In this video, we dive into China’s latest VPN crackdown and whether the CCP can truly kill off this last pocket of internet freedom. We break down how the Great Firewall works, why periodic blocks around June 4th and the Two Sessions happen, and the limits of Deep Packet Inspection and active probing.
While a total ban sounds scary, a full whitelist system is practically impossible due to economic fallout, and a permanent physical disconnection would devastate China’s $45.47 trillion trade-dependent economy. The CCP’s current firewall is likely the best balance they can achieve.
The latest crackdown was triggered by a massive 10 PB military data breach from supercomputing centers via a compromised VPN — confirmed by CNN. Expect tighter controls and possible arrests, but don’t panic: turning China into North Korea 2.0 remains unrealistic without destroying the economy. Stay safe, climb smart.
<html>
<head><title>404 Not Found</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>404 Not Found</h1></center>
<hr><center>nginx</center>
</body>
</html>
Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. Today, let's talk about VPNs. Recently,
news about a VPN crackdown has been spreading inside the world. The VPN issue has always been
like a sword hanging over people's heads in China. A lot of friends inside the world are probably
really worried that one day the CCP will shut down all VPNs, achieving a physical level
disconnection from the Internet, and turn China into basically a giant North Korea.
So, is it possible for the CCP to completely cut off China's Internet connections and
fully ban VPNs? Could this last remaining bit of freedom we have disappear?
First, to answer this question clearly, we need to talk about it from the technical level. Is a
full ban on VPNs even feasible? How exactly do Chinese people connect to the international
Internet? Here we can imagine China is a huge residential compound with 1 billion people living
inside. The entire compound is China's internal network. Once you leave the compound, you are on
external Internet. On the compound walls, there are three main gates, China Mobile, China Unicom,
and China Telecom. These three telecom companies control the connection between China's local area
network and the world Internet. Every connection China makes with the outside has to go through
one of these three gates. You can think of this connection behavior like sending express packages
from the compound. If you want to watch YouTube, you send a package requesting the video to YouTube,
and then YouTube sends the package containing the video content back to you. Standing at these
three compound gates is a security guard who inspects every single package going through the
gates. This security guard is the well-known Great Firewall of China, the GFW. However, this guard's
inspection standard isn't like the big whites during the Covid period who only let green
codes through and blocked everyone with yellow codes, red codes, or no health code. This guard
actually uses a blacklist system. The CCP marks the IP addresses of certain websites and puts them
on a blacklist. A typical website on this blacklist is the YouTube you are watching right now. Once a
site is on the list, when you send a request package to it, the guard at the gate will directly
reject it. Of course, when the website tries to send data packages back to you, the guard will
also directly reject them. The rejection methods include techniques like DNS attacks, which I won't
go into in detail here. So what is a VPN? It's actually a disguise technology. It's like an
express drop-off and pick-up point. Your package first goes to this drop point and then gets
forwarded to YouTube. YouTube's data also goes to the drop point first before being forwarded to you.
With this disguise and forwarding, you can bypass the CCP's firewall system. Your package
gets laundered from a black express into a white express. Based on this logic, you can imagine how
the CCP would ban VPN use. Under this framework, there are actually two approaches to banning VPN.
One is to strike at external violating nodes, those illegal express drop points, and add them
to the blacklist. The other is to strengthen the gate guard's patrols and work harder to identify
disguised packages and disguised data. And this is indeed what the CCP is doing,
though they don't do it that frequently. There's always this pattern in China. Whenever it's June
4 or the two sessions, many VPNs stop working well. Why? It's because during these periods,
the CCP strengthens control. Around June 4, the firewall security guard ramps up inspections
using a technology called Deep Packet Inspection, or DPI. This is the core and most powerful
technology of the CCP's firewall. You can think of it as installing an X-ray machine at the
entrance and scans every incoming and outgoing package, that is, every piece of data. Even though
your data has been forwarded multiple times, certain network protocol data signatures don't
change. Just like every person has a different walking posture, DPI technology can identify these
walking postures to determine whether your traffic is normal internet use or using a
climbing tool. Of course, DPI has a monitoring sensitivity threshold. After all, it's only
guessing whether your traffic belongs to a wall climbing activity. How strict it is can vary.
Every time we hit sensitive periods like the two sessions or June 4, the DPI threshold becomes
especially strict. In addition, at key moments, the CCP also carries out operations to net in
violating nodes. The firewall usually has a method called active probing. It actively
looks for suspicious express receiving points, that is, suspicious IPs. When the guard suspects
an IP is a VPN, it pretends to be a user and sends requests. If that IP responds according
to VPN rules, the guard immediately adds it to a list. Then, at critical time points,
they uniformly block the IPs on that list and add them to the internet firewall's blacklist.
So if your VPN craps out at key times like June 4 or the two sessions, it doesn't necessarily mean
the VPN is working with the CCP and deliberately stopped letting you climb the wall during that
period. It's very possible that the VPN's technical capabilities aren't strong enough,
and it was easily detected by DPI and active probing. Or it could be that too many people
were using it, so the nodes got flagged early. Of course, the operations during the two sessions
each year are basically the limit of what the CCP can do without making major changes to the logic
of China's firewall. This approach cannot completely ban VPNs or wall climbing behavior.
It can only increase the difficulty of climbing the wall to a certain degree.
Moreover, this kind of high-intensity network control isn't something the CCP can maintain
as the normal state. First, the relationship between DPI detection and VPN wall-climbing
technology is like two sides fighting an offensive-defensive battle. If you only
occasionally increase intensity during June 4 or the two sessions, many VPN providers can
accept it because it's only a few days and the impact on them is relatively small.
But if you maintain a high-intensity detection standard permanently, besides causing collateral
damage to normal IPs, it will also force VPN providers to passively improve their technology
to counter the firewall. And this is an asymmetric contest. The firewall has to block
a hundred vulnerabilities, but as long as one vulnerability exists, VPNs can easily slip through.
If they regularize the blocking of suspicious IPs that happens during June 4 and the two sessions,
then for VPN companies, it's just a matter of frequently changing nodes.
It makes things a bit more troublesome for VPN companies, but it cannot stop them
from continuing to provide services. If the CCP normalizes this kind of crackdown,
the actual result might be that overall wall-climbing difficulty doesn't increase much.
But during June 4 or the two sessions, when they want to tighten things up and prevent people from
accessing the outside Internet, they won't be able to. So based on the current situation,
even if the CCP cracks down hard, everyone doesn't need to worry too much. First,
this kind of intense crackdown won't last long, and it won't truly make VPNs unusable. Of course,
if the CCP completely changes the logic of the Internet firewall, then fully banning VPNs is
still possible. There are two technical possibilities. One is whitelist technology,
and the other is a physical disconnection. What is a whitelist? It means the CCP completely
changes its thinking. The GateGuard's inspection standard is no longer rejecting based on a
blacklist, but only allowing entry for whitelisted items, just like during the pandemic when only
green codes were allowed in. Doing it this way would basically eliminate the possibility of
VPNs. After all, if only whitelisted connections are allowed, then creating a new VPN node would
see its cost difficult, and the risk increases dramatically. But implementing this whitelist
system in practice is basically impossible. First, there are more than 300 million active
domains in the world, and the Internet is now evolving towards the IPv6 era, with an explosion
of IP addresses. Facing so many addresses, deciding which ones should go on the whitelist,
which shouldn't, who reviews them, and how to review them becomes a huge problem. Too many
reviewers wastes money and resources, too few reviewers makes the process too slow. Among these
hundreds of millions or even billions of IPs, the vast majority have nothing to do with politics,
but many of them have critical importance to China's economy. For example, a Brazilian
soybean auction website or a logistic website from a small African country, you can't expect
people from those countries to register their websites with China after setting them up. Also,
many websites frequently change addresses. For instance, America's UPS previously changed its
back-end express tracking address. If it changes the address and the CCP takes a month to review
it, does that mean people doing foreign trade can't check U.S. Express progress for a whole
month? That's obviously unrealistic. If a whitelist system is strictly enforced,
it might make China's VPN disappear completely and prevent Chinese people from contacting
foreigners. But Chinese people would also basically lose the ability to continue doing
business with the outside world. And this is assuming strict enforcement. In reality, there
are still risks of collateral damage, and it might not even be possible to enforce strictly.
Many VPN nodes are actually hidden behind websites that China cannot block, such as Amazon.
Besides being the world's largest e-commerce platform, Amazon also provides a service called
Amazon Web Services, AWS. Many VPNs rent nodes from AWS for disguise. Whether the CCP should
add Amazon to the whitelist becomes a problem. In addition, there is a commonly used service
on the internet called CDN Acceleration Service. And the logic is the same. What does CDN
Acceleration Service mean? If you want to access a website in Los Angeles from Beijing,
theoretically you have to transmit data through optical fiber. The speed of data in fiber is about
two-thirds the speed of light. The distance from Beijing to Los Angeles is about 10,000 kilometers.
A round-trip for the data will take about 150 milliseconds. And that's only pure physical
transmission time, not counting the processing time through routers and switches in between.
In this situation, browsing a Los Angeles website from Beijing would have an unimaginable lag.
CDN services build website copies for you all over the world. For example, the well-known CDN
provider Cloudflare has deployed server nodes in about 300 cities globally. Once a website
integrates with Cloudflare, some of its static content can be copied to these nodes. Then,
when you visit that Los Angeles website, you don't need to connect to the Los Angeles server anymore.
You can connect directly to Cloudflare's Beijing server. And browsing speed can be greatly
improved. This CDN technology is also the cornerstone of modern global internet technology.
So here is the problem. VPNs can also use these CDN nodes as a traffic forwarding and disguise
basis. Do you block these CDN services too? If CDN services are not added to the whitelist,
then the whitelist is meaningless and VPNs can still rely on these services to exist.
If you don't add them to the whitelist, Chinese people naturally won't be able to use VPNs.
But many regular internet operations will also become impossible. After all, you are now in
the whitelist era, no longer the blacklist era. Under the blacklist system, even if some websites
are blocked, everyone can still use VPNs to get around it. But if you really implement a
whitelist system, any website not on the whitelist is completely unusable and there are no VPNs
either. How will the Chinese people manage them? They couldn't access Amazon, and Chinese
cross-border e-commerce would be finished. In the whole year of 2025, China's cross-border
e-commerce scale was larger than the export scale of the new 3 products. And if you directly block
CDN, this kind of internet infrastructure, while Chairman Xi is still shouting that China wants to
compete with the United States in AI, could companies making AI large models and programmers
write code even continue their work? They need to frequently use these basic internet services.
Besides that, some people might think of another extreme, licensed internet access. That is,
in the future, all Chinese people would use the internet in the form of whitelist
plus official VPNs. If you need to access the outside internet, you apply for an official VPN
yourself. But this is also quite unrealistic. The official VPNs we understand actually don't work
on the same principles as the VPNs everyone talks about. Official VPNs give you a dedicated line.
With this dedicated line, you have special privileges. Even if the incoming and outgoing
packages are on the blacklist, the gate guard will still let you through. But the same problems
still exist. There are a huge number of website nodes in the world that serve normal business.
For example, a Chinese student wanting to apply to an American university needs to check the
official website for application requirements. If China hasn't added that university to the
whitelist, you can't access the website. At that point, as a student, would you have to apply for
a VPN first? By the time you get approval, the university application season would probably
already be over. So from the current perspective, this kind of whitelist system is simply unworkable.
Of course, just because the whitelist system doesn't work and the blacklist system has
loopholes, doesn't mean the CCP cannot do a one-click de-disconnection. Earlier this year,
large-scale protests broke out in Iran. After the protests erupted, Iran implemented a one-click
internet shutdown. Then it faced U.S. strikes, and Iran's one-click disconnection has already
lasted more than 40 days as of the time I'm recording this program. Iran's international
traffic still hasn't been restored. If a backward country like Iran can do a one-click
disconnection, then for the CCP, it's naturally no problem at all. And the CCP has indeed practiced
this before. As early as 2009, because large-scale protests broke out in Xinjiang, the CCP carried
out a forced internet disconnection in Xinjiang. They directly pulled the plug on Xinjiang's
internet cables for about 10 months. The entire Xinjiang region was completely unable to use the
internet. Later, although Xinjiang was allowed to use the domestic internet, the international
channels remained cut off. At that time, even with VPNs in Xinjiang, you couldn't climb the wall.
This kind of direct cutting of international channels is actually much simpler in technical
difficulty than banning VPNs. The essence of a one-click disconnection is the security guard
at the gate simply closing the compound doors. China's internet exits are unlike those in the
United States or Europe, which are composed of hundreds of companies. China has only three gates,
the three network companies, China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile. And these three
companies are all under the control of the CCP. As long as the CCP forcibly orders them to
physically cut the connections and completely sever China's external network links, there is no
difficulty at all. Even cutting off the internet of a single province or city, whether cutting
external connections or completely disconnecting all networks in various provinces and cities,
presents no technical difficulty for the CCP. Of course, no technical difficulty doesn't mean
no difficulty at the economic level. Building a whitelist system would cause collateral damage
to Amazon and CDN services providers, cause irreparable losses to China's economy, and cause
irreparable damage to China's AI development, let alone a complete internet blockade. China's
economy is now highly dependent on foreign trade. In 2025, China's total import and export volume
reached 45.5 trillion yuan, accounting for 32% of GDP. China also needs to import large amounts
of raw materials and food from overseas. China is very unlikely to completely ban the internet,
that would cause the Chinese economy to collapse. So, to sum up, the current intensity of China's
firewall is actually the optimal solution for the CCP, both technologically and economically.
It is very difficult for the CCP to block VPNs. Of course, this is not to say that China doesn't
have the ability to turn itself into a second North Korea, nor is it praising the CCP for being
merciful. It means the CCP cannot both keep foreign trade flowing smoothly and precisely
identify who is climbing the wall and who is using VPNs. Some people online are now saying
that because the CCP is going to crack down hard on VPNs, China is about to become the second North
Korea and VPNs will become unusable. This is obviously alarmist talk. We are overestimating
the CCP's capabilities a bit. If tomorrow China erupts into another June 4, 1989, then the CCP
briefly cutting the network is possible. But normalizing the cutting of external networks and
banning VPNs is unrealistic. For the current CCP, this operation would do more harm than good.
After all, the purpose of the CCP building the internet firewall is to maintain stability.
If maintaining stability ends up wounding the economy, causing economic collapse and thereby
affecting social stability, then that kind of stability is definitely not worth it for the CCP.
Of course, even though technically the CCP may not be able to fully achieve control over VPNs,
the recent atmosphere of cracking down on VPNs should still continue for a while.
Because VPNs have recently caused the CCP a very big problem. The origin of this current
crackdown, from what we can see, is a large-scale data leak by the CCP. In February, a hacker posted
online saying that after a long period of hacking, he had stolen 10 pb of core military secrets from
China's supercomputing centers, including content related to AWIC and the National University of
Defense Technology. This news had been out for a while, but when it first came out, the 10 pb volume
was heavily questioned by netizens. What does 10 pb mean? It's equivalent to 10 million gigabytes
a hacker stealing so much data in such a closed internet environment in China seemed a bit
unrealistic. But recently, after CNN's investigations, the authenticity of the
hacking was confirmed, and the attacker claimed that they obtained access to the Tianjin
supercomputing center through a compromised VPN domain, and then spent 6 months slowly
stealing data from China's supercomputing center. This massive information leak caused by VPNs,
especially the leak of military and the most sensitive information to the CCP,
will definitely make the CCP's top leadership very angry. And this anger will translate into
a top-down VPN crackdown operation. This top-down wind should keep blowing for a while.
When this wind blows down, besides making routine measures like DPI inspections stricter
and blocking already marked nodes, everyone should also be vigilant about the CCP adopting
non-internet methods for control, that is, arresting people. For example, severely cracking
down on VPN providers, then using WeChat payment records and Alipay payment records from inside
those VPN providers to arrest some VPN users as a warning to others. These are all things that
could happen in the near future. The CCP's methods for cracking down on VPN doesn't necessarily have
to be high-end technical means. Instead, they may use the most old-school social engineering
methods. Recently, the risk of real punishment for climbing the wall is definitely much higher
than before. Everyone must be careful. Finally, I hope all Chinese people inside the high wall
can climb the wall safely and efficiently. And I also hope that one day China will no longer have
an internet firewall. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful, please
like it, drop a comment below, and hit the subscribe button right here. It really helps
YouTube suggest my videos to others. I'll be back with more content soon. Until then, be well.