transparent as possible. And that are some things that election officials can do to strengthen the
security and the transparency of our elections.
And I have to say, across the country, Democrats and Republicans, they want election integrity,
they want the people to show voter ID and proof of citizenship. We have to pass
our legislation here to require states and local governments to prove that you're U.S. citizens
before you're voting. And with that, I'll yield back. I'd like to thank our witnesses for
appearing before us today and sharing your experience, your expertise, and your insight.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for you,
and we ask you to please respond to those questions in writing. Without objection,
each member will have five legislative days to insert additional material into the record,
or to revise and extend their remarks. If there is no further business,
I thank the members for their participation. And without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
