Zhang Youxia Verdict in July? 3 Scenarios, A Massive Retaliation Coming!

This July may mark the moment the CCP officially closes the book on one of the most shocking political cases of the decade, but behind that seemingly tidy ending lies a life-or-death political bargain. John Yoshua and Liu Jianli are expected to face closed-door trials and be charged with economic crimes, not because corruption was their only offense, but because it is the only way for both factions to step back without losing face before the entire system. But here's the most dangerous part. If the anti-Xi Jinping camp is forced to sacrifice these two key figures, they will demand payback in blood. And according to many analysts, that price could come in the form of a brutal purge aimed directly at Xi Jinping's inner circle. Why? Let's break it down in today's program. Revelation, the Jiang Yuxia case may conclude in July. According to overseas Chinese-language media, citing multiple sources close to the CCP system, the internal investigation into Jiang Yuxia has now entered its final stage. After more than three months of military investigation, Jiang Yuxia's case has reached the closing phase. The internal inquiry is now mainly dealing with procedural details. If there are no new developments, the case could be completed within two months. Barring unexpected changes, the results will likely be announced publicly in July, including the expulsion of Jiang Yuxia and Liu Jianli from both the party and the military. The anonymous source said the cases involving Jiang and Liu will be handled according to standard procedure. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection will first announce their expulsion from the party and removal from military posts, after which the cases will be transferred to the military procuratorate for prosecution. However, even after entering the prosecution stage, the trials themselves will still be conducted by military courts, and very little information about the proceedings will be made public. The source added, cases of this nature are basically never tried publicly. Even the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission during the era of Hu Jintao were all tried behind closed doors. The outside world only sees the final verdicts. Military trials never disclose their details. Another source with ties to the Chinese military revealed that the legal direction of the prosecution against Jiang and Liu has already been determined. The main charges reportedly include abusing official authority to accept bribes, engaging in power for money deals in personnel appointments, and securing benefits for relatives and individuals with special connections. The source stated, the direction of the prosecution has already been decided. What remains now is mainly how the case will be presented to the public. The amount of money involved is not the key issue. The priority is controlling the political impact and preventing outsiders from interpreting it as a power struggle. Chinese criminal law does not contain a charge such as anti-party activity. So in practice, the case can only be handled through charges like bribery. They need to find a legally suitable way to frame it. I cannot independently verify the authenticity of these revelations. But what do they suggest? Let's look at some additional analyses. Analysis. Three possible scenarios behind the Jiang Liu case. Commenting on the matter, US-based political analyst Tang Jingwan said that if the above revelations are accurate, there are three possible explanations. First, it could mean that the anti-Xi Jinping faction has decided to sacrifice Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli in order to protect the CCP itself. Xi Jinping may have acted preemptively by detaining the two men and quickly announcing the charges, creating a fait accompli. Tang believes Xi is betting that the anti-Xi camp would not dare overturn Jiang's case because doing so would amount to openly challenging Xi himself. If they attempted to clear Jiang's name, an open internal power struggle could destabilize the entire system. Xi is therefore gambling that they will hesitate and ultimately accept sacrificing Jiang and Liu. Second, there is the possibility that Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are no longer alive, but the case still needs to be formally concluded. In that scenario, Xi and the anti-Xi faction may have reached an internal compromise, assigning Jiang an economic crime in order to close the case while preserving the CCP's image. If Jiang and Liu are still alive, both sides could still agree on a politically acceptable economic charge against Jiang without triggering major instability. Third, after Jiang Yuxia's reported downfall, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has met three times without revoking the representative status of either Jiang or Liu. According to Tang, this suggests that serious disagreements still exist within the top leadership. If Jiang retains his delegate status, then in theory, he may face only internal party disciplinary measures. If that status is revoked, the matter would move into the formal judicial process. In other words, many uncertainties still remain. Tang Jingyuan argues that the final outcome may not be as smooth as the leaks suggest, namely, quietly closing the case while preserving the CCP and preventing both sides from openly turning against each other. He emphasized that whether it is Xi Jinping or the so-called princeling elite, continuing to prioritize protecting the party is ultimately a dead end because Xi is not someone who easily compromises or surrenders. Xi uses the goal of protecting the party as leverage, while the anti-Xi faction, fearing systemic collapse, still hesitates to strike decisively. Tang further stated that the ultimate fate of the Jiang-Liu case is not the most important issue. What truly matters is whether the Chinese military supports Xi Jinping or the anti-Xi camp. If the anti-Xi faction is forced to sacrifice Jiang and Liu, it will need to justify that decision to the military, and the price could be a massive retaliatory purge targeting key figures within Xi's faction. Therefore, if the cases involving Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are indeed concluded this July, it is highly possible that many more senior officials tied to Xi Jinping's camp will subsequently be brought down in an extremely ruthless manner. Why the Jiang Yuxia Case Could End With Economic Charges U.S.-based political commentator Zhang Tianliang analyzed in his personal program that the fact Jiang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli have, for the third time, not been stripped of their status as delegates to the National People's Congress does not, by itself, prove anything. In his view, the delay alone is not enough to draw conclusions. For comparison, former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong was officially announced by the CCP as having fallen from power on October 17, 2025, although he had disappeared long before that. After the two sessions meetings in March 2025, U.S.-based independent commentator Kai Shengkun had already revealed that He Weidong had run into trouble. This suggests that from his disappearance in March 2025 to the official announcement of his downfall in October of the same year, there was an investigation period of roughly seven months. By contrast, Jiang Yuxia was reportedly arrested suddenly and announced immediately, completely different from He Weidong's case, in which the arrest was followed by a seven-month delay before any public disclosure. Jiang's case has moved much faster, and Xi Jinping appears to have acted that way in order to stabilize the situation. From He Weidong's arrest to the revocation of his NPC delegate status took about nine months. Jiang Yuxia was said to have fallen from power on January 24, 2026, and if the leaked information is accurate and results are announced this July, the total timeline would be around six months. Jiang Tianliang argues that the pace of handling Jiang's case is not actually slower than He Weidong's. The real issue, he says, is what charges Jiang will ultimately face. When Jiang was first removed, the Chinese military newspaper published articles indicating that the accusations against him were primarily political in nature, most notably the charge of trampling on the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Jiang Tianliang believes that when Jiang is formally convicted by a military court, those accusations may not appear in the final judgment. Instead, Jiang and Liu will most likely be purged under the banner of anti-corruption and convicted on corruption-related charges. In October 2012, Jiang Yuxia was appointed head of the General Armaments Department of the In November 2015, he became the first director of the newly established Equipment Development Department under the Central Military Commission, a position he held until September 2017. According to Jiang Tianliang, Jiang Yuxia's alleged corruption could involve allowing substandard military equipment to be supplied during his tenure as head of the General Armaments Department, engaging in insider dealings and similar activities. These could form part of the prosecution's case. However, the serious political accusations raised by the military newspaper, such as betraying the trust of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, or seriously trampling on the chairman responsibility system, are political accusations, not criminal charges. They cannot legally serve as criminal offenses for prosecution, cannot be formally included in an indictment, and cannot be used as the basis for a conviction. Therefore, prosecutors can only focus on corruption-related charges against Jiang. Jiang Tianliang added that once the case against Jiang Yuxia is officially announced, party media and military newspapers will likely publish a series of articles about it. At that point, observers should watch closely to see whether the original political accusations made at the time of his arrest still appear. If those accusations disappear, it could signal that Xi Jinping has made concessions to the CCP's elder faction. If they remain absent, however, it may simply reflect the fact that political accusations cannot legally be used in criminal prosecutions. Princelings implicitly accuse Xi Jinping of being a traitorous clique. The power struggle between Xi Jinping and the so-called princeling elite is becoming increasingly intense. A few days ago, China's Ministry of State Security criticized the growing lying-flat phenomenon, claiming it was being manipulated by anti-China forces overseas. The statement immediately triggered a wave of mockery and backlash online. What is especially striking is that this time, it was not only ordinary citizens who spoke out after waking up. Even the so-called little pink nationalist supporters no longer appeared willing to On April 29, the CCP-affiliated website, Honggehui, Red Song Society, republished a 1969 article from People's Daily titled, Workers Collectively Lie Flat? Soviet Revisionist Clique Panics. So what kind of background does Honggehui have? According to information circulating online, it is a well-known Maoist website that claims to receive support and assistance from retired veteran cadres. Among those supporters are reportedly members of the princeling class itself. The channel Zhongguo Neimu commented that the article's focus on lying flat was clearly aimed at countering the Ministry of State Security's recent statement, effectively putting it in direct opposition to Xi Jinping's camp. And when the article refers to a traitorous revisionist clique that has seized party and state power, who is it really implying? Isn't it indirectly pointing at Xi Jinping? In recent years, public dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping's fascist-style rule has continued to grow. More and more workers are now expressing their anger and resistance toward Xi Jinping through forms of passive protest such as quitting work or deliberately doing the bare minimum. One striking example occurred on May 2, when a woman in pink clothing living in a high-rise apartment repeatedly paced across her balcony, shouting through the metal bars in frustration, Give me back my phone! Give me back my phone! Peng Liwan and Xi Jinping took my phone away and stripped me of my human rights. She reportedly disappeared afterward and could no longer be contacted. In reality, public outbursts against the CCP and Xi Jinping have become increasingly common in recent years. On May 3, three separate videos circulated online. One showed a young man directly cursing Xi Jinping by name. Another showed a woman standing in the corridor of a busy shopping mall shouting, Xi Jinping, do you deserve to be president? You don't deserve it. Step down. A third video showed a young man wearing glasses openly insulting Xi Jinping in front of police officers, who reportedly did not intervene. Even government officials appear less restrained than before. In a video recorded around 5 pm on June 5, 2023, a male official with a Shandong accent was questioning a man about allegedly organizing petitions. The man denied leading any petitions and claimed someone had fabricated evidence against him. I only want to restore the truth. The official mocked the man's attempt to restore the truth, then suddenly launched into a tirade against Xi Jinping himself. Xi Jinping has embezzled huge amounts of money already. He's done far too many bad things. Since taking power, has he done anything good for the Chinese people? Right now, the whole of China is cursing this idiot, isn't it? All of this suggests that while Xi Jinping remains consumed with political infighting to preserve his power, public frustration inside China may already be reaching a breaking point. So what lies ahead for the future of this country? Leave your thoughts in the comments below. Thank you for watching, and see you next time.