ILLICIT FINANCE- Ms. Sarah Paquet

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Apr 15, 2026
18th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum Panama City, Panama 🇵🇦 June 29- 30, 2021
-Ms. Sarah Paquet
Chairman of IEWG (Egmont Group); Director and CEO of FINTRAC/CANAFE
We have a very distinguished panel and be extremely informative. These are
frankly two of the most thoughtful, respected individuals who understand this region and
illicit finance transactions in this region better than anyone I know. I would like to
recognize Sarah Paquette who will join us virtually. She's chairman of the Egmont Group
and the director and CEO of FinTrack, which is the Canadian FIU. So we thank you,
Ms. Sarah Paquette. Also, Mr. Joseph Humeyer, executive director for the Center for the Secure
Free Society, and Ms. Selena Rial Ulloa, professor of practice for the William J. Perry
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. We will begin with
Sarah Paquette, who will join us virtually. Ms. Paquette, we thank you for being with us.
Thank you.
We don't have a good connection, Ms. Paquette. The connection is not good.
Do you want to reconnect? Maybe it'll be better and we'll start the program.
I'm going to start with Mr. Humeyer.
You can please go again if you want.
Can you hear me well now?
It's much better.
Okay. Do you want me to start?
Okay. So sorry about that. And a big, big thank you for having me today. And a big thank you for
accommodating the fact that I'm here with you virtually. Those events are very important.
They bring together parliamentarians, government officials, experts, and it's an excellent
opportunity for us to bring together the best practices for combating the shared threats that
we all face. At FinTRAC, our vision is safe Canadian, safe economy. And we realize in an
interconnected world where illicit finance can easily move from country to country,
the best way to achieve this vision is through strong international collaboration.
I have with me today Caleb Galligan, who's helping me with the presentation,
and Deputy Director of Intelligence for FinTRAC, Barry Michalop.
Next page. So I will give you an overview of FinTRAC mandates and activities. I will describe
some of the key illicit finance methods and techniques we have identified in the Canadian
context. And then I will provide some real life example of those techniques. FinTRAC is Canada's
financial intelligence unit. Next slide, please. Our mandate is to facilitate the detection,
prevention, and deterrence of money laundering and terrorist activity financing
while ensuring the protection of personal information. FinTRAC was designed to safeguard
the integrity of Canada's financial system and global financial framework while respecting the
privacy of individuals and companies. So FinTRAC is like all the other FIUs that are also members
of the Engman Group. So next slide. At FinTRAC, we have two key functions. It's compliance
and intelligence. So the compliance sector is responsible for conducting compliant activities
such as receiving financial reports, providing guidance to reporting ITT, but also ensuring
through examination that they meet their obligation. On the strategic side, we have the
tactical side, which produce and disseminate tactical financial intelligence to our law
enforcement. But we also have the strategic side, which use quantitative and qualitative
research methods and advanced analytic techniques to identify and report on trends and patterns.
On my next topic is the public-private partnership. That's one of the methods we use
that has proven to be extremely efficient. Those PPPs are initiated by a financial institution
who serve as project leads for their project. They work with FIUs, but they also work with
law enforcement. Since 2016, we launched five projects. The first one was Project Protect,
which was led by BMO. And the initiative was to combat the laundering of proceeds
derived from domestic human sex trafficking. The second one was Chameleon, led by HSBC,
and it was to combat romance scam. The third one was Project Guardian, led by CIBC,
which was to combat the drug trafficking of fentanyl. The fourth one was Project Athena,
which was led by RBC, and was to combat money laundering activities, in particular,
underground banking and professional money laundering that we are going to talk about a
bit more today. And our last one, Project Shadow, was to combat child sexual exploitation and is
led by Scotiabank. So, moving to the specific issue of illicit finance, the next portion of
my presentation will describe illicit finance mechanism. Financial intelligence units around
the world, in light of the transaction report they receive and their specialized expertise in
the analysis of financial flows, are well positioned to detect and deter illicit financing
methods and techniques through collaboration with law enforcement and the private sector.
Through our analysis, our database of financial transaction law enforcement information and
persons report, Fintrack, as other EFIUs in the world, is able to make several high-level
observations regarding illicit financial flows. The illicit financial flows are defined by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as financial flows that are illicit in origin,
transfer, or use, that reflect a transfer of value, and that cross-country borders.
On the next slide, you have a screenshot of Fintrack on professional money laundering through
trade-based money laundering and money services business. So, this is publicly available on our
website, but what you will find in this OpsAlert is professional money launderers are critical to
facilitating these illicit financial flows. PMLs are third-party. They are not involved in the
commission of the predicate offense itself, but they receive profit and benefit from facilitating
the money laundering for others. They may operate with a network that includes money collectors
and coordinators. They are coordinating the cash pickups and the money mules. They also use
international money controllers who broker money laundering deals on behalf of transnational
organized crime. So, the FIUs are playing a key role in facilitating this collaboration
and giving the insight needed from the financial activity ongoing in all the jurisdictions.
Next slide. The FADF, the Financial Action Task Force, defines three broad categories of methods
used to hide illicit funds. And then, you have the movement of value through the
formal financial system. You also have the physical movement of banknotes
using methods such as cash courier or bulk cash smuggling. And you also have the movement of
value through international trade, which is what we refer to as trade-based money laundering or TBML.
Trading companies and trade-based money laundering techniques are used to launder
critical proceeds on behalf of transnational organized crime groups through legitimate trade
and or by commingling illicit proceeds with legitimate trade payment. So, you can have
proceeds of crime money going to another country to buy perfumes. And then, the perfumes are shipped
back into the country of origin, which the perfumes are sold, and then the criminals have
the money of the drugs back into their pocket. So, next slide. Counter-illicit finance through
finance intelligence. What I want to do now is really draw your attention to three case studies
that we have seen are happening right now in Canada. So, the first one is about trade-based
money laundering. So, in this case, we had a textile wholesaler located in Canada that was
receiving a lot of money from different Latin American companies. The same individual was also
traveling to those Latin American countries, but as well as China and Hong Kong and was coming back
with luggage full of cash, different currencies, U.S. dollars, euros, Colombians pesos, and they
just closed at the borders, but still an interesting behavior. And we also saw that
that textile wholesaler was immediately sending money to shell company in China and Hong Kong.
And after that, following the money, we realized that those companies in China and Hong Kong were
sending the money directly back to Latin America. So, looking at the intelligence, we realized that
one of the correspondent bank was in Canada. So, we use our clump by and sector group,
we'll talk to the bank, do an exam, evaluate their risk tolerance, and after that, more
information was requested from those companies. The bank sees their activities with those companies.
My next case study is about professional money launderer. If you look at the middle of the slide,
you will really see how the organized crime group is structured. So, you have the gambling well,
and who recruits the casino gamblers, you have the real estate developers, and you have two
professional money launderers. So, top left is the TBML, where China and Hong Kong shell
companies are wearing millions of dollars to Canada. Top right, you have the money launderers
nominee. Bottom right, you have the money services businesses, which may be owned or used
by the TBML. You have the legal profession, which is retained to facilitate real estate transaction
or the establishment of shell companies. You have real estate developer that are ties and
are involved in loan fraud, casino gambling, and illegal enterprise. And at the bottom left,
you have the gamblers who are repaying the Canadian well with wiring funds from their
account to China and Hong Kong. So, that's a very good example of how they are organized.
The next case study is a money mule profile involving casino. So, the step-by-step summary
is the mule is first receiving money from the professional money launderer, which deposits
in an account that has been just created or had very little activities before.
When the funds are deposited, they are layered via a casino transaction. So, in this example,
purchase of bank drafts to itself or to other third party, and then those bank drafts are
negotiated in casinos where they engage in no or limited gambling activities.
There are also cash withdrawal and credit cash card advance that are used at casino ATMs.
And you can see how that all goes. So, a little bit of gambling, then the mule will take the
money back and deposit the money back into his own bank account. And through our indicators,
we have a note when those suspicious transactions are happening that the money was returned as funds
and it was not for casino winnings. So, when those indicators are appearing in our system,
we have suspicion that money laundering is happening. And in that case, in particular,
the suspicious transaction report indicated that 3 million Canadian dollars was deposited
in that mule account during a period of 9 months. And then when asked about the money,
the person was always answering that the source was casino winning.
So, in this example and the others, the goal is always the same for professional money laundering,
is to utilize those methodology to bring cash, illicit cash, into our regular financial system.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Ms. Paquette. And now we'll have Mr. Joseph Humeyer,
the Executive Director of the Center for Secure Free Society.
