ILLICIT FINANCE-Mr. John Cassara

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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26th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 7-8, 2023
-Mr. John Cassara
Board Member, Global Financial Integrity
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I hope you'll catch his books. They're fantastic on the list of finance, even a novel.
Tom Cottamore, Cottamone, Director of Global Financial Integrity.
Jerome Beaumont, the Executive Secretary of Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence.
Elisabetta Frankow, Jess Katzwicz, Head of the International Cooperation Unit
within the Department of Financial Information of the Polish Ministry of Finance.
She is also the Interim Chair of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence.
And Mr. Mariano Federici, the Senior Manager Director of K2 Integrity
and the former Chairman of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
A very outstanding panel on illicit finance. You will
learn much from these great individuals. So, carry on.
Congressman Pittenger, parliamentarians and participants, thank you. I'm absolutely
delighted to be here with you today. You know, over the last day and a half,
we've had some outstanding presentations, really, really interesting subject matters.
But one thing that struck me is how often China has come up in all of our conversations.
It's worth noting, particularly because the speakers have been very diverse.
The countries they represent are very diverse. They have various fields of expertise.
But nevertheless, China seems to be the common denominator.
Now, we've talked about China as a military threat. We've talked about China as an economic
threat. We've talked about China as a commercial threat, the human rights threat,
information technology. But one thing we really haven't talked about at all
is what I call China as a transnational criminal threat and a big money laundering threat.
And that's my background. I've been in international law enforcement for about 30
years or so, specializing in international money laundering. And over the last few years,
I've become increasingly concerned about how the international community has seemingly ignored
what I call China, CCP Inc., transnational crime and money laundering. In fact, this last year,
I wrote a book, released a book called just that, China Specified Unlawful Activities,
CCP Inc., Transnational Crime and Money Laundering. In that book, I looked at the 12
largest categories of transnational crime, things that you're all familiar with,
narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, wildlife trafficking, illegal fishing, counterfeit,
intellectual property rights violations, and many others. And in 11 of those 12 categories
of transnational crime, China leads the world. China, CCP Inc., China actors lead the world.
And I also looked at Chinese, what I call Chinese centric money laundering methodologies
and enablers. Now, in this panel, we're going to be discussing illicit trade,
illicit finance and illicit trade. So what I'm going to talk about in the time I have allocated
to me is just make a few points about illicit finance, illicit trade as it relates to CCP Inc.,
specifically trade-based money laundering. So let me begin by talking just a little bit
about trade fraud, because it's perhaps the most extensive or widespread form of Chinese
and global money laundering. And it comes from trade misinvoicing. Trade fraud is also what we
call a specified unlawful activity or predicate offense to charge money laundering. Depending
on its form, it can also be a money laundering methodology itself. In fact, I believe it is
the largest and most widespread money laundering methodology in the world. It's also the least
recognized, understood and enforced. Most forms of trade misinvoicing revolve around invoice fraud
and manipulation. Generally speaking, invoice fraud means the contents, the description and
or the value of the goods have been deliberately misrepresented. This is done for a number of
reasons, but primarily it's to minimize taxes, duties, VAT fraud, promote export incentive fraud.
It's part of alternative remittance systems, parallel banking systems, this type of thing.
Now, China is the largest trading nation in the world. In 2022, according to the CCP's own numbers,
even factoring in the worldwide pandemic, China's foreign trade volume hit a reported
high of about $6 trillion. How much of that represents trade fraud? Well, we don't know
because getting reliable data out of China and about China is problematical,
and enforcement relating to Chinese trade fraud is very, very limited. In addition,
trade-based money laundering, trade fraud can be very complex because the launderers hide
behind individual transactions within the vast volume of legitimate trade. For example,
general merchandise trade in 2022 totaled about $22 trillion in exports alone.
Another reason why it's so hard to get accurate numbers and to follow the money and value trail
is because traders transfers monies across borders, often using multiple currencies,
very complex financing. But using a conservative estimate, I'm going to use 10%, I'm not going to
tell you how I got that because it's too time-consuming, but using a very conservative
estimate that 10% of China's trade is suspect or involved with trade fraud, that could mean
possibly Chinese trade is approximately, suspect Chinese trade is approximately $600 billion a
year, $600 billion a year. That's an enormous number, but next to nothing is being done about
it. Also think how much trade fraud is costing your governments in say tax and duty, VAT fraud,
this type of thing. Now let's turn to capital flight. Similar to trade fraud, by far,
China leads the world in capital flight. From 2006 to 2016, an estimated $4 trillion
left China, $4 trillion in capital left China. Already this year, the capital outflow has been
the largest since 2015. This quarter has been particularly brutal for CCP Inc. Most of this is
due to economic and political uncertainties. They're collapsing real estate market, terrible
return on investments for traditional Chinese internal investment savings vehicles. And the
CCP Inc. has responded. They've had capital controls for years, capital flight restrictions
for years, yet even middle-class Chinese use very creative means to get their hard-earned
capital out of the country. Some people think that capital flight isn't money laundering,
and for the most part it isn't, but a lot of it actually is. Capital flight could be considered
money laundering because a lot of the capital that's leaving China is the proceeds of crime.
In anti-money laundering, we talk about mixing or commingling illicit with licit. And if some
of it's tainted, then the whole pot is in effect dirty money. Now, to the point of going back to
illicit trade and illicit finance, the point of this is that Chinese often use trade fraud or
value transfers in ways to circumvent capital flight controls. For example, in trade-based
money laundering, to move money and value out, actors import goods at overvalued prices or export
goods at undervalued prices. This happens constantly with Chinese traders. Now, I want to
briefly mention China's massive involvement in global black market exchanges. Last year at this
forum, I provided some details about the evolution of the Colombian black market peso exchange
and how forms of this exchange have spread around the world. I'm sure they affect your countries.
In these international exchanges, illicit proceeds are increasingly used to purchase Chinese
trade goods directly from China or from international businesses or Chinese brokers.
There's willful blindness on the part of the Chinese vendors and brokers. They really don't
care where the money comes from, the origin of the money. They just want to complete the deal.
A further worrisome spin on these black market exchanges is the use of Chinese apps,
such as WeChat Pay on mobile phones. Chinese brokers working with the cartels identify a
business person working in a host country that has a cash-intensive business. The broker gives
the proceeds of crime to the business person who launders it through his or her business accounts.
Using the phone app, a like amount of money in China is transferred from the
business person's China account to an account designated by the broker
and the transnational criminal group. It's a very, very effective money laundering
scheme, one that we are hard-pressed to combat. Our anti-money laundering countermeasures simply
can't keep up. By anti-money laundering countermeasures, I primarily mean financial
intelligence. I know we're going to hear from our colleagues at the Egmont Group about that
in a little bit. In this forum, I also talked a little about Chinese underground financial systems
called Faiqian, or flying money. Historically and culturally, flying money is also based on
the misuse of trade. Now, why is this important? Well, because according to estimates put forward
both by the World Bank and the IMF, unrecorded remittances could be as high as $1.5 trillion
every year, as opposed to say, you know, recorded remittances by the Western
unions and the money grams of the world. Flying money is perhaps one of the largest,
well, it is. It is one of the largest underground remittance systems. Its use is global.
Certainly, it's found in the countries that you represent. Now, international flying money brokers
often use the process of counter valuation or over and under invoicing to settle accounts
between their brokers. This is where the trade fraud, the trade-based money laundering comes in.
While flying money is often innocent, benign, certainly just used to send remittances from
hard-earned workers back home, because it is so opaque and it ignores or gets around our
anti-money laundering countermeasures, it's also frequently used to remit, if you will,
the proceeds of crime. Now, just about out of time, but I want to emphasize that there are many
Chinese CCP enablers that drive money laundering. I write about them in some of my book, including
the use of free trade zones, gaming, real estate investments, the use of offshores and secrecy
havens, influence operations, and many, many others. Perhaps the most pernicious of all
is CCP Inc. corruption. We've talked a little bit about corruption over the last day and a half.
I think corruption, particularly dealing with money laundering, is the great enabler or the
great facilitator. Now, many of these money laundering enablers have taken root in China's
Belt and Road Initiative. China has signed more than 200 agreements in jointly building the BRI
with about 152 countries and 32 international organizations and has invested well over a
trillion dollars in the BRI initiative. They did not do this for friendship. Rather, there's a
growing and alarming overlap between China's involvement in transnational crime and illicit
finance and their rapidly expanding international presence. I believe the evidence shows,
and when I mean evidence, I go back to that $2 trillion of illicit proceeds every year,
which is about half of the roughly $4 trillion that is laundered every year worldwide by all
sources. But I believe the evidence shows that, without a doubt, China, again, CCP Inc. is the
largest and most dangerous criminal actor in the world today. In law enforcement parlance,
we would say it acts like an ongoing criminal enterprise. I believe CCP Inc. criminality
is occurring in every country represented here. I don't understand why we continue to ignore the
threat, but there is some grounds for optimism if we act on it, because I firmly believe on a
tactical level, this is where CCP Inc. is most vulnerable, going after them at the criminal level.
Thank you.
