Opening Remarks- Congressman. John Katko

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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20th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum | Washington, D.C 🇺🇸 | December 6, 2021
-Congressman John Katko
Ranking Member, Homeland Security Committee
clear to the point. That's what I appreciate about Congressman Katko. So
thank you, sir. The floor is yours. Can you hear me okay? Good afternoon,
everybody. Thank you very much for allowing me to be here and thank you,
Robert. Robert and I, when we served in Congress together, had our lockers next
to each other in the men's locker room, so we saw each other every morning,
bright and early, right? So, well, thank you for having me and I appreciate the
opportunity to speak today. I'm glad to be able to join you here today as lead
Republican on the Committee on Homeland Security. Hey, guys, keep it down. Just
tell me to keep it down. Thank you. On the Committee on Homeland Security, where we
focus on efforts on transnational threats to homeland, including those
which we are discussing today, like transnational criminal organizations,
adversarial foreign investment, and persistent foreign geopolitical threats.
And I'm excited for the panel which will follow these remarks, which is hosting
thought leaders on these issues. I'm looking forward to learning from them
and it's been a long-standing view of mine that economic security is homeland
security. Let me repeat that. Economic security is homeland security and I
think that's very important, what we're talking about today, because the threat
landscape has changed dramatically. This conversation is an opportunity to help
explain why that I view economic security, why it matters in relation to
homeland security, and how the U.S. government can better encounter and curb
these threats to create an environment which fosters continued U.S.
competitiveness abroad. We're at a tipping point in history, in the history
of the American homeland security. The homeland has never been more
vulnerable to foreign influence and nation-state actors than it is today.
Over the course of the preceding decades, the U.S. government has adjusted
its intelligence and security focus towards physical security threats, like
terrorism, foreign military growth, and weapons of mass destruction. It's
perfectly understandable given the threat landscape of the 80s, 90s, and
early 2000s. And during that time period, I was a federal organized crime
prosecutor for 20 years before coming to Congress, and I dealt with all manner of
crime and all manners of transnational criminal organizations. And so I know
full well this landscape. A few specific issues which come to mind are cyber
threats, foreign economic exploitation, foreign adversarial investment, and the
continued pursuit of transnational criminal organizations like those that
are metastasizing on the southern border right now. Think about it. On the
southern border right now, we are enriching transnational criminal
organizations in a manner we never have before. Every single person that crosses
our southern border has to pay at least $4,000 before they come across into our
country. That's what the cartels charge. On any given month over the last year,
those transnational criminal organizations are netting anywhere from
750 million dollars a month to a billion dollars a month. That is a
threat landscape that's going to change, become more potent going forward. The big
four nation-states are only getting more sophisticated as hybrid threats
redefine the attack surface through the convergence of information technology,
disinformation, and geopolitical fragility. We have seen this new reality
play out close to home. This year across the Western Hemisphere, developing
countries have struggled to clutch onto democratic governance amidst
economic and political influence from foreign actors. Our global
interconnectedness has created new and potentially catastrophic domestic
resilience vulnerabilities. Economic security and homeland security are
inexorably linked due to the critical role that supply chain resilience plays
in our homeland security mission. But where these vulnerabilities lie also
exist, I believe, opportunities. Opportunities to reach beyond our own
borders and build up global resilience to bad actors. The United States' long and
enduring alliance with Australia is an example of an international democratic
nexus that can be leveraged against modern threats to homeland security. The
question remains, however, as to how we manage these threats in the face of
increase in the face of increasing intimidation efforts by China. As they
continue their economic buildup and coercive statecraft, human rights
violations which are abhorrent, and IP theft and cyber warfare, how do we stand
up to China over the next 50 years as it continues to amass power in a global
community? How? And I think that's why we're here. This is an enormous question
and one that demonstrates a need for a whole-of-nation recognition that to
compete with China and emerge victorious, we must have clear-eyed focus on the
challenges we face during every conversation about both the security and
prosperity of our nation. There are three elements I believe we can use to frame
these conversations and I call them the three C's. They are counter, they're
compete. Let's talk about counter. How do we counter China? We must impose costs on
China to deter and disincentivize actions by them and other foreign
adversaries globally. These may include prohibiting key exports from leaving our
shores, holding accountable China's nationals violating our laws, and taking
reciprocal action in response to cyber incursions and theft of intellectual
property and data. Think about what China has done this year in the United States
along with the cyber attacks. And what have we done in response? Curb, that's
number two. In the United States we must educate state and local municipalities
about the nature and extent of the threats they face from China's
partnerships, financial transactions, or business acquisitions. There's not a
college out there that doesn't at least think about partnering with
China. When China comes knocking and offering college, you may be struggling
a little bit financially, saying hey I can give you 20, 40, 50 million dollars
to my Confucius Institute. They're not doing it out of the goodness of their
heart and we must remember that. There must be more robust dialogue with
business leaders about the impacts of doing business in and with China. And
most importantly we need to recognize that the decisions we make now will have
outsized impacts down the line. China is playing the long game and we must focus
on long-term results as well. We in the United States do not always do well
playing the long game. We need to do that. Last time I really did it effectively
was how we dealt with Russia post-World War II. Compete. Ultimately this isn't a
binary challenge. There is no home-and-away game anymore. If we intend
to challenge Chinese actions, we need to recognize the tactics they employ
internationally will ultimately affect the U.S. domestically. We need to work
with partners and allies around the world to determine how we are going to
convince entities and nations that it's not in their interest to work with China
on foreign investment, supply chain diversity, ICT technology proliferation,
data security, and a multitude of other areas. Most of all we need to provide
viable alternatives and competitive solutions in the face of cheap and
heavily subsidized Chinese goods and services. Counterfeiting and copyright
infringement are perhaps the most obvious form of cheating in the global
market. Entities that participate in these activities distort the true market
cost of innovation, research and development, and bringing a product to
the consumer. By short-circuiting this natural business cycle, culpable entities
lower startup and production costs and eliminate for themselves the most
expensive element of any business, which is the sunken cost of innovation. China
just steals it from us and we let them do it. Innovation historically has been
what sets America apart and it is equality that has allowed us to lead in
so many sectors. If we are to continue to succeed and win the global market, it is
vital that we protect the costliest and most valuable element of our
country's enterprises. The past year has shown this to be true in ways that we
have never thought possible, as evidenced first by the COVID-19 pandemic and now
because of the crush of goods wallowing off our shores that was created by
supply chain technologies. I'm a little bit heartened by things I've spoken to
with business leaders recently telling me that the great economic advantage
that they once had by having goods and component parts produced halfway around
the world and shipped to the United States is kind of dissipating because of the
cost of the supply chain now. And that may change this dynamic in and of itself.
I'd like to share with you some of my thoughts on both the current state of
play and the challenges we face going forward. In moving forward with the
future of the Homeland Security Department, which I oversee every day,
Homeland Security is a unique agency and much of its success is rooted in strong
and impactful public-private partnerships. Nowhere is this truer than
in the enforcement of laws related to trademark and intellectual property. The
need for strong democratic partnerships will only grow as we face increased
competition and challenging diplomatic conditions within our largest trading
partner, China. It is incumbent upon us to be clear-eyed about the realities we
face and candid with one another about the solutions we must enact. By
countering the PRC and other countries' efforts to exploit free markets, the U.S.
government and partners can strengthen collaboration within these countries,
protect sensitive information, and enable the success of other countries' fair
investments. These counter-efforts are straightforward but do
require democratic world powers to work in unison to achieve the best results. I
must do it. Leading practices include ensuring foreign investment is
diversified and derived from like-minded allies, to include the continued
identification, analysis, and mitigation of critical technology or resources
dependent on China. We must also examine the several key trends that have emerged
from China's investments, including increased ownership of transit and
shipping lanes by China's state-owned enterprises, proliferation of China's
state-owned enterprise surveillances and facial recognition technologies, ICT
investments enabling cyber exploitation, and increasing supply chain dependencies
through investments in critical manufacturing, raw materials, and chemical
precursors. I thank you again and look forward to discussing these solutions
with you going forward, but I do want to say I do think the market will help with
some of this as the costs in the supply chain skyrocket for shipping. That
may have a very big impact on this, but make no mistake about it. China does not
act the way we act and what the others in the free world act when it comes to
business. We must understand that, we must embrace that concept, and we must
figure out how to deal with it. And these great people over here are gonna talk to
you more about that going forward. So thank you very much folks and have a
good afternoon.
