ILLICIT FINANCE- Mr. Tom Cardamone

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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26th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 7-8, 2023
-Mr. Tom Cardamone
Director of Global Financial Integrity (GFI)
Good morning everyone, or perhaps it's afternoon now. A pleasure to be here.
For those of you who are not familiar with Global Financial Integrity, we are a Washington-based
think tank that conducts research on illicit financial flows, illicit trade,
money laundering, transnational crime, as well as providing training and advice to governments
that have demonstrated the interest and the political will to try to address these issues
in their particular countries. What I'd like to do with my eight or ten minutes today is to talk
about these issues, illicit trade, transnational crime, national security issues, money laundering
challenges, and what we, through our research, have found to be sort of the connecting
tissue to all these various criminal activity, which is opacity and ownership of commercial
shipping vessels. Before I get to that specifically, I think it's important to
try to provide a brief order of magnitude on what we're talking about. Our research,
and that of other organizations, has shown that counterfeiting of goods is about a trillion-dollar
business each year. This can include handbags and watches and sunglasses and sneakers,
but also medicines of various types, infant formula, things that can actually be harmful to
people who take them. They either have lower effective qualities or they could be outright
dangerous and can threaten the health and lives of people. Added to that, if you look at the
illegal trade in legitimate products, whether it be minerals, timber, fish, that's another
$150 billion a year. Narcotics is $500 billion, $600 billion, I think we heard earlier this morning,
perhaps as much as $650 billion business a year. So this is a massive, massive challenge to
law enforcement. These types of illicit trade activities, as we've heard today earlier,
used by terrorist organizations, transnational criminal groups, non-state actors, drug cartels,
it is the way to earn and move money around the globe. This type of illegal trade affects a whole
swath of society. It prevents revenue generating for companies that actually provide the legal
products that are being copied in the counterfeit area, threatens the health, as I've already seen,
and can substantially reduce the number of jobs that could be created from legitimate products.
The OECD did a study a couple of years ago and they estimate that some 400,000 jobs a year in
Europe are not created or lost because of this type of criminal activity. Altogether,
illicit trade is about $2 trillion a year. So again, a massive challenge for law enforcement.
What we have found is that the linking factor between these types of illicit trade,
and whether it's some sort of fraudulent medicine, impure baby formula, cocaine,
or illicit oil coming out of Russia, is that they are likely delivered by ship.
The vast majority of international trade, about 85% of international trade, is delivered by ship.
So it was our view at the outset, our hypothesis, is that it would be likely that illicit goods
are probably delivered in the same way. The problem is that the ownership of commercial vessels
is shrouded in darkness in many instances. In April, we released a paper along with S&P Global,
which you may be familiar with that firm. They're probably one of the leading
providers of commercial shipping data in the world, as well as with the Institute of International
Banking Law and Practice. We looked at the ownership of commercial ships around the world
and found that a little more than 12% of global shipping has no company name whatsoever associated
with the ships. That's over 8,300 commercial shipping vessels that have no known company name
associated with them. That is a very low bar if you're talking about transparency of ownership.
We didn't even get into looking at where there was a company name associated, but no beneficial
owner name associated with it. That is a person or person, individuals that could be identified as
actually benefiting, owning, controlling the activities of those particular
vessels. What we found was that for ships that have no known company associated with it,
they are more than twice as likely to evade, violate safety rules and other
regulations governing maritime activity around the world.
They are associated with so-called dark fleets. You've probably been seeing this in the media
related to oil coming out of Russia. We have found that these ships are more than likely flagged in
a so-called flag of convenience state. These are countries that allow ships to use their national
flag with not necessarily any connection between the company being based there or the beneficial
owner being a citizen of that country. For a fee, these ships are provided with the flag,
very low taxes, very low regulation, very low oversight of some of these regulations that
should be followed. We also found that these ships that have no connection with a company
tend to be in so-called single ship fleets. We see that also related to many types of illegal
activity. The metaphor I like to use talking about this is that the world's oceans are the
international circulatory system for the economy, for the global economy. These ships with no known
owners are the cancer cells flowing through that circulatory system. It is incumbent upon
governments to begin to take a look, shine a light, try to identify these cancer cells,
and address that problem. Data linking ships with no known owners to the delivery of
illicit goods is, as you may well know, very difficult to come by. Law enforcement doesn't
tend to want to give it up. We've engaged with Customs and Border Protection here and their
colleagues in the UK and other countries in Europe. It's very difficult to get this information.
In several cases, this type of information has made it into the public domain.
These are not large data sets by any stretch of the imagination, but they do go to the point of
looking at these patterns, these connections between opaque ownership and illegal activity.
Just this year, we've been able to find 11 instances of a ship being connected to
delivery of, as it turns out, they were all related to drug imports into Europe. Nine of the
11 had no known owner. Six were flying flags of convenience. A very good example of this was just
seen in September when a ship by the name of the MV Matthews was interdicted off the coast of Ireland
with 2,400 kilos of cocaine on it. Just two months earlier, the ship was owned by a Chinese firm.
It was sold in August, re-flagged in the Marshall Islands. Unclear who the owners
are, although it seems from media reports that they may be tied to criminal organizations in
Ireland, but it just goes to show that this is the type of activity that we can find when the
data are available. Similar numbers are available for the United States. Again, it's difficult to
find the information, but when we do find it, we find a very high percentage of ship names
connected to illegal goods coming in tend to have no known owners. Speaking of the United States,
our paper in April showed that in 2022 alone, some 500 ships with no known owners made 800
visits to US ports that year. We have no idea of who actually owns, controls,
benefits financially from many of the ships that come into the United States. If I'm a national
security policy person, this would give me some sleepless nights knowing that we don't know
who actually owns the ships coming in. John Walsh this morning was talking about paying
attention to your borders. If you don't protect your borders, you can't control what comes into
the country. All our ports are essentially borders, and we don't understand who actually
owns the vessels that come in to our ports. The lack of owner affiliation means that all types
of illicit goods from around the globe can come in with little to no ramifications for the
people who actually own these vessels. This is very much a low risk, high return endeavor
for whatever illegal activity might be taking place, whether it's human trafficking,
illegal fishing, drug trafficking of course, and a whole host of other crimes which for the most part
very rarely get prosecuted. The goods themselves are often interdicted, but the people bringing
them in often are not. So briefly, two solutions on how we can begin to address this challenge.
First, from a national perspective, would be to require any ship coming into a port
to provide their beneficial ownership information prior to docking. That is, who is the person
or persons who own the vessel. It's a very simple process that could be undertaken.
Without this information, docking should be denied. It's a very simple thing to do,
and if you're not doing anything nefarious, you shouldn't have a problem providing the
information. Secondly, we believe there should be a new global norm, a new global standard,
a public global beneficial ownership registry for any company that owns a ship or operates a ship.
Who are the people who actually own these companies? You may have seen that over the
five years or so, perhaps a bit more than that, there has been a wave of governments
that have committed to creating beneficial ownership registries for their country.
In the United States, our Corporate Transparency Act mandated that we create a beneficial ownership
registry which will go into effect on January 1st. Some 130 governments have done this.
Despite this, there are wide variations in the pace that these are being implemented in,
the ability for the public to get this information, investigative journalists,
analysts like ours, in addition, of course, to national security folks and law enforcement
individuals. Because it is uneven, the quality of the verification and the validation of the data
is different. We believe there should be a dedicated beneficial ownership registry just for
global commercial ships that should be implemented by the International Maritime
Organization. We believe that would be the logical place for this to be implemented.
If this were to be done, it would shine a light in the dark places of the global economy,
would shine a light to address transnational crime, would be a game changer for law enforcement,
certainly, but also for financial institutions that provide trade financing. They may not have
any idea who owns a particular ship that they may be financing a trade transaction.
It would be beneficial to insurance companies, maritime insurance firms, to prevent against
fraud. We see time after time ships being set on fire or scuttled for the insurance money.
Whether you're interested in environmental crime or human trafficking, this type of information
is invaluable to try to get to the owners of the vessels that are actually delivering
these goods, and in some cases, these individuals around the world.
These ideas have been presented to members of the European Parliament.
They are now in the process of negotiating their next anti-money laundering directive.
They are considering whether some of these two ideas may be implemented into that new legislation.
It is our view that other governments, other jurisdictions should likewise examine these
ideas and seeing whether they are beneficial for their particular security in law enforcement.
Thank you.
