China, Iran, Trump: A new global power shift? | DW News

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AI GeneratedThe conflict involving Iran has become a focal point for the power struggle between Washington and Beijing. China is leveraging its economic ties with Iran and its role as a diplomatic mediator to enhance its global standing, while the U.S. faces depleted military resources and strained alliances, potentially shifting the strategic balance in favor of China.
The Iran war is now becoming entangled with the broader power struggle between Washington and
Beijing, with China increasingly positioning itself at the center of efforts to limit the
fallout from the conflict. Beijing is Iran's biggest economic lifeline. Before the war,
China bought most of Iran's sanctioned oil, helping to keep Tehran's economy afloat.
Iran's top diplomat, Abbas Arachi, was in Beijing on Wednesday, seeking China's continuing support
as Iran finds itself under increasing international pressure to reopen the
Strait of Hormuz to stabilize global energy markets. Beijing will host the other side in
this conflict next week when Donald Trump arrives for talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The
Trump administration has been urging China to use its influence with Iran to help defuse tensions
in the Gulf. China always believes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Middle Eastern and Gulf countries should be effectively respected and civilians and non-military
targets should be protected. The urgent task is to immediately implement a comprehensive ceasefire
to prevent the spread of war. So what does China want from this conflict and could the Iran war
ultimately shift the balance of power between Washington and Beijing? Kelly Grieco is a senior
fellow at the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. She's a military
and security analyst with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. Welcome to the day. Let's start
with yesterday's meeting between the Iranian and Chinese foreign minister. President Trump
is due there in a week. Has China picked a side in this war? I mean, effectively, yes,
they picked the Chinese side for sure. What I think we're seeing is they're clearly supporting
Iran to an extent. Diplomatically, they're providing cover for Iran. There's reports
that they're continuing to provide dual use components for their drones. But they're also
walking a fine line here and that they've also signaled their limits to Chinese support. For
example, today, the announcement that they've told banks not to provide new loans to Iranian oil
facilities. So, you know, clearly aligning themselves more with Iran, but walking a fine
line. And for all Beijing's talk through this war about de-escalation and diplomacy and the need
for stability, is China quietly benefiting from this war? I mean, it clearly is. I do think that
actually Iran, you know, China would like actually for this war to be over. It is economically
exposed. They have deep oil reserves, but that doesn't last forever. And generally,
the Chinese, you know, don't like this kind of instability in places. But they are clearly
benefiting from it. And I think you see this, you know, quite a bit even in the Indo-Pacific itself,
because, you know, Asian allies are being and partners are being hard hit by the closure of
the Strait of Hormuz. And while China announced a ban on exports of oil early in this conflict,
it's actually not a complete ban. And what we've seen is that they've been doling out
favours, if you will, to countries where they have improved relations like Vietnam and Australia,
providing some measure of relief to those countries. So, positioning itself in many
regards as a constructive player, and also a country that has some solutions to this kind of
pain. And as it sort of sits back and watches these two sides knock lumps out of each other,
I wonder about the lessons that Beijing is taking from this war when it comes to Taiwan
and future US military capacity. Yes, I mean, clearly they're learning quite a bit. And I
want to say what's important here is that it's validating actually a lot of what the Chinese
already thought about US military vulnerabilities. If you look at Chinese military writings,
they talk extensively about the vulnerability of US air bases, about the critical enablers,
for American air power, things like aerial refueling tankers, early warning aircraft.
And they're well aware of the limits on US interceptors and long-range munitions. And so,
all the things that they've designed their military strategy to exploit against the United
States in a potential confrontation over Taiwan, they're seeing lots of validation of that in terms
of Iran's success against the United States. So, I think it will bolster their confidence
in their own strategy. And equally, this war has forced Gulf states to reassess their security
alliances. What initially was thought to be an advantage of having America cast its blanket
over them has turned out to be not such a good thing given that that's made them targets for
Iran. What role might China have in the post-war regional order? Yeah, it's a great question. I
think what we're going to see is going to be a need for real significant rebuilding in some of
these countries, certainly infrastructure that's been hard hit. And I think you'll see certainly
a role in Chinese firms in trying to win some of those contracts. But I think the bigger question
you're really asking here is, will some of these Gulf states decide that the United States is not
a reliable strategic partner, doesn't want the United States, US bases on their soil, and maybe
replace the United States with China and Chinese security guarantees? I don't think that's actually
what these countries will seek. I don't think they want to replace one set of problems with another.
I think they're going to try to be more strategically independent. But I would also
just say that there's no indication that China really wants to play that role in the region.
In some respects, they're smarter than the United States, and that they're careful to
not put themselves in a position where they might get entangled in Middle East conflicts.
It's really interesting that, isn't it, if you sort of take a gross look at it. On the one hand,
you might say America is there flying the flag and saying, we lead the world, whereas China is
sort of sitting back, letting them get on with it, and quietly doing its bit to lead the bit of the
world that it wants to lead, without making a great big song and dance about it. Absolutely.
And in doing it in a way that they're not necessarily going to pay high costs if they fail.
So I think it's been interesting in the last week, for example, we've seen the Iranians have
gone to Beijing to try to shore up diplomatic support. And at the same time, we've seen the
administration very publicly now trying to put on pressure to Beijing to be a constructive actor,
to make the Iranians more reasonable at the negotiating table. So in other words, everyone's
trying to curry favor with Beijing to try to facilitate these kinds of negotiations. And so
it's really setting up the Chinese to position themselves as the more responsible, reasonable
actor that's trying to promote a return to peace and stability. Okay. So has this war also
strengthened China's hand in the Indo-Pacific? Are there benefits to China in drawing up the
conflict, perhaps? Yes, for sure. I mean, there are a few, I think, big ones here. One, of course,
is that the United States has expended a lot of military capability, particularly on munitions and
interceptors in the Middle East that are now not available for any kind of contingency in the
Indo-Pacific. And that is going to take years to be able to rebuild those stockpiles we went through,
which, frankly, weakens U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific in the years ahead. And so that is
certainly a big one. The second I would just say is what we talked about earlier about Gulf states
finding that having U.S. bases on their soil makes them a target. You'd have to think that
some allies and partners have watched that with concern and thinking about if there is, let's say,
a Taiwan contingency, whether they will also find themselves in the crosshairs receiving Chinese
attacks because they host U.S. forces. And I've seen even some writings out of the Philippines
expressing this kind of concern. And so something that the Chinese can certainly exploit. And then
the third one, I think, is just certainly that the more the U.S. is seen as the party that is
challenging the existing order, flouting the rules and the norms, the criticism and the spotlight is
on the United States and not on China for its own behavior, which creates space for that in the
region. OK, so if we think ahead then to Donald Trump's impending visit to Beijing next week,
how much has this war shifted the dynamic between these two rivals? Has it exposed or created
strengths or weaknesses on either side? Yes. I mean, you know, to some extent, I think
if it is the case that the president is going to Beijing next week and there isn't some kind
of framework agreement, something on the table that sort of indicates that there could be a
real serious diplomatic solution to the Middle East, he's going to be going there looking for
Chinese help. And that shifts the dynamic. You know, the Chinese may offer that kind of help,
but they're going to want concessions and significant concessions. And I will just say
that the other part of this is that the United States administration is distracted. There's no
way around that. And so coming into this high stakes summit that was supposed to be very important,
it's being overshadowed by U.S. actions in the Middle East. And so the degree to which the
administration has been able to focus on preparing for this summit, making sure it's successful,
has to have necessarily been reduced. Thank you for talking us through that so clearly. Kelly
from the Stimson Center. Thank you. Thank you.
