From Genius General to Doomed Traitor: The Ridiculous True Story of Lin Biao’s Final Days

Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's really happening in China and share some unique insights. Recently, the two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong and Zhang Youxiang, both fell from power. There is even talk circulating online now that He Weidong has already taken his own life. The last time China saw a purge on this scale with such ranking officials dying, you have to go back to the Mao era to vice-chairman Lin Biao. We may not know right now exactly what He Weidong and Zhang Youxiang did to end up like this, but as the old saying goes, we can use the past as a mirror. So in this episode, let's borrow the story of Lin Biao to look at just how absurd the infighting among Chinese officials can get. We'll talk about why Lin Biao really turned against the party and why his plan ended up crashing. Just how much real value did it have to be China's one and only legally designated successor written into the party constitution? Lin Biao was born in 1907 in Huanggang, Hubei province into a small landlord family. From a young age, he was quiet, not good at socializing, but he did inherit that classic Huanggang trait, extreme diligence. In the end, through sheer hard work and endurance, he got into the Wampoa military academy. Then in 1927, when the communists and nationalists split, Lin Biao got successfully brainwashed by the communists, defected from the nationalists, joined the Nanchang uprising. And thanks to his military academy background, became a platoon leader in the Red Army. From 1927 to 1949, while the communists kept rebelling and trying to overthrow the government, Lin Biao kept rising through the ranks. Compared with other communist party members though, his rise looked almost clean in that big cesspool. He was quite different from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, or Deng Xiaoping. If you look at those figures, they all shared one habit. They spent their days doing almost nothing except fighting their own people or picking sides. Before 1949, Mao carried out several major purges. Zhou Enlai was constantly jumping back and forth between Mao and Wang Ming. When you read that history, you often feel like the biggest enemy of the communist party wasn't the nationalists or the Japanese invaders, it was other comrades inside the party. But our comrade Lin Biao was different. He had always been the quiet type, bad at socializing, so he stayed out of most of the struggles. He even disliked them. Back on the Jingang mountains, he once said that the people who engage in ideological struggle are just a peddling snake oil, far less effective than a single machine gun. So how did a guy with zero talent for picking sides still become one of the ten marshals in a party where everyone's brain had turned into dog brain from all the fighting? Simple. Lin Biao could really fight. He wasn't great at grand strategy, but on the tactical levels, he was outstanding. Some of the most famous campaigns, everyone knows the Pingxingguan, Liaosheng campaign were personally commanded and planned by him. And his style was different from someone like Peng Dehuai, who relied heavily on personal charisma and ideological mobilization to slug it out in hard battles. Lin Biao was all about calculation. Take the Liaosheng campaign for example. His troops ran into a nationalist unit near Hujiawopeng. After scattering them, they captured a few trucks and some officers. Most commanders might have struggled off routine captures like that. But Lin Biao, hypersensitive to detail, immediately saw something. Faced with this chance haul, he launched his deadly three-question combo. First, what kind of trucks are these? The staff officer answered, not the big rural kind, rubber tires, short axles. Second, what were they carrying? Answer, no artillery. Third, what about the captured soldiers? Answer, they ran almost without a fight. Most were officers, healthy, pale, and chubby. Hardly any dirt on them. Didn't look like regular troops. Hearing those three details, Lin Biao instantly did a rapid mental data match. Short-axle rubber-tied vehicles were usually American military transports. Such rare, well-equipped American troops weren't holding heavy weapons, just pale, fat officers and radios. In an era without satellite reconnaissance, based solely on this one accidental capture and the tiny clues it revealed, Lin Biao decided in one second that the commander post of Liaoyaosheng's nationalist corps was very likely hidden nearby. The moment he reached this conclusion, the usually calm Lin Biao became extremely excited. He immediately ordered the entire army, ignore all other enemies, every unit, no matter where you are or what you are doing, head straight for Hujiawopeng right now. And it turned out exactly as he predicted. Under the fierce assault, Liaoyaosheng's headquarters collapsed instantly. Liao himself fled in panic. The elite corps of 100,000 men became headless flies once the command center was gone. Lin Biao's force took just two days to annihilate the nationalist's strongest strategic group. Mao Zedong once commented early on that Lin Biao didn't act like a general. He acted like an accountant keeping books. We often hear the term technocratic today. Cadres who don't play political games or build factions just bury themselves in technical or economic work. Lin Biao was very much the technocrat of the military. On the other hand, although he hated political struggle, Lin Biao had pretty good luck with picking sides. Early on, because he joined the Nanchang uprising and ended up stranded on Jinggang mountain, he met Mao Zedong early and had a chance to align with him. When Mao was purging the AB leagues, Lin Biao didn't join the direct killing, but he clearly supported Mao on the military side. So, a fighter as capable as Lin Biao earned Mao's high regard very early. Mao's famous line, a single spark can start a prairie fire, was nominally written to Lin Biao. Later, when Wang Ming was in power, Lin Biao did once stab Mao in the back. But who would hold a grudge against a pure technocrat and military talent? Mao needed Lin Biao's command skills, so afterward, he didn't really pursue him. So here is this guy who hated political struggle. Fine, he can rise become one of the ten marshals during wartime, but how does he become the only successor written into the party charter? The reason is actually the same, he didn't like playing politics. In the early years after 1949, because he refused to build a faction, his career path actually stalled. Despite his brilliant war record, Lin Biao's status wasn't that high right after liberation. Before 1949, it was wartime, command ability mattered, so he had room to shine. After 1949, no more wars, now it was civilian governance. And civilian governance is all about building alliances and playing politics, especially during Mao's wild free-wheeling period where he pointed wherever his thoughts wandered. Lin Biao became even less useful. According to Lin Biao himself, he really disliked meetings, documents, and all the side-picking. So, for a long time after 1949, he was the marshal with the least real power among the ten. His nominal rank was the first or second, higher than the well-known Zhu De or Peng Dehuai, but his actual authority was the lowest. After the founding, he didn't enter the state council system like Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, or He Long, nor did he run the military like Ye Jianying. Lin Biao was more like a military mascot. And ironically, that exact position let him accidentally hit the jackpot. When is the most dangerous time for a Chinese supreme leader? Not during the civil war with the nationalists, not during the war against Japan, it's during peacetime. From 1927 to 1949, very few high-level communist generals actually died at the hands of the nationalists or Japanese. But after 1949, China's top generals suddenly entered hell-mode survival. They died one after another, faster and faster. The reason was simple, greed for power. First came the two regional military strongmen Gao Gong and Lao Shushi, who refused to give up their troops and tried to set up separate centers. They were purged in 1955. Then, at the 1959 Lushan conference, Peng Dehuai was brought down. From then on, senior PLA officers kept falling like dominoes. In that kind of environment, a man like Lin Biao who didn't crave power caught Mao's eye. After Peng Dehuai was ousted at Lushan in 1959, the military fell into some disorder. Mao needed someone to help him control the army. Having been burned by Peng, Mao wanted someone with a few strong political opinions, someone who could keep the military loyal without threatening him. After looking around, Lin Biao, the guy with very little ambition, no faction-building talent, but huge prestige in the army, became the obvious choice. Lin Biao himself was very clear about his role at the stage. In his diary, he wrote, The subject follows the ruler. Never let the subject overtake the ruler. Whatever Chairman Mao says, that's what I do. Now, the word subject he used there is quite telling. After the founding of new China, the system had a kind of imperial flavor. Mao was the big emperor. Even though there was no legal imperial system and everyone was theoretically equal. In that context, people like Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, and Peng Dehuai rarely saw themselves as Mao's subjects. They saw themselves as Mao's political partners or political rivals. Mao was simply the strongest among equals. But Lin Biao was different. He truly treated Mao as emperor, and himself as subject. The clearest example of this subject mindset and repeated nature came at the 7000 cadres conference. From 1959 to 1961, three years when China's agriculture and weather records showed some of the best conditions in a century. The country suffered a man-made super-famine caused by communist mismanagement. Tens of millions died. The agricultural base that even survived the Japanese invasion was completely wrecked by the party in just a few years. The disaster was so horrifying that even the party itself couldn't hold it together. Liu Shaoqi, a more practical man than Mao, at least understood that collapsing the whole country helped no one. So in early 1962, at Liu Shaoqi's urging, the Central Committee held an enlarged work conference, the first time grassroots cadres were allowed to join a central meeting. Liu Shaoqi hoped to use pressure from below to force Mao Zedong to end his mistaken policies. Because so many local cadres were invited, attendance reached an unprecedented scale, hence the name 7000 cadres conference. The meeting turned into collective pressure on Mao to step down. In that atmosphere, people reacted in two main ways. One group, highly politically astute like Zhou Enlai, knew Mao Zedong would come back. They understood Mao's monstrous fighting ability. A short setback at the conference won't cost him real power forever. Mao would rise again. So they firmly sided with him. But they also saw things were bad and understood Mao wanted to step back temporarily. They gave him veiled support during the meeting. The other group, less astute, saw Mao Zedong being criticized and genuinely thought his time was up. They went with the flow, joining Liu Shaoqi in attacking Mao Zedong, hoping to board the new ship. Then there was a very small third group, Lin Biao. He still firmly supported Mao. In the middle of the one-sided criticism, Lin Biao suddenly stood up, slammed the table, and scolded everyone present for not listening to Chairman Mao. He threw aside the speech the military commission office had prepared for him and spoke of the cuff. He even suggested turning the conference criticizing Mao into one criticizing the lower cadres instead. He said, The difficulties we are facing now, the three years of famine, in certain respects and to a certain degree, are precisely because we did not follow Chairman Mao's instructions, his warnings, his thought. If we had listened to Chairman Mao and grasped his spirit, we would have taken far fewer detours, and today's difficulties would be much smaller. As soon as Lin Biao said that, the whole room of cadres was stunned into silence. The atmosphere became painfully awkward, everyone's toes curling, while people stared at him like he was an idiot. One person on the restrooms started clapping. Who? Mao Zedong himself. Of course, Lin Biao standing alone for Mao didn't change everything. After the conference, Mao still lost some ground, Liu Shaoqi took a bit of power, and Mao went into semi-retirement. But it did make Mao see Lin Biao in a new light. Before, Mao thought, now that the country is founded, we don't need war anymore. A guy who only knows fighting and has low political skill is useless. Who knew that someone with such low political skill, low enough to stand firm against wind, still had this kind of use? Wonderful! How wonderful! As Mao made his comeback, and the cultural revolution began, Lin Biao, who had firmly backed Mao at the 7000 conference, finally entered his own era. If, after Lu Shan, he had been accelerating on the promotion highway, during the cultural revolution, the era that rewarded only loyalty, he was riding a rocket. Early in the cultural revolution, Lin Biao contributed a lot. Before it officially broke out in 1966, his army had already become almost an armed missionary organization for Mao Zedong thought. Once it started, Lin Biao jumped in with maximum fanfare. He oversaw the compilation of the Little Red Book and pushed slogans like Politics First, Thought First. Using the army as the carrier, he spread the cult of Mao Zedong nationwide, creating an unprecedented political carnival. Most crucially, he controlled the guns, giving Mao the armed backing to launch the cultural revolution. During the cultural revolution, Liu Shaoqi was overthrown, humiliated, and died unnaturally. Throughout it all, Lin Biao, the one who crazily supported Mao, finally got his reward. To reward his loyal subject, Mao named Lin Biao his successor and wrote into the party constitution. It looked like supreme honor, but in reality, Mao had played a trick on Lin Biao. Succession isn't just about saying, I want this person. You need groundwork, preparation. Even ancient emperors had to build up the crown prince's power base. In a modern dictatorship, it's the same. A title alone with no political foundation and zero talent for faction building meant Lin Biao clearly wasn't Mao Zedong's real intended successor. Mao knew Lin Biao lacked the ability to succeed him. That's exactly why he named him. Naming Lin Biao didn't threaten Mao at all, and it tied Lin Biao permanently to his boat. The successor title was like a shiny apple laced with poison inside. Of course, saying Lin Biao lacked political wisdom is only relative to other top CCP cadres. He didn't get to be a marshal by being stupid. The moment he learned he was the designated successor written into the charter, he realized what it meant. Not a pot of honey, but a bowl of poison. He immediately panicked. According to people close to him later, after the successor status was written in, Lin Biao wasn't happy at all. He repeatedly asked Zhou Enlai who proposed it and begged to revoke it, remove his name. When Zhou Enlai told him it was Mao Zedong himself, Lin Biao fell silent. Lin Biao was fundamentally different from people like Zhou Enlai or Kang Sheng. Those two had firmly sided with Mao long before the Cultural Revolution, even before the 7000 conference. You could call it foresight, realizing Mao could always turn the tables, or you could say they were already on Mao's pirate ship and couldn't get off. But Lin Biao boarded more like someone who made a dumb mistake and got pulled on passively. Before Lu Shan, Lin Biao had no clear affection and always avoided deep political involvement. But once the Cultural Revolution started, becoming the national successor tied him completely to the ship, and the sheer madness of the Cultural Revolution scared him. The CCP had infighting before, Yan'an Rectification, the AB League purges. The party was ruthless to its own, using every cruel method without hesitation. But Lin Biao, bad at picking sides, didn't want to join then and didn't. Even when the Cultural Revolution began, he mostly stayed out. He never personally struggled or denounced anyone. He mainly kept the army loyal and supportive so Mao could feel secure. Then suddenly he found himself dragged into something far more terrifying and insane than Yan'an or AB League purge, and inexplicably became the number two figure in it. How could he not panic? What happened to people in the AB League era? What happened in Yan'an Rectification? Lin Biao may not have participated, but he saw it all. He knew his own political skill wasn't even enough for small-time side-picking in those earlier campaigns, let alone this super-plus version of the Cultural Revolution, let alone succeeding Mao later. At that point, Lin Biao realized his situation was bad and started looking for a way off the ship. His method? Turtle up, go into full passive mode, slack off, hoping to slip away from the Cultural Revolution boat and part with Mao Zedong. In 1969, the third year of the Cultural Revolution, at the Ninth Party Congress, Bao asked Lin Biao to draft a political report setting the future direction. What did Lin Biao draft? Something unprecedented, and the Cultural Revolution started focusing on production, stabilized the situation, stopped the chaos. Of course, before it could even be formally presented, Mao vetoed it outright. After that, to keep his army out of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao issued the Military Commission's eight points, stressing that the commission would not get involved in mass struggles, factional activities, or political conflicts, hoping to preserve the army's independence and professionalism. In response to this political breaking, Mao immediately overrode it with ten points, forcibly dragging the army back into political struggle. The Cultural Revolution had to spread into the military and be injected with Mao Zedong's thoughts even harder. After that, Lin Biao completely lost it. In his diary from that time, Lin Biao repeatedly expressed anxiety about the political situation. He said he was gradually losing his grasp of what was happening. When breaking failed and a jumped ship failed, Lin Biao just kept slacking, hoping to dodge Mao's final perch. He repeatedly asked for leave, citing poor health, and refused to attend events. At some activities, he tried hard to speak less and avoid taking positions, hoping to detach himself and return to his pre-Lushan state. When Romania's Ceausescu visited China, Mao asked Lin Biao to accompany him. Lin Biao showed up, exchanged a few polite words, then immediately retreated outside. I don't hear, I don't hear, so I can't hear, I don't have to decide. At that point, Lin Biao summed up his political stance as the three no's. Apart from highly praising Mao politically, on everything else, no responsibility, no suggestions, no offense. He hoped this would buy him a peaceful ending. Of course, facing Lin Biao's attempt to jump ship and his slacking, would Mao indulge him? This isn't a boat you can just leave when you feel like it. Mao scolded him to his face. You are pretending not to want to join the movement but really you want to be like Emperor Jiajing of the Ming dynasty, hiding behind a facade of aloofness to protect yourself. After that, Mao quickly began sidelining Lin Biao. Just one year after being named successor, criticism of him started. Mao let the Central Cultural Revolution group, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and others meddle in military affairs and disrupt army order. Lin Biao's old subordinates were repeatedly dragged out by Jiang Qing for struggle sessions and self-criticism. At the same time, Jiang Qing tried to bypass the military commission office and build her own people directly in the air force and the navy. Later, Mao even allowed Jiang Qing to openly criticize Lin Biao, saying Lin Biao was running a bourgeois headquarters and was a fake left, real right. Then, on August 23, 1970, at the Third Lushan Conference, just one year and four months after being named legal successor, Lin Biao and Mao effectively broke with each other. Mao ditched his lackey faster than a playboy dumps a girlfriend. After the break, Mao personally stepped in, bypassing generals to attack Lin Biao directly. During a sudden tour, Mao said outright, some people are in a hurry to become state chairman. And who was he talking about? Obviously, Lin Biao. At that point, Lin Biao must have wanted to cry. I really don't want it, I am really just trying to slack off, how am I suddenly trying to be state chairman? So how did this guy who kept slacking and trying to slack his way through the storm end up in a plane crash, dying with the aircraft destroyed? Here, we have to mention Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguo. Lin Biao was saying, I am done fighting, I am in my 60s now, time to enjoy old age. But Lin Liguo said, no dad, 60, 60 is the prime time to make a move, 60 and you have to fight. Don't you have ideals anymore? Don't you have dreams? You don't want to be emperor, fine, but I want to be crown prince. Lin Liguo was born in 1945 in Harbin, Lin Biao's only son. Like many red second generation today, he didn't need to work. What work? When my dad led the PLA through the he already did all the work I'd ever needed to do in this lifetime. No work, but the status still had to keep rising. In 1969, with Lin Biao personally pulling strings and using connections, 24-year-old Lin Liguo became deputy director of the Air Force Command Office and the deputy head of the operations department. That was a key post. All documents passed through his hands. Everything in the Air Force had to be reported to him. He quickly gained access to a huge amount of classified information. Of course, those years in the Air Force weren't wasted. Through the information he controlled, he soon understood the situation. Things were extremely dangerous for the Lin family. Mao was about to sacrifice his dad. Wolf in front, tiger behind. If you want glory, you have to bet your life. Lin Biao might still hold it together in this bad spot, but Lin Liguo couldn't. Dad, if you won't make a move, I will. Dad, you are slacking, I will fight. So Lin Liguo started gearing up to pull off something big for his dad and Mao. Not too big, not too small. He planned to assassinate Mao. To achieve this unprecedented feat, a rather ridiculous document called 571 Engineering Outline appeared. Why 571? In Chinese, it sounds like an armed uprising. Looking back, the whole thing seems comical and childish. They say big things succeed through secrecy, especially something like rebellion when heads roll. But Lin Liguo approached rebellion with the mindset of a modern internet entrepreneur. He first set up a research group. The 571 Outline needs more like a startup pitch deck, laying out various scenarios and countermeasures. He believed Lin Biao had three possible futures, peaceful succession, being usurped, or early succession. For each, he listed responses, including assassinating Mao. The assassination method included eight options, blow up the train, blow up the railway bridge, use flamethrowers, direct pistol assassination, even bomb Zhongnan Highway with a bomber. Don't be fooled by how elaborate the report sounds because he was so clueless about politics and politically immature. The plan barely got off the ground. Before it even reached a few investors, the startup project targeting Mao had already landed on Mao's desk. Naturally, well-informed Lin Biao found out about the plan. By that point, what did Lin Biao think of his son's clumsy rebellion scheme? He didn't think anything, because he had zero knowledge of the specific details. He couldn't possibly know. If he had known even a little, such a plan would never have been made. Forget Lin Biao's political philosophy of turtle-up caution, he had come through decades of bloody struggle. No way someone like that would approve such childish nonsense from his son. In the end, the plan was just Lin Liguo using his dad's exhausted face cards, waving the big flag and borrowing the tiger's skin. Even without participating, once Lin Biao knew his son had this plan, he knew he was finished. Sure, he didn't join. Mao would probably realize that too. If Lin Biao had really been involved, it wouldn't have been so absurd. But your son posed this stunt? That's just handing Mao a pillow when he's sleeping. I've been shrinking, giving Mao no excuse to move against me. Now you are handing him the excuse. I can't turtle up anymore, and I only have one son. Even if Mao spared me but kills my son, what's the difference? While Lin Biao was nearly collapsing, hesitating what to do after the exposure, Lin Liguo acted nonchalant. Exposed? So what? He refused to sit and wait for death. He immediately tried to mobilize the united fleet he controlled for an all-or-nothing fight. He also planned to fly his father to Guangzhou to set up a separate central committee and confront Mao head-on. But while Lin Liguo was deciding when to assassinate Mao, Mao moved first. On the evening of September 12, 1971, things suddenly accelerated. Mao returned to Beijing early, around 4 in the afternoon. He first talked with Lin Biao's old subordinates at Fengtai to calm them, while moving a division from the 38th army to stand by at Nankou. Lin Liguo also hearing the news, flew from Beijing to Shanghai Guan around 7 that evening, then rushed by car to Beidaihe and Lin Biao's residence. He shut himself in with his mother all night to discuss going to Guangzhou the next morning. By then, Lin Biao was already mostly checked out. He only partially knew about Lin Liguo's detailed plans. When Lin Liguo demanded he go to Guangzhou, Lin Biao was full of question marks. At first, he refused. Too hot there. He insisted on Dalian. Only after his wife Ye Qun persuaded him by saying Guangzhou had air condition, did he reluctantly agree. This already full of holes plan then produced an even more absurd twist. Another Lin family member wrecked the separate central committee idea. Lin Biao's daughter, Lin Doudou. He hadn't joined the plan. Instead, he desperately ran to the central guard unit to report. Lin Liguo plans to kidnap Lin Biao at dawn, flee to Guangzhou and possibly escape to Hong Kong. She urged the guards to block it and save the chief. This was the earliest first-hand warning the central committee received that night of September 12 in 2013. Among top CCP officials, Zhou Enlai got the news first. After hearing it, he didn't immediately order arrests or shoot downs. He did two very restrained but crucial things. First, he ordered all northern airports no plane takes off. This blocked Lin Liguo from using air force authority to mobilize aircraft and actually bomb Zhongnanhai. Second, he called to reassure Lin Biao, saying he would come to Beidaihe to see him. But for Lin Liguo, who was already a frightened bird, this call was the last straw. The moment Zhou said he was coming to Beidaihe, Lin Liguo understood the secret was out. It was. And Zhou was coming to arrest him. Lin Liguo decided to leave immediately for the airport. The plan changed fast, from Guangzhou separate center to the worst case, defect to the Soviet Union. He took every military secret he hoping to use, Lin Biao and the secrets as bargaining chips for a Soviet comeback. By then, Lin Biao had gone to bed and taken sleeping pills. The effect hadn't worn off. He was dragged out of bed by Lin Liguo and others. His bodyguard later recalled, Lin Biao was in pajamas, dazed, no voluntary movement at all. Two guards literally carried him out. Meanwhile, Lin Doudou, who had already reported her birth father and younger brother, kept reporting relentlessly. After 10 that night, she contacted Beijing's central guards five more times, urging them to hurry and stop it. At the same time, because of Zhou's no-take-off order, the airport gave Lin Liguo no clearance. He frantically used his privilege to demand the plane take off. Under pressure, it took off in haste, but without permission. No navigation lights, no tower guidance, no ground control. The plane Lin Biao was on lurched into the dark sky like a drunk. It circled repeatedly over Shanghai Guan trying to find a direction, then headed straight for the Soviet Union. When Mao heard, he went completely crazy. He had already planned how to handle Lin Liguo's childish play Rebellion, demote, struggle Sessions, and use it to pull Lin Biao down too. He never imagined the man holding China's core secrets would be dragged into defection by his own son. At first, Mao refused to believe it. He ordered Zhou to verify repeatedly. Only after the plane had been airborne over four hours, and guards searched everywhere with no trace of Lin Biao, did Mao finally accept it. At that point, Mao completely broke. The entire state apparatus went into the tightest war readiness since 1949 in just a few hours. The whole top leadership held its breath, waiting for Lin Biao's next move. But unexpectedly, the plane didn't fly far. At 2.25 am on the 13th, it crashed the Ongdo Khan in Mongolia. Two years after becoming the legal successor, Lin Biao died. There are two main explanations for the crash today. The first, now the official Chinese version, is a fuel shortage. The plane was a Trident 256. Because everything happened suddenly, and the original plan was Guangzhou, they hadn't filled the tanks. It took off with only 12.5 tons of fuel instead of the full 20 tons, just enough for Guangzhou. The flight path was chaotic at first, burning even more fuel. In the end, it ran out over Mongolia and crashed. But there is another theory, the infighting version. A book by a Mongolian scholar, The Death of Marshal Lin Biao notes that although the black box went to the Soviets, judging from the crash site instrument panel and explosion intensely, there should still have been fuel on board, at least 2 tons. Not necessary enough to reach the Soviet Union, but enough for a nearby airport. Also found in the wreckage were several pistols and submachine guns. For a defection plane, carrying guns isn't strange, but all of them were loaded and safeties off. So the Mongolian scholar concluded there may have been fighting inside the plane. Some wanted to continue to the Soviet Union, others wanted to turn back to China. The one wanting to return was likely the pilot. Later CCP statements somewhat support this. In 1980, when Deng Xiaoping commented on the Lin Biao defection incident in an interview, he said something very interesting. In his personal judgment, the pilot was a good man. The pilot's death treatment also raises questions. There were 9 people on board, the other 8 were all labeled defectors. Only the pilot was not. He was ruled a normal death in the line of duty and given a pension. The reasons behind that are worth thinking about. Of course, the exact truth, because the Soviet Union fell, but the CCP hasn't, can only gradually come out after the CCP falls. Afterward, Lin Biao's daughter, the one who informed on her own parents, Lin Doudou, didn't fare well either. She was treated as part of Lin's remnant clique, beaten half to death, locked up for long interrogations, forced to confess Lin Biao's crimes over and over. During detention, she once tried to kill herself with sleeping pills but failed. Only in 1974, after repeatedly writing to Mao for help, did Mao approve ending her investigation. By then, she had lost half her hair and six teeth. Looking back on Lin Biao's life, his entry into the power game feels more like an accident. He was never a master or veteran of political struggle. He had no ability to maneuver among monsters like Mao and Zhou Enlai. All he ever wanted was a peaceful end. Before Lu Shan, he was actually doing fine. But when Mao threw him that olive branch after Lu Shan, he couldn't hold back. Greed pulled him into the power game. Once in, he found he couldn't get out. Of course, once you get tangled with a demon like Mao, how could you possibly die peacefully? And Lin Biao's defection, Lin Liguo's betrayal, it wasn't some grand heroic thing. The whole event just screams absurd and childish. Perhaps whatever is happening between Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and Xi Jinping is just as absurd and childish. We just won't know the truth until the CCP collapses, or until the day Xi steps down. Thank you so much for watching. If you find this video helpful, please like it, drop a comment below, and hit the subscribe button right here. It really helps YouTube suggest my video to others. I'll be back with more content soon. Until then, be well.