Alexanders Impossible Conquest Explained -

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The conquest of the Achaemenid Empire by the Greek forces of Alexander III of Macedon
is rightly perceived as one of the most important events in world history.
Leading a highly efficient and innovative military force, the young Macedonian general managed to
conquer the largest superpower the Earth had ever seen up to that point. Many scholars have
tried to answer the question of why Alexander achieved this feat. Sometimes the role is
attributed to Alexander's strategic genius, or to the supposed incompetence of his rival,
Darius III of Persia. The truth, as with any grand-scale military endeavor,
lies in a convergence of factors, from the legacy Alexander inherited from his father Philip,
to the structural weaknesses of the Persian Empire, to Alexander's own remarkable capacity
for military and political improvisation. The first aspect that led to the Alexandrian
onslaught through Iran has very little to do with either Alexander or his rival, Darius III.
That factor is simply the background of the states and societies in which both rulers grew up before
their titanic clashes at Isus and Gaugamela. Alexander, while undoubtedly a military mastermind,
could not have achieved his goals without the legacy of his father, Philip II of Macedon.
Philip was both a seminal military reformer and a shrewd diplomat,
points which we have discussed in our previous videos and on our members-only series
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When Philip came to power, Macedon was under threat from the Illyrian kingdoms to the north
and was, at best, a secondary power in Hellas. His military reforms, with innovations such as
sappers and siege engines, as well as formalizing the use of the longspear known as the sarissa,
turned the kingdom into a powerhouse in Greece. He also managed to either annex or vassalize the
whole of Greece through military campaigns and the League of Corinth. His whole military
career in the second half of the 4th century BCE was devoted to this affair. In addition,
Philip also had plans for attacking Persia and had already sent some preliminary contingents
to Asia Minor that Alexander could use when he began his operations. Thus, Alexander inherited
a strong military from his father, one with experience and strategic cohesion. In addition,
the Greek allies of the Macedonians provided him with both security on his southern flank in Hellas
and additional military personnel that contributed to his success in Persia.
If we turn our eyes to the east, we'll find that Darius III faced a trickier situation to manage,
for the Achaemenid Persian Empire was less stable than it had been under Darius I
and Xerxes in the 5th century BCE. Our sources about 4th century Persia are scarce,
and often only Greek in character, with the usual anti-Persian biases that that implies,
but some information reveals the fragmented nature of Persia at the time.
Before Darius, the previous Shahanshah was Arses, who seems to have ruled for only two years,
338 to 336. He was allegedly under the control of a eunuch called Bagoas,
but this might be a fanciful tale by the Greeks who wish to denigrate the Achaemenids.
Before him, Artaxerxes III ruled for about 20 years, but had to deal with various revolts,
including one in Egypt, which had been independent of Persia for almost six decades.
His own father, Artaxerxes II, also had to fight against his brother Cyrus for control of the
throne, where the Athenian soldier and writer Xenophon served, later recording the experience
Thus, the political environment was rather unstable by the time Darius came to power.
The young Shahanshah is often unfairly portrayed in the sources as a coward or a weakling,
but the truth is that he faced a far harder context to contend with once he came to power.
Political success is often just as much about circumstances as it is about skill,
and in the case of Darius, he inherited a far less robust empire than Alexander.
The Greek general had a strong foundation to build upon, and he used that to his
utmost advantage, whereas Darius had to contend with what he was given.
Besides the background factors which gave Alexander an advantage,
there was also the most fundamental of aspects, that of military innovation.
Here, the importance of Alexander's capacities as commander and tactician
came to the fore on more than one occasion.
The Greek army, which marched into Asia Minor in 334 BCE, was a flexible and well-trained
military machine. Among its ranks lay Greek troops working as both hoplites and peltasts,
as well as experienced mercenaries from the Balkans. The Macedonians, especially the companions
who served with Alexander, were also from aristocratic families that had risen through
the ranks on the basis of their talent, enabling them to devise masterful military strategies.
Other innovative specialist units, such as the Hyaspists, who had light infantry capabilities,
also provided the young king with flexibility on the battlefield.
In addition, Alexander's pesetaeroi were defined by their use of the syriza,
an innovation that enabled greater control over how battles unfolded, thanks to the power of
distance. This is most evident in the Battle of Gorgamella in 331 BCE, where Alexander's ability
to use all of these tools came to the fore. In this decisive third clash with Darius III,
Alexander managed to turn the tables of battle through military improvisation.
During the battle, the Persians managed to pin the Greeks' flanks with their cavalry and chariots,
partly lured by Alexander himself and his companions on the right flank of the Helenes.
However, Alexander managed to use his rearguard to charge from the right wing of the center
formation and break into the Persian center at the back of the battlefield.
The chariots were unable to turn in time, too busy with the Greek flanks. Eventually,
Darius hap to flee for fear of being surrounded and captured, defeated by Alexander's military
skill. Darius's military forces were not incapable of fighting wars, far from it, in fact.
The Achaemenid armies were always a cosmopolitan behemoth of the finest of the thousand nations
ruled by the Achaemenid Empire. However, the aforementioned political turmoil within the
rather labyrinthine structures of the Achaemenid court meant that Darius was not as able to counter
Alexander's march. For instance, Darius did indeed prepare for the Greek attack, ordering the
satraps of Asia Minor to fight off the Helenes. However, there were military issues on multiple
fronts in the late 330s BCE, including a revolt in Egypt. Thus, Darius had to both prepare for
Alexander's coming and also tame the breadbasket of his empire. Unfortunately for Darius, by the
time he managed to bring some stability to Egypt, Alexander had established a foothold in Asia Minor
upon his victory in the Battle of Granicus. The Persian military was also great in number,
but in the two battles in which Darius fought Alexander,
Isis and Gargamela, it proved to be unable to adapt quickly to the tides of battle.
Many explanations have been given for this weakness, from bad leadership by Darius himself,
to the choice of battlefield terrain at the Battle of Isis, to inflexibility in battle tactics.
Whatever the case, Alexander's military capacities were both more robust and more adaptable than
those of Darius. Thus, when the two titans clashed, Persian numbers could not overcome
Greek phalanx. Alexander's success, at least in the first decisive half of the expedition across
Persia's realm, also highly depended on logistical masterstrokes. In our previous video on Alexander's
logistics, we mentioned that Alexander's troops carried a lighter load than previous Greek forces
and rarely used cars. This flexibility of movement was important throughout Alexander's
campaigns, but in Asia Minor and the Levant, he had one further logistical boom.
Alexander's naval support followed him throughout Asia Minor as well as the Levant,
through his important battles in Tyre and Gaza. They provided him with logistical and
provisional support, as the general solidified his control over the western parts of the Persian
Empire. In addition, Asia Minor's populations included Greeks, who were friendly to Alexander,
and gleefully gave him supplies for his early campaigns of the 330s.
Many Levantine and Cypriot cities also submitted and fed Alexander's troops, despite the famous
resistance of the Tyrians. And, of course, the Egyptians, who controlled the great agricultural
wealth of the Nile River, eagerly saw Alexander as a liberator from the Persians they so often
revolted against. Alexander's logistics strained on occasion in Asia Minor, but only really became
unsustainable when he chased after the usurper and murderer of Darius, Bessus. In Bactria,
Sogdiana, Gandara, and Aracosia, where the terrain was far from Persepolis and rather harsh,
Alexander's army did indeed struggle. It was only when they found local support,
like when the Gandharan kings allied with him, that Alexander was spared complete
oblivion. Our sources on the logistics of Darius III are almost non-existent,
so we must speculate based on the Persian Empire's issues at the time.
Darius does seem to have been able to sustain large armies on the march, and to have provisioned
his forward operating hubs in Asia Minor that were manned by local satraps. We must also not forget
that his forces were multinational, and could draw resources from across the empire. It was
thus not a question of how many provisions Darius could acquire, but of where and how to utilize
them. The main disadvantage of his logistics may have stemmed from the army's large size,
it was likely less flexible than Alexander's forces. Whereas the Greeks could cover long
distances with some ease, the Persians still had to maintain their massive trains of supplies and
equipment, along with larger numbers of servile populations to fill support roles such as cooking
and smithing. In addition, the loss of control over Asia Minor and Egypt cost the Achaemenid
forces dearly, for now their main supply lines had to come from further in Persia itself.
Thus, the local logistics of the Persians, who were meant to defend against Alexander until Darius
amassed his tremendous forces, had to rely on often unstable and desertion-prone local
collaborators. The major defeats that Darius faced at Issus and Gorgomela likely shattered
his logistical network, and when Alexander captured Persepolis, Darius lost most of the
legitimacy that had allowed him to muster many resources. Wars of conquest are often just as
won by rhetoric as by arms, and here is where another convergence of circumstances
contributed to Alexander's victory over Darius. The Macedonian youth who entered Asia Minor after
subduing rebels in the Balkans had an ideological mission he preached wherever he went, the
liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor from the Persian yoke and vengeance for the Persian
invasion of Hellas a century and a half prior, or at least, that is what he claimed to his Greek
audience. In reality, Alexander was a masterful political propagandist, keenly adapting his
message to whoever he was addressing. For the Greeks, he focused on his anti-Persian pedigree
and on the liberation of the Hellenes of Asia, but when he went to the Levant and Egypt,
he behaved as both their liberator and as a man who wished to engage with local cultures.
When he ended up taking the family of Darius hostage, he is also said to have treated them
with respect. Over time, and to the dismay of many of his companions, he adopted certain local
elements in clothing and ruling style. For example, he tried to incorporate the Persian customs of the
royal tent and proskynesis, or prostrating oneself before the king of kings, into the way that he was
addressed. As we discussed in our Persianization of Alexander video, the Macedonian general hoped
to build an ideology of universal monarchy using both Greek and Persian elements, a propaganda
tactic which allowed him to assert his control over most of the Persian empire. These methods
may have alienated some of his companions at times, but they gained him support and rapport
with local elites throughout the Persian empire. Alexander's political theatre allowed him to
assert control over the lands he took by the sword and spear. In the case of Darius, we have little
surviving of his propaganda efforts to rally the empire to his side. Given that he was a distant
relative of the Achaemenids, his claim to the throne must have been weak at first, and yet,
he managed to survive on the throne for almost six years and amass a large army against Alexander,
only losing legitimacy when the latter defeated him decisively in battle.
Nor can we readily accept claims that Darius was weak because of the presence of the eunuch
Bagoas at court. This is because our sources discussing the matter are Greek and thus heavily
biased in favour of Alexander. What appears to have been the main issue of Darius's own political
manoeuvring was that the Achaemenid empire was already strained from political turmoil.
For the Levantine and Egyptian audiences that received Alexander, the propaganda of the King
of Kings seemed far less believable after decades of turmoil and revolt. The only remaining audience
that Darius could rely on, the Persian elites, probably could not reconcile his claim to fame
and kingship when Alexander achieved his victory in Gorgomela. The recent victory of the Achaemenid
empire made Darius's political and rhetorical manoeuvring much more difficult than Alexander's,
who was a new power whose ideology was not yet tainted by decades of imperial overreach.
Finally, there were administrative factors that enabled Alexander's victory,
namely his ability to secure the confidence of the elites that he ultimately conquered.
This is not an innovation of the Greek general himself, it was in fact a key ingredient in the
recipe of success for the Achaemenid empire. Alexander's success was in taking these tactics,
as well as other Achaemenid administrative institutions, and using them to his advantage.
Thus, Alexander was not just relying on propaganda to conquer the Persians, but building and adapting
networks with local elites. For instance, when he conquered Ionia upon his landing in Asia Minor,
he restored the democracies of the city-states but ensured they paid vassalage taxes to him.
When he conquered the core of the Persian empire in Persepolis and Susa,
he tried to engage with and maintain many satrapal administrative structures.
Alexander often innovated by placing Greeks in positions of authority alongside some Persian
satraps, as well as by securing the allegiance of many Achaemenid nobles at court. This is
because the Achaemenid empire's political and administrative core was, according to Rolf
Strutman, a large web of social networks which Alexander understood he needed to insert himself
into. This combination of continuity and innovation was key in Alexander securing
control over Persia. Darius III appears not to have been able to have an equal level of control
over both imperial and local social networks. His uneven control over the Achaemenid realm
was a detriment to his ability to block Alexander from establishing a springboard in his territory.
This allowed the Macedonian to gain additional territories through the effective use of
logistical supply chains. It was also much easier for social elites in Judea, Egypt and parts of
Asia Minor to switch their allegiance. Darius, thus, only had the core of the Persian elite to
side with him. He was, however, not able to sustain this support when he was defeated by Alexander.
This weakness may have stemmed from the sheer magnitude of his defeats or from his provincial
origins as a distant relative of the royal family. Thus, Darius fled to the east, to the mountains of
Bactria and Sogdiana, but his alliance structure was insecure and the satrap-turned-pretender
Bessus killed. The convergence of the previous military and propaganda factors, as well as the
instability of the Persian empire, made the administrative foundations of Darius's defense
against the Greek invasion rather shaky. Once they came under the pressure, Darius lost his
legitimacy in the eyes of his fellow nobles. Alexander's swift capture of those institutions
as soon as Darius fled made any counter-attack highly implausible. In the end, it was a
combination of historical factors that allowed for Alexander's conquest of Persia. Alexander's
genius was an important part of the equation, but he also faced a formidable opponent in Darius III.
Thus, it was both Alexander's ability to easily establish a foothold in Asia Minor
and the issues rocking the Persian empire that gave him a solid foundation for victory.
In addition, Philip's military reforms and Alexander's own strategic capabilities
enabled a push into Persia and the Levant. Alexander's own diplomatic and administrative
skills, along with the use of Achaemenid and Levantine officials, helped cement Greek rule,
and the stunning military victories at Gorgomela, Isis, and Granicus
ultimately cost Darius his power base. Alexander's victory was not inevitable,
and was partly due to favorable circumstances, but it was also built on prudent foundations
and Alexander's own ability to innovate, as well as the reliability of his companions.
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