Xi Bows to Old Rivals Wen Jiabao s 4 Words Shake Beijing

According to Li Daoyu, a secret list for the 21st Party Congress has been circulating overseas. It suggests a controversial possibility that Xi Jinping might follow the model of Deng Xiaoping after 1989, stepping down as General Secretary and President in 2027 while retaining his role as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, thereby holding ultimate power behind the scenes If this scenario is real, then before the 21st Congress, Xi would have to undertake an extremely risky move, a thorough purge of anyone in the military and security apparatus with even the slightest, say, 0.1% doubt about their loyalty. Because if he were to relinquish his formal titles without firmly controlling the blade, then the Deng Xiaoping model could turn into a Zhao Ziyang This may help explain why, since 2024, China's military and security forces have experienced the largest wave of purges in half a century. Is Xi effectively clearing the path for a plan to retire without truly retiring? But power struggles within the Chinese leadership are never that simple. According to many observers, there are currently four groups that could pose First, the elder faction, represented by figures like Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao. Although they no longer hold real power on the surface, they still retain a sense of political legitimacy. Within the system, and even within the military, there are still those who support them, and they are deeply dissatisfied with Xi's disruption of the economy and his breaking of Deng Xiaoping-era norms. Second, the remnants of Jiang Zemin's faction, such as Wang Huning and Zhao Leji. While they remain on the Politburo Standing Committee, they are seen as opportunists who quietly pursue their own interests, possibly waiting for the right moment to turn against Xi. Third, professional officers in the military who have grown desperate amid ongoing purges. They feel increasingly vulnerable in the wake of Zhang Yuxia's downfall, and could become a real threat. This scenario is particularly plausible. They may seek out a high-ranking figurehead to rally around in opposition to Xi. Fourth, provincial officials and the technocratic bureaucracy. Outwardly compliant, they are in reality quietly disengaging and harbor deep dissatisfaction toward Xi Jinping. And in an effort to reduce his enemies, many observers believe Xi Jinping has recently made a dangerous move. If you found this information helpful, take a second to like, share your thoughts in the comments, and if you can, support us by hitting the thanks button below. Your support keeps us going and helps us bring you better content every day. Thank you. Does Xi Jinping seek backing from the Jiang faction? In early April this year, a notable deal was completed. Starbucks China sold a 60% stake in its China business to the private equity firm Boyu Capital. The founder of Boyu Capital is Zhang Xicheng, the grandson of Jiang Zemin. Around the same time, Burger King China also finalized a transfer. A company called CPE Yuanfeng invested $350 million to acquire an 83% stake. The ultimate controller of this firm is Liu Lefei, the son of former Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan. Back in 2016, Boyu Capital had already indirectly invested in Ant Group through a fund. That particular investment nearly got Zhang Xicheng into trouble. In October 2020, Jack Ma criticized financial regulators and was subsequently reined in by the authorities. The Wall Street Journal later revealed that one reason Xi Jinping personally halted Ant Group's IPO was his discovery that Zhang Xicheng and the son-in-law of former Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin were among its hidden investors. At the time, Xi had reportedly considered taking action against Zhang Xicheng. But now, not only has he remained unscathed, he has openly taken over 60% of Starbucks China and is even said to quietly hold around 45% of Beijing's high-end SKP Mall. So what changed? Is Xi now seeking support from the Zhang faction? Why do some believe that Xi has shifted from suppressing the Zhang faction to courting it? To understand this, one has to go back to 2004. Before stepping down as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin made a tour of Zhejiang, effectively to meet Xi Jinping, who was then the provincial party secretary. Xi hosted him with 80-year-old Mao Tai, and the two reportedly drank through the night. After that meeting, Jiang is said to have designated Xi as Hu Jintao's successor, in exchange for a promise that Xi, once in power, would protect the Jiang family's interests. This was the first debt. Later, after Xi came to power, his anti-corruption campaign struck hard at figures like Zhou Yongkang, Xu Taihou, and Guo Boxiong. While it appeared he might pursue Jiang Zemin himself, he stopped short. In return, the Jiang faction supported Xi's 2018 constitutional amendment abolishing term limits. This was the second debt. At the 20th Party Congress, Xi secured another term, while close allies like Li Qiang and Cai Qi rose to power. Hu Jintao was escorted out during the closing ceremony, and his faction was pushed out of the political center. Behind the scenes, this reflected coordination between Xi and the Jiang faction. This was the third debt. Now a fourth debt may be unfolding. Xi's own allies have recently run into trouble, with several senior military figures being purged. Internal discontent has reached a critical point, and with Xi seeking another term at the 21st Party Congress next year, he may need the Jiang faction's continued backing. That could explain the re-emergence of Jiang Xicheng and Liu Lefei. Deals involving Starbucks, Burger King, and Beijing SKP may represent the price of this latest arrangement, not merely economic concessions, but part of a broader political bargain. In August this year, the Chinese Communist Party is set to hold a high-level commemoration marking the 100th anniversary of Jiang Zemin's birth. Historically, only figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun have been honored at this level, making Jiang the seventh. Even more striking, the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall is undergoing internal renovations and has been closed from March 16 to August 31, almost exactly spanning the period around Jiang's birthday. There is speculation that the renovation may be intended to prepare an additional memorial section for Jiang Zemin. Xi Jinping may be seeking to elevate Jiang, using the legacy of a deceased leader as a form of political backing for his anticipated reappointment next year. Meanwhile, Jiang Xicheng's father, Jiang Mianheng, has not been targeted at all. He controls Shanghai Alliance Investment Ltd., nominally a state-owned enterprise but widely seen as a de facto asset of the Jiang family. Why hasn't she investigated him? The answer may be straightforward. Probing Jiang Mianheng would effectively shatter the entire arrangement with the Jiang family and make next year's 21st Party Congress a lost cause. For that reason, Xi needs their support. Clearly, he may be aligning with them to counter another force, the so-called elder faction often speculated about in public discourse. Xi's most formidable rival, the elder faction. On March 27, the 84-year-old Wen Jiabao made an unexpected public appearance. Prior to that, there had been rumors he was under house restriction, having disappeared from view for an extended period with no official updates. His sudden re-emergence sends a very different political signal. Some independent media sources claim that during this period, he personally called the central office and delivered just four words, I want to leave the party. Those four words, it is said, landed like a political nuclear bomb, forcing Xi Jinping to make concessions. Wen, a former premier of the state council and once the number two figure in the party, carries enormous symbolic weight. If he were to publicly renounce the Chinese Communist Party, the shock would go far beyond what Xi could comfortably absorb, effectively signaling to the world that even the highest ranks of leadership had lost faith in the party. Such a move would deal a devastating blow to the CCP's governing legitimacy. More importantly, if Wen were to formally relinquish party membership and become an ordinary citizen, Xi would lose the legal basis to bind him through party discipline. On the surface, leaving the party might seem like a concession, but in reality it would remove a key weapon from Xi's hands. There are reports that Xi perceived this as a serious threat. In response, Xi Taifeng, head of the central organization department, was reportedly sent to personally pay a visit. Put bluntly, it was an act of appeal, urging Wen to prioritize the bigger picture and not leave the party. In the end, Wen is said to have used those four words as leverage to regain his freedom of movement. This kind of maneuver is not without precedent. According to various accounts, Hua Guofeng, a former top leader of China, quietly left the party around 2001. His reason? The CCP had, in his view, betrayed the legitimate interests of workers and farmers, instead representing corrupt officials and capital. Following him, his chief of staff, bodyguard, confidential secretary, and personal driver reportedly also applied to leave the party. At the time, this caused significant internal shock. The then General Secretary Hu Jintao had to convene meetings to handle the situation. From Hua Guofeng to Wen Jiabao, more than 20 years apart, both senior leaders appear to have treated leaving the party as a last card when pushed into a corner. Seen in a broader context, Wen represents a reform-minded elder bloc within the party, figures deeply dissatisfied with Xi Jinping's direction. This group has long been a thorn in Xi's side. They hold no current office nor command military power, but they possess seniority, decades of accumulated networks within the party, moral authority in society, and the willingness to speak plainly. Over more than a decade of anti-corruption campaigns, Xi has mainly targeted the Jiang faction, figures like Zhou Yongkan, Bo Xilai, and Guo Boxiong. But when it comes to the elder faction, he has yet to find an effective way to contain them, largely because corruption charges are harder to substantiate. Their real threat lies in their ability to speak the truth, voice dissent internally, and influence opinion among retired elites. If the elder faction, represented by Wen Jiabao, were to align with elements of the military against Xi, his position could genuinely be at risk. This helps explain why he might be seeking allies, particularly by reaching out to the Jiang family. The Jiang faction and the elder faction are fundamentally different forces. The Jiang camp has wealth, business networks, and political allies still in power, such as Wang Huning and Zhao Leji. The elder faction, by contrast, holds seniority, party prestige, and moral standing. Xi is now walking a tightrope between these two forces. Either one could potentially cost him power. In fact, the latent threat from the Jiang faction may be even greater. From the outset, that camp was never fully supportive of Xi's rise. Aligning with them now could be likened to inviting a wolf into the house. Consider the history. During the leadership transition, Hu Jintao carried out a full withdrawal, handing over party, state, and military power entirely to Xi Jinping. Yet, there have been persistent overseas reports that elements linked to the Jiang faction plotted against Xi as many as ten times. According to NTDTV, during the Beidaihe meeting in the summer of 2012, Zhou Yongkang allegedly orchestrated at least two assassination attempts, one involving a bomb placed in a meeting room and another exploiting a medical checkup at the 301 hospital to administer poison. Against that backdrop, Xi's current move is hard to read. Whether it will ultimately work to his advantage or backfire remains an open question. Where is China headed? According to journalist Li Dayu, the intense power struggle ahead of the 21st Party Congress could have three direct impacts on ordinary people. First, if Xi's faction seeks to stabilize its grip on power, it may escalate threats of reunification by force with Taiwan in the lead-up to the Congress, possibly even provoking limited conflict to secure a political legacy. This would spell disaster for investment markets. Second, the weakening of the CCP's power structure means that over the next year and a half, China's policies could swing wildly like a roller coaster, supporting the real estate sector one day, then cracking down on e-commerce the next. People should not be misled by any outward appearance of stability. Third, the pressure on overseas Chinese communities will likely intensify. Xi Jinping may seek loyalty from abroad to reinforce internal confidence, meaning efforts to enforce a united front could directly affect Chinese communities and students overseas, including those connected to Taiwan. Those who once helped Xi purge others could themselves become the next targets. Figures such as Li Xi, Kai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and even Wang Huning and Wang Qishan have all been subject to rumors of instability. Who among them will be removed from the chessboard before the 21st Congress remains an open question? The final battle leading up to 2027 has only just begun. Let's keep watching. Thank you and see you next time.