LIVE: International Monetary Fund Holds Departmental Session About Economies Navigating War

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The International Monetary Fund holds a departmental session titled "MENA Economies Navigating War: Managing Shocks and Shaping the Future" at 1:30 p.m. ET on April 14 to explore policy responses for Middle East and North Africa nations as they confront the regional economic impact of conflict.
Well, good afternoon, everybody.
My name is Gillian Tett.
I have two hats.
I'm both a columnist at the Financial Times
and also oversee King's College in Cambridge.
And I would like to welcome you all to the panel
that no one wanted, because when the IMF started
repairing its WIO, World Economic Outlook, a few weeks ago,
it had a fairly upbeat message to the analysis in that WIO.
Essentially, global growth last year
was a lot more resilient than many people had expected.
And essentially, they were looking forward
to a fairly good year this year as well.
Well, tragically, war has now exploded in the Middle East.
And quite apart from the horrific human cost of that,
which I'm sure is deeply painful for many of us in the room,
there is also an economic cost too.
So what we're gonna be talking about today
is what that economic cost means.
How bad is it?
Because right now, there's a major disconnect
between the equity markets and some of the messaging
from people close to supply chains.
How bad is it gonna be?
Who is gonna suffer?
Is it going to be just the global South?
Is it going to be just the economies in the region?
Or will it spread more widely?
What can be done about it, if anything can be done about it?
And lastly, what role do groups like the IMF
actually have in trying to counter this?
And to tackle these very thorny issues,
we have a fantastic panel representing different aspects
of the, if you like, intellectual supply chain
around these questions.
On my immediate left, your right,
is Bo Lee, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.
Next to him is Mohammad Arunzeb,
who's the Minister of Finance from Pakistan.
Next to him is Mike Kyle,
the Senior Managing Director and Deputy Head
of the Portfolio Management Group of BlackRock.
And at the end is Tim Gould, the Chief Energy Economist
at the International Energy Agency,
all of whom have incredibly important perspective
to share and to educate us
as we are facing these tragic times.
So perhaps I can start with you, Bo Lee,
and ask you, as Deputy MD of the IMF,
having just had to rip up your forecasts,
having come out with, in my view, very intelligently,
three sets of different forecasts
about what might happen next,
which, if nothing else, shows just how uncertain it is,
how bad, in your view, are the impacts for the,
let's start with the MENA region,
the Middle East and Europe and North African area?
Just how bad is it?
Because when I talk to people right now,
I have this extraordinary disconnect
between people in Silicon Valley
who appear to be living in Happyville,
where everything is boom, boom, boom,
and they can't see any reason to get worried,
and then I talk to people, a bit like Tim Gould,
who are here from the minute,
who are actually at, if not the cold face,
then deep in the weeds of supply chains,
who are deeply alarmed.
So tell me, what do you make of the current situation?
Thank you, thank you, Gillian.
Let me start by expressing that our thoughts
are with all those people
who are experiencing incredible hardship right now.
The MENA countries are all heavily impacted by this war,
including humanitarian consequences,
such as civilian casualties, population displacement,
and strains on many vulnerable groups.
In terms of economic impact,
let me quickly make three points.
One, MENA countries are facing unprecedented challenges,
exceptional uncertainty in their outlook.
Even if we see production and export normalized
by the middle of this year,
the MENA economies, their growth,
their growth outlook are already severely impacted.
For those countries most directly affected,
their output will remain below their pre-war trends
for the near term, and also for the medium term.
That's number one.
Number two, the impact on the MENA countries
are also very uneven, very asymmetrical.
For those oil exporters directly impacted,
they will see disruptions to their output,
to their production, to their export,
and those impacts most likely will outweigh
the benefits of higher oil price.
For oil importers, they're gonna face
higher energy and food prices,
which will erode their purchasing power,
worsen their trade balance,
and strain their public finance.
For low-income countries, for vulnerable,
for fragile states, they are particularly vulnerable
because their reliance on import of energy and fertilizer
because of the high food insecurity,
and also because of their limited fiscal space.
Number three, in terms of their global impact,
the impact of this war is certainly not limited
to the MENA region.
As the managing director eloquently elaborated last week
at her curtain reserve, we see three channels
of this war that could impact the global economy,
including on energy price and supply chain,
on inflation and inflation expectations,
and also on financial conditions.
And this high uncertainty also produced
three possible scenarios which we outlined
in our World Economic Outlook,
which was released earlier this morning.
And in those three scenarios, we can see that
all paths leads to higher price and lower growth,
and slower growth.
And with that, I want to give the floor back to Jilin,
and also to other panelists.
Right, so to paraphrase, it's gonna be bad.
We don't know whether it's gonna be slightly bad,
very bad, or extremely bad.
But either way, there's not a lot of good news
to go around at the moment.
I should say, I don't think I've actually seen
the IMF-WIO come out with three different scenarios
in quite such clear form, which does reflect the fact
that we are facing extraordinarily uncertain times,
and pretty scary ones.
And of course, you, Minister, are on the front lines of this
because you are both very close to the fighting.
In fact, you just played a very critical role
in hosting the peace talks.
So congratulations on that occurring without incident.
But you are also directly impacted
because you are very heavily reliant
both on energy imports and agricultural imports
like fertilizer.
Tell us how you see this current situation.
Is it bad, very bad, or extremely bad?
Which are you more concerned about,
the food aspect or the energy aspect?
Thank you, it's a pleasure to be here on this panel.
A month and a half into this war-like situation,
what we are dealing with at this point in time
is the first-order impact.
So our focus right now has been
the procurement of the molecule,
whether it's crude, whether it's smog gas,
whether it's diesel, aviation fuel, LPG,
and then associated pricing and logistics.
Because even if the molecule is available,
if one route, it used to take four to five days,
now, say, for instance, from Yandu,
it will take 15 to 20 days.
So those logistics have to be kept in mind
as we sort of negotiate this discussion.
The other thing which has been quite critical for us
is how do we deal with the price transmission?
So in the first three weeks or so,
because as you rightly pointed out,
and as the DMG also pointed out,
I mean, the first three weeks,
we didn't know it was going to be
one week, two week, three week.
So we tried to protect our citizenry
in terms of giving or doing no transmission whatsoever
except for one particular intervention.
And we sort of went with a blanket subsidy discussion,
but we kept it fiscally neutral
in terms of what we could do
in terms of cutting our expenditures,
whether it's our public spending,
whether it's the cut in our cabinet ministers,
the fuel which had to be brought down
in terms of the costing, et cetera.
But as we moved on, the reality was,
I mean, you are dealing with a limited fiscal space.
Although we came into this crisis
with good buffers, both on the fiscal and external side,
but when you don't know where it's going to end,
so we had to move towards full transmission
with targeted subsidies.
And the targeted subsidies which are now in vogue
are for the two wheelers, for public transportation.
You mentioned agriculture,
because we are right now into the harvesting season
and diesel is a very important component
and enabler of that.
So we're especially protecting the small farmers
who have 25 acreage and less.
So that's where we are at this point in time.
I think what the DMD is pointing out
from our perspective, second order, third order
type of discussions.
But going back to your original question,
at this point in time,
we are very focused on the petroleum side.
We are very fortunate that on the fertilizer side,
we came into this crisis having stocks
which were much larger than last year.
And fertilizer and food stock, quite frankly,
food security is less of an issue.
Everything associated with availability of petroleum.
And when I say petroleum, it's both oil and gas.
And dealing with a force majeure from Qatar,
and that's where we have to get our oil field,
sorry, the gas fields moving as we move forward.
So I think that's where we are at this point in time.
Second order, third order, all very important.
It's going to be a function of duration and intensity.
Because one thing is very clear,
that even if it's a session next week
or next couple of weeks, and let's hope and pray
that the peace comes back to the region,
the energy infrastructure has been hit.
So it will be weeks, if not months,
that we get back into normalcy.
So we are looking at inflation, we're looking at GDP,
we are looking at elastities vis-a-vis our exports
and remittances, our fixed income flows, et cetera.
But as of now, if it's of short duration, we will manage.
Right, well, before I turn to Mr. Payal, I should say,
firstly, congratulations for either being there previously.
I don't know whether you had any premonition
about what was coming or just got very lucky there,
but that's clearly very helpful.
In terms of the fuel aspects of it,
are you anticipating rationing?
Because we've already seen signs of that in the Philippines,
and there's clearly going to be a need
for some form of demand destruction
if this doesn't stop soon.
Yeah, no, I think we have been dealing with the context
because we are obviously looking at what's going on
in Southeast Asia and South Asia in general.
So far, we have stayed away from interventions
at the gas stations and at the petrol pumps.
Because what we've seen is it has led to law
and order situations in other countries.
And if demand destruction can be done
through price transmission,
price transmission combined with targeted subsidies,
from our perspective, that's a much better way to go
than going into rationing.
But again, I have to put an asterisk there.
It all depends how long this goes and how far this goes.
But your point about fertilizer, Mr. Jihad Azur,
actually about two, two and a half weeks back,
and we are very grateful to him,
he organized a meeting, a Zoom call,
or virtual call with the finance ministers
and the central bank governors.
And I'll be very honest with you,
that while we were very focused
because we are dependent on petroleum going through Hormuz,
I did not realize the kind of percentage of fertilizer
which was going through Hormuz.
I didn't.
So, you know, from certain countries
and certain finance ministers learning that,
obviously, that's a huge issue for certain countries.
I think it's probably the first time in history
that central bankers have had to have a crash course
in fertilizer.
And of course, one of the big problems
is that there are very few people
who are either central bank governors or media pundits
or politicians who've ever studied chemical engineering.
And that's one of the big problems we all face right now
in trying to make sense of the impact of this
through the supply chains.
But I'd like to bring you in from BlackRock
and ask you to explain a very simple question.
I am stunned by the resilience of the financial markets
thus far in the face of these potentially huge shocks
to the system.
Can you explain why markets remain so buoyant
and whether you think they will continue to be buoyant?
And essentially, what portfolio managers like yourself
are doing to try and protect yourself
from these uncertainties?
Sure, well, thank you for having me.
I would echo the sentiments
of the deputy managing director that, of course,
at BlackRock, our thoughts first and foremost
go to those who are affected by the war,
our friends, our partners, our colleagues in the region.
I guess maybe a few observations.
First, I would note that what we've seen
during the course of the war
isn't a traditional risk-off shock.
It isn't stocks down, bonds up.
It's been stocks down, bonds down,
which highlights that what we're seeing is a supply shock
and a pretty historically scaled one at that.
And so I think the first thing, again, to observe
is just this isn't the type of risk-on, risk-off environment
that we saw in the 2010s.
It's one much more particular to the moment,
particular to our decade,
and our decade is really characterized by supply shocks.
The second point I'd make is,
this is really echoing what both of the prior panelists said,
a really differentiated shock,
and it's differentiated in a couple of ways.
I think it's differentiated within energy markets itself.
I think a lot of people have noted the distinction
between the way paper markets are trading
versus the way physical markets are trading.
I think we've seen a lot more buoyancy
in the physical markets for Brent, for WTI,
for other crude products,
and a lot more stress in the physical markets
for the refined products that people,
businesses actually consume,
gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, naphtha, on down the list.
And so that's one way
in which I think the shock is differentiated.
The other, which has been noted upon, of course,
is the way in which it's regionally differentiated.
And I think this gets to some of your question, Jillian.
BlackRock, we estimate the overall global growth impact
is on the order of 20 to 30 basis points
off of global growth,
should we see hostilities hopefully continue
to move towards de-escalation.
But that's very differentiated.
It's probably half a percentage point off of GDP in Europe.
And in Asia, on average, it's probably 30 to 40 basis points,
but with wide variation from Southeast Asia,
South Asia on one end to China on the other.
The U.S., probably only a 10th or so off of growth,
I think reflecting the fact that the U.S.,
for a range of reasons,
is relatively insulated from global energy shocks.
The kind of thing that I point to most particularly is,
yes, it's true the price at the pump is higher
and meaningfully so,
but if you look at the benchmark price of natural gas
in the United States,
an increasingly important electricity source,
an increasingly important industrial input,
it's actually down since the war has began.
And I think underscores the extent to which the U.S.
is comparatively insulated here,
even as this is a global shock.
And so I think to that point looking ahead,
I think even were we to see
the cessation of hostilities from here,
the aftermath is going to be with us
for some time economically.
A lot of that is already baked into the cake
as been said by the Deputy Managing Director
and the Finance Minister.
But I think from a markets perspective,
where so much of the equity market weight globally
is in the United States
where the differentiated economic shocks of this
are relatively lesser in the United States,
I think that goes a long way to describing
why what we've seen has been a differentiated shock
to financial markets
and one where that kind of benchmark asset
that we all look at,
namely how is the U.S. equity market performing
has remained relatively buoyant
even in the face of a historically scaled
global real economic shock.
Right.
I mean, I must say the U.S. is not entirely shielded.
I was very struck yesterday,
I was chatting to some Congressmen
and they were saying that they'd gone back
to some of their districts over the weekend
and farmers are shrieking about a 50, 60% increase
in fertilizer costs just as they're planting.
So certainly even in the U.S. it's not evenly spread,
it's concentrated on certain areas right now.
And one may not want to shed too many tears
given what some of many people in the global South
are facing, but it's still striking
how that disparity is emerging now.
But I'd like to bring you in Tim Gold
because I'd love you to explain to us two things.
Firstly, how bad is this current shock
when looked at in a historical perspective?
You're chief economist at the IEA,
you're paid to crunch these numbers
and look back at them in a long-term perspective,
but just how bad is the shock potentially?
And can you explain to us
what's happening in the market pricing?
Because it looks very odd compared to normal pricing,
both in terms of the discrepancy
between the paper and physical markets,
but also words like backwardation and contango,
which aren't usually tossed around,
are now incredibly important.
So give us a very quick explanation
of just how bad it is and why the pricing
looks so utterly weird and funky.
And by the way, it's a very practical question to ask
because one challenge that all the media faces right now
is which price should they be telling the audience about?
Traditionally, we've been talking about WTI and Brent.
In many ways, that's the very worst price
to be looking at right now,
even though that appears to be the price
that say the White House is looking at.
So you can add that one as well.
What would you tell your media friends
about what they should be actually putting
in their diagrams right now?
Well, thanks very much, Gillian.
And I think the first question
was on the magnitude of the shock.
Yeah, how bad is it?
I mean, when we think of those types of shocks,
we often think back to the 1970s, 1973, 1979.
Oil market was much smaller then,
but roughly in each of those cases,
we were losing around 5 million barrels a day of oil.
Today, we're losing 13 million barrels a day.
So that's the latest numbers that we have from the IEA.
So Gulf producers were bringing around 24 million barrels
of different oil products to market in February.
There's been a very successful ability
to bring some of that to market through bypass routes,
the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia,
the pipeline to Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates.
But because of 20 of those 24 were going
through the strait and those flows have obviously collapsed,
we've gone from 24 to something like 11.
That is extremely serious in a historical perspective.
And let's not forget also that this is a natural gas crisis
because whereas we have bypass routes for oil,
we do not have anything similar for gas.
So all of the LNG that typically comes from Qatar
and UAE to market is locked away in the strait.
And indeed, the main production facility
at Ras Al Afan has shut down and there's some damage
to some of the two out of the 14 liquefaction trains there.
So the effects of that have been felt with a time lag
because as the minister pointed out,
in crisis situations, distances matter, logistics matter.
So it's five days sailing from the Gulf to South Asia.
But effectively, throughout March,
we had pre-conflict cargoes arriving
in different destinations around the world.
And the last of those cargoes
are reaching their destinations right now.
In fact, we had a big picture
on the front page of the FT yesterday
showing one of those last cargoes docking,
which gives a sense of drama and foreboding.
So that what happened in March
is not necessarily representative
of the nature of this shock.
We will see much more severe impacts in April
because that flow of cargoes is drying up now.
Now, onto your second point on prices,
which ones should be paying attention to?
So obviously we look at different price markers.
The ones that we look at most closely
are some of the refined product markers
because those have responded much more than Brent and WTI.
Look at diesel jet fuel in Northwest Europe,
but look at jet fuel in Singapore.
Jet fuel in Singapore a few days ago
was trading very close to $300 a barrel.
So looking at the refined product prices
that consumers actually end up feeling,
I think is probably one of the best ways
to have a sense of where we're at.
And then when it comes to the different crude price markers,
as Mike mentioned, there's some real tightness
in the markets for physical delivery.
So North Sea dated, you've seen 130, $140 per barrel.
And I think those are the ones
where you really feel the strains
on the current supply situation in world land.
And so give us a quick primer
in what backwardation means.
So the next time we have a conversation with our bosses
or at a dinner party, we can sound really smart.
And why does backwardation matter?
So backwardation matters because it's a signal to the market
about essentially what you should do with your inventories.
And the backwardation,
you're having very steep backwardation at the moment.
So your front month price is much higher
than the prices for deferred delivery.
And what that means is the market is screaming,
we are short barrels now.
Use your inventories.
Try and bring us barrels to the market as soon as you can.
And that's in fact what you're seeing in inventories
have come down quite sharply this month
because of that shortfall in available deliveries
from traditional producers in the Gulf.
And there's a couple of questions.
Firstly, I mean, one of the things I learned
when I was a rookie reporter at the FT
is you should never use a number without a denominator,
some sense of what it is a percentage of.
So when it was 5 million loss in the 1970s,
it's 13 million barrels a day lost today.
What does that mean in terms of,
are we looking at comparable terms percentage-wise
or is the shock actually bigger today
than it was in the 1970s?
So roughly speaking, the global oil market
has almost doubled over that period.
So, but the size of the shock
is more than twice what it was.
So even in percentage terms,
this is a larger shock than the ones we had in the 1970s.
So it doesn't translate all the way through
into the impacts that we can expect.
I mean, in the 1970s, you had a move essentially
from around $3 a barrel oil to $12 a barrel oil,
and then it stayed there.
So that quadrupling of the price
was a real lasting shock to economies around the world.
I don't think anyone's expecting a sustained quadrupling
in the oil price as a result of this shock.
But still, the volumes involved are very significant
and that raises questions about the physical availability
of supplies in different parts of the world.
And echoing a point that I think has been made,
the effects are very asymmetric.
So as often is the case with an energy shock,
it is the most vulnerable,
it is the most exposed that feel the effects first,
and maybe they're not the ones with the loudest voices
in the international arena.
Yeah, well, tragically, they're not the ones
who tend to be here this weekend or this week as well.
And therein lies the tragedy and the pain
that many people are feeling.
But before I turn to the other panelists,
I'd like to throw it forward and ask,
how do you think this shock is gonna remake
the global energy market ecosystem more widely?
Are we going to see more demand destruction,
more intensity of energy use decline further?
Are we gonna see a dash towards renewables
or new forms of supply chains emerging?
So I think it's gonna change risk perceptions
around certain geographies and around certain fuels.
I think it would be natural if, as a result of this crisis,
there was a sort of energy security mindset
that attached a premium to resources
that are available domestically.
And renewables are widely distributed around the world,
and they are, contrast to the 1970s,
now essentially cost-competitive.
And there's been some astonishing developments
in Pakistan, Minister, in the last few years,
because of the availability of very low-cost solar,
in particular, solar and batteries.
Pakistan's a model about solar power energy.
We'll talk about that in a moment.
And you could see some of the things
that we've observed over recent years in Pakistan
becoming much more widespread in other parts of the world.
But there's a few other things that could benefit.
I mean, after the 1970s,
there was a big wave of new construction of nuclear.
So nearly 40% of the nuclear plants
that are in operation today were built
in the 10 years after the two oil shocks of the 1970s.
So they can, I think nuclear could also see a revival
or an extension of the revival
that's already starting to become visible because of this.
But let's also remember that
for many developing economies in Asia,
they don't just have renewables, they also have coal.
So there are some open questions there
about what also happens to the discussion around coal,
the most carbon-intensive of the fuels.
Can I add in one point?
Absolutely, yes.
And I think the minister highlighted this as well.
You know, I think one of the trends that I expect to see
coming out of this shock,
and I think you could already see the outlines of it
post COVID, post Russia's invasion in Ukraine.
I certainly saw it in my chair in the US government
in the prior administration,
and that's the trend towards stockpiling.
You know, I think that, you know,
whether it's energy or other critical supplies,
you know, in the 2010s,
the move was away from stockpiling, selling down reserves.
I think the move now is all towards rebuilding those,
investing in those.
And I think that that's gonna be true
across a range of economies.
You know, for example, clearly one of the key insulators
that China has had in the face of the shock
is their very sizable petroleum reserve creating a buffer.
And I think a lot of other countries
are seeing that play out and learning that lesson.
And I expect that we'll see a number of countries
adopt that as part of their strategy looking ahead.
I'm gonna turn to the minister about this for a moment.
I know you've been thinking about it.
Before I do, though, Gina Raimondo,
the former Commerce Secretary,
made a very interesting point last week,
which is that at the moment,
the financial markets don't reward companies
that are building resilient supply chains or stockpiles
because outside analysts can't see that.
And they see that merely as a cost.
They don't really see that as a beneficial,
you know, corporate aspect of what they're doing.
Do you think that investors are starting to get more savvy
when they look at either countries or companies
in terms of trying to find ways to measure resilience,
who is resilient and who isn't?
Yeah, I mean, obviously I know
and care for Secretary Raimondo a lot,
but I might respectfully kind of take the other side
of that a little bit,
which is I think the degree to which the market in general
has been more favorably inclined towards companies
with high capital expenditures in recent years
has changed meaningfully versus the 2010s.
I mean, the model of the 2010s was capital light businesses
spinning off high free cash flows and running just in time.
I think today the market has been tending to reward
companies with a much more significant
capital expenditure footprint.
Now, part of that is historic investments
in technology and AI,
but I think it shouldn't be undersold
the degree to which some of that is investing
in resilience, investing in reshoring,
among other things.
And so to me, that's a trend that looks different today
than it did five, six, seven, eight years ago.
Right.
So Minister, is Pakistan going to become
a center of stockpiling?
Are you trying to create a fortress Pakistan
with lots of resilience in that way?
I think what was said earlier,
that this is certainly one of the largest supply shocks
in recent history.
You can make a comparison,
what COVID did is probably the largest demand shock
in recent years.
So therefore, there is a reset discussion
and 2020 hindsight is a wonderful thing.
But from our perspective, two aspects.
One, we certainly find ourselves to be very fortunate
to have 8,000 megawatts being produced through solar
at this point in time,
and the wind that we have and the hydropower,
but there's a very clear discussion
in the next eight to 10 years,
how do we move towards renewable and get it to 80 to 90%.
So that's a very clear priority.
How much of your energy is renewable at the moment?
Just to remind the audience.
At this point in time,
it will be more in the sort of 30 to 40% range.
So it's a long way to go
and there are hydro projects,
large hydro projects underway.
And therefore, there's more solar coming through,
there's more wind coming through,
but it's something which we were on the right track,
but clearly the journey we feel needs to be accelerated.
That's one.
The other thing, again, as I said,
2020 hindsight is a wonderful thing,
but what we have right now are commercial reserves
by coming into this conflict.
And then the question is,
should we have had strategic reserves?
And that is a very clear learning,
a clear understanding that we need to work on that.
As I said, 2020 hindsight is a wonderful thing,
but these are the two aspects,
which from our perspective are clear learnings
and these are still early days.
And just on the fertilizer thing,
before I turn to the MDD,
were you just lucky to have stockpiled fertilizer before?
No, I think there are two aspects to fertilizer.
We have always had one set of fertilizer,
which is the single largest usage, which is urea.
And that we were self-sufficient for the longest time.
What we are still dependent on is phosphates or DAP,
which we have to import.
So I think this is something which was always there
and is not surprising given the fact that we,
agriculture is 24% by economy
and therefore ensuring that this important critical input,
we are as self-sufficient as we can.
So I would say that part is deliberate.
Right, well, congratulations.
I mean, we do live in a peculiar age
because economists and analysts
are having to simultaneously spend time
worrying about abstract disembodied issues
like neuro-symbolic AI
alongside real world grubby issues like fertilizer.
I don't think anyone's ever had to,
had that kind of yo-yoing intellectually
to understand the world right now.
It's fascinating.
But Boli, I'd like to ask you,
one of the things that has emerged in the last few weeks
but it's often been ignored
is the fact that about 80% of oil and LNG shipments
going through the Strait of Hormuz goes to Asia.
And there's been increasingly close ties
between Asia and the Gulf regions.
So I'm curious, how do you see this shaping
or reshaping this conflict,
that crucial axis going forward?
Are we about to see a major diversification
or breakdown in that very tight and tightening relationship
or will they simply go back to business as usual
when this conflict is hopefully over?
Thank you, Gillian, for that question.
Well, in addition to be a human tragedy,
the world could also reshape economic relationship.
One of the prime example, as Gillian just said,
is the relationship between the Gulf countries and Asia.
Let me start by saying that we see a structural
complementarity between the Gulf and Asia.
Let me give a couple of examples.
The refinery systems in Asia,
those in China, India, Japan, Korea,
they are mostly configured to process
these kind of medium and heavy sour crudes from the Gulf.
So they are matching each other.
And it's not easy to adjust that.
Another example would be long-term LNG contracts.
So there are a number of long-term LNG contracts
enter between the Gulf suppliers and Asian countries.
And those long-term LNG contracts have been
kind of anchoring trade flow between the two regions
over a multiple number of years.
So, again, those long-term contracts
will also be there for some time.
And, again, it's not easy to adjust.
So that kind of structural complementarity
would help, hopefully, help maintain a strong link
between the two regions.
That's my first point.
But that being said, it does not mean
there will not be diversification and risk mitigation.
There will be, and we do expect that,
for example, Asian countries, given this new war,
Asian countries will explore diversification, right?
Diversify suppliers, diversify shipping routes,
diversify energy composition, doing more renewables
or going more nuclear.
So there will be efforts to diversify.
There will also be efforts to expand strategic reserves,
as Minister just said.
Some countries will start to think about it
more seriously about strategic reserves.
So all this diversification and risk mitigation
could happen in Asia.
But on the side of the Gulf countries,
there could also be risk mitigation and diversification
in terms of diversifying shipping routes,
in terms of acquiring downstream assets,
and also in terms of strengthening strategic partnership
that can anchor demand.
So this kind of risk mitigation and diversification
will be natural response from both the Gulf countries
and Asian countries.
But this does not mean the interdependence
between the two regions will decline.
It only means that, I mean,
the interdependence may still be there,
but there will reduce reliance on a single shipping route
or reliance on a concentrated risk.
So there will be more risk diversification,
but the interdependence will still be there.
Let me add one more point before I conclude,
which is that the Gulf region and the Asian countries,
their economic relationship is much more than oil and gas.
If we look at the last 20 years,
there are trade in many areas,
in petrochemical, in fertilizer,
in logistic and port development,
the infrastructure investment,
the air links in financial flows.
You know, we see more and more Asian companies
doing infrastructure construction projects
in the Gulf countries.
We also see from the Gulf countries,
you know, a number of sovereign investors
very active in Asia.
So this interdependence, again, is much more complex
than simply oil and gas.
Of course, the question is, given this war,
will that relationship be weakened or be deepened?
We think a lot of that depends on
how long this war will last,
whether this shock will be temporary
or it will become a long-term geopolitical risk.
That will, to a large extent,
determine whether that interdependence
between these two regions will be weakened
or strengthened in the next several years.
Well, it very much depends, yes.
Please, Minister.
Can I just make a very quick intervention
on what the managing director just said?
Whether it's temporary, whether it's permanent,
time will tell.
But what we've seen on our own ports
in terms of diversification of routes,
to the Karachi port in the last 25 to 30 days,
the kind of TUs that we have managed
are larger than what the kind of volume
we have managed entire 2025.
Wow.
And-
So, again, in the last 25 days,
you've been dealing with more volumes
than in the whole of last year.
Correct.
Wow.
And then there's another port in Pakistan
called Gwadar Port,
and we've been trying to operationalize it.
It's up and running, but trying to operationalize it,
getting it scaled up.
And again, we just now see volumes coming through there.
So I think just the point that the DMD made
in terms of people thinking through diversification,
we would certainly be a beneficiary of that.
But, you know, again, people are thinking through that.
That's absolutely fascinating.
I mean, the great, wonderful thing about humans
is we are adaptable.
But, Mike, I'd like to ask you,
before we go to the audience for questions,
and we do have an absolutely packed atrium
standing remotely, quite literally.
So do, you know, think about questions in just a second.
Before we do,
investors in recent years have looked at the GCC
as a bastion of stability
compared to many other parts of the world.
And you've seen a big flow of money into the GCC.
And, of course, we've had this long history
of petrodollars being recycled into the rest of the world,
not just treasuries,
but increasingly private capital deals.
Are you expecting that international investors
are going to now flee the GCC
or regard it as no longer being a safe place to invest,
and or that the flow of petrodollars out will slow down
as the money is kept at home to help rebuild?
Bottom line is no, far from it.
You know, one, I think, you know,
obviously it's clear that the economic headwinds,
the economic pain in the short term of the GCC,
you know, is real.
And that's, you know, particularly going to be felt
in places like Kuwait and Qatar
that have no ability to get energy to global markets
other than through the Straits,
maybe somewhat less so with respect to Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and the like.
But, you know, clearly there is short-term economic challenge
as a result of this.
I think in the medium term,
you're going to see a lot of investment
from these economies,
investment in diversifying their ability
to get energy to global markets,
investment in resilience,
including around energy and other forms of infrastructure,
investments in defense.
Third, you know, I would say, you know,
there's a reason why these were seen
as resilient haven economies,
economies that were rapidly diversifying themselves
from their foundation in energy to financial services,
to tourism, to technology and artificial intelligence.
And we expect a BlackRock, those trends to continue.
I mean, one of the observation I would have
from my time in government,
when I spent a lot of time in the Gulf,
a lot of time in India, a lot of time in Southeast Asia,
my observation from all of that time was
there is likely to be no more dynamic part
of the global economy than that stretch of the world
that connects those three regions of it,
the Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia.
And I think the Gulf is really, you know,
the linchpin of that for all the reasons I cited
around the dynamism,
around the focus on diversifying the economy.
And I think our expectation is that
that's going to continue,
that expectation of dynamism is going to continue.
And we continue to see it as a place
that's going to continue attracting capital
for the, you know, years and decades beyond this.
I think the one point I would make,
which it goes to what you said is, you know,
and it connects your first question to me as well,
you know, the financial linkages between the Gulf
and the rest of the world,
the United States included, are real.
And when we think about treasury markets,
when we think about CapEx in the United States,
there are important financial linkages
and capital that is going to be deployed
in that part of the world to investing
in the resilience, the security,
the diversification that I talked about
at the head of my answer.
And that is capital that may not find the home
that was otherwise going to find
in the United States and elsewhere.
And so I think it's important to keep an eye
on those financial linkages,
including for folks like me who are engaged
in financial markets and investing day in and day out.
Right, well, thank you.
Well, we have a few minutes for questions,
very few minutes for questions.
I believe there are microphones there.
So if you can come to the microphone
and please identify yourself very briefly indeed
and keep your question very, very short
because we don't have much time at all.
Minister has to go off and do a meeting very soon.
Yes, sir.
My name is Hisham Jabi.
I have a question.
I think all of you alluded to COVID
and different countries showed
the different level of resiliency.
And we were surprised I was working at the World Bank then
how resilient our local communities to handle COVID.
So what are the, of course,
this is a different crisis, different nuances,
but what are one or two lesson learned
and what are one or two element
that distinguish X country from Y country
to be much more resilient?
Right, well, I don't think we've got time
for all of you to answer that question.
Would anyone like to jump in in particular?
Boli, FMDD, or perhaps the minister can just tell us
what did you learn from COVID and what do you-
Just very quickly.
I would say just two things.
One, very disciplined governance
and putting that mechanism in place.
That's one.
And number two, the role of technology.
And I see the parallel between that demand shock
and the supply shock at this point in time.
Even the targeted subsidies that we are now doing,
we're using digital wallets.
And that's why you don't have to do physical intervention
at the gas stations and the petrol stations
as you go and try to protect the vulnerable
and having a committee which is looking at all the facets,
all of the government approach.
So these are the two parallels which I would draw.
That's a very encouraging example
and very, very important indeed.
Of course, this was meant to be the year
that the IMF talked mostly about AI and tech innovation
and productivity until war got in the way.
But yes, MDD.
I would just add, I would agree
with what the minister just said.
Can I add one more thing,
which is that the quality of your institution.
Do you have an independent central bank that is credible?
Do you have fiscal rules that is credible?
If you have those,
those countries are typically doing better
to be more resilient in a crisis like this.
We have a question over here.
Yeah, my name is Iman Saleh
and I'm a postdoc at Yale University.
My question is, first of all,
thank you for the insightful discussion.
I'm curious how the panel sees the current focus
on emerging conflicts alongside the longest standing crisis
in the region such as Sudan,
which often receive less sustained attention
but have deep economic and human impacts.
So are you, I mean, as you're arguing,
has this conflict sucked all the oxygen out the room
and we're just focusing on that
as opposed to potentially sometimes related,
sometimes unrelated conflicts like Sudan?
MDD, would you like to comment on that?
Would you like to comment on that?
Are you concerned that we are spending less time
worrying about places like Sudan
in terms of the development of emerging conflicts?
Well, from the fund, we don't have that concern
because we have one team for every country, right?
So we have one team worry about maybe Qatar,
but we have another team worry about Sudan.
So we have one team for every country.
So in that way, we also have a board
that representing all 191 countries.
So we try to be even handed
and also trying to devote enough resource
for every member country.
Right, I can certainly say as a journalist
that there's a really big bandwidth problem right now
and all manner of incredibly important issues and stories
are not being covered because of the dominance
of this tragic news.
It's a really big issue.
Let's have that question.
Lastly, very quickly, we're almost out of time.
Yeah, Zach Coleman with Politico.
You've talked a lot about the ways
in which the energy map will be reshaped
after this conflict.
In your whatever baseline you use, 2030, 2040, 2050,
are we using less oil and gas or more oil and gas
relative to the pre-war period?
I think that's definitely something
for our resident energy expert.
Well, we're gonna be producing our very own WIO
a bit later in the year
where we try and answer these questions.
Tell us incompetence.
But intuitively, you would imagine
that this would encourage diversification,
again, away from the fuels that are in short supply now.
So it would encourage development of other resources
that allow you to meet those energy service demands
in other ways.
And it could be electric mobility in some cases,
it could be renewables, it could be other sources.
But higher prices, it does mean that
there's a strategic hesitation about committing
to the infrastructure necessary
to use some of these resources.
The only additional thing I would say
is that we have been talking quite a lot in recent years
about a new wave of LNG coming to market
also from North America.
That is still coming.
So there will be gas looking for a home.
I think the question then is,
do the importing countries in Asia,
in South Asia, in Southeast Asia, in East Asia,
has gas taken a reputational hit?
Are they willing to trust
that this is a reliable and affordable fuel?
And I think that's an interesting open question
for the next few years.
Right, well, thank you.
I'm very sorry indeed.
I know lots of other people want to ask questions.
We are sadly out of time.
I take away sort of three key messages from the discussion,
which has been very rich and fascinating.
I've learned a lot.
Firstly, that we are dealing with,
obviously, extreme uncertainty.
And the question is, is it going to be bad,
very bad, or extremely bad,
as the IMF lays out so clearly?
Secondly, this is indeed the era of stockpiling
and resilience.
And I'm not sure people have yet thought through
all the implications of this going forward.
If we are now dashing into a world
where everybody is going to be rushing out
to stockpile on every level.
And then last but not least,
within this stockpiling response,
within all these extraordinary shocks,
and as you've said, at least in statistical terms,
it's worse than the 1970s,
we do, thankfully, have extraordinary human resilience.
And I love the fact that, as the minister says,
using all of this new technology,
which is creating so much fear along with excitement,
to try and respond to some of these shocks
is one little glimmer, if nothing else, of hope.
And heaven knows we all need the hope right now.
So I'll finish by saying to all of you, good luck.
And to all of you too,
let's try and navigate these very difficult situations
going forward.
Thank you.
