LIVE: Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Missile Defense Activities

Live News Network
1.4K followers
4 Video Views·Apr 27, 2026
The Senate Armed Services Committee holds a hearing to examine Department of War missile defense activities in review of the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2027 and the Future Years Defense Program at 3:30 p.m. ET on April 27.
Witnesses:
Marc J. Berkowitz, assistant secretary of defense for space policy
Gen. Michael A. Guetlein, direct reporting program manager for Golden Dome for America
Lt. Gen. Heath A. Collins, director of the Missile Defense Agency
Lt. Gen. Francisco J. Lozano, portfolio acquisition executive for Fires of the U.S. Army
The hearing will come to order. Welcome to our witnesses today and thank you for your service
to this country. We look forward to hearing your testimony. As everyone here understands,
the United States faces a very different threat environment than ever before. Our adversaries
are developing non-ballistic threats, including hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles
designed to hold our homeland at risk. Our adversaries have also spent decades
building multi-layered defensive systems, often referred to in the past as anti-access area
denial capabilities. While the department did begin programs to modernize our ability to defend
against limited ICBM attacks from a rogue actor, the United States has failed to make a similar
investment to defend against a broader range of attacks. We now have a real opportunity to build
a homeland defense architecture capable of meeting the threats that we currently face.
General Gutlein, you have been granted extraordinary authorities as the direct
reporting program manager for Golden Dome. While I appreciate our conversations on Golden Dome in
classified settings, I look forward to sharing more with the American public this afternoon
on why we need to improve our missile defense posture and how you plan to do so in a cost
effective manner. Lieutenant General Collins, I look forward to hearing what progress has been
made on enduring missile defense agency programs, including the Next Generation Interceptor and
Glide Phase Interceptor, as well as how MDA is supporting Golden Dome. Assistant Secretary
Berkowitz, your deep expertise in missile defense and deterrence policy is an invaluable resource
for this department, and I appreciate your frankness and insight into the risks and the
opportunities before us. General Lozano, the Army's contributions towards regional and forward
deploy missile defense systems cannot be overstated. I look forward to hearing more
about these systems and an update on the defense of Guam. With that, I would recognize Senator
King for any opening remarks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm going to submit my opening remarks
for the record, some very detailed points that I think will come up in the hearing,
and we can proceed directly to our witnesses. Thank you. Thank you, Senator King. Again,
welcome to our panel today. Secretary Berkowitz, would you begin with your opening comments, please?
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of War's missile defense activities.
It's an honor to appear with my colleagues General Gutlein, Lieutenant General Collins,
and Lieutenant General Lozano. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the
security environment. The pace and scale of the threat is unprecedented. Our rivals are expanding,
diversifying, and increasing the sophistication of their arsenals of missiles and aerial weapons.
They are integrating offensive strike and missile defense systems into joint operations
to deny access and impose costs. By threatening America's safety, territorial integrity,
and economic prosperity, rivals aim to undermine our political will, societal cohesion and morale,
and ability to project power. President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these
challenges and secure peace. He issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden
Dome for America, a comprehensive next-generation defense against the most catastrophic threats
facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical
infrastructure, and second-strike capability. The President's Golden Dome for America initiative
is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It's a necessary and pragmatic response
to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles,
as well as other next-generation aerial weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our nuclear deterrent.
Today, our capability to defend the nation is limited, and its effectiveness is eroding against
increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense
in depth of the United States. It will defend against accidental, unauthorized, rogue, decapitation,
and coercive attacks. In contrast to the current limited defense system, consisting of a single
layer of ground-based midcourse defense interceptors, multiple terrestrial and space-based
defensive layers will complicate adversary attack planning and provide more engagement opportunities
to destroy incoming threats. Combined with the prospect of retaliation,
the Golden Dome will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the ability to achieve
their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, it will save lives and limit damage
should deterrence break down. The cost of the Golden Dome, while significant,
is a necessary investment to protect assets of truly incalculable value. The lives of our
citizens and the territorial integrity of our nation. The cost of failing to defend our homeland
would be infinitely greater. China is our pacing competitor. We will deter China from a position of
strength with a denial defense along the first island chain. Our regional missile defense posture,
centered on Aegis destroyers as well as terminal high-altitude area defense and Patriot batteries,
provides a forward-deployed, layered, integrated air and missile defense network. As Operation
Epic Fury underscores, regional missile defense is essential to protect and defend our forces,
allies, and partners. Our global alliances will remain a strategic vantage if our allies and
partners invest properly in defense. The Department will continue to pursue opportunities for missile
defense and defeat cooperation to increase burden-sharing capacity and interoperability.
We're also supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base by cutting bureaucratic red
tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks, and leveraging private
sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical missile defense and
defeat capabilities at scale. In closing, with the continued support of Congress,
the War Department will invest in the missile defense and defeat programs
necessary to achieve peace through strength. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General Gutlein, welcome. You are recognized for your opening comments.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to report on the progress of Golden Dome for America.
We are here today because the global strategic landscape has changed. For the first time in a
generation, our nation's margin of safety has vanished. While we have been focused on the
away game, our adversaries have been working around the clock to challenge us at home,
and today the homeland is exposed and relatively undefended. A new generation of advanced
air and missile threats, unprecedented in their speed, numbers, and lethality, now holds the
American homeland at risk. Our adversaries are not just expressing the intent, they are
demonstrating the capability to threaten our families and our way of life. This threat is not
theoretical. We see it unfolding in front of our own eyes every day on our televisions. It is real,
it is growing, and we must meet it with American resolve. Golden Dome for America is the
administration's bold and decisive answer to this danger. It is the cornerstone of our strategy to
rapidly improve the defensive equation of the homeland and to ensure peace through strength.
This is not another weapons system. It is a layered, integrated shield designed to defend
the homeland against the full spectrum of advanced threats. This vision is ambitious, but it is
achievable. The foundational technology exists today, and we are moving with the utmost urgency
to bring it to bear. Our strategy is built on speed, affordability, and partnerships. My priority
is establishing a unified command and control network to link our existing battle-proven systems
and field-credible defenses now. With the resources authorized by this committee, we are also
investing in next-generation technology to dramatically increase our defensive capacity
and fundamentally drive down the cost per intercept for generations to come. Make no mistake, the
greatest challenge here is not technical, it is organizational. Success requires forging unity of
effort across the federal government, and as the Golden Dome Director, I have been granted
unprecedented authorities to do just that. The leaders on this panel before you today, along
with NORTHCOM, represent this new way of doing business. We are working as one team. NORTHCOM is
my number one customer. The Missile Defense Agency is integrating the architecture and delivering
cutting-edge capabilities. The Army is building the operational framework, and policy is deterring
our adversaries. In addition, we are transforming our relationship with the industrial base,
using innovative partnerships and prize-based competitions to unleash the full power of
American innovation. Golden Dome is a generational investment in the security of our nation.
It is a promise to the American people and a clear message to our adversaries
that their reckless and aggressive actions will not go unanswered. With your continued support
and resourcing, we will deliver a defense that protects every American. We owe nothing less to
our children and our children's children. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, General Gutlein. General Collins, welcome. You are recognized for your comments.
Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for your continued, unwavering support of the missile defense mission.
Since its initial founding as the Strategic Defense Initiative Office in 1983,
and through its current establishment as the Missile Defense Agency in 2002,
the men and women of this missile defense enterprise have made the impossible possible,
hitting a bullet with a bullet. And we have integrated disparate capabilities from services,
agencies, and nations into an effective weapons system proven in combat in recent years,
months, and days. We have developed, globally delivered, and evolved the missile defense system
since it went operational in 2004 to address evolving threats, leverage new technology,
and align with the nation's national policy. MDA has leveraged its extensive experience in
integrating, testing, and delivering technologically advanced missile defense
systems to deliver on its promises and commitments to our nation, and provide the warfighter the
battle-proven, lethal, and effective systems that have saved thousands of lives.
This team has adapted to the changing character of war, but the mission is not done. Recent
operations have only highlighted the increasing pace of change, and MDA is increasing our
acquisition tempo to maintain relevancy. Today, MDA is pressing ahead to continue developing and
delivering the disruptive, lethal, resilient, agile, and affordable capabilities required
today and tomorrow for the defense of the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our
international partners. We continue our transformation into the fast and agile
enterprise the nation needs, and we are renewing our focus on delivering cutting-edge capabilities
across the air, land, sea, and space domains. With the ongoing transition and transfer of
proven missile defense systems, MDA will invest more purposely in the development,
experimentation, integration, testing, and delivery of breakthrough technologies
and foundational missile defense capabilities. MDA will continue to develop and test system
elements, components, and technologies for this new generation of capabilities,
what we're calling missile defense system next, and it will continue to operate as the system
of systems integrator for the homeland defense architecture developed and delivered by the
Golden Dome for America. MDA is aligned with Golden Dome, I with General Gutlein,
to deliver the critical capabilities required to defend our homeland and our nation's interests.
In closing, I'd like to honor those who have paid the ultimate price in the service to our country
and thank those warfighters, civilians, contractor professionals, and their families
of those operating the missile defense system around the world around the clock in harm's way
today. They honor us with their selflessness and sacrifice. I greatly appreciate your steadfast
support for MDA and your commitment to providing the resources necessary to execute the missile
defense mission. Recent conflicts have proven and cemented the vital role missile defense plays
in the strategic environment and on the battlefield. Thank you. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you, General Collins. General Lozano, you are recognized for your comments, sir.
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and members of this subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the criticality of defending the island
of Guam. On behalf of Army senior leadership, we thank you for your continued support of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and their families. Guam is an
undisputable part of the homeland and I cannot overstate its strategic criticality as the home
of American citizens. Defending Guam is unquestionable. It is a geo-strategic location
that makes it central to the deterrence efforts against our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific,
serving as a critical hub for power projection, logistics, and regional operations. Our ongoing
efforts center on defending against increasingly sophisticated and evolving threats. As the joint
program acquisition executive, our organization is charged with synchronizing the development,
testing, integration, fielding, and sustainment of the Guam defense system components.
These components span across 25 prototype efforts and programs of record in the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and the Missile Defense Agency. The joint program acquisition executive also serves as the
developer for the Guam Defense System Battle Manager. This suite of products allows current
service and agency developed weapon systems and command and control to behave as a unified system.
Guam currently hosts multiple systems that not only deliver critical defensive capabilities,
but also provide soldiers with valuable training and hands-on experience. In the past year,
the Army has fielded a lower-tier air and missile defense sensor known as LTAMS,
and that battery is on the island. Additionally, a terminal high-altitude area defense battery
known as Task Force Talon is fully integrated and actively operated by soldiers stationed there.
An AN-TPY-6 radar panel provided by the Missile Defense Agency also serves as a key element of
Guam's defense system architecture, contributing to a comprehensive 360-degree coverage of the
island. With initial operating capability taking place in fiscal year 27, the GDS architecture
will continue to evolve to outpace the threat and could incorporate new technologies in the future,
such as directed energy. Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here.
I look forward to your questions about the Guam defense system.
Thank you, General. Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, I'd like to begin with you and General Gutlein.
In this setting, what threats is GDA being designed to defend against? And perhaps more
importantly, how well is the homeland defended against those threats today?
Thank you for the opportunity to underscore a critical rationale for the program.
As I indicated in my opening statements, we are in a very complex and dangerous security
environment where our rivals have dramatically expanded their missile and aerial arsenals.
Those include ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and other
advanced aerial weapon systems. The threat they pose, whether nuclear armed or even conventional,
are truly grave threats to our homeland, to the American population, to our critical
infrastructures, and to our second strike capability. And that is the reason why the
president took the initiative to order the department to pursue the Golden Dome initiative.
If you could remind me about your second part of your question, please.
Can we defend against those threats today?
Today we have a very limited ground-based, single-layer homeland defense system that
was specifically designed against a small-scale rogue attack from North Korea. We have very
limited capability against any other attack with ballistic missiles, and we have no defense against
hypersonic weapons or cruise missiles today. I would say advanced cruise missiles.
General Gutlein, would you like to add anything to that?
Yes, Chairwoman. So Golden Dome is designed to good after the next generation aerial threats,
which includes unmanned aerial systems against our homeland, cruise missiles, hypersonic,
and maneuvering hypersonic missiles, as well as ballistics from the air and ballistics from the
sea. Today, as Secretary Berkowitz discussed, we were really focused on the rogue nation
intercontinental ballistic missile threat to protect the homeland, and then we relied on
our oceans to take the fight to the enemy. That distance has been quickly eroded by their
technology. So Golden Dome is protecting for both conventional threats that we see unfolding on
television every day, as well as nuclear-capable threats that could be brought against the homeland.
General Gutlein, in the President's fiscal year 27 budget request for Golden Dome, it included
over $17 billion in the mandatory portion of the request. In this setting,
can you tell us why it is critical for these funds to be provided to Golden Dome this cycle,
and what happens if we wait to fund these programs until fiscal year 28 or even later?
Thank you, Chairman, for that question. Today, as we stated, the homeland is relatively
undefended. Our number one objective is to change the homeland defense equation as fast as we
possibly can, with the objective of delivering an operational capability to protect against
those next-generation aerial threats by the summer of 2028. Are you ready, in your plan,
to be able to put that $17 billion to good use, and then to be ready in FY28
for more funding to continue the build-out? Absolutely, Chairman. Chairman, we have
completely gotten the entire architecture approved. We know what the testing strategy
is going to be to get us to the summer of 2028, and we are postured to rapidly put those funds
on contract efficiently and affordably to deliver an operational capability in the summer of 2028.
Great. And what's the total projected cost of Golden Dome, and how will you ensure that the
taxpayers' money is going to be spent responsibly? What's going to happen if portions of the planned
architecture turn out to be not feasible from a cost perspective? Chairman, that's a great
question. Currently, the estimated cost of Golden Dome, with the objective architecture out into the
2030s, is $185 billion. That's the $175 billion that the President announced when he stood up
Golden Dome, plus an additional $10 billion to accelerate space capabilities that were not
originally part of our architecture. We have built the foundation of Golden Dome upon a scalable,
modular architecture, using affordable elements and taking advantage of competition and innovation
from industry to deliver those elements, and we have scaled it so that it is multilayered
and integrated. If any component of the architecture cannot deliver on time,
we have pathways to pivot away from that and embrace a different technology.
Thank you, General Gutleit. Senator King. I have a couple of more general questions. Number one,
I'm very concerned about the way this is being funded. In this year's budget,
almost 25% of the budget is in this reconciliation slush fund that doesn't go through the normal
appropriations process. It makes defense a partisan process, which I think is unfortunate.
The Senator and I were here in the days of OCO. This is son of OCO, and it's a fund that doesn't
have the oversight of the United States Congress. Yes, it's authorized by Congress,
but in a purely partisan way. Since I've been sitting on this committee, all of our work has
been bipartisan until now. I don't understand how this all happened. You talk about mandatory
spending. Mandatory spending is Social Security and Medicare. This isn't mandatory spending. This
is the American taxpayer's dollars, and it's our responsibility to shepherd those dollars
and to approve and work through and have oversight over programs created. I thought Mr.
Harwich said it was the President's initiative and continued support of Congress. The President
gets to say we're going to do a $150, $200, $300 billion project, and Congress can sit meekly by
and say, okay, we'll write the check for you. I don't understand. I'm very disturbed by the
precedent that this has created, which is basically for this year, I understand, is about 25% of the
defense budget is out of the consideration of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services
Committee, and the chairman of our committee is reduced to saying, will you hopefully follow the
precedents of Congress? We've heard it saying at multiple committee meetings, rather than the
process that is supposed to take place, which is the President proposes, the Congress considers
the risks and the costs and enables and authorizes the program. I don't know if any of you want to
respond to this, but I really am very concerned about the process that we're talking about here.
None of you personally have any responsibility, but we're talking about taking 25% of the defense
budget away from the Appropriations Committee and effectively away from the authorizing the
Armed Services Committee and handing it to OMB and the White House. That's not the way our system
is supposed to work. Mr. Horwitz, can you give me some reason why it should be done this way
and not through the ordinary appropriation process that's stood this country in good stead for a
My understanding is that the rationale for making the request as part of the reconciliation part of
the budget is to accelerate the President's initiative and to provide flexibility. That's
another way of saying, we don't want to mess with that messy congressional thing where they consider
and have hearings, right? You just want to do it because the President wants it. Is that what you're
saying? Accelerate. No, sir. What I'm saying is that this is a one-time request for a plus-up to
accelerate. This is the second year of reconciliation. This isn't a one-time request. This is year number
two. The other part of the rationale is that it provides flexibility given the rapidly changing
dynamic of advanced technology, sir. Well, I really don't like this process. I think it's a huge
mistake, and I think Congress is one more abdication of Congress' responsibility and authority
to take care of the taxpayers' money. General Lozano, what's the cost of defending Guam,
what you outlined? What's the total cost of the defense that you outlined in your testimony?
Thank you, sir, for your question. Right now we're tracking a total cost of about
three and a half billion, sir. Okay. Three and a half billion. So the total cost of
Golden Dome projected, I think, is $175 billion. Divide that. I'm not very good at doing math in
my head, but that comes out. What is it? I'll do it right in front of you. Divide it by 3.5.
It would be about 50,000 times that. I mean, we're talking about a very significant cost.
General Gutlein, can you do Golden Dome and protect like Guam is being protected
with that $175 billion budget? We can absolutely protect the homeland for $175 billion. Senator,
the difference is Guam is a point defense, and it needs to be self-contained and self-defended,
whereas the protection of the homeland is an area defense. When you say area defense,
what does that mean? That means the whole country, Montana, isn't necessarily going to
be protected or Iowa. You're protecting everything simultaneously. So if you were
trying to protect a single jewel in a museum, you would have to put down an enormous amount
of protection measures and defensive measures to protect that one jewel. If you step back and
you're trying to protect the entire museum, you can now go back to a regional defense,
protect the perimeter without having to dedicate all those point defenses. That's really the
big difference between the way we're protecting Guam and the way we're going to protect the
homeland. So the budget that you have, you can protect the entire homeland, the villages of
Louisiana or New Mexico or Montana or Maine, with the system that you're proposing. It's not
designed to protect particular areas like the national capital or other major metropolitan
areas? Golden Dome is designed to protect the entire homeland from that array of threats,
whether that be counter UAS, cruise missiles, hypersonics, or even ballistics from the air,
ballistics from sea, the entire homeland to include Alaska and Hawaii. And after Guam,
the defense of Guam is delivered, Guam will be part of the defense of the homeland as well.
My time is up. We'll have a second round, I presume, Madam Chair.
Since we have no other members here, I think we'll continue if you're good with that, Senator King.
General Gutlein and General Collins, I have a question for you. Can you walk us through the
role that Missile Defense Agency has in supporting Golden Dome? I don't know how you want to work
this. Who wants to start? If you're okay, Madam Chairwoman, I'll start.
What we wanted to do is take advantage of the vast resources and the expertise of the Missile
Defense Agency, which has been around for several decades. So under the authorities memo that the
Secretary of War gave me, they aligned the Missile Defense Agency under the operational control of
Golden Dome to do the system to systems integration, to do the testing, and to do the
transition from development into operations to take advantage of the vast expertise and resources
of the Missile Defense Agency. So under Golden Dome, General Collins is actually dual-hatted as
my deputy for systems and systems engineering, as well as the director for the Missile Defense
Agency reporting to the director for research and engineering within the Department of War.
Thank you, General Collins. And in your answer, if you could, if you could talk a little bit about
that integration that we did yesterday at our meeting in classified, and if you could bring
that up a little bit. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Certainly to build on General Gutlein's
comments, Missile Defense Agency, and I mentioned in my opening comments, we have a long history of
integrating disparate capabilities into effective combat proven missile defense systems.
And the big ask that comes with Golden Dome is part of that as well. One additional thing,
we are also an acquirer of a number of those capabilities as well. So we are acquiring
capabilities to deliver, and then we're the integration lead for Golden Dome across all
the services and agencies as we go forward. That integration role really covers down on a number
of different parts of what integration means. There's program integration, making sure all of
the acquisitions and deliveries and schedules are integrated together. Earlier today, ma'am,
we talked about an integrated master schedule and how we're in an integrating office that we stood
up are really the source of bringing in the capabilities and the schedules from all of
the different partners, integrating those together. So General Gutlein has insight
into execution as well as all the interdependencies across the enterprise.
Another integration is systems integration, more of the technical integration piece.
My chief engineer at Missile Defense Agency works shoulder to shoulder with General Gutlein's chief
engineer, and they really make sure that technically the technical integration, the
requirements, the interfaces, and the management of those interfaces are tied together seamlessly
so that when the kit arrives, it all works together as a single weapon system. And then
we're building below that as well. How do we integrate with operations? How do we integrate
with the warfighter interagency and the like? And so all of those are part of that integrating
office, and it's really part of the DNA of Missile Defense Agency in support of General Gutlein and
Golden Dome for America. I'd ask any witness this. We're looking at a generational investment here in
Homeland Defense, and we want to make sure it's going to be what we need in order to meet the
threats that we have. Are you working with industry so we have the best concepts and technology
available for this? And when you work with industry partners, the second and third tier of
Are you making sure that those supply lines can't be exploited in the future or even now?
Chairman, I'll take that. We are absolutely working in partnership with industry. I have
personally met with well over 400 individual companies over the past six to eight months
to share with them my problems, but also to understand how they can solve our problems.
We have stood up the C2 Consortium, the Command and Control Consortium, which includes both the
traditional contractors as well as new entrants. There are 11 of them now working in partnership
to deliver our next generation command and control capability. And then as of last week,
we stood up what we call the Ecosystem Hub. The Ecosystem Hub is a one-stop shop for industry to
come do business with Golden Dome. It's a single point of entry. It includes two-way communications
to have transparent dialogue back and forth. It has strategic matchmaking. I can connect them to
anybody in the federal government that may be in need of their services or their capabilities.
It has a security and resilience element to it. We have brought on companies like Exeger
and Govini to do supply chain resilience down to the multiple levels deep into the supply chain
to look for alternatives to expand the supply chain and diversify it. And then we have also
partnered them with a red team that goes in and helps them figure out how the threat is going to
manifest itself, how to protect and defend themselves against that threat in a very
transparent and partnering type manner. So we are embracing industry like we've never
embraced industry in the past. Thank you, General. Senator King.
What's the estimate of the number of missiles, UAVs, and other attack elements that China has?
What do we know? Senator, those numbers are classified,
but they range depending on the type of threat from several hundred to several tens of thousands.
I guess one of my questions about Golden Dome is that the cornerstone of our defense strategy
for 80 years has been deterrence, mutually assured destruction. And we live through a
period of the second half of the 20th century where we faced an aggressive adversary with a
lot of capability, strategic missiles, bombers, the whole range, without any Golden Dome.
And what protected us wasn't sensors and missiles, but the idea of deterrence, that if we are struck,
we will strike back in such a way as to impose unacceptable costs on the adversary.
What has changed that makes this new initiative necessary from the experience that we had with
the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century? They had bombers, they had missiles,
they had strategic capability, they had ICBMs. And that's what we're talking about that China has.
Why is it that we suddenly need a defense shield when we went without one for 70 years and it
worked? Mr. Horowitz? Thank you for the question, Senator.
I am being a little argumentative, but I'm genuinely skeptical and want to understand
why this is necessary now when it wasn't necessary when we faced a similar threat,
perhaps more aggressive from the Soviet Union. Well, thank you for the question. I think it is
a very important question that Congress and the American public must understand to be able to
support the program's rationale. What I'd say is that the strategic environment has changed
dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and that we're no longer facing just a single
monolithic threat. We're now facing multiple nuclear armed rivals who have increasingly
sophisticated missile and aerial capabilities, first off. The second thing I'd say...
Deterrence. While this is all going on, we're upgrading our own triad very substantially in
terms of our ICBMs, in terms of new bombers and new nuclear submarines. So, why won't deterrence
work with China if it worked for 50 years or 80 years with the Russians?
I believe that strategic stability cannot be based on U.S. societal vulnerability to assured
retaliation. Our competitors clearly do not accept that their societal vulnerability contributes to
stability. Both Russia and China, and for that matter, other actors, have long pursued their
integrated air and missile defense systems. Their objections to U.S. missile defenses are not
really about preserving strategic stability. They're aimed at weakening or constraining
our own defense capabilities that would complicate their ability to use coercive threats
or to attack the United States. In short, what they've been doing is insisting that U.S.
vulnerability is stabilizing while simultaneously rejecting such vulnerability for themselves.
As I said earlier, the Golden Dome is intended to be a complement to our nuclear deterrent
because in conjunction with our nuclear triad, a homeland missile defense capability will provide
us both a sword and a shield that'll have a synergistic benefit to strengthen deterrence.
Should deterrence fail, it'll provide a means to protect the territorial integrity of the nation
and the lives of our citizens. Thank you. General, knowing that we're in an open setting,
can you explain how Golden Dome would work? In answer to my question about Guam,
you said, well, this isn't like Guam. We're not protecting particular places. By the way,
I did my math. If we protected particular places in the U.S., we could do 50 if we had the same
costs that we have in Guam. But you're saying the system doesn't work that way. Can you give us the
concept of how it would work rather than having THAAD batteries around Kansas City, for example?
Absolutely, Ranking Member. If you look at the way we fight the away game,
every one of our weapons systems has to be self-contained so that it can operate in a
bare bones environment, that it can operate independently, disconnected from the larger
enterprise. But that is not the way we need to defend the United States. Rather than having
all those point defenses being able to operate independently, we can actually bring that
capability back to the United States, integrate it, network it in new and innovative ways,
layer it, bring to bear multi-domain capabilities, automate it, and then take advantage of the next
generation level of processing artificial intelligence to make sense out of a greater
array of data to get a better fire control solution. So it allows us...
Missiles coming from China. What's the defense? You used a lot of words there,
but are we still talking about THAADs and Patriots, or are we talking about something
entirely different? Ranking Member, we're talking about something different.
Well, tell us what it is. We are integrating and networking an array
of effectors and an array of sensors using next-gen technology to get a greater magazine depth at a
lower cost per intercept. Okay. So when you talk magazine depth,
we still are talking some kind of kinetic response. We are talking about kinetics. We're
talking about non-kinetics. We're talking about left of launch. We are talking about a whole host
of capabilities in a layered effect to include directed energy and bring it to bear in new and
innovative ways. We cannot go into the specifics of the effectors nor the magazine depth,
but it is a different set of capabilities than what we currently have for the away game.
You said directed energy just because you knew that was something I was going to respond to.
Thank you. He does. He does. Thank you very much. And again, I'm not trying to be argumentative,
but my job is to represent the American people who I think deserve to understand
how this thing would work, why we're doing it, whether it will, in fact, increase our security.
And as I said at the beginning, how it's being funded. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Senator King. If Senator Rosen's ready, she just joined us.
Take your time. Get a breath. You made good time then. Good to see you.
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here. Thank you for holding the hearing. And
thank you for your service to our country. I really appreciate that. And well,
I'm going to talk a little bit about Golden Dome and the vulnerabilities that are there.
I'm going to move this a little bit closer. There we go. So the proposed Golden Dome
architecture represents a significant expansion of the U.S. Missile Defense Network,
integrating a wide variety of systems, numerous touch points that, of course, have to be
protected. An example would be the Command Control Battle Management and Communication
System that serves as the global network linking disparate sensors and shooters. So,
General Gutlein, can you talk to me about how the department is addressing the wide variety
of systems and numerous touch points that need to be protected in such a complex,
interconnected system? Thank you, Senator. The threats that you are talking about are
very detrimental to our capabilities. When we first stood up Golden Dome,
the first thing we did was architect in cyber resiliency from the start. Whereas,
traditionally, our legacy systems had to be architected after the fact, we actually brought
to bear cyber resiliency from the beginning. Then we stood up what we call the GDA Ecosystem Hub.
It's actually a collaborative effort with industry to help them protect their IP and
to protect their systems. So, we have red teams that can go into industry and show them how the
threat is going to manifest itself and how to protect and defend themselves against that threat
in a very collaborative and partnering way going forward. From a command and control perspective,
we brought to bear some of the leaders of industry that know how to do this.
They are architecting in cyber resiliency from the very foundation of our command and control
capability that brings to bear all the legacy C2 systems. GDA becomes basically the glue layer,
if you will, federating all of these in a machine-to-machine interface with cyber
resiliency as a foundation. I think that's really critical because if we don't work with the public
sector, that interconnectivity, every touch point is a point of vulnerability, to your point.
I want to talk about building on that. I appreciate what you're doing there,
bringing in industry partners, building that cyber resiliency in from the bottom or from the
bottom, from the top, from every side. I guess we'll say it like that. But I want to ask you
to consider that adversaries like China are employing already jamming capabilities,
other technical means to confuse our missile defense systems. What measures are you taking
then to ensure the integrity of the data layer and prevent that cyber interference from degrading our
defensive response during a conflict? We have built in a layered set of capabilities,
multi-domain set of capabilities so that we do not have a single point of failure.
And where we can, we have pulled our capabilities off of the grid to be able to operate independently
at the tactical edge, if necessary, and if they are disconnected from the broader enterprise,
if you will. Thank you. I want to move on to talk a little bit about some lessons learned
in missile defense. Because our current real world air and missile defense in the Middle East,
in Ukraine, well, we know they provided insights into how advanced air and missile
defense systems perform under extreme stress. So these engagements have highlighted not only
the effectiveness of layered defense architectures, but also the challenges.
And I so appreciate your focus on resiliency, redundancy, and all of that. It's just critical.
But the challenges are posed by high volume, mixed threat types. It includes cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems, in addition to adversary tactics designed to exploit
our system's limitations. So General Collins, can you describe how the department is incorporating
the lessons learned from the recent air and missile defense operations into its testing
evaluation process? And what steps are you taking going forward to validate
or update our systems before they're deployed again?
Thank you, Senator Rosen. Very important question. We've certainly had a number of lessons learned
over the last couple years in Ukraine, as you mentioned, defensive Israel, as well as in just
the last couple months. I was going to say the Middle East, too, but we'll stick to this.
And I think you've really tagged into the increasing complexity in a scale and a layering
that we have not seen or planned for in the past. It's increasing at an ever-increasing rate. And
the ability to do integrated battle management and integrated command and control is paramount
to the success of these weapons systems going forward. During the operation, we meet with the
fighter every single day. We pull data from the systems every single day and analyze every data
source from every weapon system. And we have been feeding that data back to the operators.
They have been making tactics changes, technique procedure changes within a day of seeing the
adversary make a change as we go forward. In addition, we're distilling those down into
upgrades and advancements of the weapon systems that we are responsible for, as well as, you know,
working with the Army on their systems. And we've put hundreds of updates out to the field
in the last two years to Aegis, to THAAD, to C2BMC, in response to the capabilities that we've seen.
There are still capabilities that we need to continue to drive forward in.
I think salvo size and the complexity of integrated salvo size is a very
tough problem to scale the system into. As we move forward, one of our key technology
thrusts in the future for Missile Defense Agency and in support of Golden Dome is to make sure that
we can get the lethality, affordability, and the scalability into the future weapon systems that
we bring to bear so that we can really get the magazine depth at the as affordable cost as
possible to take out these threats. And then with the agility of open systems architectures
and government ownership of the baselines and the technology baselines, that's going to help
us be agile as well as we move forward. I think those are all fundamental things that we're
bringing to bear to make sure we're as agile as possible against this nefarious threat.
Well, thank you. I have so many more questions. I'll submit them for the record.
I wanted to kind of finish up on this because there's been a high demand and expenditure
of our missile defense systems, right? So what's the state of our inventory and our
industry's capacity to replenish those missile reserves? How do you think we are faring on that?
We're coming up on the NDAA. So many lessons learned about what's going on between Ukraine
and the Middle East about what else we need to do. But can you talk to me about that?
Yes, Senator. While the inventories are sensitive and we could take the actual numbers offline,
scale is extremely important as we move forward. And for a couple years now, I've been in the
hearings talking about we needed increased focus on capacity. And we have been building a capacity
debt where we have not maximized our production lines to meet the needs that the warfighter has
identified. That changed last year. Deputy Secretary Feinberg has really focused the Munitions
Acceleration Council on engaging industry, bringing the right sustained focus, the right
sustained resources to move the needle and speed up capacity to what we need, not what fits in to
the budget. And that's a very different way to look at this problem. It will take time to
scale the supply chain, to grow it and receive the-
Yes, ma'am. And in this president's budget that has been released,
there is a significant increase to all of the critical munitions that we require to include
missile defense interceptor inventories as we move forward. And then I would just say
we got here by not having sustained focus and resources on munitions. We really need to sustain
the resources and the focus on munitions in the years to come to replenish the stocks and get us
Thank you. Can I ask one more about staffing? Well, perfect. I have a few more, but I'll finish
up with this one. I want to stay with you again, General Collins. Our Missile Defense Agency
staffing. So you're the director, you oversee global organization, 9,000 military, civilian
and contract personnel. That's a lot of people. So given the ambitious Golden Dome initiative,
how has the administration's push to reduce the federal workforce, eliminate contracts affected
your agency's ability to really manage this massive expansion? How do you get to be nimble,
bring in the people that you need to, as you're learning more and more every day,
the data sets coming down every day from real time events in the AOR and theater is really
changing what we know. So how are you managing this massive expansion for Golden Dome,
dwindling missile stockpiles? Of course, you have to collaborate with industry
and work with our allies. So tell me or tell us what you need to do, what we should be thinking
about as we manage this going forward and seeing what we're learning every single day.
Yes, ma'am. I will say Missile Defense Agency, a strength of Missile Defense Agency is the long
depth of knowledge and experience we have with an unmatched commitment to the mission from the
entire workforce, whether they be the civilians, the military or the contractor. And we continue
to have that. We have reduced the size of the Missile Defense Agency last year, but we were
specific in focusing on areas that made us faster and made us more agile as we move forward.
And we're at a manning level today that continues to support us moving faster.
You have the authority zone to hire people in new areas or things that are emerging. As you're
learning from what's happening real time, you may see you need to plus up on something in a place
you didn't expect, right? Yes, ma'am. As the director of the Missile Defense Agency, I do
have the flexibility to pivot, identify the competencies that we require and then the authorities
to go hire the right people into the right professions. And whether that's engaging them
through contract hirings or through the civilian workforce as well, I do have hiring authorities
to be able to identify those. And we have started some tiger teams within the agency to make sure
we do a full competency survey of the agency to identify if there's any areas that we
may be a little thin on, especially as we move into some new areas like artificial
intelligence, machine learning, even some of the applications of that to quantum and
crypto and those types. Those are probably some growth areas that we still need to
address and get to. And then I'll tell you the last thing that we're probably really fortunate
because we're located in Huntsville, Alabama. We're located in Colorado Springs. We're located
in the Northern Virginia area. Fantastic incubators for technical talent. Yes, ma'am.
Well, thank you. Thank you again for your service and commitment. And
we're learning a lot and we're going to have to be nimble and agile to meet the emerging
threats. So thank you so much. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator Rosen. We're happy
that you were able to join us today on a Monday. I know it's hard for you. General Collins,
last question I have for you. Can you give us an update on the Next Generation Interceptor
program? Yes, Senator. Thank you for that question. Next Generation Interceptor,
we've been talking about it for a number of years. It is the future of the homeland defense,
the ground-based midcourse defense, homeland defense against peer and rogue intercontinental
ballistic missiles. That program is still executing. That is still our largest and
highest priority program when it comes to that defense of the homeland against the peer threat.
That program continues. A couple years ago, we did a down-select, an earlier down-select than planned
due to priorities. And since then, we did re-plan about 18 months ago. We re-planned
the delivery of the program based on some issues and concerns with the solid rocket motor.
We are continuing to drive that program forward. The end of this year, we are on track for the
all-around full system critical design review to close the design phase of the Next Generation
Interceptor program and completely move into the manufacturing and test phase of that as we drive
towards first flight test in 2029. We have no open major liens against the design of the system,
which is a plus at this point in the time of a program. We are, as we transition into
manufacturing, identifying and finding some issues with some of these new systems, the solid
rocket motor, the inertial measurement unit, as well as some in the sensors. And we are working
to buy down those risks and move forward as quickly as possible to make sure we pull the
day as far to the left as possible. General Geo, General Guline and I are regularly talking about
Next Generation Interceptor and the important part it plays in the layered defense of our homeland as
Thank you. And General Lozano, good afternoon.
Chairman Wicker and I had the opportunity to visit the Pacific last August and spend some time
on Guam in trying to assess the situation there. Can you give us an update on the
implementation of the defenses of Guam? Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your question.
So the program is executing on schedule and on budget. I'm very proud of all the work that has
occurred thus far to deploy early capabilities onto Guam. As a part of the Army's transformation
in contact initiative and also working closely with the Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency,
as I stated earlier, not only do we have a THAAD battery out there, but we also have elements of
the Air Force's air base air defense capabilities on Anderson Air Force Base. We also have a couple
of lower tier air missile defense sensors, an ALP sensor and a couple of integrated air missile
defense battle command systems, IBCS engagement operations centers. So we've started infiltrating
capability out onto the island early so that we could start working through some of the integration
challenges that we forecasted we might face when we started planning what the defense of Guam might
look like. This has also provided an opportunity for the 94th Air Missile Defense Command to start
sending soldiers down to Guam to start training on these systems so that they could start developing
CONOPS and tactics, techniques, and procedures, what we call TTPs, on how to operate and employ
this system. Right now we will conduct our integrated flight test campaign 26 this year at
White Sands Missile Range. That'll act as a graduation opportunity, a test missile flight
test campaign for us, and then we'll start flowing the bulk of the systems out to Guam in the 27-28
time frame. So everything remains on schedule, everything remains on track, the development of
capability, the production of the systems, and so we're looking forward to continuing to mature
and evolve that capability so that it maintains its relevancy against the threats we intend to face.
Thank you, sir. Senator King.
One final question going back to the beginning of my comments. Secretary Berkowitz, what is the
justification for this bifurcated budget process that we've experienced last year and this year
for the first time in my experience? Why do we need to do it this way, which is a
radical departure from how defense budgets have been built over the years? What's the justification?
Senator, I'd have to give you the same answer I gave before with respect to the request
specifically for Golden Dome, which is within my portfolio. The broader budget construction
is well outside of my area of responsibility. I don't understand why Golden Dome is any different
than B-21 or any other defense initiative that requires a special budgetary treatment that
basically takes it largely out of the purview of Congress and congressional oversight.
Sir, the answer is the flexibility to address dynamics of advancing technology
and to accelerate the president's priority.
Well, that's not a very satisfactory answer, I must say. All of the things you said could
apply to any other major weapons program that we've had in this country, and I just don't
understand why all of a sudden 25 percent of the defense budget is off limits for the normal
appropriations process, but that's something I'll take up with, I think there's a hearing tomorrow
with Secretary Hicks Thursday, so warn him. Thank you. Thank you, Senator King. I'd like to thank
the panel for being here today and giving us some really good information. I appreciate your service
again. If we have questions for the record, those need to be submitted, and I hope you will answer
them in a timely manner. With that, the subcommittee hearing is adjourned.
