Illicit Finance, Financial Integrity Software Solutions, and Biological Warfare Dr. Steve

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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20th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum | Washington, D.C 🇺🇸 | December 6, 2021
-Dr. Steve Bennett, Ph.D.
Director Global Public Sector at SAS; former Director of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Dr. Bennett, I'll turn it over to you.
Sure. Thank you, John.
Excellent discussion on anti-money laundering,
which I will be the segue to being the biological weapons guy
for the biological warfare part of this panel.
A number of you were in Budapest three months ago.
I will summarize my remarks briefly from what I said there in September
and then maybe refocus today's discussion around naturally occurring threats.
If you remember in Budapest, for those of you that were there,
I talked about the largest bioterrorism attack in United States history.
We had 700 Americans were sick and 45 were hospitalized.
The intent, as many of you may or may not know,
was to disrupt the function of government and achieve a political outcome,
sort of the definition of terrorism.
But it actually isn't the Ameritrax events.
You may be thinking, surely that's the anthrax events of 2001,
shortly after the events of September 11th.
If you want to know what the largest bioterrorism attack in the history of the United States was,
you'd have to go back 17 years to a small town in Oregon.
We spent some time talking about a small mystic cult in rural Oregon,
in a very small county in Oregon called the Rajneeshees.
They were starting to run afoul of local county ordinances
that wouldn't let them build the sort of compound that they wanted to build
and sort of local property challenges.
So the Rajneeshees decided that they were going to use bioterrorism
to get enough people sick on the day of a county election
that not enough people would be able to show up to vote,
and they had their own candidates standing for election
who would be elected because their people would be able to come and overwhelm the vote.
So a very real sort of classic description of terrorism
in the attempt to disrupt an election or disrupt a political outcome.
So we talked a lot about that in Budapest.
Just to summarize, they were pretty brazen.
They ordered salmonella samples just over the phone from a biological supply company in Seattle,
and they poisoned I think 10 different salad bars at restaurants around town
right before the election and got 751 people sick,
including a two-day-old infant that nearly died.
Thankfully no fatalities.
Ultimately, well it was a huge mess as I mentioned back in September.
It backfired, you know, nothing makes Americans angrier than being told they can't go vote.
So misunderstanding Americans in rural Oregon,
people showed up to vote in droves,
and thankfully their plan to disrupt the election was unsuccessful.
Everybody went to jail, 20 years of prison or more.
But it highlights a couple things for us in how susceptible we are
to intentional bioterrorism attacks,
which I spent a lot of time talking about in September.
We had a couple of takeaways from that.
One, other than no one's going to want to eat in a salad bar in Oregon in this audience ever again,
but a low barrier to entry.
Even today with some additional controls,
much of the bacteria you might want to use if you're a bad guy,
you can culture that out of the soil in different parts of the United States,
even though it's not quite as easy to order these things over the phone
like the Rajneeshis did, you know, back in the early 1980s.
Biology makes for a good weapon on its own.
You know, we're watching that in COVID.
You know, just biological spread and the transmission of disease
can wreak havoc on economics and societies in general,
and the ability to function and all of those things that we're seeing now.
So you don't often have to be even very good as a bioterrorist,
and the biology itself can do its thing.
And then third, proof of asymmetric use.
This wasn't a nation-state back in Oregon, you know, 17 years ago.
It was, you know, it was kind of a cult that wasn't even all that sophisticated.
So the concern about availability of use is kind of number one.
Number two, the fact that it works pretty well on its own without help.
And then number three, the fact that you don't have to have a lot of capability
to make it work was the focus of a lot of our discussion last time around bioterrorism.
So we talked about bioterrorism. That's kind of a quick summary.
Let me summarize what we said in September around nation-state actors,
and in the balance of my time, I'm going to expand what we really didn't get to in Budapest,
which was naturally occurring health threats.
So terrorism we talked about, you know, key policy actions that we summarized.
You can watch scientific publications around the world,
withhold sensitive methodological details when you're doing science in your country
so that you don't make it easy for a nefarious actor to get all the details right,
but yet still fulfill the peer review components of science.
Watch for countering radicalization for highly skilled or highly trained scientists.
And then, of course, international collaboration and information sharing was key.
Kind of ripped from the headlines back in Budapest, this is an overview drone video
or a screenshot from a video over Tarnak Farms, which was a facility al-Qaeda used in Afghanistan
to really solidify its biological weapons program in the late 1990s.
And so I added a fourth one there, a fifth one there to the bottom,
which is collaborate globally to, you know, what's old is new again.
Deny terrorist organizations safe haven for biological weapons planning and training,
which wasn't as much of a big deal, but as of August and September, it's a big deal again.
Nation-state actors, let me quickly summarize what we said there.
I think I've just got a couple things here.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, you heard Dr. McCrae this morning talk about his role.
So it's an incredibly important global instrument to help in terms of monitoring
and maintenance of key tenets of biological security.
The Soviet Union and Russia, just as a note, we talked about this a lot, like I said a couple months ago,
have operated the world's largest, longest and most sophisticated biological weapons program
in high-profile accidents like 1979 in Sverdlovsk when a bunch of anthrax got out.
High-level defections from the Soviet Union and Russia have given us a pretty significantly detailed glimpse into that program.
Things like gain-of-function research, people in Russia attempting to place Ebola,
hemorrhagic fever genes into smallpox so that you have something that spreads like smallpox
but causes the hemorrhagic conditions that you get with Ebola.
And even as late as 1999, a lot of the scientific publications seem to indicate that some of this work has continued.
So it isn't just terrorism. It is nation-states.
And key policy actions we discussed back in September were around strengthening
and supporting the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention
and making sure that we are modernizing those instruments to cover the rapid pace of technological change in biological science,
things like CRISPR and gene editing and the like.
So let's talk a little bit more about naturally occurring threats.
That's kind of where we've been in September. Catch you up to speed if you didn't make it to Hungary.
Let's talk about naturally occurring threats, and we're kind of in the middle of one of those now in COVID-19.
Just a quick review of some of the big ones, of course.
SARS in 2003, about 8,000 deaths, high 10% case fatality rate.
That was a coronavirus.
Another coronavirus, MERS, more recently, about 900 deaths, but a 34% case fatality rate, also a coronavirus.
So again, high fatality rates for many of the examples where coronaviruses have infected humans.
Quite fortunate to not have that with COVID.
Spanish flu, we know, greater than 50 million deaths, about a 2.4% fatality rate.
One that we don't always talk about, 2013, a rare strain of influenza, H7N9.
It only killed about 100 people, a bit more than 100 people, but had a 32% case fatality rate,
and we're just plain lucky that that particular strain of influenza never developed the ability to spread person to person.
Those cases were contracted directly from interaction with animals, poultry, birds, etc.
So it really takes not a lot of genetic change for an influenza variant to be able to go from infecting people directly from birds
to now being able to jump human to human, and with a case fatality rate of 32% for a flu,
that would have been, shall we say, society-altering.
Partially because of this, and when I was in Homeland Security, we monitored these sorts of pathways.
We were quite worried about, because these novel influenzas got into bird populations, wildlife birds as well,
we were worried about things like the Australasian Flyway.
We had monitoring stations in Alaska watching for arrival of birds from China that could carry things like H7N9.
So a big problem that thankfully a lot of governments are working on.
So that brings us to COVID, 2019 to who knows when, right?
If you look at the scientific literature, though, COVID isn't all that unexpected,
as humans continue to interact with animal populations with higher frequencies.
Currently, there are about 260 known viruses that infect animals.
We call those zoonotic viruses that can then jump to humans.
About 260 known, but it's believed our Centers for Disease Control,
I imagine scientists agree on this globally, could be as many as 800,000 currently unknown viruses
circulating in animal populations that could cause human disease.
So what do we do about it?
I want to spend the remaining, what do I have, seven minutes or so talking about what do we do about it.
And there's a lot of good news to go with kind of the challenges of naturally occurring threats.
So if you look at pandemic prediction, prevention, and early warning,
things like data and analytics, artificial intelligence, investigative analytics,
some of those things have come up today in other contexts can have a big impact on mitigating this threat.
And so I'm going to run through a couple of these to give you a sense of where we can make a difference.
Actually, one comment before I proceed.
You know, when I worked in Homeland Security as the director of national biosurveillance, we did some of this.
We were, Congress used to ask us all the time,
well, why can't you all just look at Twitter and figure out when people are getting sick, you know,
before anybody else knows about it in the hospital.
And I'll just as an aside, if you've ever done any research in Twitter,
you sort of lose your faith in humanity a little bit.
But getting past all of that, we were able to find a good signal in Twitter,
be able to geolocate tweets where people were talking about anomalous health events,
got it right about 85% of the time for influenza-like illnesses.
So advanced technologies like AI and natural language processing applied to things like social media
have some promise in being able to detect outbreaks before they start showing up in hospitals.
But that's still still quite, quite under development.
So I'm going to talk in two areas, response and recovery.
And I'm going to give you some stories about how we've seen on the front lines in responding to COVID over the last year and a half,
how some of these technologies have made a material difference in response.
And I think there's some lessons learned here.
Some lessons learned here in terms of how we continue to plan and prepare for the next pandemic,
but also some things we can take away in steady state public health,
how we can make our public health and government systems work better now or even after a pandemic.
So epidemiological modeling, if you remember those early days of the pandemic, everybody had a curve.
It was flat in the curve. Where's the curve telling us we're going to go? We're talking about curves.
And those epidemiological models were attempts to forecast where the pandemic might go.
And they're all wrong. They're always wrong.
But one of the things that we did is working with one of the biggest hospital networks in the United States,
we said, well, let's look at six different future scenarios, six different curves, and let's plan against all of them.
If any one of these six potential futures came to pass, what hospital capacity would we need?
What personal protective equipment would we need? Where would we need ventilators and respiratory therapists?
And then what we did is we watched for indicators as to which of those six tracks we were on as the pandemic proceeded
and allowed us to make decisions with this hospital network about how to open or close hospital capacity and make decisions.
So it wasn't predicting the future, but using data and analytics to help you figure out which of these tracks are you on,
and you've already been able to do some advanced response planning, so you're ahead of the game.
So that's one. Another one, medical resource optimization.
So we worked with a number of countries, certainly here in the United States, a number of states.
We worked with the governments in Germany, Spain, and some in Latin America about how to optimize limited resources.
You've got limited ICUs, limited ICU beds, and limited ventilators.
How do you make sure that those resources or the doctors that go with them are optimally available when you need them for the people that need them?
That's not an easy problem, but you can apply data and analytics to that problem and really make some progress.
And those sorts of activities really did save lives.
This is one of those where, well, if we can optimize hospital use in a pandemic, maybe we could optimize hospital use the rest of the time.
So this is one of those lessons we can take away in healthcare, using some of these advanced techniques to drive better use of our resources that we all have in limited supply.
Contact tracing, another thing that was, you know, don't talk about it as much anymore, but last summer it was really quite a big deal trying to figure out who's been exposed to whom.
And this was, if I had more time, the history of contact tracing is fascinating.
It goes back to John Snow and the Broad Street pump in London and the cholera epidemic of 1834.
And he interviewed everybody in the neighborhood to figure out where they were getting water.
And the interviews gave the basis for making a public health conclusion.
So that's what we still do it the same way 100 years later today.
And it really wasn't fit for purpose for the scale of COVID-19.
But using things like investigative analytics, which can automatically make connections between pieces of data.
You don't have to ask that overworked public health epidemiologist to do a 50 million interviews and try to piece it together on his or her own.
The technology can come alongside those public health epidemiologists and help.
And I'm not talking about an app that replaces the public health expertise.
This is technology that comes alongside them and augments and scales their ability to do what they've done well for 100 years.
Outbreak prediction, this is a screenshot of some of the work we did with Globe Telecom in the nation of the Philippines.
And it turns out that you can learn a lot by looking at mobility patterns of the population.
So Globe Telecom provides telecommunication services for the Philippines.
Now, to be clear, no one is tracking individual movements or where an individual person is going with their mobile device.
What we were doing is an aggregate looking statistically at where large populations of the Philippine population was moving.
And then using that data to predict up to two weeks in advance with about 94 percent accuracy where the outbreak was going to go next.
And we got it right, like I said, about 94 percent of the time.
We used AI and machine learning to do it.
And the cool thing about it was it allows public policymakers to be much more surgical in their public policy decision making.
You can shut down only a neighborhood or you can reopen earlier in an area of the country because you know something about how the dynamics of the pandemic are proceeding.
It doesn't have to be blanket country or provincial decisions about lockdowns, which are quite damaging to the economy.
You can be much more tailored if you have a good, trusted sense of where the outbreak is going to go.
And this is using data that we and most governments have ready access to in aggregate at a statistical level.
Recovery. This isn't so much around naturally occurring health risks, but I will make a point to say since it's, you know,
we're talking about financial systems and economics and security,
that just as important in the response phase in dealing with the public health issues around COVID and pandemics is what we do to recover.
And just two quick examples that the sorts of technologies we're talking about in data analytics can help us recover as well.
So we worked with HMRC, the tax agency in the UK, which, you know, after the UK government passed a scheme that said, hey,
if you've lost your job, if you've been laid off subject to some constraints, we will cover your salary up to 80 percent.
And so HMRC was basically asked to run the tax system in reverse to start sending money out through employers to beneficiaries who qualified.
Now, unfortunately, there are those who would take advantage of that when that much money is moving out of government that fast.
It's hard to to watch it to the degree we might want to. But technology can help.
So we work for them to build technology that help detect potential fraudulent claims on those those resources,
but without slowing down the rate at which those resources could get to British families that needed them.
I think I'm about out of time. So we've done the same thing for Dataprev in Brazil,
working with them to to help identify potential fraudulent claims on resources so that Brazilian families who need those resources are the ones that get it.
Key policy actions in closing for naturally occurring threats, building on my remarks in Budapest on those other two terrorism and nation state threats.
Increasing animal disease surveillance and strengthening global partnerships.
We want to know early when something is going on. We don't want to wait.
Commit to strong public health systems before the health threat hits.
A lot of discussion in the United States about the erosion of the public health system that we then came to rely on when we needed it.
Incentivizing and instilling a culture of preparedness in our populations.
Making sure that if we had to if we had to kind of deal with things on our own for two weeks, are we ready to do that?
If we really can't go to the grocery store, it's harder to get fuel or the supply chain is disrupted.
And then finally, look for opportunities, some of which I've kind of given you a little taste of today.
Look for opportunities to use advanced technologies like AI and analytics to enhance capabilities across public health.
And these can be durable, not just for a pandemic, but can help us in steady state public health and the health of our communities in general.
All right. I think I made it with only a minute or two left.
Thank you for your thank you for attention. And I don't know if we're going to take questions now, sir, or if you want to have a discussion first.
I had a question first and then we'll we'll we'll turn it out to the group.
Like the thing that I'm concerned about right now is you started to speak about the response.
Right. And the illicit activities of the global anti money laundering and counterterrorism is a global community.
And we have to deal with things on a local level and then a community on a global level on a regular basis.
So if we transfer that thinking over to pandemics, whether it's natural or warfare.
How can I look at the world right now and I'm kind of looking at how could we do better?
Right. So what do you think we could do better as far as information sharing, but also in a response to either weaponized or natural events like this?
So it's kind of a complicated question. Well, I shouldn't ask easy questions.
No, no, no. They pay the big bucks for it. So there's some things.
So what we tend to look for in biosecurity, we're looking for things that can that can provide general resilience.
If you're trying to predict which type of virus you're going to see or which type of bacteria you're going to see,
that can be very expensive game to try to pre-build countermeasures for those special drugs, treatments, vaccines.
So while we are enhancing surveillance, which is a key part of this, knowing early makes all the difference.
It being able to get vaccine production started, to make travel decisions, all those sorts of things only work if you're early.
So surveillance is key and that's great for general public health as well.
So investing in surveillance is critical, but then investing in basic public health, basic public health infrastructure goes a long way.
So I think those are the two pieces, better surveillance and better public health infrastructure.
Coupled with, you know, I intentionally didn't get into sort of origins of COVID.
That could be the rest of the afternoon. But, you know, certainly,
certainly biosecurity measures in countries dealing with dangerous pathogens is a critical component of discussion for the international community.
So that, you know, things that we're working on in research labs,
we have some assurance that they're not going to break free and terrorize the world for a year and a half.
Well, thank you for that. It is a complicated question.
I think your field is very interesting, one that's going to be very important in the days to come.
So we hope that SAS and you could come back to future events.
By a show of hands, we have some really great intelligence up here.
How many questions do we have? That's great. If I could, I see Andreas Frank.
No, no, if you could come up. Actually, you're one of the experts.
If you could come up and just give a couple of statements.
Oh, come on.
Andreas, you're welcome to come make a statement.
None of you are safe.
Okay. Listen, like always, you know, it has a lot of insight.
Project.
I beg your pardon?
Just speak up a little.
Oh, yes. Like always, a lot of new insights, but the basic problem remains.
We are not fighting money launching and the financing.
Everyone, you know, come together in the Western world and really fight the enemies with a weapon of choice.
And this is going after the money.
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you. We have a few more minutes. Please, question.
Thank you. To resume the question, it's again about the situation in Europe.
Our intelligence and actually border intelligence is fixing, starting from 2016 to now, the usage from Russian Federation,
such a weapon which affects the human health.
It's permanently, year after year.
And also now they are using in the East a new weapon, which is about waves in France.
And it became like the East of Ukraine, which was attacked by Russia.
It's like a polygon, like a platform for experiments.
And I need also to remark that everybody knows about Novichok.
But Novichok, this poison, was produced many years ago.
And still this scientific institution exists.
But what is interesting, now all the scientific institutions are made, which are military and non-military, but they are like state enterprises.
Now they are consolidated into one so-called ZATO.
It's like a closed administrative unit with additional intelligence unit and additional biological threat unit.
And it is what we are exactly saying, like a renovation of those approach, which was used by Soviet Union to make the closed territories with buffer zone
to work on biological and chemical weapon.
And it's not about only Ukraine, but also taking into account that we are challenged with real open invasion in one month.
But it's about the Europe and the world.
And the question is how you are taking into account these issues and how you are taking into account the overall investigation and strategy that was expressed.
Really, it's very interesting event in this forum.
But what I see from one panel to another, we are talking about mostly those which was several years ago.
But now, in this moment of time, we have this.
And especially like example, this consolidation and going back to the Soviet Union approach.
Thank you.
I appreciate that remark.
When we have a forum like this, this is a wonderful opportunity to meet with people and discuss that.
And elected officials from around the world.
Does anybody want to respond to that one?
Just your comment about continued biological and chemical weapons.
I didn't say as much.
I kind of summarized that Russia section.
But it's a standing concern.
And so, you know, certainly European countries and NATO and Western countries have to have a robust biodefense program,
robust intelligence programs to understand what those threats are and how we might mitigate them.
Only one sentence is an example.
You mentioned the convention not to spread the biological and chemical weapon and so on.
But now, Russia is using this convention to say that they are not working on this weapon.
So, it's also the example how the hybridization of the modern institution conventions and different documents,
memorandums is being used to go vice versa.
I think what we'll do, Dr. Bennett and I will follow up with you.
Because that's a much broader conversation and we only have two minutes left.
And thank you for that.
There was a question.
Yes.
Yes, a question for Mr. Bennett.
Just follow up your – regarding enhancing the biosurveillance.
Because when I was working in the field of biosurveillance globally,
so one of the big challenges, actually, the capacity in different areas is so drastically different.
So, actually, some days we have a loophole, right?
So, we have a safety issue as well.
And even in China, it's safe.
I realize it was actually because of funding from the United States to support the building of biosafety issues.
But it still happens.
And then, right now, one of the biggest danger in China is actually they have so many problems,
really more peaceful people there.
So, I just wonder if you have any suggestion how do we deal with this threat right now?
China is a tough one.
In general, countries that don't have capabilities for biosurveillance,
the United States has historically, and other countries, not just the United States,
but other countries have invested in those places to help support good biosafety, good biosurveillance.
And everybody wins, right?
That data comes out and is useful globally.
And that helps that particular country with their own biosurveillance and public health challenges.
China is a separate one, right?
But, you know, some separate challenges in China.
But, you know, again, other instruments can be brought to bear to try to enhance biosafety
and biosecurity in legitimate research facilities.
Well, that concludes our session here.
Please, these gentlemen, and we'll be here for the rest of the day.
Thank you.
Great job.
Thank you.
Excellent presentation.
