Illicit trade, trade-based money laundering, adversarial foreign investments, adversarial threats

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Apr 6, 2026
20th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum | Washington, D.C 🇺🇸 | December 6, 2021
-Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, PhD
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Sir, remarkable leadership. We appreciate it so much. Dr. Otlingue, the stage is yours. We look
forward to hearing from you. This is a great warrior right here, a great patriot. I have
great respect for him. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, everyone. And as it's customary, but also pleasure to thank my friend, Congressman
Pittenger. I have been attending your events since, I think, 2015 was my first one. And
every year, it's a pleasure to come back here to Washington or follow you around the world,
even though the pandemic has made it sometimes a little more difficult. I want to thank you.
I want to thank everybody here in this room, as well as online on the live stream,
for being still here with us. And I want to say a few words and hopefully something new after
so many distinguished panelists on this panel and on the previous panel about
trade-based money laundering. I want to try and bring it back to the level of
simple, ordinary people like I am to understand how that impacts our daily lives by looking
at how it works and also by focusing in particular on certain nodal points here in the United States
and in Latin America that are critical to the working of global trade-based money laundering
networks. And in doing so, I want to emphasize a growing problem that we're confronting
in the Western hemisphere, but also increasingly at a global level, of the convergence between
organized crime and terror organizations were, and as it was pointed out before, despite sometimes
before in a previous panel, despite sometimes these organizations having very different
objectives or goals, they find it very expedient and convenient to join forces and cooperate
in a mutually beneficial way. The way where terror and organized crime really converge
is that terror networks, many of which are global, provide the infrastructure to move money
that regionally based organized crime cartels lack to reach the global markets that they now
ship their merchandise to. And what we're seeing is to some extent a product of globalization
and the global economy. 20, 30, 50 years ago, organized crime was not involved in shipping
cocaine from Latin America to Australia. Today it is. And of course, when it does that, it
confronts a number of challenges. How do you get it there? How do you repatriate the money?
How do you ensure that you enter those markets without entering into a turf war
with local organized crime? A lot of questions there. And so the ability to cooperate and
subcontract certain logistical, financial operations in a global criminal business
enterprise lead to this convergence between terror and organized crime. And what we see
in Latin America, of course, is a convergence that involves significantly the Lebanese Hezbollah,
one of the truly globalized terror organizations that has perfected the art of
laundering money and working with their criminal cartels in order to facilitate their operations
and get a commission in return which generates independent funding for their own terror
activities. Now, let me get back just briefly to what trade-based money laundering is. It is
really the transfer of value from dirty cash to formal legitimate money by way of trade. So when
we look at trade globally, and trade globally is an immense phenomenon that requires substantial
resources on a daily basis to monitor, we see the movement of refrigerators, alcohol products,
cosmetics, apparel, clothing, shoes, you name it. But the cartel and the provider,
the facilitator of the cartel, in the case I want to focus on Hezbollah, sees the value of a brick
of cocaine being repatriated to the original seller through a variety of transactions that
start from the delivery of cash and end to the delivery of money into a bank account
in order to disguise the origin of the funds and in order to pay back the sellers in a way that
authorities will find hard to trace back to the criminal activities. That is what trade-based
money laundering is. So we're watching all of these movements and we're saying, well, you know,
they're moving printers or computers or PlayStations or mobile phones or refrigerators.
What's wrong? What's criminal about that? What is criminal is the origin of the money
and the fact that that system moves value back to the criminals. The terrorists, of course,
benefit from the commission. And as I said, it has a global character and we see it,
and I want to offer you two examples in a lot of cases that have been prosecuted over the years,
two in particular that have a Latin American basis involved. Ayman Juma, a drug kingpin linked
to Hezbollah operating out of Colombia, who ran a very complex global scheme spread out
in four continents involving the transfer of drugs to Africa, their sale, the generation,
generating cash, the purchase of used cars in North America, the shipping of the used cars
back to Africa to be sold on the local market, then the movement of money to Lebanese money
exchange houses and banks. From there, the purchase of merchandise in Asia that involved
food commodities and other commodities shipped back to Latin America and sold on the local
market, whereby at the end of this very complex scheme, the money would go back to the cartels.
And by the time it comes out at the other end of the scheme, through the companies that purchase
the merchandise, the money is clean. The second operation is called Operation Cedar. It was a 2016
dragnet run by a cooperation between DEA and European law enforcement agencies,
again targeting a Hezbollah operation that was not just laundering money on behalf of the cartel,
but by then was also taking its own cocaine from Colombian sources and selling it onto the European
market in addition to laundering money on behalf of organized crime. And again, it involved several
countries with movement of cash, of commodities that included used cars, luxury watches, to the
Middle East, to West Africa, all for the purpose of laundering money. And these networks are not
insignificant. They're large. The Juma network alone was laundering $200 million a month for
Mexican and Colombian cartels. And when you look at a percentage that these schemes generate for
the organizations of about 8 to 15%, you understand how this cooperation is mutually beneficial for
the terrorists and for the organized crimes syndicates. Now, all of this poses a challenge,
of course, to law enforcement and to government, as well as to the private sector, to the financial
sector first and foremost, because most of these activities still go through the banking system.
If you think that money laundering for drug traffickers is Tom Cruise in American Made,
think again. When you're moving trillions of dollars a year, as we were told before by the
Bank of America representative on the previous panel, a year in illicit proceeds, you can't just
move enough suitcases of cash. You have to do it through the financial system. So one of the things
that I want to raise here is that one way for law enforcement, for policymakers, for private sector
is to look for anomalies. Anomalies in the trends of trade down to the bills of lading and documents
that accompany each transaction, whether it's filed with port authorities or as a way to justify
the movement of money to the banks. And I want to give you a couple of examples. One from the macro
level, and this is part of my research on the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
something that at the macro level flags a problem. And that is that in the last
batch of annual trade data from Paraguay pre-pandemia, before the pandemic
of 2020, in 2019, Paraguay imported 8.6 million mobile phones into the country.
Now, why is this an anomaly? Because Paraguay is a country that has less than 8 million people. So
for that figure to make sense, you would need every single citizen of Paraguay, all the way
down to the babies, not just to have a mobile phone, but to have bought a new mobile phone
in the course of 2019. Now, that's an anomaly. Why is that an anomaly? Because the market doesn't
justify it. And it is something that happens to cover up the movement of cash. Oftentimes,
the merchandise is just transhipping and transiting in the case of Paraguay, but also,
as my colleague knows, in free trade zones in other parts of the world, that is a classical
indication of money laundering going on. I want to give you a micro example. We have a case being
prosecuted currently in Florida involving a Lebanese national that was running a money
exchange house in Paraguay, suspected of being a financial supporter of Hezbollah.
Well, one of the companies that he was using in the United States to conduct money laundering
in 2015 shipped 237 units of an HP, Hewlett-Packard, deskjet printer with inkjet cartridges,
so an old model, to Paraguay, to a company that was later implicated in arms trafficking.
When you take the manifest of that single shipment, you realize, based on the specifications
of the product, that the shipper is declaring almost 700 grams or just under two pounds
more per unit in the bill of lading, while declaring the value of a printer that is
sold at $200 on the retail market at $22, which is lower than the cartridge price.
So here you have two anomalies, a weight tinkering and a price tinkering. Now, the weight tinker,
you could say, well, 700 grams, two pounds is not that much. But when you multiply it by 237
in that specific shipment, that's 150 kilos or more than 300 pounds, which is the concealed
weapons bought legally in the States at local retail gun sellers, then disassembled,
hidden in the merchandise, and then shipped down to Paraguay. And the company in Paraguay
is being prosecuted for arms trafficking. So this raises another point, which is the ripple effect,
what I call the ripple effect. When you're looking at the trade-based money laundering,
you're not just looking at money laundering. You're looking at a whole host of other problems
that these traffics generate, feed into, or involve. For example, one side activity of
trade-based money laundering is what I just described, arms trafficking. Another one is
that in order to falsify the values and move dirty money as part of supposedly legitimate
transactions, traders sell false counterfeited merchandise as authentic. So you not only have
money laundering for drug trafficking, you also have intellectual property fraud.
You don't only have intellectual property fraud, arms trafficking, money laundering,
and drug trafficking, but you have corruption. And the list goes on. Selena mentioned before,
the issue of illegal mining and environmental degradation. That also brings human trafficking,
because when you have illegal mines, you have prostitution for the miners. The illegal mines
pollute, you create environmental degradation. In other words, every time you look at this
phenomenon, it's not just one aspect of crime. It feeds into a growing wave, a rising tide,
of other side effects that are damaging to society. The corruption of the politicians,
the judges, the policemen, and so on. The environmental degradation, the taking away
of resources from the economy, the loss of revenue by the state when there is tax evasion,
or lower custom duties paid, and so on. So what can be done to address this phenomenon?
I want to throw some suggestions as a closing remark. One, we need more prosecutions,
and harsher sentencing. A lot of the cases I mentioned, and the ones that have been prosecuted
in this sphere, have yielded very mild sentences for white collar crimes that lead, at best,
to imprisonment in white collar prisons. This is true, at least in the United States,
for a short period of time. Just to give you an example, Qasem Tajeddin, Hezbollah financier,
sanctioned by the United States in 2009, extradited to the United States in 2017,
was released in 2021 on humanitarian grounds after serving two and a half years.
So here you have a situation, and I'm almost done, where the United States spent 15 years
investigating, capturing, extraditing, prosecuting a major terror financier involved
in money laundering, and after two and a half years, this person leaves jail.
If you start having harsher sentencing and putting white collar criminals with the tougher criminals,
now that may change the calculus. The cost of breaking the law would be significantly higher
for those who get captured and caught. The second is, of course, you need a lot more action
on these cases. The U.S. has a strategy that I call kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.
You take one example, egregious, however that may be, in order to convince somehow all the others
involved in those activities to desist. Well, if the punishment is so mild and the profit,
when you don't get caught, is so high, that is not going to discourage people from getting
involved. You need more private and public information sharing. That was mentioned before,
so I'm not going to rehash. You need to boost resources for the public sector.
You need to pay, and this is valid especially in Latin America. The people who are being corrupted,
they're not just ethically damaged. A lot of times, these are people who are neglected by
the state, not given enough protection, and not paid enough. The policeman who mans the
frontier post between Paraguay and Bolivia, or in the Amazon forest between Brazil and Peru,
probably gets two, three hundred dollars a month. But if he also gets two, three hundred dollars
per truck, he doesn't check. And this person will not be protected by the central authorities
if he is self-righteous and refuses to take the bribes. So think about that. We need to
put more resources into the public sector. And also, we need to target the enablers,
not just punish those who move the money and launder it, but also the vast network
of corrupt officials who turn the other way and make this happen. And last but not least,
and this is something for the United States, we need more transparency. We cannot, from this
country, continue to go around the globe telling people how to fight corruption and be more
transparent. And today, as you know, the administration released its anti-corruption
national security doctrine. But at the same time, be one of the most opaque jurisdictions on earth.
We were just hit by the revelations of the Pandora paper, where five states in the United
States are offshore jurisdictions that promote utmost secrecy. Mariano Federici just told us
of 120 companies established in Nevada by the former president and current vice president
of Argentina for the sole purpose of money laundering. We need to be more transparent.
The beneficial ownership measures passed by Congress last year are important, but you need
to have full transparency. I can get into the public registry of my county and find out where
you live, how much you paid for your house, and where you have your mortgage. But if you own a
small shop within the shell of an LLC, I cannot find out who's the owner and who's your partner.
That has to change. And those are things that will increase the ability of the public sector
and the private sector to combat these phenomena. Thank you.
