ADVERSARIAL INFLUENCE THROUGH COERCIVE DIPLOMACY- Mr. Andrew Publicover

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 27, 2026
24th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, Panama🇵🇦- February 23 – 24, 2023
-Mr. Andrew Publicover
Economic Officer, US Embassy in Panama
Thank you very much.
Muy buenas tardes a todos y a todas.
I hope you'll understand if I do most of my comments in English.
Thanks to the organizers for inviting me.
My name is Andrew Publicover.
I'm an officer at the U.S.
Embassy here in Panama and send warm greetings on behalf of my
embassy colleagues and our ambassador Marie Carmen Aponte.
It's great to have this opportunity here to speak with
so many distinguished colleagues not just from here in Panama
but from across the region.
I want to pick up on some of the themes that the Admiral
touched on but drill down a little bit to some of the
specific examples that we see around the world and some of
the specific cases that we see of this instances of coercive
diplomacy.
And certainly I wouldn't say that this is a phenomenon unique
to any one country.
I think we can point to a variety of examples in our region
and around the world.
But as we think of some of the most prominent headline-grabbing
examples of coercive diplomacy around the world over the last
several years, one state actor does come to mind.
There have been several prominent examples involving the
People's Republic of China.
And so one of the issues that I look at here in my work at the
embassy is engagement between this region and important third
countries like China.
I work closely with my colleagues at other embassies in the
region who cover these same issues.
So it's exciting to see some of these issues on your agenda
today as you look at security and intelligence challenges in
the region.
I know tomorrow there will be a discussion specifically on some
of the technology related concerns in this area, but I hope
my comments can just briefly touch on some of the broader
picture.
From the United States perspective, President Biden and our
Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, have made clear that we
see the People's Republic of China as posing a unique
long-term challenge to the international order, as being
the only country with both the intent and the capability to
reshape the international order, with again, that unique
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capacity to
do it.
We see Beijing with a vision for the world that would move us
away from the universal values that have sustained so much of
the world's progress and this region's progress for the past
75 years.
And we see these examples of coercive diplomacy as one clear
manifestation of that.
I also want to be clear that President Biden, Secretary Blinken
have said the United States is not looking for conflict or a
new Cold War.
We are determined to avoid those scenarios.
We don't seek to block China or any country in this region or
elsewhere in the world from growing its economy, building
connections with other countries, advancing the interests of
its people.
This is not about closing our doors or forcing partners to
choose sides, but we do see a need to think about ways that
we can work more closely together, strengthen our international
laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that help us
maintain our collective peace and security and protect the
rights of our individual citizens and our sovereign nations.
Make it possible for us all to coexist and cooperate.
And we're certainly looking to increase our alignment with
allies and partners around the world, including here in this
region, as we look to do that.
What exactly do we mean by coercive diplomacy or economic
coercion?
We see countries, including the People's Republic of China,
using a variety of tools, particularly China's central position
in the global economy, to increase other countries' dependent
relationship with them, and then to use that dependence to
impose their own foreign policy preferences and ultimately
limit other countries' sovereign scope to make their own choices
in their own best interests.
Again, there are some headline-grabbing examples that might
seem to come from far from this region.
There are also other examples from much closer to home, but
these lessons are important for all countries to consider.
I'll quickly highlight just a couple of examples, and this
is all information that's been widely reported in the media.
Last year, we saw the PRC impose a de facto trade embargo
on Lithuania and block imports into China from other companies
that did business with Lithuania, after Lithuania opened a
Taiwan representative office in Vilnius.
Another example, from 2017 to 2020, the PRC severely delayed,
restricted, and ultimately blocked important Australian imports
after Australia became increasingly vocal about security and
human rights concerns in China and blocked certain providers
from Australia's 5G network development.
And in 2017, the PRC blocked Korean entertainment broadcasts
and performances in China and closed a number of Korean retail
outlets after South Korea decided to deploy a new missile
defense system.
So I just want to pause for a moment on these examples and
think about these contexts that I've mentioned.
These are decisions these countries took to choose which
countries or territories to engage with and on what terms,
to set criteria to protect their own national telecommunications
networks, to make their own decisions about their national
defense needs and the systems that they would employ to meet
those needs.
So these are core sovereign decisions that any country in
our region, any country around the world, needs to be able
to make according to the best interests of its own citizens.
And efforts to manipulate, constrain, dictate those decisions
ultimately represent a serious concern for sovereignty.
There's a recent study out this month from the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute that includes much more detail on
these examples and some analysis and lessons learned from them.
It's called Countering China's Coercive Diplomacy and it's
available on the website of that Institute, ASPI.
One interesting observation I found that the study's authors
made is that at least by one measure, the PRC's coercive diplomacy
is actually remarkably ineffective.
In several of the cases I highlighted, the PRC efforts actually
failed to change the core policy decision that they were meant
to be targeting.
But the study assesses the larger effect may actually be on
other countries worldwide, sort of a chilling effect that attempts
to impose boundaries and pressure governments around the world
to effectively self-censor and hold back from certain policy
positions, policy statements, policy decisions they might
otherwise take in their own interest.
So what can countries around the world do in response to this
risk of coercive diplomacy that's been highlighted in these
examples that I've mentioned involving the People's Republic
of China, but they could ultimately come from a variety of
directions.
Here I would highlight the strategy that the Biden administration
has put forward with regard to our engagement with
China, and that is align, invest, compete. In the United States
we think it's really important to invest in the foundations of
our own strength and resilience at home, our competitiveness,
our innovation, our interconnectedness, our democracy.
And so we've undertaken a series of efforts to revitalize our
manufacturing and high-tech industries at home, and diversify
and strengthen supply chains, just as two examples. All of these
efforts make our own economy and our society more resilient to
this kind of coercive pressure, and better able to present a
positive alternative to partners around the world.
And as I say, we're looking to align these efforts increasingly
with allies and partners all around the world, including importantly
from here in this region. Some pieces of these efforts that you
may have heard about, including some major bipartisan pieces
of legislation passed in the United States in recent years,
the Chips and Science Act, the bipartisan infrastructure law,
the Inflation Reduction Act, have actually created specific
new opportunities and funding streams for increased cooperation
here in this region. And we know a number of partners here in
the region are excited about the possibilities and opportunities
for all of our economies under ideas like near-shoring,
friend-shoring, bringing manufacturing closer to home.
So this alignment ultimately strengthens all our hands in pushing
back against activities from the PRC or any country that would
seek to coerce other governments, distort markets, undermine
the success of our own workers, businesses, and citizens.
So the United States looks forward to ongoing discussions with
partners here in the region and around the world on ways we can
continue to strengthen that investment in all of our countries
and strengthen our alignment on these issues as we sort of find
our way through some of these new diplomatic challenges that
we face in the world today.
Thanks.
