CYBER, 5G, AND EMERGING TECH THREATS- Hon. Sohan Dasgupta

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Apr 2, 2026
22nd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum | Romania 🇷🇴 | July 6- 7, 2022
-Sohan Dasgupta
Former Deputy General Counsel at the Department of Homeland Security
AI Generated·May contain errors
With so many people here, friends in this room, we managed to mirror some great things that are
happening way back across the ocean for protecting our democracies. Sohan, you have the floor.
Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Popescu, for that very kind introduction. Your Excellencies,
members of Parliament, members of the military, ladies and gentlemen, I'm honoured to have been
invited here to the Palace of the Parliament in Romania, in Bucharest. I'm most grateful to the
hospitable people of Romania, to the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Romanian
Senate, and to Congressman Bittinger for this great honour, and of course to my esteemed friend,
Chairman Popescu. The global security map is in flux and is being renegotiated as we speak,
and in many, many respects, the security challenges we face today ride into our precipitous times
on the wings of 5G, or as we call it, fifth generation wireless technology.
5G-induced faster data speeds, increased device density, enhanced reliability, and ultra-low
latency will enable countless industries and markets, such as information technology,
manufacturing, healthcare, agriculture, and so on and so forth, to flourish and innovate
on an unprecedented rate and scale. From smart cities to autonomous tech applications,
5G's potential has been heralded as transformative. It is hardly difficult, therefore,
to envision why the globally competitive technological revolution brought on by 5G
is a matter of national security. Yet the race among nations and the private sector
is not just for superpower status that exalted dominance. It is also in defence of the liberty
of the free world, in fervent support of humankind's perennial quest for truth and for
the preservation of the polychromatic diversity of ideas. The free world fosters and relies upon
the free exchange of ideas, and suppression of that exchange by any means, including
telecommunications sabotage or interdiction, is poison to a free society. Indeed,
the stakes are so high because attaining technological leadership may increase the
likelihood of success, prosperity, fecundity, stability, and, of course, security. These
mission-critical elements inform fruitful trade and investment relationships across the globe
and are affected by trade and investment policies of sovereigns and governments.
It is there that 5G can help spur unprecedented innovation and productivity,
deploying those objectives to mission-align the free world with itself and its highest aspirations.
The national security and international trade implications of 5G significantly concern the
equities of businesses and industry stakeholders. Through sanctions, export controls, Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States, what is known as CFIUS, and other responses, the US
government carefully is monitoring 5G's implications. Same is largely true of the
European Union and other governments. From industry perspective, the balance between
investing, acquiring, and selling products and services on the one hand, and cautiously
engaging with regulators is important and should ideally be addressed with care and nuance. 5G
signals a potent and widespread transformation of telecommunications networks. 5G is endeavouring
to build upon previous generations in an evolution that will phase in over many years,
utilising legacy infrastructure and technology. Just comparing the most vital metric, latency,
under 4G and 5G with each other, can be most indicative. Latency, quite simply, is the delay
between transmittal of data and its execution. With 4G networks, the latency is less than 100
milliseconds. Under 5G, that could fall to less than 5 milliseconds. That pace of acceleration
between 4G to 5G will be titanic. To illustrate the commercial ramifications, 3.8 to 4.6 million
additional jobs and a GDP growth of $1.4 to $1.7 trillion over the next decade can be expected
from 5G's deployment and rollout. The collateral economic impact of 5G will be more significant
still. The cottage industry will burgeon. 5G's indirect effects are expected to add $1 trillion
to $1.2 trillion just to the US GDP, as well as generate 3 million to 3.6 million additional jobs
in the cottage industry related to 5G over the next decade. But none of this should distract
us from some of 5G's fabled vulnerabilities, which include, first, the use of 5G components
manufactured by untrusted companies that could expose certain entities to risks introduced by
malware and counterfeit components and component flaws resultant from deficient manufacturing
and maintenance. Data that travels overseas through untrustworthy networks might be compromised as
well. Risks to the intelligence community are particularly alarming. Next is another
vulnerability. 5G will use more parts and the law of large numbers suggests that the
proliferation of 5G infrastructure may provide malicious actors with additional attack vectors
and a greater number and volume of vulnerabilities. Third, it is unknown what new vulnerabilities on
top of the legacy and historic vulnerabilities may be discovered in 5G networks. Fourth,
untrusted companies may be less likely to participate in interoperability efforts.
Custom 5G technologies that fail to meet interoperability standards may be difficult
to manage. It is fitting to address just some of the more prevalent manifestations of 5G in the
modern world and the governmental responses to them. In that vein, I shall commence with blockchain
and cryptocurrency and go on to address briefly artificial intelligence, machine learning,
and digital infrastructure. I will then explain why some of the sanctions and export control
measures the US government is taking as well as the actions of CFIUS may be salient to this field.
Crypto's future will have to interface with 5G's realities. The future of crypto is dependent on
the successes of and the vulnerabilities baked into 5G. Crypto sometimes is viewed as a relatively
safe and inexpensive medium in which to undertake complex transactions. That may be true.
Governments, of course, have begun regulating crypto in order to curtail terror financing,
tax evasion, money laundering, sanctions evasion, and even black market activity.
The global crypto market size is expected to amount to almost 2,000 million US dollars by
2028 at a compound annual growth rate of just over 11% in the next decade. Many governments,
consequently, are adopting blockchain or approving investments based on it.
Much of Asia, Australia, Estonia, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria,
the United Kingdom, and Germany, and certain other jurisdictions are in various stages of doing so.
The EU as a whole, too, has accelerated its acceptance and integration of blockchain.
Although some other nations have taken a jaundiced view of bitcoin and blockchain,
many others contain fecund startup activity concerning bitcoin. In sum, numerous governments
have accepted that cryptocurrency is very much the coin of the realm and something to be regulated
because it is part of our world, and they have chosen to factor how 5G affects those transactions.
Increasingly, businesses across sectors are accepting blockchain once their peers and rivals
jumpstart the trend of doing so. Businesses that fall behind may have to pay a price,
and the first mover advantage can be irresistible. 5G's impact on artificial intelligence and machine
learning will also be profound. It is already proving to be profound. Some business and
governmental pioneers are deploying AI to solve real-world and consequential problems.
At the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak, private investment worldwide in AI medical and
pharmaceutical spaces rose 450% year over year to $13.8 billion. Tesla's autopilot AI system,
Amazon Alexa, Google Assistant, and Apple Siri, all of which use AI, are used by hundreds of
millions of users and consumers globally. Companies use AI to monitor and improve even
internal efficiency, and banks, financial institutions, they use AI for anomaly detection,
intelligent pricing, document analysis, and so on and so forth. It's estimated that by the year 2030,
AI would deliver global economic gains in the neighbourhood of 13 to 16 trillion US dollars,
and almost all of these deployments will use 5G. The regulatory responses to it all will be
most interesting and will present deeply complex questions. Certain US government measures might
be illuminating. First, the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS,
is implementing a multilateral agreement among 42 nations and the EU to control certain
biotechnology software that could be misused for biological weapons purposes. Second, just over a
year ago, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 14032, preventing US persons
from purchasing and selling publicly traded securities in 59 Chinese military industrial
complex companies, CMICs. Indeed, the names are familiar to us. Huawei, Aerosun, AVIC,
Inspur, Proven Glory, China Mobile, CoStar, and other technology companies, including
semiconductor and fibre manufacturing companies, are among the forbidden CMICs, according to this
Executive Order. This EO prohibits any US person from engaging in the purchase or sale, that's the
instrument's language, purchase or sale of any publicly traded securities or any publicly traded
securities that are derivative of such securities or are designed to provide investment exposure to
such securities of any entity identified as a CMIC. In addition, China Mobile, China Telecom,
and China Unicom investments are still forbidden, thus compelling them to delist from the New York
Stock Exchange. In the mid-2020, the Federal Communications Commission in the United States
issued orders designating Huawei and ZTE as national security threats and thus prohibited
the use of universal service funds to purchase communications equipment and services from
Huawei and ZTE and other high-risk suppliers. Then the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 was enacted.
It denotes an enduring US government strategy to restrict the domestic use of technology produced
by Huawei, ZTE and certain other Chinese companies and it enlists the FCC, that agency's assistance,
in doing so. This law requires the FCC to clarify that it no longer will review or approve any
authorisation for equipment on the FCC's covered list, it's an automatic and a per se disqualifier.
The list, which was originally published about a year ago, includes Chinese telecommunications
companies that the US government believes are national security risks, and again,
the list is familiar, Huawei, ZTE, Hytra, Hangzhou and Dawa. The FCC may also revoke
authorisations previously granted to equipment on the covered list, so there's no grandfathering in.
It has also decided to approve a nearly $2 billion programme to subsidise the replacement
of Chinese equipment by federal contractors. Now, a substantial reason for the prevailing 5G
consternation were the geopolitical and market realities. As many prominent members of Congress
and of the executive branch, members of the executive branch over time have articulated
the need for a domestic industrial base, or at least nearshoring in the western hemisphere,
for the manufacturing of telecommunications components in the free world is overriding
and imperative. Now we finally come to the last part of the analysis and presentation,
which is CFIUS. CFIUS, as I've noted already, is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States. It's an inter-agency working group of the US government that decides whether
a wide variety of proposed transactions, acquisitions, involving foreign entities
wishing to acquire part of US businesses poses sufficient national security risk to be stopped.
The current 5G is in play in many of them and could be the reason those transactions are afforded
searching scrutiny by CFIUS or even blocked by the president.
Typically, though, mitigation measures are preferred over outright blocks on an acquisition,
and the final decision does, as I mentioned earlier, rest with the president, the chief
executive. Outright blocks on acquisitions are extremely few, just a handful, but as the
recently failed Wise Road Magna Chip deal worth $1.4 billion shows, CFIUS's concerns about the
national security implications of deals can interfere with the business priorities and the
timeline of acquisitions, and that delay can indeed make the parties back out of a deal.
Before the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 was enacted,
CFIUS's jurisdiction had been limited to transactions that could result in foreign
control, the word control is key here, of any US business, but FERMA, that 2018 statute,
and those regulations have conferred additional authority on CFIUS to review and participate in
blocking two new categories of transactions, certain non-controlling investments in some US
businesses involved with critical technology, critical infrastructure, and sensitive personal
data, known, therefore, as TID US businesses for technology infrastructure data, and certain real
estate transactions. Determining what is a TID US business for CFIUS purposes is critical for
seeing if 5G's long shadow is gossed over any of it. As far as critical technology is concerned,
the regulations maintain that it includes certain nuclear-related software, technology facilities,
equipment, parts and components, materials, some emerging and foundational technologies
controlled for export under recent US law called the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
certain defence articles and defence services included on the US munitions list, certain items
included on the commerce control list, and particular agents and toxins. And the high
technology sectors that are implicated in this include, there are 27 of them, and some of them
are electronic computer manufacturing, missile and space vehicle manufacturing, military armoured
vehicle and tank component manufacturing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, so on and so
forth. Now we come to infrastructure. The infrastructure category includes telecommunications,
power, oil and gas, finance, defence industrial base, pertaining to fibre optic cables that serve
military installations, facilities that provide electric power, interstate oil pipelines,
satellites, rail lines that are part of the US Department of Defence's strategic rail corridor
network. What about data? What is sensitive identifiable data? That includes financial data,
consumer data, health data, geolocation data, biometric enrolment data, and critically,
data contained in an individual's application for US Government personnel security clearance
status. There are ten data categories that trigger CFIUS's jurisdiction. They are all
subject to CFIUS's review before an acquisition truly gains safe harbour. And all of this,
one way or another, directly or indirectly, will be affected by 5G innovations, and the CFIUS
calculus, often jump-started by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's analysis in
the United States Government, will have 5G playing a pivotal role. We have come to the end of our
discourse today. If the challenges we have highlighted seem formidable, that's because they
are, and if the opportunities seem great, that's because they are. And we must be thoughtful about
minimising vulnerabilities and maximising opportunities. The developing framework for
5G will be difficult to predict, because great discoveries and new twists and turns often have no
exact roadmap. For example, we could not have anticipated 4G's impact on the global economy at
large, in urban areas or smaller villages, or in the spaces of agriculture, telecom,
telemedicine, and so on and so forth. I beg your indulgence in borrowing from Sun Tzu's The Art
of War, when he enumerated what he called the five essentials for victory. Those principles
articulate to us the free world's broad objectives, and as we have discussed today at length,
the current realities have reinforced the importance of those enduring truths.
To begin, he will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. Risk aversion in order
to avoid needless or egoistic fights can be a virtue. Spoiling for a fight is not a virtue,
it's a vice. And discretion can often be the better part of valour. Sun Tzu also continued
that he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. Different forces
require different kinds of strategies. The same is true with 5G. He will win whose army is
animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks, and may the spirit of unity and common
purpose and objective pervade the governments of the free world and their partners in the private
sector. He will win who, once he has prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
Navigating between tactful transparency and strategic opacity is an essential predicate
for victory. Finally, he will win who has strength, vitality, ardour, and commitment
to the achievement of his goals, and such clear-minded focus signals the resolve to
achieve and succeed to friends and foes alike. So may the free world know peace, prosperity,
stability, and unity. This is a time for visionaries and leaders to step up to the mark,
and may we all be worthy of the highest and noblest aspirations of our peoples.
Thank you very much for your graciousness and kindness today.
