As the military operation unfolds in the Middle East, rare earth security is once again making headlines.
Will the United States have enough critical minerals to produce weapons for itself and its allies?
At the heart of Manhattan, Amvest Capital will host an in-person book launch and discussion on March 24 at 5:30 p.m. ET for "Mineral War: China’s Quest for Weapons of Mineral Destruction."
The book is authored by Tomasz Nadrowski, CFA, portfolio manager at Amvest Terraden.
NTD’s Tiffany Meier, anchor of Evening News and China in Focus, will be joining the event.
Nadrowski will discuss how China came to dominate the critical minerals supply chain and what that means for advanced industry, energy security, and the balance of global power.
As critical minerals move closer to the center of strategic competition, this conversation offers a key perspective for investors, operators, and policymakers alike.
For a conversation on Thomas' book,
How China Came to Dominate the Critical Mineral Supply Chain,
and what that means for advanced industry,
and security and the balance of global power.
And after that, we'll head upstairs,
we'll have Q&A down here,
and we'll head upstairs to the 37th floor,
where we'll set up our office.
So what do we do here at Adverse Keratin?
We run a critical minerals equity fund.
Investing in companies,
exploring, developing, and mining critical minerals
for today's world,
mining energy applications,
defense applications,
every electronic device that's on the earth at the moment.
And importantly, we concentrate on companies that don't rely on us.
And if you'd like to hear more about our fund,
before I introduce Thomas,
we're going to be asking a poll.
And if you want to answer the poll,
you can go to that website,
scan the QR code.
And the export restrictions
have China placed on the world
that involve minerals since 2020.
So since 2020,
how many export restrictions has China placed on the world
that involve minerals?
And after Thomas and Tiffany's discussion,
I'll give you the answer.
Let me fill you in about Thomas.
So I actually met Thomas
in the middle of nowhere,
in Western Australia.
I was with him on a tour
about eight years ago.
And I was like,
look at that guy.
I'm in the middle of Raymond's talk in Western Australia.
Look at that guy.
He doesn't answer my phone or my emails.
I'm trying to teach you mining ideas.
Anyway, since then, we've stayed in touch.
And he joined us in 2022
as a portfolio manager
of the Australian Critical Minerals Fund.
And he formed it together
with Dave and the others at AMBAS
and launched in 2023.
And he began his mining career
in one of the world's largest gold companies.
And he's an investment expert
with over 25 years of experience
in mining funds.
He's genuinely fluent in several languages.
I mean, genuinely.
And now he is the author of a book
published.
Pretty impressive.
So now I'm going to pass it over to Thomas.
Thank you, Stuart.
Thanks everyone for joining us today.
It's a real pleasure.
I'm going to share a couple of visuals.
And maybe the first one is a little surprising.
It's coming from Rembrandt van Rijn.
17th century maestro.
Famous for his talent
for illuminating moments in history
which are characterized by shifts in power.
And this famous painting
in which he anticipated
something from our era
is entitled Night Watch in Busan, Korea.
So what do we see here
in this beautiful composition?
It's almost theatrical.
On the right side, it's China.
China very composed, very assured
in dispensing access.
On the left side is this lonely figure
sometimes blonde, sometimes orange
depending on lighting
representing the rest of the world
and waiting.
What's being offered here
is not tribute.
It's not peace.
It's access.
It's access to
a marginal increase
in flows of rare earths.
Rare earth oxides and rare earth magnets.
That's what happened in Busan in October last year.
So essentially, it's a permission.
It's right to manufacture.
Now, how did we get to this point?
How did we get to a moment where
our needs for chemical elements,
molecules, compounds,
magnets, oxides, anodes, and so on
depend on the whim of the Chinese Communist Party?
That's a question which
some depth I treat in this book, Mineral War.
But I'm going to give you a little bit of a
macroeconomic context to this today.
And that context, of course, has a lot to do with China.
So let's start with this.
What is this?
This is 320% debt to GDP.
This is the Chinese economy.
It's more than Japan, it's more than the United States
for an economy which is much less developed
on GDP per capita.
So what do you do when that happens to you
and your growth slows down?
There are a couple of options.
The first option would be, of course, to grow faster.
But is this really an offer?
With all this simple urbanization already over,
on a good day, China grows at 4%, probably less.
And with 47% savings to GDP,
that's not a particularly attractive investment
capital output ratio.
You have to put 12 renminbi to earn one.
It's not growth, it's maintenance.
So what are the other options?
What can you do to unwind that?
Well, there's the Japanese option.
The Japanese option would be to try to move
the resources from production to consumption.
Japan lost two decades trying to do this.
And, of course, the social cohesion in Japan
is somewhat unique.
I doubt very much the Chinese Communist Party
would risk two decades of stagnation
in the name of national rejuvenation.
Any other options?
Maybe a fiscal reform.
So that would mean essentially unwinding
the 1994 fiscal reform that took place
and which settled local governments
with all the social liabilities,
offering all the resources to the central government
so that they could pursue their strategic objectives.
Military, diplomatic, probes to Mars, you name it.
Very unlikely to happen, to see this unwind
for political strategic reasons.
So we are left with two options.
One is to reflate this debt,
and the other one is to rely on external accounts.
Can we really reflate this debt?
Because the elephant in the room
is that China is a totalitarian police state
and cares about stability.
And as we know, inflation invites destabilization.
How do we know it?
We know it from the history of totalitarian regimes.
Nazi Germany famously managed to control prices.
How? By financial engineering.
Die Wechsel, so the bills which were never redeemed,
that circulated in the economy
until Nazi Germany invaded Poland.
No inflation until then.
Soviet Union was another successful case
after the currency reform of 1947,
and then the government controlled,
topped down all the prices, including the prices of labor,
basically taking inflation out of the system until the 1980s,
and we know what happened later.
And then we have a counter-example
that we all think about every day these days, Iran.
Iran has not been successful at controlling inflation.
When I went there a couple of years ago,
I remember exchanging dollars into rials.
I got a brick like this.
My bag was too small to carry that.
99% loss in the value of the currency
since Shah's departure.
And therefore, since 1999,
there have been seven episodes of social unrest in Iran,
including this tragic one two and a half months ago.
And so China went through something similar in the late 80s.
1988-89, inflation in China was about 20%,
and we know how long it ended at Tiananmen Square in June of 89.
Since then, the Chinese Communist Party
has always erred on the side of monetary caution.
If you look at their monetary policy in detail since then,
you'll find out that it's been always either prudent or tight,
with one exception, great financial crisis.
For about 18 months, there was a loose monetary policy,
but it's 18 months out of 33 years since 1993 that we have good data.
And so what happens if there is no inflation?
Of course, there's disinflation and sometimes deflation.
And in disinflation, two things happen.
First, it's much more expensive to service this debt.
And the second thing that happens is it makes no sense to consume
because your renminbi tomorrow is worth more than your renminbi today.
So this red dot there is 1989,
the moment where Chinese consumption of GDP begins to nosedive.
And today, household consumption is only 38% of GDP of China.
And so, unfortunately, this trend has been exacerbated in this decade.
So you see here a trend that was a pre-pandemic,
and what happens is that the production surges above the trend
and consumption falls below the trend.
And you can say, well, it's structural, just the real estate bubble and so on,
which is part of the story.
But let's not forget the agency, the decision-making.
Last year in October, as I was finishing this book,
the fourth plenum of the CCP decided to double down on just this,
productive forces, modern industrial system.
Let's produce more and more and more.
And there's something very elegant and Marxist about it,
because Marxists don't believe like us that value is created in the moment of exchange.
They believe that it's created by infusing economic factors
into capital goods and production.
And so that's exactly what happens there.
Now, what is this final option?
The final option is, of course, relying on external accounts.
And here the story is that, of course, if China produces and needs consumers,
for a very long time the U.S. was this ultimate sink for Chinese goods,
until 2018, roughly, when for the first time there were negotiations to rebalance
the very lopsided trade relationship.
And it continued last year.
Has China recalibrated its economic system?
It certainly hasn't.
It just redirected it to Asian countries and Africa.
But last year, the chronic current account surplus of China reached $1.2 trillion.
Who's on the receiving end of this?
Essentially Africa.
$102 billion of current account deficit vis-à-vis China.
No chance to industrialize, no chance to develop human capital.
But while Africa cannot push back, America tried and did.
And so when America tried and did push back and went to Busan
so that Rembrandt could anticipate it with his beautiful painting,
at that time China was ready.
But China was ready not with tariffs or counter-tariffs.
China was ready with critical mass.
How is this possible?
Well, the country spent many years controlling, increasingly,
those various elements here, which are extremely important.
I'll explain in a moment why.
Controlling and consolidating control is one thing.
Weaponizing it is another.
So since when did China start weaponizing it?
I don't know what you were doing during COVID days,
but I was amusing myself by reading communist legalese.
In October 2020, China came up with export control law.
This is where the light bulb went on, and I decided,
okay, this is time maybe to set up a fund.
We'll be investing in rebuilding of this value chain on the western side of the divide
because there was already an episode 10 years before
when China slapped export controls on Japan, its largest customer.
And these are the results of that work.
Now, the U.S. approached this somewhat naively in 2025
because this is a process that took five years since the export control law
to the Pusan meeting, the Rembrandt moment.
There are 24 different restrictions on exports of these elements,
related technologies, and equipment to extract them, refine them, separate them, and so on.
There are different types of controls, technology bands, and so on
for a variety of minerals, not just rare herbs,
but graphite, gallium, germanium, tungsten, antimony, indium, and several others.
And so when Pusan happens here, China is ready with leverage.
What do I mean by leverage?
So imagine I am the United States and you're China.
I'm going to sell to you some soybeans and buy from you some rare herbs.
So I'm selling you soybeans.
I send it through the port of New Orleans at $11 per bushel.
You buy it in the port of Ningbo in Zhejiang at $13, let's say.
Maybe now with fuel oil prices going through the roof, $13.5.
Okay, that's all.
Then I ask you, okay, so sell me some rare herb oxen.
Your government tells you, no, you're not allowed.
This tall guy here on the stage, he's not allowed to get it.
Okay, you lose $1 from that oxide, let's say NDPR oxide, rare herbs.
You know how much my downstream industry is going to lose?
$1,600.
That's what I call leverage because $10 billion worth of rare earth oxide at that time,
in October of last year, that's the global market,
translates into the underlying value of $10 trillion downstream.
That's leverage.
And the U.S. was not ready for that.
So what happened in Busan is that China conditionally agreed to suspend
four out of these 24 restrictions, four out of 24,
conditionally and temporarily until November of this year.
And since then, new restrictions have been imposed,
not least on Japan since January of this year.
Japan, our most important ally.
Have we stood up saying, hey, don't do this to our allies?
No, we haven't.
It's the best metaphor of this dependency.
Dependency that shows that in 24, so halfway through this process,
we still relied on 100% of heavier herbs through imports from China.
100% of our gallium was sourced from China.
Over 50% of our tungsten, antimony, and natural flake graphite
was sourced from China until 2024.
That's strategic myopia.
That's strategic negligence.
That's industrial complacency that mistook that historically short window
of 30 years of globalization for historical determinacy and permanence.
Now, to the Communist's credit, they never made this mistake.
In 2013, Xi Jinping wrote Document No. 9,
in which he clearly identified the West, our Western values
and Western institutions as inimical, as foes, ideological foes
of the Chinese Communist Party.
And that meant confrontation.
Luckily enough, confrontation also means opportunity
because dependency eventually translates into scarcity.
And the market has a way of rewarding those who anticipate scarcity.
This is what we've been trying to do
at Ambassador Adam Craig for many years.
And so five years ago, six years ago,
some thought that this is somehow a lunatic fringe
of a contrarian value thesis.
Today, of course, it's strategic necessity.
And we strongly believe that we have to pay attention to geopolitics.
When geopolitics determines the flows,
it is our fiduciary duty to exploit that opportunity,
extract value from that event for the benefit of the capital allocators.
And that's exactly what we're doing at Ambassador Adam Craig.
Thank you.
Thanks, Matt Thomas.
So, yeah, we did have a poll about how many export controls
China placed in 2020 in the US.
And the answer is 24, I believe.
So 25% guessed between 100 and then 75%.
51 to 200.
So a lot of you guessed the weight overs, but still a lot of...
I want to introduce you to Tiffany Meyer of NTD News.
She's an anchor, China News investigative reporter
and producer for NTD News based at the network headquarters in New York City.
Tiffany anchors NTD's flagship show, NTD Evening News,
and China In Focus.
She also co-writes NTD's special election coverage,
The Nation Decides,
and produced the award-winning NTD original documentary,
Hollywood Takeover, China's Control in the Film Industry.
With her unwavering commitment to finding and preventing the facts,
the show has received overwhelming support and positive feedback.
Tiffany is also dedicated to the truth and integrity
and a return to journalistic standards in her reporting.
With a network of underground sources in China,
she has stayed ahead of the curve with her China coverage,
and USAID she presents tomorrow's news to that.
And Thomas, good to see you again.
After the macroeconomic view there, let's dive straight on in.
How did China gain so much control of critical minerals that are so essential?
How did they manage that?
That's probably the best question.
We have to delve into three different areas.
These areas are geology and mining, metallurgy and trading.
And they evolved differently because, for example,
the geological endowment differs for those different minerals.
But we often forget and think about China,
probably because we never actually invested in Chinese mining.
It was always a closed sector by the Ministry of Land Resources.
I just remember in the 90s, some of you may remember,
there were three Western companies that functioned there.
Griffin, for example, SinoGold and Eldorado.
That's all.
Like the window in the 90s.
So it was difficult to invest.
However, in the 90s, there was access and we learned a lot about geology.
So for those who have some geological background,
you may remember there used to be this massive supercontinent called Gondwana.
And Gondwana then split into many continents in the southern hemisphere
that we usually associate with ore-rich continents.
South America, Africa, Australia, right?
Mining happens there rather than sedimentary basins in the north.
It just happens that southern China belongs to that,
even though it's part of the northern hemisphere.
The Yangtze Crater is extremely rich in many of these minerals.
Tin, tungsten, lipidolite, lithium, antimony,
the largest mine in the world.
And the only germanium mine in the world.
So a lot of these minerals are found there.
So this is geological stuff.
However, of course, there are a lot of minerals that are not available in China.
And by the year 2000,
China identified those that would be very important for future technologies
and those that the Chinese subsoil is not particularly rich in,
and then also those that fall in both categories
because of cobalt and manganese.
And these two cases are very interesting
because China today refines 95% of global manganese
and only mines about 10.
And it refines almost 80% of global cobalt
and only mines something like 5% of that domestically.
So this is a story of mining outside of China,
structured in a very different way
from what we know in the Western world
with junior mining companies from Canada, Australia,
Digging into that very quickly,
talk to us about the metallurgy communist oppression part of this.
This is very interesting.
So the man who is responsible for China's plight in the last 80 years,
his name is Mao Zedong.
He had a great hero.
The name of the hero was Joseph Stalin.
Except Stalin's real name was not Stalin.
It was Yudashvili.
He was Georgian.
What does Stalin mean?
Stalin, in Russian, means steel.
The man of steel.
The obsession with steel and metals is typical for totalitarian regimes.
It's typical.
It's Magnitogorsk, right, in the Soviet Union.
It's those massive centers.
Without that, without those massive factories,
without those massive metallurgical complexes,
you don't have a huge army,
which is so important for these regimes to feel secure.
So it was always an obsession,
even though in many other parts of the world,
metal making was considered less important,
access to energy resources.
That has never been the case of the totalitarian regimes.
So you might remember catastrophic moments in the history of the PRC,
not least the Yigong, Weigong,
the backyard steel furnaces, right?
Which led to massive famine, periods of famine.
And it moved from steel and steel alloys into base metals,
and then eventually to critical metals as well.
So there were different phases in this, which I explain in the book,
because a lot of these materials were to be accessed outside of China.
And with that ideological distance or background,
how does that fit into the control of flow or price?
This is another fascinating thing that I actually dug in a little bit
by doing research for that.
You know, here in the Western world,
we rely very much on control and contract law, contracts in trade.
Now, long-range trade probably wouldn't have existed as it does without metals.
Think about it.
Okay, when we left Africa,
and all we were doing was chiseling pieces of stone,
and some Einstein of the era, Leonardo da Vinci, said,
no, let's do bronze instead.
What is bronze?
It's tin and copper.
Except that tin and copper hardly ever co-occur in one place.
Two exceptions, one is what's today Pakistan,
Indus Valley, and Perkel Crescent,
which were the reasons why these were the first two urban centers in the world.
For everybody else, let's say Roman Empire,
you had to send these metals from far away to make bronze.
Roman Empire was Cyprus, so Cyprus,
that means copper,
and Cornwall in Britannia to make tin.
Copper may be from Iberia.
Anyway, it's a long-range connection.
When you deal over a long distance,
how do you trust that person?
Romans had Roman law.
Romans codified law,
which was valid over those long tracts of trade,
and then in the Middle Ages,
as Magdeburg rights developed in Northern Europe,
as markets developed and cities developed around markets,
there was a development of contract law,
which was kind of a marriage of Roman law formalism
and the consensual nature of canon law,
Christian canon law.
Nothing like this ever happened in China.
Metal trading in China was always an imperial privilege.
If you look at the network of medieval movements
of how metal moved around Europe,
it's like a crossword puzzle with multiple centers.
Cities in China were never market centers.
They were administrative centers.
And the long-range trade,
the only one that existed other than maybe coastal trade
in Southern China because of mountains
and difficulty of getting inland,
the Silk Road.
The Silk Road is the only long-range, one line,
and it was always controlled by the emperor.
So in a way, the fact that today's China is controlling,
the state is trying to control the flow
through monopsony, such as the iron ore monopsony.
So it's a state-owned, unique company
that purchases today iron ore from different sources.
That's a longer tradition than the PRC itself.
It's just a different concept of how you organize trade,
which was a different history in the West
and a different history in China.
On that note, talk to us about what are the characteristics
of this sector in particular that lent themselves
so well to strategic manipulation by the state?
This is one of the most important questions
because as investors, we usually pay attention
to capital and return on capital.
For a large metallurgical complex,
you need a lot of economic factors,
a lot of capital, land, and labor.
One of the characteristics of the system introduced by CCP
was to underprice these factors.
So it's easy for labor, you can imagine.
It's easy for negative externalities,
such as pollution and so on.
How do you do it for capital?
Well, you offer capital
to those happy state-owned enterprises
below inflation and below your GDP rate,
which means essentially you underprice capital
and that's why it's possible to build scale.
Who cares about profit?
You just build scale.
Now, one thing about refining specifically
is refining, as we know in mining,
the mining margin is large at the mining level,
it's large at the retail level,
whatever it is, excluded product,
and it's very low in the middle.
And so you need a lot of volume in refining.
Once that volume started migrating to China,
it was like a flood.
You don't stop it,
and you don't run an operating facility
for small volumes in the middle of the value chain,
which is not viable economically.
On the flip side, then, who failed in the West?
Politicians, regulators, capital markets, industry?
Everybody.
Politicians' lack of vision.
So they kind of believed in this market dogmatism,
the market's gonna solve all the problems,
as if we haven't learned in economics
about negative and positive externalities
of public goods and other things,
and I think healthcare, right,
is not always ideal for market structures.
So that's one thing.
The regulatory overreach is another story to tell,
and I have some friends working in the industry,
and as we know from investing in junior companies,
sometimes you have to wait years and years and years
and years for a permit,
and then you have litigation,
which NEPA allows in this country,
and then it lasts another couple of years,
and of course, you're so far away from cash flow,
the net present value of your cash flow collapses.
So regulators as well.
I would say capital as well.
This is our addiction to scale.
It's so easy to just go into this massive sink
and hope this is 1.4 billion people
who are gonna buy something.
That doesn't allow you to innovate.
You know, when I used to work in China in the 90s,
the most popular car, at least in Shanghai,
because the engine was shoddy,
and I couldn't get in.
It was small.
But in Shanghai, it was a Volkswagen Santana.
Volkswagen Santana remained this core piece
of German engineering that stayed there for 30 years.
You know, for 30 years,
if you sell something large numbers,
you're not gonna innovate.
So where is Volkswagen today in China?
It doesn't count anymore.
You cannot rely on just scale,
and this is what we do constantly,
chasing scale.
There's this great promise there.
Like during the Qing dynasty,
where the first Western capitalists went to China,
we're always coming to this,
and this is another example.
Given all that you just laid out there,
what are the most important lessons
for the U.S. and its allies
to learn from this experience?
I would say let's stick together
because we're not gonna solve it by ourselves.
First, the geology doesn't allow us to do it,
and secondly, we don't have the human capital
and the technology to just pull it ourselves.
Luckily enough,
this is an alliance of Western democracies.
We're pretty well-endowed.
So Australia and Canada are eminently
mining countries by excellence
and very, very helpful
and much better in the mining markets
than the United States.
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea
are those three countries
that have not been de-industrialized.
They paid more attention.
They were more astute
in protecting their manufacturing
and moving further up
in terms of the cutting-edge technologies.
So they are extremely helpful,
at least Korea recently
in a recent deal with the United States.
So that's very helpful.
The other thing we have to remember
is that right now,
it seems like there are attempts
to use taxpayers' money
to solve some of these issues,
and maybe it's good to open a couple of doors,
but in fact,
that's not the solution.
The solution is to incentivize
private capital to do this.
On the equity side,
maybe with tax incentives.
On the debt side,
certainly with guarantees for banks
which are afraid of investing
in companies and projects
whose commodities don't trade on futures.
You cannot hedge against it.
And so it's a difficult project,
and I think there should be more thinking
how the government can incentivize
the private sector
rather than doing the private sector's job
to take this industry off the ground
for the entire alliance.
Very quickly on that,
is there a role for governments here?
Yes, there is a role for governments.
The role is not overregulating,
so spinning up some of the regulatory hitches
that are here for a variety of reasons.
That's not only just permitting reform,
it's also, I think, corporate reform.
Something needs to be done with this.
It cannot be this last person standing,
blocking project.
This leads to collapse of many systems.
I'll give just two examples.
In the book, there's a risk
that the European Union might not survive
because there's always one Hungary
that blocks everything.
We call it liberal battle.
It was the greatest country in Eastern Europe
that existed,
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
was dismembered this way
because one person in their parliament
could say no,
and it's an easy prey for enemies.
So I think there is definitely regulatory work
and also incentivizing capital.
I feel like I know the answer to this one,
but how should investors look at this?
Because if it's no longer a competition,
but as you say, a critical industry,
even a war,
is there a role for investors here?
Yes, I think what we learned
in the last two or three years
is that it's a little different
from investing in just a mining company.
Great project, good management,
very interesting analog of other deposits
where you have nice conversion of resources to reserves,
and so on and so forth.
That's just from one company to another.
Here, we're talking about
rebuilding the entire value chain.
So if you don't know how that fits
into the middle of the value chain
and further into the market,
you cannot invest in this
because you have to know
if you're drilling for, say, rare earths in Brazil,
what are you going to sell?
Are you going to sell mixed rare earth carbonate
or mixed oxide?
Maybe you're going to separate oxide
and mix sulfur?
Boom.
So you have to have
this sort of structural attitude
to endorse the entire supply chain,
and because a lot of things
are happening in the supply chain
in different countries of the West,
that has to plug into this.
Just on that last point,
expand on that.
How is it structural and not cyclical?
Because many things are very cyclical.
In history, there are three things
that we analyze.
One is pre-existing structures.
The second one is agency of leaders,
important leaders,
very influential
who can affect structure.
And the third one is contingency, chance,
something that's very difficult to model,
this residual thing
in your multi-factor linear model.
I think we are facing
a structural problem
that has to be solved,
and it's not going to be solved
for several years,
and therefore,
we might not understand
all the mini-cycles
that happen in the middle
because they were smoothed out
by Chinese Communist Party's
attempts to reduce cyclicality.
As I said before,
stability is so important for them,
and we've lost from sight
those short-term cycles
like inventory cycles
and longer-term cycles of investment.
But at the same time,
let's not forget
that maybe we are at the cusp
of a completely different
long-term cycle
called congratulate waves
because of the changes
in technology and AI,
and these technologies
are extremely hungry
for these materials.
So yes,
it's maybe a different type of cycle,
but it's definitely a structural change.
And of course,
with all the global tensions right now,
there's a big focus on this industry,
especially in the military applications.
Is there a chance for America
and the West
to rebuild the industry?
Do we have any other choice?
Yeah, I would hope so, certainly.
It is true that
many of these materials
feed into a military complex.
Now, the military sector
is usually a tiny fraction,
never more than 5% to 10%
of the overall offtake
of these things
in times of peace,
but we are not in times of peace.
If you look at the budgets
of Japanese, German, Australian,
Korean, Polish, you name it,
American,
then this is definitely
a market that's growing.
And when security is at stake,
time is of essence.
So it's definitely something
that drives a lot of decision-making
right now,
that sense of insecurity.
What happens if we just don't have
replacement material?
And a lot depends on this.
Let's not forget also
a lot of new technologies
related to chip-making
relies on these materials,
which are actually small markets,
but very vital
for some of the key applications
in power electronics,
in optoelectronics,
and all of the military applications.
And on that note,
how should the West
rebuild the middle
of the value chain here?
So there are attempts.
So when I look back,
say, a year now
since the inauguration
of this administration,
there were several attempts
to do America first.
That doesn't work very well
for geology, of course.
You cannot insure it.
And then attempts to sign
a lot of bilateral deals
with different countries.
And towards the end of the year,
I was becoming
a little more optimistic.
Thanks not least
to one deal with Korea Zinc.
Korea Zinc is a very important refiner
that potentially could extract
up to a dozen
of different materials
by rebuilding
a brownfields operation
in Tennessee,
where a smelter
belonged to a company
called Mercedal.
And this is exactly
the type of activity
that's needed to create
a market,
physical market,
here in this country.
In addition to
attempts to create
a financial market.
So without capturing
that opportunity
in the middle of the value chain,
it's going to be
extremely difficult
because we know
what happened in the past
when there was a rare earth
mining company
in the United States,
but they had to sell
all the rare earths
to China to process them.
And I think that's
a perfect transition
because talk to us
how innovation helps,
but it has to kind of
be coupled with scaling here.
Yeah, so that's
another theme in the book.
We tend to say,
we're so good at innovation.
Why are we even bothered, right?
We always win.
We take LFP batteries,
NCM batteries,
sintered magnets,
bonded magnets.
If it wasn't invented here,
it was invented in Japan.
So what?
All the scaling up,
all the mass production,
all the facilities
were created
far away from these folks.
It was our capital market
never had patience
to deal with this,
never had patience
to deal with complexity
of those linkages.
And then of course
you have the problem
of negative externalities,
NIMBYs,
pollution,
regulatory system.
And of course,
the capital went
after cost.
That's what happened.
So innovation,
yes, absolutely,
but in a way
that can be harnessed
onshore
without exporting it
again to China
because then
we're back in the same way.
And what are the incentives
for downstream producers
to kind of start
weaning themselves
off of the China market?
This is a good point
because a lot of talk
about establishing
reference prices
or price floors
for some of these materials.
And then of course
if you do it,
in order not to
lead to leakage
of taxpayers' money,
you have to protect
it with tariffs.
But the moment you protect
this with tariffs,
the cost for the
downstream producers go up.
And they're so addicted
to Chinese material
that they're very unwilling
to comply.
So you have to
incentivize them.
If you set up tariffs
and you generate
some revenue from that,
some of that revenue
should be directed
towards subsidies
so that over time,
over time,
those downstream producers
who are politically
much more powerful
here in this country
than miners
cannot push back
against these policies
because they do it
every time.
And again,
think about steel tariffs
during Trump 1.
There were 40,000
applications for exemptions
from steel tariffs
downstream.
Or think about
Tesla and Biden
over graphite.
Tesla pushed back.
No tariffs on graphite.
And so,
to deal with that
political power
of downstream industry,
you have to incentivize them.
And by the way,
they cannot just
unplug completely
the Chinese material.
It's a process
that's going to take some time.
Hence,
there's a need
to incentivize them
also maybe reputationally,
but also fiscally
to slowly move it up.
And some of the loops
we've seen lately,
of course,
you have Japan's
Prime Minister Takahashi
at the White House.
There's some talks
for more bilateral deals
there,
especially in the rare earth sector.
Of course,
Linus Rare Earth
is the name
that's been come up
and for materials in California.
What are you seeing
in terms of the moves
here in this space?
Yeah,
so a lot of moves.
It's a long conversation.
I'll stick to Linus
if anything
because I'm fortunate
enough to go and see
their operation
next month in Malaysia.
This is a company
that has been salvaged
by Japan
on multiple occasions.
It's an Australian
rare earth producer
with a separation plant
in Malaysia,
which is of critical importance
to us
because it just started
in the third quarter
of last year,
third calendar quarter,
to separate dysprosium.
And dysprosium
is one of those heavier earths
which are really rare
as opposed to others
and which are really critical
for high-performing magnets,
those that perform
very well
in high temperatures.
you need for high technology
applications
especially in the military.
And so Linus started
producing dysprosium
nine tons
in the third quarter,
26 in the fourth quarter.
We haven't seen
the numbers from now.
It's the beginning.
It's the beginning
of the rejuvenation
of the Western production
of some of these materials.
And Linus also signed a deal
for 75% of those
in Japan.
So it was a bit surprising
to see the other day
that the U.S.
is also trying
to extract
some of that
product from Linus.
It wasn't clear
to me
if this was heavy earth
or
some other
But it just illustrates
the paucity of choice.
There's very little
that you can choose from.
MP Materials
is of course
an American company
with an operation
in California
but they don't produce
heavy earth.
Very quickly on that,
explain to us
heavy earth
versus light earth
and why the military
cares about one or the other.
Yeah, so
the difficulty
with rare earths
as opposed to other
mine products
is that they
co-occur together.
So there's
technically 17 of them
but in reality
there are 16
because one has
a half-life
of only 17 years
so you usually
don't find them
in nature.
And many of those
have very little
economic value
and therefore
by extracting them
alongside the others
you generate more cost.
And so
it's a costly operation.
That's the first problem.
Then you have to
separate these things.
You know,
if you go to
a copper mine
or another
base metal mine
or in a flow sheet
you'll find
eight to a dozen
different nodes
and they all
are very similar.
If you go to
a separation plant,
rare earth separation plant,
it's going to be
over 900 nodes
trying to separate
each of these
like calculating
the permutation
among 16
plus radionuclides
like thorium and uranium
that co-occur with that.
So
it is
a complicated business
and because of this
of course
each
geologically
each deposit
is different
from the other.
But in terms of
rare earth deposits
they are so radically
different from each other
that you can have
one deposit
that has
maybe $13
per kilogram value
in situ
and another one
will have 73
because of the
different breakdown
between different
elements
of those 16
of which
about 7
are very,
very high value
and in that
list of
restrictions in China
last year
China
in direct
retaliation
for liberation day
two days later
slapped restrictions
on exactly those 7
and they have
military applications
Samarium
often in an alloy
with cobalt
for aerospace
gaboleon
is for electronic
warfare
dysprosium
and terbium
doping for these
high-performing
magnets
and so on
and so forth.
So there is
a significant
military
interest
in those materials.
And give us a sense
how long would it
take to build up
these industries
especially in the west
if you want to be
able to counter
climate change?
Usually
the benchmark
we have
outside of maybe
spodumene
in Australia
which is for
lithium
for a large
open-pit copper mine
or a large nickel mine
takes about 15 years
from discovery
to production
and I would say
we don't have
that much time
we don't have
that much time
because we're probably
not in charge
of the calendar
so my fear
at night
is that Xi Jinping
is in charge
of the calendar
so what?
What should we do?
And we have to
accelerate
that
and not
be
in a
to
build
a
new
sector
in
if we
build
sector
in
China
five years from now, not populated
with hundreds of juniors.
There's going to be a couple that will go first
for that finishing line.
And it's going to be sort of like an oligopolistic structure
of these sectors.
And it's important and interesting for us
to identify which are the ones.
And very quickly, before we go to viewer questions,
I want to ask, because it sounds like this
isn't a Republican or Democratic problem.
This sounds like an American problem.
Looking ahead, obviously, as a company
wanting to build up something, a lot of time is involved.
Do you see this as a bipartisan issue,
where no matter what administration is in power,
companies can believe that their plant will
be able to last and build up?
It's the easiest question to ask.
Yes.
It's a bipartisan issue.
Beautiful.
All right, let's go to some questions from the audience.
The first one is, which mineral can the West
get into production the quickest, Antonani?
Yes, Antonani, thank you for answering the question.
The reason being, empty money often,
at least in those deposits that we're looking at right now,
is often associated with gold, say, shear zones.
It used to be, for us, gold investors in the past
that empty money was this pesky, deleterious element.
Now, of course, it's extremely valuable.
And because it's associated with gold,
then bankers are not going to look away,
because they can actually look at gold equivalent value
of what's in the ground, and they can structure
financing for it accordingly.
Because, of course, bankers know what to do with gold,
hedge it themselves, or force the companies to hedge,
although that's maybe less popular outside Australia
than it used to be in the past.
So empty money, probably easier to take it off the ground
than others.
I think on the other end of the spectrum,
graphite is probably the most difficult one to finance.
All right, next question is, we hear
a lot about hydrocarbons being affected
by the Cold War in Iran.
But what, if any, implications are there
for critical minerals and related supply chains
in which the consumer is most affected?
Yeah, first, South Asia, then Europe, then East Asia,
and then North America.
How are we affected?
Sulfur.
Sulfur matters for leaching, nickel, copper, uranium.
Not necessarily these.
But one of the elements which are important in our list
is synthetic sapphire, which is high-purity alumina.
And as you may know, Persian Gulf
is an important hub for production,
both aluminum smelting and alumina refining.
And therefore, those HPA producers,
so these are high-purity alumina that use aluminum metal,
or alumina as a feedstock, are going
to suffer because the prices of aluminum and alumina
are going through the roof.
And so that means that if you invest in HPA companies,
they probably have to find one that
uses a different type of feedstock
like kaolin, which is an aluminous clay.
The next question is, can AI decrease the timeline
from discovery to production?
I would very much hope so.
This is the world that changes on a daily basis,
as you probably well know.
Mining industry has never had yet
this sort of clacking moment that really accelerated
the pathway to production in oil and gas,
reducing the duration of the investments,
and really making oil and gas markets so much more amenable
to the needs of the US capital market.
It was more geared towards plus depletion,
heavy capital intensity, and plus duration.
Unfortunately, we are in a long-duration industry,
which private equity doesn't like here,
nor venture capital, for that matter.
And therefore, I would hope very much that it happens,
but I cannot see the future.
Our next question is, if the other competitor, China,
is constantly cheating, how can the US and its allies
win this game, since China doesn't care about its people
or the environment, or industry like rare earths
and power plants are developing very slowly
in Western countries?
What advantage does the US have in this game?
What advantage do we have in this game?
I think we still have a market for innovation,
which, I'm gonna sound dramatic here,
I still believe is a better system
than shutting people down in cellars
and whip them into innovation.
I think stealing is stealing.
What you steal already exists somewhere.
And when you hear about DeepSeek,
stealing black hole Nvidia chips,
smuggling them into Southern Mongolia,
then clustering those in order to do what?
To distill entropic code.
I don't think that's a source of innovation.
So on this side, we're fine.
I think what we have to fine tune
is how our capital market can actually respond
to incentives properly and be more open to this sector.
And in this country, mining has been such a peripheral.
It's 1% of S&P 500, it's completely invisible.
And therefore it's unhelpful.
If the main strategic problem here is for the United States
giving our strategic interest around the world,
and mining is so peripheral,
then we have to do something about it.
Maybe it's time to learn from others.
Canada, UK, Australia, by the way,
Defense Production Act countries of Title III.
So their own materials count as our domestic source,
according to US legislation.
All right, next question is,
every global war has a good guy and a bad guy,
depending on your point of view,
or who wrote the history book.
Are we in danger of vilifying China
simply because we, the West, were asleep at the wheel?
And are we just too little, too late?
Excellent question.
I love this question.
So it's always easy to reach Carl Schmitt,
who was the ultimate philosopher of conflict
in the 20th century.
And there was a very interesting French philosopher,
Julien Faunier, who once said that
even if we want to define who our enemy is,
we're not in the driving seat.
Because if she or he defines that I'm an enemy,
I am an enemy.
I have nothing to say about it.
So it's kind of like a Lacanian mirror.
We don't decide that we are in conflict.
If someone else decides that they're in conflict with you,
then there is a conflict, like it or not.
And so that's the unfortunate situation right now.
I would love to live in a globalized, peaceful world
without proxy wars in Eastern Europe and Middle East.
I would love this world to be back.
It's not.
And next question is,
how do you think attendees here
should incentivize capital outside of this room
to support investment and development in Western minerals?
Lobbying, lobbying, lobbying, discussing,
raising this issue.
We should have IR codes that help us invest
in what is so vital for our economic security
and our national security.
Right now, I don't see this happening,
but I understand the complications
because that would mean, for example,
investing in Australian companies.
But as I said, Australian material counts
as domestic material for our own legislation.
So why don't we do this?
So we have to raise the awareness,
but it's really important.
We in this game together with our allies,
and we have to solve it while hoping for the best.
Closing on to this next question,
will the Western world be able to fill the gap
of rare earth and minerals
that they can no longer source from China?
You said it could take a minimum of plus or minus five years.
What happens if that is too long?
What do we do in the meantime?
I wonder what it means that it's too long.
Let's hope not some kind of a cataclysm.
I think things always take longer than we think.
But just on rare earths,
am I looking just at numbers?
Numbers of, say, centric magnets
about which all of the story is, right?
So 47% of electricity goes through some electric motors.
Therefore, it needs those permanent magnets
which require rare earths
at the current technologies which are old from 1982.
So to solve that,
let's say United States uses about 50,000 tons of magnets,
of which about 4,000 of those high-end
dysprosium gold materials.
For that, you need maybe 400 tons of dysprosium.
Well, Linus promises to produce in Malaysia 1,500 tons.
So we are beginning to see
the result of the acceleration of the process.
Not yet across the board, not in all of these materials,
but we see it and we see interest in the market.
If you've been in tungsten in the last year,
you're a big winner
because some markets are responding to this attention.
So I hope nothing bad happens over the next five years.
Well, the next question is, paint for us a picture.
What do our worst fears look like
if we lose the Mineral War?
That's the last sentence in my book.
If we lose the Mineral War,
we probably will lose many others that we fought.
Next question, despite their dominance,
Chinese producer margins in many metals
are arguably thin due to competition.
Is that true?
So the Chinese private market
functions on a very different type of competition.
This is not competition for profit,
this is competition for market share.
And so from the economics perspective,
it's called Bertrand style competition.
Everything is about the price.
And so when prices fall,
you don't care about money loss.
You're trying to be the last person standing
and make sure that everybody disappears.
And so that leads to those very deep deflationary
troughs in the market.
Does it make them good competitors?
Yes, if you think about scale and market share,
not if you think about profitability, obviously.
And some of these companies are really good
about hiding their dubious profitability.
Best example, I think in town, BYD,
a very well known EV producer,
which pushes all its debt off the balance sheet
into accounts payable that are not visible,
basically destroying the entire ecosystem.
And if you know, in automatic industry,
it's so important that you actually nurture your ecosystem,
like say Toyota has done in Nagoya,
Aichiken in Japan for the last 60 or 70 years.
So this is a finite game for a lot of companies.
And that's why the average life
of a Chinese private company is three years.
Interestingly enough, also in Miami.
So it's possible to go to Myanmar,
rape some pill and get out within three years.
Where are we after three years of exploration
and development in the West?
Well, next question,
what is the current administration doing right now
on this issue?
What should it do differently or faster?
I think I already partly responded to this.
I think the good side is there is a lot of momentum there.
The bad side is sometimes the direction of the momentum
is a bit strange.
We are in a bit quirky ideological stand up with Canada,
for whatever reason.
I don't understand it from a pretty common perspective.
So if anybody does, please explain to me when you ask this.
There are a number of international
or multinational initiatives.
The G7 has an initiative.
And then we launched FORGE a couple of weeks ago,
which is basically a replacement
of the Mineral Security Partnership
that was launched under Biden administration.
Interesting, but how does it fit with the G7 initiative,
which was launched by Japan in 2023,
if my memory is correct?
All I know is that the different negotiations with US
on a bilateral basis.
So European Union is negotiating
critical mineral agreement with US on its own,
Japan on its own.
And then it turns out that Japan and European Union
discuss among themselves
how to negotiate with the United States.
I'm not sure these games are really necessary.
Okay, next question.
Is the section 45 times
advanced manufacturing production credit enough
to incentivize innovation?
And if not, what do you think should be the next step?
Anything that incentivizes innovation is good,
but it should not stop at innovation,
lab level or pilot scale level.
We have to make sure that we actually bring these things up.
I'll give you an example from our herbs.
Energy Fuels last year in summer,
so the Uranium Earth Company,
announced that they have a pilot
for dysprosium, heavier herbs,
in the United States, in Utah,
for one kilogram, one kilogram.
This was August, September last year.
Why aren't you all over that thing to accelerate this,
speed up this process really quickly?
It's just not enough to talk about lab
or pilot plan stage of innovation.
There's a lot more to be done.
Next question is,
with Chinese producers producing so cheap
with scale and efficiency,
how do Western producers compete?
How does the sector become investable?
Tariffs, minimum pricing, et cetera.
What would you do if you were in China?
Yeah, so China gave us an answer to it
by restricting experts,
by making experts unsafe.
So if China continued just to consolidate these markets,
but not weaponize them,
then probably we wouldn't be talking about it today.
Because, okay, it's so good to get this cheap schlock,
why not?
But unfortunately, they decided that their prices
are no longer applicable to us,
which they are not,
because the structure of their demand
is completely different in oversupplied markets.
It's a much more elastic demand curve.
We are unfortunately in a very inelastic
demand curve environment here,
so we shouldn't be importing Chinese prices.
And so back to your question,
it's back to, you know,
are we developing a different price model here?
And what do we do to incentivize the users
to use that material?
Because we're not gonna win the competition
against China on price.
All right, and my last question would be,
you know, right now,
all the headlines seem to,
besides the Iran war,
are talking about critical minerals,
you know, China's dominance.
It seems like your book came out in a very timely manner.
Why did you write this book right now?
I wrote it because we often circulate
between here and Washington,
and I found that the language spoken
in those two places are very different.
So it's still Shakespearean English,
but it's a different language on Wall Street,
and it's a different language on Pennsylvania Avenue.
And so I wanted to build a bridge
between market and geopolitics,
and to make the two languages understand each other
a little better,
to understand, you know,
what are the different challenges?
And so this is a book for market participants,
mining people, people interested in economics,
but also policy makers to understand how we got here,
because we cannot solve this problem
if we don't understand how we got here in the first place.
And so that's so important.
And I also realize now that the book is out,
but it's somehow popular among academics
in different countries,
which is important,
because there are so many footnotes in this book
that it's really good for food fetishes as well.
Well, I just wanted to thank you for writing this book,
and of course, having the conversation today.
I found the book very interesting.
There's a lot more in it,
so I would actually recommend you get your own copy.
I am not getting paid to say that,
but I do think it's a great book,
but thank you so much.
Thank you, Tiffany.
Thank you very much.
You did super, great.
I was chugging the entire coffee right before.
I know one of us.
And I think the tie-in in the jacket was really good.